“.. ._I ~ I^. ..-__-,- _._-....-. ------.---.-. 1)(q*(~1111)(~1’ l!)!)O TEST AND EVALUATION The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation’s Controls Over Contractors ,- Illllllll~l~ll I 142969 RELEASED IUBTIUCTED --Not to be released outside the General Accotmtlng Offlce unless speclfhIly approved by the Office of Congressional Relations. (;hO/NSIAl)-!)I-(;0 .- I __,. “. ..“. _, . -. .l-- ___..._ _.,-...- -_.. ll...-l__ United States General Accounting Office Washington, D.C. 20648 National Security and International Affairs Division B-240028 December 21,199O The Honorable David H. Pryor Chairman, Subcommittee on Federal Services, Post Office, and Civil Service Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate Dear Senator Pryor: The Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DONE), uses contractor assistance to support its oversight responsibility for operational test and evaluation (UT&E) of major weapon systems. Recently, congressional members have expressed concern that some of DOME’S contractors could have conflicts of interest; that is, they could assess the operational testing of the same weapon systems that they had participated in developing. In response to your request, we are providing information on DOT&E’S use of contractors. Our objectives were to . describe the nature and extent of DOT&E’S management controls over con- tractor support, including measures to address possible conflicts of interest under omnibus contracts;’ . provide our views on DOT&E’S use of Federally Funded Research and Development Centers,2 particularly the Institute for Defense Analyses;3 and . determine W&E’S use of the Institute during fiscal years 1987-89 and identify any possible conflicts of interest and the Institute’s controls to avoid such conflicts. Concerned that or&~ was not receiving sufficient emphasis and indepen- Background dent oversight, the Congress established DOT&E as an independent test ‘Omnibus contracts contain a general statement of work to be performed by contractors. The con- tracting agency develops specific work orders or task&s for contractors based on this general work statement. %derally Funded Research and Development Centers are privately operated but publicly funded under long-term contracts with federal sponsoring agencies. 3The Institute for Defense Analyses, a Center established in 1966, primarily assists the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the defense agencies. The Institute provides studies, analyses, computer software, models, and other technical or analytical support for policy and program planning and management by its sponsors. It does not work for private companies, foreign governments, or the military departments. Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-9180 OTflrE Controls B-240028 organization in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (0s~). The Con- gress believed that an organization with a vested interest in a weapon system’s development should not evaluate the operational testing on which production decisions are based. Rather, Congress intended that the OT&E field tests be assessed by an independent test office to deter- mine whether weapon systems can actually perform their intended mission. Because DOT&E lacks a large in-house staff, it obtains contractor assis- tance to support its oversight of operational testing. Of its $34.8 million total budget for fiscal years 1987-89, about 90 percent, or $31.2 million, was for contractor assistance. Approximately $12.5 million was obli- gated to the Institute for Defense Analyses, $0.2 million to another center, and $18.5 million to private companies. Of the latter amount, about $2.1 million was provided to private contractors awarded omnibus contracts beginning in March 1989. DUIXE’Smission is to provide independent assessments of major defense systems. However, the ability to fulfill the independence mission was questioned in a hearing held on DOT&E’S use of contractors and consul- tants by the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Federal Services, Post Office, and Civil Service. The primary concern centered on possible conflicts of interest for private contractors. In response to this concern, a DOT&E official told us DOT&E discontinued using private contractors in March 1990. Since that time, DOT&E has used only the Institute for or&~ assistance because it believes that the Insti- tute, which does not develop or produce weapon systems, is less likely to have a conflict of interest. Although DOT&E relies on other defense agencies4to award contracts, the Congress has indicated that it holds DCT&E ultimately responsible for the consequences, such as conflicts of interest, of any contractor participa- tion in or&~ activities.h DOT&E is also expected to follow the govern- mentwide Federal Acquisition Regulation and applicable Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance on contract management and 4Due to the limited dollar value of DOT&E’s contracting support, the Defense Test and Evaluation Support Agency and Defense Supply Services-Washington award its contracts. “See the Conference Report on the DOD Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991. HRep. No. 101-331, Page 600 (1989). The act added section 2399 to 10 USC., and states that the Director is not to contract with any person for advice or assistance in the test and evaluation of a system in which the person participated in the development, production, or testing for a military department or defense agency (or for another defense contractor). In addition, the legislation states that a contractor that has participated in the development, production, or testing of a system for a military department or defense agency is not to he involved (in any way) in the establishment of criteria for data collec- tion, performance assessments,or evaluation activities for operational testing. Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-9180 OF&E Controls B-240028 conflicts of interest regarding the use of contractors. For example, OMB Policy Letter 89-1 states that the responsibility for identifying and preventing potential conflicts of interest in government contracts is shared between the contracting officer and the requester of the service. DUI’&E’Spolicies and procedures for managing contracts for W&E support Results in Brief comply with existing guidelines. Moreover, DOT&E took measures that were consistent with regulations requiring agencies to guard against contractors’ conflicts of interest. For example, DUNE evaluated the omnibus contracts for possible conflicts of interest and inserted lan- guage in contracts requiring the contractors to disclose any conflicts. Because a federal agency has considerable latitude in placing work with Federally Funded Research and Development Centers, DOT&E'S use of the Institute for CYI%E support is permissible under federal regulations. Fur- ther, in our opinion, DCYRQE'Suse of the Institute is appropriate because the Institute is less likely than private contractors to have conflicts of interest. Of the $12.5 million obligated by DONE to the Institute during fiscal years 1987-89, about $2 million was used for consultant and subcon- tractor support. The Institute’s policy is not to employ consultants on tasks that could result in a conflict of interest. However, based on avail- able information, we identified three consultants that were involved in defense programs and later made operational test assessments for the Institute on the same programs. We have no basis to conclude that the consultants’ prior work affected their ability to provide objective and impartial advice. These situations raise questions, however, about the effectiveness of the Institute’s controls over consultants because it did not, periodically update its conflict-of-interest reviews of consultants or disclose to DOT&E possible conflicts so that they could be addressed. Even though the Institute’s contract and Federal Acquisition Regulation do not require disclosure of a consultant’s prior work, we believe such dis- closure would be consistent with the regulation requiiring disclosure of a center’s affairs. The Institute’s work for OSD organizations responsible for system acqui- sition and development testing raises questions regarding its ability to be fully objective in performing operational testing work for DUNE. We found four instances in which the Institute’s objectivity may have been impaired due to its acquisition and development work. Although the Federal Acquisition Regulation does not require the disclosure of such Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-91-60 UT&E Controls B-249028 circumstances, we believe that full disclosure to DOT&E would have been consistent with the spirit of the regulation. A detailed discussion of these matters is included in appendix I. The Institute is not now required to disclose to D~II‘&E possible conflicts Conclusion and of interest arising from (1) its work for OSD organizations responsible for Recommendation system acquisitions and development testing or (2) its use of consul- 4 tants. Nonetheless, we believe that such disclosure to DOT&E would be consistent with the Federal Acquisition Regulation requiring disclosure of the Institute’s affairs. Accordingly, we recommend that DOT&E require the Institute to disclose possible conflicts of interest to it for resolution because DCYIXE is ultimately responsible for the consequences of any con- tractor participation in Or&E activities. Our fieldwork was performed at various sites in the Washington, DC., Scope and metropolitan area, including the offices of DOT&E and the Institute. Methodology We reviewed applicable legislation, regulations, policy letters, and DOME’S contract management guidelines and interviewed DOT&E officials about their controls over contractor support. Since the request focused on DOME’S use of omnibus contracts to supplement its in-house capabili- ties, we focused on DOT&E’S conflict-of-interest controls over those con- tracts. We did not evaluate conflict-of-interest controls over other private contractors. Our views on DOT&E’S use of the Institute are, in large measure, based on past reports that dealt with establishing and using Federally Funded Research and Development Centers. However, to identify any potential conflicts of interest at the Institute, we