oversight

Access to Space: Issues Associated With DOD's Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Program

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1997-06-24.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                   United States General Accounting Office

GAO                Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee
                   on National Security, Committee on
                   Appropriations, House of
                   Representatives

June 1997
                   ACCESS TO SPACE
                   Issues Associated With
                   DOD’s Evolved
                   Expendable Launch
                   Vehicle Program




GAO/NSIAD-97-130
             United States
GAO          General Accounting Office
             Washington, D.C. 20548

             National Security and
             International Affairs Division

             B-272655

             June 24, 1997

             The Honorable C.W. Bill Young
             Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security
             Committee on Appropriations
             House of Representatives

             Dear Mr. Chairman:

             The Department of Defense (DOD) is acquiring a multi-billion dollar
             Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) system to replace the existing
             fleet of expendable launch vehicles in the 21st century. For an initial
             investment of about $2 billion, the EELV program goal is to reduce the costs
             of launching satellites into space by at least 25 percent, compared to using
             existing vehicles.

             As you requested, we reviewed DOD’s progress in acquiring the EELV
             system. We specifically reviewed factors associated with program cost,
             schedule, and performance and examined selected aspects of EELV’s
             relationship to the commercial launch vehicle market. This report
             discusses program issues and risks that need to be addressed before the
             program proceeds into the engineering and manufacturing development
             (EMD) phase of the acquisition process, which is currently scheduled for
             June 1998.


             The federal government currently uses a fleet of expendable launch
Background   vehicles—Delta, Atlas, and Titan—to transport a variety of national
             security and civil satellites into space. According to DOD, these vehicles
             (which are acquired by DOD), currently operate at or near their maximum
             performance capability. Also, DOD and congressional sources consider
             these vehicles to be very costly to produce and launch. Since 1987, the
             government has made several attempts to develop a new launch vehicle
             system, but these attempts were canceled either because of funding issues,
             changing requirements, or controversy regarding the best solution.

             In 1994, by congressional direction, DOD developed a space launch
             modernization plan that led to the initiation of the EELV program.
             Currently, two contractors—Lockheed Martin Astronautics and
             McDonnell Douglas Aerospace—are competing in a pre-EMD phase, and
             one is to be chosen for the EMD phase. Of the total planned $2 billion
             investment, the EMD phase is expected to cost about $1.6 billion and take




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                   approximately 6 years. Concurrent with the EMD decision, DOD plans to
                   authorize the start of EELV production. An initial quantity of 29 launch
                   vehicles is estimated to cost about $1.5 billion. In addition, toward the end
                   of the EMD phase, a decision is to be made on whether to produce a
                   significantly larger quantity that would cost several billion dollars.


                   Reducing the cost of launching satellites into orbit is the paramount
Results in Brief   objective of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program. However,
                   DOD faces many risks in making the transition to the vehicle program that
                   could increase costs, cause schedule delays, and possibly jeopardize some
                   satellite schedules and missions. Vehicle development is less than
                   25 percent complete, and DOD has about 1 year to address these risks
                   before proceeding into engineering and manufacturing development,
                   which is scheduled for June 1998. With several billion dollars at stake, risk
                   mitigation efforts are essential.

                   Cost risk is inherent in the vehicle acquisition plan because production
                   could be initiated from 1 to 2 years before the first system development
                   test flight. Pursuing such a strategy could result in costly modifications to
                   the production vehicles because historically, most launch systems have
                   had several failures during their early flight period. In addition, there is
                   program cost uncertainty as evidenced by significant estimating
                   differences between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Air
                   Force. Also, existing satellite programs expect to incur at least
                   $117 million in added costs as a result of launch vehicle transition, and
                   these costs are not included in the Office of the Secretary of Defense or
                   Air Force cost estimates for the vehicle program.

                   There are schedule risks that could seriously affect the program. First, as
                   currently planned, DOD will purchase the last of its existing expendable
                   launch vehicles before the first system development test flight is
                   scheduled to occur. An unsuccessful test flight, coupled with the
                   expiration of existing vehicle contracts, could create a void in the
                   government’s launch capability. DOD has not developed contingency plans
                   to address this potential risk to national security and civil satellite
                   schedules and missions. However, it did indicate that commercial launch
                   vehicles could be used for an emergency procurement in the event of an
                   Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle failure or schedule delay. Second, the
                   Air Force has identified the meeting of launch facility preparation




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               schedules as a significant program risk. At the Cape Canaveral and
               Vandenberg launch ranges, there are conflicts between the planned use of
               certain facilities for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program and
               the current use of these same facilities by other programs. Also, the
               environmental regulatory process that is required before facility
               construction can begin could cause an 8-month program delay.

               In addition, there are technical issues that raise concerns about potential
               system performance. The Air Force has identified vehicle propulsion,
               systems integration, and software as technical risk areas. Propulsion
               systems are expected to require significant development. Integrating all
               design, engineering, testing, manufacturing, and launch functions and the
               software information system are expected to be challenging tasks.
               Although risk mitigation plans have been developed, problems could arise
               in these areas, adversely affecting program cost and schedule goals.