reviewed all 10 task orders spon- sored by the Deputy Director Defense Research and Engineering (Test and Evaluation) during fiscal years 1987-89 and information on 113 out of 145 task orders sponsored by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition during fiscal years 1988-89.6 Our objective was to determine which of these task orders included systems that were also included in all the 42 task orders sponsored by DOT&E. We then interviewed officials regarding the scope of selected task orders and, where necessary, reviewed the Institute’s work products. “At the time of our review, 32 task orders were not available. Page 4 GAO/NSIADBlSO CYl’&E Controls B-249028 We reviewed DONE'S contracts, taskings, and funding documents con- cerning its relationship with the Institute. We also obtained lists of the Institute’s consultants and subcontractors and reviewed available data on organizational business ties and controls in place to address conflicts of interest. The term “conflict of interest” means any situation in which a person or organization is unable or potentially unable to render impar- tial advice because of prior work, other activities, or relationships. We did not evaluate whether the consultants or subcontractors had finan- cial interests that could result in conflicts of interest. We performed this review between September 1989 and September 1990 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We did not obtain written agency comments. However, the views of agency officials were sought during the course of our work and are incorporated where appropriate. As requested, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after its issue date, unless you publicly announce its contents ear- lier. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretaries of Defense, the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force and to interested congressional com- mittees. Copies will also be made available to others on request. Please contact me at (202) 275-8400 if you or your staff have any ques- tions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix II. Sincerely yours, Paul F. Math Director, Research, Development, Acquisition, and Procurement Issues Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-91-59 OWbE Controls Contents Letter 1 Appendix I 8 DCYlYkE’Use s of DOT&E’s Controls Over Contractor Support Appropriateness of DOT&E’s Use of the Institute 8 10 Private Contractors The Institute’s Work for DCYI?&E 10 and the Institute for Defense Analyses Appendix II 17 Major Contributors to This Report Abbreviations Dm&E Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation OMB Office of Management and Budget OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense CT&E operational test and evaluation Page 6 GAO/N&ID-91-50 OT&E Controls Page 7 GAO/NSIAJ%91-60 Ul’&E Controls Appendix I DOT&E’s Use of Private Contractms md the Instituk for Defense Analyses In obtaining assistance and advisory services, DOT&E uses the required DCYIY&E’Controls s controls over both contract management and conflicts of interest, as dis- Over Contractor cussed below. support Management Controls Meet DCr&E’s contract management control system is consistent with proce- OMB Requirements dures prescribed by “OMB Circular No. A-120.“1 The circular requires, among other things, that (1) written approval for advisory and assis- tance services be required at a level above the organization sponsoring the activity, (2) requirements be appropriate and fully justified in writing, (3) work statements be specific and complete, (4) contracts be competitively awarded, (5) work be properly administered and moni- tored, (6) work be evaluated when completed, and (7) written reports on advisory and assistance services be obtained when needed. As summa- rized below and on succeeding pages, we found that DOT&E’S contract management process meets these requirements. To initiate contractor assistance, a DOT&E staff member and the DCYME l Program Analyst, who is responsible for DOT&E’S overall funding, draft a task order defining the scope and need for contractor support. The Deputy Director, Resources and Administration, responsible for DOlYkE’S contractor assistance, reviews the work statement and decides whether to proceed with the work request. For all work requests, a review board consisting of DOLCE’S deputy directors decides whether to contract for the proposed work, . DOME’S Program Analyst maintains monthly financial statements that track obligations by task order. The financial statements are designed to ensure that DOT&E does not over obligate funds. . The larger contractors provide m&E monthly status reports which it evaluates and uses to track contract status and costs. l When a work request is reported as having been completed, the con- tracting officer’s technical representative consults with the DOT&E staff member who initiated the work and reviews the monthly status reports to determine whether the work has actually been completed. Also, the OSD Director of Contractor Assistance and Advisory Services helps to ensure that the proper process is followed in determining whether the contractor support was adequate. . To document the use of contractor assistance, the DORUE Program Ana- lyst and the contracting officer’s technical representative maintain log ‘Guidelines for the Use of Advisory and Assistance Services (Jan. 4,1988). Page 8 GAO/N&W-91-60 CYl%E Controls Appendix I lXYl’&E’s Use of private Contractor and the Institute for DePenae Analyses . books consisting of task orders and supporting records for the larger contracts. Controls Established by Before it began obtaining ONE support exclusively from the Institute, DCYl’&E had controls in place to guard against possible conflicts of interest DOF&E Adhered to on omnibus contracts. These controls adhered to the Federal Acquisition Regulations Regulation, which states that agencies should prevent conflicts of interest that could result in an unfair competitive advantage to a con- tractor or impair a contractor’s objectivity in performing contract work. Therefore, as required by the regulation, DOT&Eevaluated the omnibus contracts to (1) identify and evaluate potential conflicts of interest early in the acquisition process and (2) avoid, neutralize, or mitigate signifi- cant conflicts before contract award.2 DOT&E further attempted to prevent conflicts of interest by inserting a provision in the contracts requiring contractors to self-disclose potential conflicts and eliminate them. For example, contractors were required to evaluate whether the work to be done for W&E conflicted with work being done for other organizations. In addition, a DOT&E official said that based on past experiences, DOT&E was generally aware of a contractor’s business ties and has tried to avoid giving contractors work that could result in a conflict of interest. For example, one contractor was not given work on space systems because the contractor’s prior business had the potential of creating a conflict. In June 1989, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Subcom- mittee on Federal Services, Post Office, and Civil Service, held a hearing on D(JT&E’S use of contractors and consultants. The Subcommittee released a report which found that private contractors’ work for the Department of Defense raised concerns of both direct and indirect con- flicts of interest. Direct conflicts of interest resulted from the omnibus contractors monitoring and assessing operational tests of weapon sys- tems that they participated in developing. In addition, indirect conflicts of interest could result from their relationships with other private con- tractors that developed weapon systems that the contractors would later assist DOT&E in evaluating. Because DfYl%E discontinued this practice ‘According to the Federal Acquisition Regulation, each contracting situation should be examined on the basis of its particular facts and the nature of the proposed contract. The exercise of common sense, good judgment, and sound discretion is required in deciding whether a significant potential conflict exists and, if it does, in developing an appropriate means for resolving it. Page 9 GAO/NSJAD914IO Ol%E Controls Appendix I DUME’s Use of Prlvate Contractors and the Instltnte for Defense Analyses in March 1990, we did not evaluate whether its use of these private con- tractors would result in conflicts of interest. Instead, we focused our attention on DOT&E’S sole use of the Institute for obtaining Ol%E support. now uses only the Institute for OWE support. DOT&E believes that Appropriateness of DCT&E this practice is appropriate because the Institute is thought to be less DCJIY&E’Use s of the likely than private contractors to have a conflict of interest concerning Institute particular weapon systems. We agree. Under its charter, the Institute has no commercial interests in developing weapon systems and may not work for the services that could develop and use those systems. In addition, ~&E’S use of the Institute is consistent with govern- mentwide regulations issued as Policy Letter 84-1 by the Office of Fed- eral Procurement Policy and later incorporated into the Federal Acquisition Regulation. The regulation states that Federally Funded Research and Development Centers must meet some special long-term research or development need that cannot be met as effectively by existing in-house or contractor resources, In March 1988, we reported that centers are effective because of their expertise and independence and because they have a special relationship, including the sharing of information, with their sponsoring agency.3 Also, the policy letter specifies that a center’s purpose, mission, and gen- eral scope of effort should be stated clearly enough to differentiate between work that should be done by the center and that which should be done by private contractors. The policy letter, however, does not state how these mission statements should reflect such differentiation. According to the Institute’s mission statement, its purpose is to promote national security, public welfare, and advancement of scientific learning. Its scope of effort typically covers analyses, evaluations, and reports, including the examination of the relative effectiveness of alter- native national security measures. Thus, under federal regulations and the Institute’s mission statement, DOT&E has considerable latitude in placing work with the Institute. The Institute’s relationship with DOWE is governed by Policy Letter 84-1 The Institute’s Work and the Federal Acquisition Regulation, which set out Federal policy for for DOT&EY establishing and using Federally Funded Research and Development 3Competition: Issues on Establishing and Using Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (GAO/NSIAD -88 - 22 , Mar. 1988). Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-91-60 Ol’&E Controls Appendix I DW&E’s Urre of Private cOntractora and the Institute for Defense Analyeee Centers. The Federal Acquisition Regulation reinforces Policy Letter 84-1 by stating that a center is required to conduct its business in a manner befitting its special relationship with the government, operate in the public interest with objectivity and independence, be free from orga- nizational conflicts of interest, and have full disclosure of its affairs to the sponsoring agency. The Institute has controls to ensure that . its consultants and subcontractors4 do not have previous or current employment that could result in conflicts of interest and l its work for OSDorganizations responsible for weapon systems acquisi- tion and development testing does not conflict with its operational testing work for DOT&E. As discussed below, we question whether the Institute is completely effective in administering these controls. In addition, we believe the con- trols can be improved by having the Institute disclose possible conflicts to WT&E for resolution because DOT&Eis ultimately responsible for the consequences of any contractor participation in or&~ activities. Such dis- closure to DGME would be consistent with the Federal Acquisition Regulation. The Institute’s Controls Of the $12.5 million obligated by DW&E to the Institute during fiscal Over Consultant/ years 1987-89, about $2 million was paid to 51 consultants and 2 sub- contractors. (The Institute’s use of consultants and subcontractors as a Subcontractor Conflicts of percentage of its work for DOME declined from 24.4 to 12.3 percent over Interest Have Weaknesses this period.) Based on available information, we believe these consul- tants/subcontractors did not have other current employment that could cause conflicts of interest. However, the Institute did not periodically update its conflict-of-interest reviews of consultants or disclose to DOT&E any prior employment of the consultants that might have involved potential conflicts. Further, the Institute did not document its subcon- tractor conflict-of-interest reviews. ConsultantControls The Institute’s policy is not to employ consultants on jobs that could result in a conflict of interest. For example, a consultant would not be allowed to do or&~ work on a weapon system if the consultant was also working for the developer of the same weapon system. To carry out this policy, the Institute requires its consultants to sign an agreement stating 4According to an Institute official, a consultant is an individual who agrees to work for the Institute as needed at an agreed-upon hourly rate. A subcontractor is an incorporated entity that works a specified number of hours for the Institute. Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-9180 Ol’&E Controls Appendix I LKYI’& E ’s Use of F’rkate Contra&m and the lnntitnte for Defense Analyses that they will (1) avoid any activities that cause conflicts of interest and (2) disclose possible conflicts so that the Institute may exclude them from such work. Before hiring consultants, the Institute asks about their backgrounds to determine whether any of their past or present business activities could cause a conflict. However, the Institute does not periodi- cally update information about its consultants’ business ties or other employment after they are hired; therefore, a new business tie could arise and create a potential conflict of interest, and the Institute might not know about it. Of the 61 consultants hired by the Institute, 2 had played a role in over- seeing the services’space programs before they did operational test assessments on such programs for DOT&E. The Institute was aware of these consultants’ prior work experiences but did not disclose this infor- mation to DCJ’IJ~ZEbecause it was satisfied that no conflict of interest was created, One consultant previously worked for the Air Force in a high- level policy position involving space systems and later planned and reviewed the Institute’s OT&E assessments of various Air Force space systems. The other consultant headed the Naval Space System Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and later evaluated the Institute’s CJI’&E assessments of a Navy weapon system that was to pro- ceed into full-rate production. While we have no basis to conclude that the consultants’ prior work affected their ability to provide objective and impartial advice, these situations nonetheless raise questions about potential conflicts of interest and the performance of the Institute in administering pertinent controls. Considering the consultants’ prior gov- ernment positions and their work for