               The commercial application of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
               poses a unique situation for the government. The space industry expects a
               large international market for commercial satellites, particularly
               communication satellites, and therefore, for launch vehicles. As a result,
               the winning contractor will enjoy an enhanced competitive position in the
               international launch vehicle market from DOD’s investment in the program.
               Although the competing contractors have indicated that they intend to
               make private investments in program development, they are not
               contractually obligated by the government to do so under the existing
               pre-engineering and manufacturing development contracts. Given this
               situation, the question arises as to how the government should be
               compensated for its major investment by the winning engineering and
               manufacturing development contractor who stands to benefit substantially
               in the commercial marketplace from that investment. Alternatives could
               be for DOD to employ a cost-sharing contract for the engineering and
               manufacturing development phase and/or arrange for the government to
               recoup part of its investment based on commercial launch vehicle sales.

               DOD  has emphasized reducing the costs of space launches as the
Program Cost   paramount EELV program objective. OSD established a $2-billion
Uncertainty    development cost objective. The Air Force established a production and
               launch cost-reduction goal of 25 to 50 percent, compared with the cost of
               using existing launch vehicles. However, considering the uncertainty in
               program cost, as evidenced by risk in the acquisition plans and the
               differences in the cost estimates done by OSD and the Air Force, the
               potential exists for program cost increases.



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Acquisition Plans Contain   Cost risk is inherent in the EELV acquisition plan because production could
Cost and Mission Risks      be initiated from 1 to 2 years before the first system development
                            (medium-lift) test flight. Initial procurement funding is planned for fiscal
                            year 2000, and the system test flight is scheduled for as early as June 2001,
                            but not later than December 2001. This test flight could have a relatively
                            high risk of failure because, as indicated in DOD’s space launch
                            modernization plan, (1) historically, most launch systems have had several
                            failures during their early flight period and (2) generally, failure rates
                            increase subsequent to a major design or operational change. In the event
                            that the EELV test flight does not perform as required, the result could be
                            costly modifications to production vehicles.

                            DOD usually considers the initial production strategy and authorizes the
                            initial production quantities concurrently with the EMD decision. Our
                            experience has shown, however, that once the initial production decision
                            is made, the options available to decisionmakers, when a system is found
                            to be deficient, are significantly limited.1 DOD has the latitude to modify its
                            usual concurrent approach and schedule a separate initial production
                            milestone authorization at a later point when more program risk
                            assessment information is available. The opportunity to do this would
                            extend up to 15 months from June 1998—the planned EMD decision
                            date—to October 1999—the earliest that fiscal year 2000 procurement
                            funds could be obligated.

                            EELV acquisition plans show that all 29 of the initial production
                            vehicles—20 for DOD and 9 for other U.S. government organizations—will
                            be used for launching operational satellites, and none will be used solely
                            for operational test and evaluation purposes. Generally, DOD’s major
                            programs include separate production-representative articles for
                            operational testing. However, according to the acquisition plans, cost
                            dictates that there not be any EELV operational “test article” per se. Instead,
                            assessments are to be performed on the operational flights. Although this
                            strategy may be economically sound, there is increased mission risk to
                            costly national security and civil satellites because of not having assurance
                            that a production-representative vehicle will perform as intended.


Program Cost Estimating     EELV program cost uncertainty became evident during the December 1996
Differences Are a Major     Defense Acquisition Board review process when estimates were prepared
Issue                       for system development and production and launch costs. The uncertainty

                            1
                             Weapons Acquisition: Low-Rate Initial Production Used to Buy Weapon Systems Prematurely
                            (GAO/NSIAD-95-18, Nov. 21, 1994).



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                             was manifested in significantly different cost estimates done by OSD and
                             the Air Force, which used different assumptions and methodologies. Both
                             OSD and Air Force estimates were higher than the $2-billion development
                             cost objective, and the calculations differed by several hundred million
                             dollars. Regarding production and launch costs, both OSD and Air Force
                             primary calculations showed cost reductions that exceeded the 25-percent
                             cost-reduction goal. However, differences between the two organizations
                             ranged from over $1 billion to about $2 billion. In addition, a separate OSD
                             analysis, using a different assumption, showed that the minimum
                             25-percent cost-reduction goal would not be met. Overall, OSD’s position
                             was that the program would likely cost more than the Air Force estimated.

                             A complicating cost-estimating factor was fluctuations in the national
                             mission model2—the primary concern being a decrease in heavy-lift
                             vehicle requirements. The model was used to prepare a launch cost
                             baseline, assuming the use of existing launch vehicles, to compare with
                             the estimated EELV production and launch costs for the purpose of
                             assessing the achievement of the program cost-reduction goal. In addition
                             to the heavy-lift requirements issue, the baseline was questionable because
                             of long-term predictions of U.S. satellite launches that extended 25 years
                             to fiscal year 2020. OSD cost analysts characterized the production and
                             launch cost estimates as highly uncertain.