the Institute, we believe the Insti- tute should have disclosed these situations to DOT&E for resolution. Although the Institute’s contract6 and the Federal Acquisition Regula- tion do not specifically require the disclosure of a consultant’s past and present employment, we further believe that such disclosure would have been consistent with the regulation requiring disclosure of a center’s affairs to the sponsoring agency. In another situation, a consultant performed work on the LHX heli- copter for a private company prior to performing OT&E related work on this system. The work for the private company included evaluating the requirement for the helicopter as well as a general developmental “The Institute’s contract states that it shall submit quarterly the names of all consultants employed during the period, a short statement of the matters on which the consultant’s advice or service was needed, the daily rate of compensation, and the period for which service was required. Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-9180 (Yl’& E Controls Appendix I DUT&E’s Use of Private Contractors and the hwt1tut.e for Defense. Analyses approach. The private company later prepared a proposal for a con- tractor that was awarded a development contract. The Institute was aware of this consultant’s prior work experiences but did not disclose this information to DOT&Ebecause it was satisfied that no conflict of interest was created. Although we have no basis to conclude that the consultant’s prior work for the private company affected the con- sultant’s ability to provide objective and impartial advice to the Insti- tute, this situation again demonstrates a need for disclosure of such potential conflicts to D(JT&E.For reasons similar to the above situations, disclosure of this matter to DOT&Efor resolution would have been consis- tent with the regulation. An Institute official told us that more attention will be given to con- sultant’s work in relation to specific areas of prior employment. SubcontractorControls Although we were advised that the Institute also assessed whether hiring a subcontractor would cause a conflict of interest, it did not docu- ment such assessments. Despite this shortcoming, the Institute’s two subcontractors did not appear to have past or present employment that would affect their objectivity. We reviewed the outside ties of the subcontractor that received over $852,000, or about 99 percent of the funds that the Institute paid to subcontractors from 1987 to 1989. Although the subcontractor worked for both the Institute and the Air Force in the chemical warfare area, its work for the two organizations differed. The subcontractor performed policy analyses and studies for the Institute as part of its DCYIXEwork regarding how and when the United States should retaliate if the Soviets were to use chemical weapons. For the Air Force, the subcontractor assessed chemical contamination avoidance and decontamination proce- dures and chemical defenses against a Soviet chemical threat. The Institute’s Work for The Institute’s work for the OSDorganizations responsible for system Other OSD Organizations acquisition and development testing raises questions regarding its ability to be fully objective in performing operational testing work for Raises Questions About Its W&E. In three instances, we found that the Institute performed acquisi- Objectivity tion and operational testing work on the same weapon systems. In one other instance, the Institute performed similar develobment and opera- tional testing work on the same system. Even though the Federal Acqui- sition Regulation does not require the disclosure of such instances, we believe disclosure to DCWE for resolution would have been consistent with the regulation. Page 13 GAO/NSIAD9180 CJT&E Controls Appendix I DUl’&E’s Use of Private Contractors and the Institute for Defense Analyses In fiscal years 1988-89, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, who is responsible for the weapon system acquisition policy, including development testing, sponsored task orders for the Institute. In reviewing information on 113 of these task orders and all 42 task orders sponsored by DOT&E, we identified 3 sets of task orders relating to both acquisition and operational testing tasks for the same weapon systems. The Institute’s work for the Under Secretary called for assessing alter- native candidates to perform a specified mission, while the work for DOT&E required creation of methodologies for operational test planning and assessment of test results. Although the Institute personnel per- forming acquisition work do not perform operational testing work on the same weapon systems, we believe the Institute’s work in assessing these candidates should be disclosed to DOT&E for possible resolution, For example, in one case, the Institute’s work for the Under Secretary required the identification of capabilities and the appropriateness of various aircraft in satisfying the Army’s scout, attack, and assault mis- sions. This analysis included assessing the technical and operational advantages and disadvantages of various competing candidates, including modified Apache