                             DOD recognizes that EELV cost estimates need more attention. The Under
                             Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology directed that every
                             effort should be made to further understand the cost differences that exist
                             between the Air Force and OSD for both EMD and production.


Additional Satellite Costs   As discussed in DOD’s 1994 space launch modernization plan, redesigning
Are Already Evident          satellites to fly on new launch vehicles is extremely costly. Therefore, a
                             key consideration in establishing the EELV program schedule was to
                             minimize the cost of satellite redesign and integration with the vehicle.3
                             This was to be achieved by making the transition from the existing Delta,
                             Atlas, and Titan vehicles to EELV at planned satellite design change or
                             satellite constellation replenishment points.



                             2
                             The national mission model is a long-range mission requirements plan, prepared periodically by the
                             Air Force Space Command that lists planned U.S. space launches.
                             3
                              Integration in this context means mating the satellite and vehicle to each other using compatible
                             mechanical and electrical interfaces. To aid in reducing costs, EELV requires a single standard satellite
                             interface design for each vehicle class in the EELV family.



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                           We identified at least $117 million in additional costs, separate from the
                           EELV program, that satellite programs expect to incur as a result of the
                           transition to EELV. These satellite systems—the Defense Satellite
                           Communication System (DSCS), Defense Meteorological Satellite Program
                           (DMSP), Defense Support Program (DSP), and Global Positioning System
                           (GPS)—were specifically designed to be launched on the Delta, Atlas, or
                           Titan vehicles. Each system must now have payload interface adapters, or
                           associated equipment, designed and developed to allow them to be
                           launched on EELV. A new satellite system currently under
                           development—the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS)—is to be made
                           compatible with both the Atlas and EELV in the eventuality that EELV may
                           not be available when needed.


                           The interrelationship between the EELV program schedule and other
Schedule Issues to         space-related activities involves some significant risks that DOD needs to
Address                    address. The activities affected are existing launch vehicles, future
                           satellite launches, and launch facilities. Ensuring that the EELV program
                           and these activities are effectively coordinated is essential to preclude
                           schedule disruptions, cost increases, and adverse effects on operational
                           satellite schedules and missions.


Vehicle Transition Plans   DOD either has purchased or will purchase the last of its Delta, Atlas, and
Contain Future Satellite   Titan launch vehicles before the first EELV system development test flight
Launch Schedule and        in fiscal year 2001. An unsuccessful system test flight, coupled with the
                           planned expiration of existing vehicle contracts, would (1) delay EELV’s
Mission Risks              availability, (2) create a void in the government’s in-house medium-lift
                           launch capability, and (3) place national security and civil satellite launch
                           schedules and missions at risk.

                           Replacing the existing medium- and heavy-lift launch vehicle fleet with
                           EELV requires effective planning to ensure that the continuity of scheduled
                           satellite launches is maintained while minimizing the cost of retaining
                           duplicate launch capabilities. However, in planning this transition, DOD
                           representatives told us that they had not yet assessed the need for or
                           feasibility of either extending existing vehicle contracts or using U.S.
                           commercial launch vehicles (such as Delta III or Atlas IIAR) as an
                           alternative to ensure the continuity of planned satellite launches.




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Launch Facility Transition   The Air Force EELV program office identified the meeting of launch facility
Requirements Could Delay     preparation schedules at the Cape Canaveral and Vandenberg launch
Program                      ranges as a significant program risk. The Air Force Space Command
                             characterized the required lead times for facility projects as the greatest
                             risk to meeting EELV operational milestones. Effective transition planning
                             at the ranges is critical to ensure that existing space launch facilities are
                             available for satellite launches and that EELV facilities are available on
                             schedule.

                             There are two specific areas of concern—(1) conflicts between the
                             planned use of facilities for the EELV program and the existing use of these
                             same facilities by other government and commercial launch programs and
                             (2) the length of time normally required to complete the environmental
                             regulatory process associated with modifying existing facilities or building
                             new ones for EELV.

                             The most critical goal is to have the facilities available for the first EELV
                             system development test flight in June 2001. However, some significant
                             launch facility conflicts could cause major disruptions to ongoing
                             programs, requiring DOD to address facility priorities. In addition, based on
                             nominal time frames associated with the environmental regulatory and
                             construction process, the EMD contract award, and possibly the system
                             development test flight, could be delayed by 8 months.


                             The Air Force identified vehicle propulsion, systems integration, and
Potential Performance        software as technical risk areas. Major changes in vehicle propulsion
Issues                       systems are expected that could require significant development, and
                             propulsion represents a significant portion of EELV estimated costs.
                             Systems integration, which involves combining all design, engineering,
                             testing, manufacturing, and launch functions and the software information
                             system necessary to complete a project, is a common risk in most
                             programs. Although the Air Force has required the contractors to submit
                             risk mitigation plans, these risk areas could still pose significant system
                             development challenges and adversely affect EELV program cost and
                             schedule goals.