helicopters, various tilt rotor aircraft, and light helicopter weapon systems. For DOME, the Institute will assess operational test functions on the light helicopter weapon system ulti- mately selected, including the review of test plans, monitoring of ongoing testing, and making recommendations on the test program. We believe that the Institute’s work in developing acquisition options for the Under Secretary raises questions about its ability to be fully objec- tive in assessing operational test matters for the system eventually selected. We also compared the 42 task orders sponsored by DOT&E with the 10 task orders sponsored by the Deputy Director Defense Research and Engineering (Test and Evaluation), OSD’S development test organization. The Institute’s personnel worked for both the Deputy Director and DW&E on nine weapon systems.6 A potential conflict generally was not created because the types of work were different. For example, the Institute’s work on the Army Tactical Missile System for the development test organization identified a generic methodology to be used by the develop- ment tester in evaluating weapon systems, while the Institute’s work for “During the course of our evaluation, the Institute’s personnel working in its Operational Evaluation Division performed development and operational testing related work. They were not organization- ally separated from one another. Page 14 GAO/NSIAJh9180 m&E Controls Appendix I IXJI%E’s Use of Private Contractors and the Institute for Defense Analyses DOME evaluated the adequacy of the actual operational testing on that specific system. As another example, the Institute’s work on the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile for the Director, Live Fire Testing, examined an approach for conducting live fire testing. Live fire testing is used to determine the physical vulnerability of selected U.S. aircraft and armor systems to enemy weapons, and the lethality of U.S. weapons against selected enemy aircraft and armor systems. On the other hand, the Insti- tute’s work for DOBE was fundamentally different because it evaluated the adequacy of the operational testing on that specific missile by assisting in the evaluation of the missile’s operational effectiveness and suitability in a realistic environment. In our view, the Institute’s work for the Director, Live Fire Testing, does not conflict with its work for m&E because the nature and types of work were very different. Although live fire testing complements operational testing, this special- ized form of testing focuses on a system’s vulnerability and lethality. In one case, however, involving the Forward Army Air Defense weapon system, the Institute’s personnel working on development and opera- tional testing performed essentially the same tasks. The tasks included identifying issues, objectives, and threats that should be addressed in testing; reviewing and monitoring the Army’s plans and preparations for testing; observing the conduct of the tests; and assisting in the analyses of all test phases. In our view, performance of work by the Institute in the development test phase could impair the Institute’s ability to be completely objective in performing essentially the same work regarding operational testing. Nevertheless, the Institute’s development testing work ended in 1987 because OSDbelieved DCII'&Ewas the most appro- priate sponsor for the task. In response to our preliminary findings, an Institute official stated that its Operational Evaluation Division will not undertake tasks related to systems and programs over which D~&E has oversight responsibilities for any sponsor other than DO&E and the Director of Live Fire Testing. With the exception of tasks relating to live fire testing, the Institute will not perform development testing work for the Deputy Director Defense Research and Engineering (Test and Evaluation). Additionally, no Insti- tute research staff member or consultant may be assigned to an opera- tional test and evaluation task for D~&E if that staff member or consultant, subsequent to the establishment of the Office of DOT&E,has participated in the evaluation or analysis of that system as part of an Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-91-60 oT&E Controls DCW&E’e Uee of Private Contractmu and the Institute for Defense Analyses Institute task for any sponsor other than LKY%E and the Director of Live Fire Testing. Page 16 GAO/NSIAD9180 CW&E Controls . Appendix II Major Contributors to This Report Michael E. Motley, Associate Director National Security and Lester C. Farrington, Assistant Director International Affairs Division, Washington, Charles D. Groves, Evaluator-in-Charge Carlos E. Hazera, Evaluator James A. Driggins, Evaluator DC. Thomas E. Mills, Adviser William T. Woods, Assistant General Counsel Office of General Raymond J. Wyrsch, Senior Attorney Counsel (296229) Page 17 GAO/N&ID-9180 Ol’&E Controls ‘J’t~lt~ptlont~ 20%275-624 1 ------
Test and Evaluation: The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation's Controls Over Contractors
Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1990-12-21.
Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)