                             DOD’s 1994 space launch modernization plan stated that although the four
Commercial                   national space community sectors—defense, intelligence, civil, and
Application for EELV         commercial—have distinct space missions with their own unique cultures
                             and practices, they have one thing in common—the requirement for space



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                      launch. In this regard, the plan referred to a natural synergy that could be
                      created with the commercial sector. It cited the emergence of the
                      commercial satellite market during the past several years—particularly
                      communication satellites—as a significant driver for launch vehicles and
                      an opportunity for potential private sector investment in space launch.

                      DOD  has an interest in seeing that EELV is used for commercial purposes in
                      order to lower EELV costs. For example, the EELV acquisition plan states
                      that the government is interested in the competing contractors’ ability to
                      develop a successful commercial EELV system, which should result in
                      achieving recurring cost reductions by virtue of a significantly larger
                      customer base (government and commercial) for the EELV contractor.

                      In addition, both contractors have indicated that they intend to make
                      private investments in EELV development, and they have an incentive to do
                      so because of the potential to enhance their positions in the international
                      commercial markets. In December 1996, the Air Force informed the
                      Defense Acquisition Board of DOD’s potential to benefit from contractor
                      commercial (private) investment in EELV. However, the contractors are not
                      obligated by the government to make such investments under the existing
                      pre-EMD contracts. According to program officials, the option of
                      contractually binding the winning EMD contractor to such an investment is
                      available, if it is considered prudent.

                      Considering the commercial benefit to the winning EMD contractor from
                      using the EELV design, a mechanism to ensure some reduction to the
                      government’s estimated $2 billion investment would be reasonable. From a
                      government perspective, the question is how the contractor, who stands to
                      benefit substantially in the commercial market place from the
                      government’s investment, should compensate the government for that
                      investment. Alternatives could be for DOD to employ a cost-sharing
                      contract for the EMD phase and/or arrange for the government to recoup
                      part of its investment based on commercial launch vehicle sales.


                      Considering the cost and schedule issues associated with the EELV
Recommendations       program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense:

                  •   Either (1) revise the program strategy, by decoupling the planned
                      concurrent engineering and manufacturing development decision and
                      initial production authorization, to take advantage of the most current
                      program risk assessment information available prior to obligating



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                         procurement funds planned for fiscal year 2000 or (2) review the initial
                         production authorization prior to obligating any procurement funds, if that
                         authorization is made concurrently with the engineering and
                         manufacturing development decision.
                     •   Develop contingency plans to (1) meet national security and civil satellite
                         launch schedules when the existing launch vehicle production contracts
                         expire and (2) address the potential for delay in the availability of launch
                         facilities.

                         In view of the expected compensating benefits to the winning EELV
                         contractor to enhance its competitive position in the international
                         commercial launch vehicle market, we recommend that the Secretary of
                         Defense devise a mechanism, such as a cost-sharing approach and/or a
                         recoupment arrangement for commercial launch vehicle sales, to help
                         reduce the government’s investment in EELV and see that the mechanism is
                         included in the Air Force’s request for proposal for the EMD acquisition
                         phase of the EELV program.


                         In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed with two of
Agency Comments          our recommendations and disagreed with one. We modified that
and Our Evaluation       recommendation in an attempt to address DOD’s concerns while still
                         retaining the thrust of what we believe needs to be done.

                     •   DOD stated that it had initially implemented a launch vehicle transition
                         strategy and would continue to refine it as the EELV program matures. DOD
                         indicated that the commercial demand for Delta and Atlas vehicles would
                         keep the production lines operational during the transition. DOD also
                         indicated that the Air Force was tracking the potential delay in the
                         availability of EELV launch facilities and developing risk mitigation plans.
                     •   DOD stated that several cost-sharing approaches will be evaluated during
                         the next 12 months; the actual arrangement for any cost sharing between
                         the government and the winning EELV contractor would be included, as
                         appropriate, in the source selection process; and the approach that
                         provides the best value to the government would be incorporated into the
                         EMD contract.
                     •   DOD disagreed with the recommendation in our draft report on refraining
                         from authorizing EELV production concurrently with the EMD decision and
                         holding a separate production decision meeting subsequent to the planned
                         EMD decision to take advantage of the most current program risk
                         assessment information available prior to obligating procurement funds.
                         Although DOD agreed that the decision to begin full production



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              (milestone III) should be based on as much program risk data as possible,
              it viewed the implementation of our recommendation as limiting the
              Defense Acquisition Executive’s flexibility in the milestone II acquisition
              review process.

              Concerning the last item, we believe that the extent of the risks in the EELV
              program makes a concurrent EMD decision and initial production
              authorization unwise. We also believe that the Defense Acquisition
              Executive’s flexibility should not be restricted in making the best
              milestone II decision. Accordingly, we modified our recommendation to
              call upon the Secretary to choose between (1) revising the EELV program
              strategy by decoupling the planned concurrent EMD decision and initial
              production authorization or (2) reviewing the initial production
              authorization prior to obligating any procurement funds, if that
              authorization is made concurrently with the EMD decision.

              DOD’s   comments are reprinted in appendix II.

              We evaluated the Air Force’s plans and progress in developing EELV. We
Scope and     reviewed the interrelationships among EELV and existing launch vehicles,
Methodology   satellite programs, and launch facilities. We also reviewed program cost,
              schedule, and performance information; program risk areas; transition
              plans; and national mission model data. We specifically examined
              acquisition planning documents, budget information, launch requirements,
              contractor proposals, launch facility plans, and space policies and studies.

              We performed our work primarily at the Air Force Space and Missile
              Systems Center in El Segundo, California. In addition, we held discussions
              with representatives from the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of
              Defense for Space, the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Program
              Analysis and Evaluation Directorate, the Air Force’s Office of the Assistant
              Secretary for Acquisition, and the Air Force Cost Analysis Agency,
              Washington, D.C. We also held discussions with representatives from the
              Air Force Space Command, Colorado Springs, Colorado; the Air Force’s
              30th and 45th Space Wings, Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, and
              Patrick Air Force Base, Florida, respectively; the Air Force’s Phillips
              Laboratory Propulsion Directorate, Edwards Air Force Base, California;
              the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center, Albuquerque, New
              Mexico; and the Aerospace Corporation, El Segundo, California.

              Competition sensitive information associated with the ongoing EELV
              program acquisition is not disclosed in this report.



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Appendix I provides detailed information on the EELV program.

We performed our review between January 1996 and January 1997 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.


We are sending copies of this report to the Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on National Security, House Committee on Appropriations
and to the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the House
Committee on National Security; the Senate Committee on Armed
Services; and the Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on
Appropriations. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of Defense
and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will make copies
available to others upon request.

This report was prepared under the direction of Thomas J. Brew,
Associate Director, Defense Acquisitions Issues, who may be reached on
(202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any questions. Major contributors
to this report are listed in appendix III.

Sincerely yours,




Louis J. Rodrigues
Director, Defense Acquisitions Issues




Page 11                                       GAO/NSIAD-97-130 Access to Space
Contents



Letter                                                                                           1


Appendix I                                                                                      14
                        Acquisition Strategy and Status                                         15
Evolved Expendable      Acquisition Plans Contain Cost and Mission Risks                        16
Launch Vehicle          Program Cost-Estimating Differences Are a Major Issue                   19
                        Additional Satellite Costs Are Already Evident                          21
Program Plans and       Vehicle Transition Plans Contain Future Satellite Launch                23
Issues                    Schedule and Mission Risks
                        Launch Facility Transition Requirements Could Delay Program             25
                        Potential Performance Issues                                            27

Appendix II                                                                                     29

Comments From the
Department of
Defense
Appendix III                                                                                    33

Major Contributors to
This Report
Figures                 Figure I.1: Planned Concurrent Development and Production in            18
                          EELV Schedule
                        Figure I.2: Last Procurement Action and Launch for the                  24
                          Government’s Existing Launch Vehicles Relative to Key EELV
                          Scheduled Events




                        Abbreviations

                        DMSP      Defense Meteorological Satellite Program
                        DOD       Department of Defense
                        DSCS      Defense Satellite Communications System
                        DSP       Defense Support Program
                        EELV      Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
                        EMD       Engineering and Manufacturing Development
                        GPS       Global Positioning System
                        OSD       Office of the Secretary of Defense
                        SBIRS     Space-Based Infrared System


                        Page 12                                    GAO/NSIAD-97-130 Access to Space
Page 13   GAO/NSIAD-97-130 Access to Space
Appendix I

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
Program Plans and Issues

              The federal government uses expendable launch vehicles to provide
              transportation for communication, navigation, ballistic missile warning,
              meteorological, environmental, intelligence, and scientific satellites into
              space. U.S. policy asserts that access to and use of space is central to
              preserving peace and protecting national security as well as civil and
              commercial interests.

              Since 1987, the United States has been attempting to develop a new launch
              vehicle. The Advanced Launch System program during 1987 to 1990, the
              National Launch System program from 1991 to 1992, and the Spacelifter
              program in 1993 were each subsequently canceled because of funding
              issues, changing requirements, or controversy over the best way to
              address national launch needs. These development efforts resulted from a
              combination of factors, including (1) policy decisions in the late 1970s
              regarding exclusive reliance on the space shuttle for space transportation,
              and the corollary action to terminate investments in expendable launch
              vehicles; (2) the 1986 space shuttle Challenger accident; (3) restoration of
              expendable launch vehicle programs that were based on 1960’s and 1970’s
              technology, which did not take advantage of newer technology and
              manufacturing concepts; and (4) a concern about reduced competitiveness
              in the international launch market.1

              The existing launch vehicles—Delta II, Atlas II, Titan II, and Titan
              IV—were derived, to one degree or another, from ballistic missile systems,
              and currently operate at or near their maximum performance capability. In
              addition, these vehicles lack standardization, even among different
              configurations of the same vehicle. In its October 1993 Bottom-Up Review
              report, the Department of Defense (DOD) characterized U.S. military space
              launch capabilities as very costly, with serious operational limitations. The
              report stated that the existing expendable launch vehicles (1) were able to
              meet their performance requirement of delivering satellites to a specific
              orbit, but with less than desired reliability and (2) fell short of the
              operational flexibility requirement—meaning the capability to perform
              rapid payload integration, servicing, substitution, and launch.

              In November 1993, the Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to
              develop a space launch modernization plan with clearly defined priorities,
              goals, and milestones regarding modernization of space launch capabilities
              for DOD or, if appropriate, the government as a whole.2

              1
              Final Report to the President on the U.S. Space Program, from the Vice President, Chairman of the
              National Space Council, Jan. 7, 1993.
              2
               National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (P.L. 103-160, Nov. 30, 1993).



              Page 14                                                         GAO/NSIAD-97-130 Access to Space
                       Appendix I
                       Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
                       Program Plans and Issues




                       In May 1994, DOD’s space launch modernization plan (known as the
                       Moorman study) discussed the increasing hardware costs associated with
                       DOD’s medium- and heavy-lift launch vehicles, with particular emphasis on
                       the heavy-lift Titan IV and its inefficient production rates. In addition, it
                       discussed the manpower intensive aspects of launch system
                       manufacturing and operations, also with particular emphasis on Titan IV,
                       and the multiple launch complexes at Cape Canaveral and
                       Vandenberg—the Air Force’s two space launch ranges. The plan provided
                       four options to alleviate these conditions—(1) sustain existing systems,
                       including austere upgrades; (2) evolve existing systems; (3) develop a new
                       expendable system; and (4) develop a new reusable system. DOD chose to
                       pursue the second option as a cost-saving measure and to accommodate
                       schedule opportunities when several satellite systems were to undergo
                       design changes. In September 1994, the Congress provided the initial funds
                       to develop a new family of medium- and heavy-lift expendable launch
                       vehicles evolved from existing technologies.3

                       In November 1994, DOD developed an Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
                       (EELV) implementation plan, stating that the program objective was to
                       reduce total cost for medium- and heavy-lift vehicle space launch. The
                       plan summarized DOD’s launch assets as including 11 launch pads, 5 launch
                       teams, 3 launch vehicle production and processing industries, 2 launch
                       ranges, and various support resources. It discussed an EELV program
                       strategy to incorporate industrial competition, resulting in a single
                       production contract that would (1) maximize common systems and
                       components to reduce procurement costs and enhance production rates
                       and (2) decrease the number of launch complexes, launch crews, and
                       support requirements to reduce operation costs.


                       EELV  is intended to be the federal government’s only medium- and
Acquisition Strategy   heavy-lift expendable space transportation capability for several years
and Status             after the beginning of the 21st century. This planned family of vehicles is
                       intended to launch the government’s portion of the national mission
                       model, which is currently being launched by the existing fleet of Delta,
                       Atlas, and Titan vehicles. For EELV, this model consists of 193 government
                       launches for fiscal years 2002 through 2020—177 for defense and
                       intelligence purposes and 16 for the National Aeronautics and Space
                       Administration.



                       3
                        Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1995, (P.L. 103-335, Sept. 30, 1994).



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                    In May 1995, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) established an
                    EELV development cost objective of $2 billion (in then-year dollars). The
                    Air Force’s acquisition plan included a threshold amount not to exceed
                    $2.3 billion. In addition, the Air Force Space Command established a goal
                    of reducing EELV production and launch costs by a minimum of 25 percent
                    from the estimated costs of using existing launch vehicles, with an
                    objective of 50 percent. In August 1995, the Air Force awarded four
                    competitive $30 million contracts for a low-cost concept validation phase.
                    The purpose was to provide system specifications, cost estimates,
                    trade-off analyses, risk mitigation results, environmental analysis reports,
                    and manufacturing plans.

                    In December 1996, DOD decided to proceed into a 17-month
                    pre-engineering and manufacturing development (pre-EMD) phase, and the
                    Air Force awarded competitive $60 million development contracts to both
                    Lockheed Martin Astronautics and McDonnell Douglas Aerospace. The
                    purpose of this pre-EMD phase is to refine system specifications, update
                    cost estimates, complete risk-reduction efforts, and support the
                    government in the environmental regulatory process.

                    In June 1998, DOD plans to decide whether to proceed into a 6-year EMD
                    phase, and the Air Force anticipates issuing one cost-plus-award-fee
                    development contract for an anticipated $1.6 billion. During this phase, the
                    contractor is to provide detailed system specifications, perform two
                    system test flights (one medium-lift and one heavy-lift), validate
                    manufacturing processes, and activate the launch sites. Also, at this EMD
                    decision point, DOD plans to authorize the initial production strategy and
                    quantities. Air Force documents show that 29 initial production vehicles
                    are planned—20 for DOD and 9 for other U.S. government
                    organizations—which we estimated to cost about $1.5 billion, based on Air
                    Force budget information. A decision on whether to produce larger
                    quantities that would cost several billion dollars is also to be made during
                    the EMD phase. In its fiscal year 1998 research, development, test, and
                    evaluation budget, the Air Force is requesting $91.6 million for EELV. Of
                    this amount, $28.4 million is to initiate EMD.


                    Air Force EELV acquisition plans show that the 29 initial production
Acquisition Plans   vehicles would be procured over a 4-year period (fiscal years
Contain Cost and    2000-2003) during the EMD phase. Assuming appropriations are provided,
Mission Risks       missile procurement funds for the first six initial production vehicles
                    would be obligated in fiscal year 2000—at least 1 year, and possibly



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2 years, before the first system development (medium-lift) test flight. The
preferred date for this test flight is June 2001, and the threshold date is not
later than December 2001. Missile procurement funds for a second set of
six vehicles are planned to be requested for fiscal year 2001. If these funds
are appropriated at the outset of the fiscal year, they could also be
obligated before this test flight actually occurs.

Although the Air Force acquisition plan assumes a 2-year lead time from
initiating production to delivering and launching a vehicle, it states that
the industry has historically required over 2 years. According to the plan, if
more than 2 years are needed, missile procurement funds could be
requested as early as fiscal year 1999—at least 2 years, and possibly
3 years, before the test flight. Figure I.1 shows the current funding and
launch plans for the 29 initial production vehicles and the associated
concurrency of these plans relative to the EMD schedule.




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                                        Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
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Figure I.1: Planned Concurrent Development and Production in EELV Schedule



Pre-EMD


EMD


System test flights
                                                              (Medium lift)        (Heavy lift)

Initial production
  funding
(Number of vehicles)                                    (6)       (6)      (10)      (7)

Initial production
  launches
(Number of vehicles)                                                       (6)       (6)     (10)      (7)


Full production


                            1997    1998    1999      2000      2001 2002           2003    2004      2005 2006
                                                                Fiscal year



                                        Source: Air Force EELV acquisition plan.




                                        We have reported on numerous occasions about the risks associated with
                                        program concurrency and initiating production without adequate testing.
                                        For example, in 1990, we concluded that although concurrency can
                                        expedite the development and production of weapon systems, entering
                                        production before critical tests are successfully completed has resulted in
                                        the purchase of systems that do not perform as intended. In 1994, we
                                        reported that programs are often permitted to begin production with little




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                    or no scrutiny, and the consequences have included procuring substantial
                    inventories of unsatisfactory weapons requiring costly modification to
                    achieve satisfactory performance. Once production is started, the options
                    available to decisionmakers, when a system is found to be deficient, are
                    significantly limited.4 DOD usually considers the initial production strategy
                    and approves the quantities concurrently with the EMD decision. Generally,
                    a favorable decision authorizes the program manager to initiate
                    production.

                    The EELV acquisition plan states that there will be no initial production
                    vehicles dedicated solely for operational testing because of high vehicle
                    cost. Instead, the Air Force plans to use all of these vehicles for
                    operational purposes by launching navigational, missile warning,
                    communications, meteorological, scientific, and classified satellites.
                    Although this strategy may be economically sound, there is increased
                    mission risk to costly national security and civil satellites because of not
                    having assurance that a production-representative vehicle will perform as
                    intended. The planned involvement by the Air Force Operational Test and
                    Evaluation Center in the EELV program is to acquire and evaluate data from
                    the first system development test flight and the initial six operational
                    flights to support a decision to continue long-term production in fiscal
                    year 2003.


                    EELV program cost-estimating differences between OSD and the Air Force
Program             became evident during the December 1996 Defense Acquisition Board
Cost-Estimating     review process. The primary reasons given were the use of different
Differences Are a   assumptions and methodologies.

Major Issue
Development Cost    DOD’s development cost objective of $2 billion was for all three
Objective           development phases—low-cost concept validation, pre-EMD, and EMD. This
                    objective was based on the 1994 space launch modernization plan, which
                    estimated that nonrecurring costs for evolving a family of medium- and
                    heavy-lift launch vehicles were in the range of $1 billion to $2.5 billion. The
                    study’s wide cost range was largely due to the lack of detailed engineering
                    and program estimates for this particular evolved expendable launch
                    vehicle approach.


                    4
                     Weapon Systems: Concurrency in the Acquisition Process (GAO/T-NSIAD-90-43, May 17, 1990) and
                    Weapons Acquisition: Low-Rate Initial Production Used to Buy Weapon Systems Prematurely
                    (GAO/NSIAD-95-18, Nov. 21, 1994).



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                        Of the $2-billion objective, $1.6 billion was planned for EMD, which is to be
                        performed by one contractor. OSD’s development cost assessment for the
                        EMD phase (in constant 1995 dollars) was several hundred million dollars
                        higher than the Air Force estimate, and both calculations exceeded the
                        objective. (Details regarding cost estimates are considered competition
                        sensitive and therefore not disclosed.)


Production and Launch   The Air Force Space Command’s 25 to 50 percent production and launch
Cost-Reduction Goal     cost-reduction goal meant that an evolved family of vehicles should cost
                        less than if existing vehicles were used. This goal was to be measured by
                        first establishing an estimated recurring cost—called the launch cost
                        baseline—of producing and launching Delta, Atlas, and Titan vehicles to
                        satisfy the government launch needs during fiscal years 2002 through 2020.
                        This calculation was then to be compared with the EELV contractors’
                        proposed cost estimates for satisfying these launch needs during the same
                        period. The Air Force’s latest baseline was estimated at $20.6 billion. It
                        was prepared by the existing vehicle program offices based on the Air
                        Force Space Command’s January 1996 national mission model for 193
                        predicted launches.

                        OSD’s assessment of EELV production and launch costs for fiscal years 2002
                        through 2020 (in constant 1995 dollars) ranged from over $1 billion to
                        about $2 billion higher than the Air Force’s estimate. OSD calculations
                        showed cost reductions that exceeded the 25-percent goal, and the Air
                        Force showed reductions that exceeded the 50-percent goal. However,
                        there was considerable uncertainty regarding these recurring costs. For
                        example, OSD cost analysts believe that some of the estimated component
                        costs were too low, and in the process of performing a net present value
                        analysis, determined that the minimum 25-percent reduction would not be
                        met. (Details regarding cost estimates are considered competition
                        sensitive and therefore not disclosed.)

                        In addition, the validity of the national mission model, which was used to
                        prepare the launch cost baseline, was questionable because (1) of the
                        uncertainty in predicting government space launches 25 years into the
                        future; (2) the model had fluctuated from 171 to 193 launches since the
                        EELV program was established in 1995; and (3) the model is expected to
                        continue changing, probably downward, because of recent OSD analyses
                        regarding decreased heavy-lift vehicle requirements. According to DOD cost
                        analysts, such long-term predictions and fluctuations made credible




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                           assessments of production and launch costs and the comparative baseline
                           more complicated.


DOD Recognizes That Cost   As a result of a Defense Acquisition Board review, the Under Secretary of
Estimates Need More        Defense for Acquisition and Technology authorized the Air Force to
Attention                  proceed with the EELV program into the pre-EMD phase of the acquisition
                           process. However, considering the differences in estimated program costs,
                           the Under Secretary emphasized that every effort should be made to
                           understand the cost differences between the Air Force and OSD estimates
                           for both EMD and production. He indicated that the variability of these cost
                           estimates, which stem from both increases and decreases in the national
                           mission model, as well as the effect of varying requirements for heavy-lift
                           capabilities, should be fully explored.

                           OSD established criteria for the program to exit the pre-EMD phase and
                           enter the EMD phase, which is scheduled for June 1998. These criteria
                           included (1) preparing an updated life-cycle cost estimate with a detailed
                           cost risk analysis and (2) performing an independently reviewed economic
                           investment analysis that would identify projected recurring cost savings
                           and investment payback. An independent program cost estimate is a
                           statutory requirement under 10 U.S.C. 2434 for entry into EMD.


                           Five Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) satellites, which
Additional Satellite       have been built, remain to be launched during fiscal years 1998 through
Costs Are Already          2003 as the transition is made to EELV. Although these satellites were
Evident                    designed to be launched on Atlas II vehicles, the last two are now
                           scheduled to be launched on EELV. According to program representatives,
                           an additional $25 million has been budgeted for a payload interface
                           adapter design and modification that will be needed for these last two
                           satellites.

                           Six Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) satellites, which have
                           been built and are currently in storage, remain to be launched during fiscal
                           years 1998 through 2007 as the transition is made to EELV. Although these
                           satellites were designed to be launched on Titan II vehicles, the last four
                           are now scheduled to be launched on EELV. According to program
                           representatives, an additional $28 to $30 million has been estimated for a
                           satellite payload interface adapter design and modification effort that will
                           take about 5 years. They believe that other costs could be incurred
                           because there is concern that the satellites may need to be modified to



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withstand the stress anticipated from an EELV launch. Whether this will be
necessary will not be known until the EELV launch tolerance parameters
are demonstrated during the first system development flight test in fiscal
year 2001.

According to program officials, five Defense Support Program (DSP)
satellites are either built and in storage or being fabricated and are
scheduled to be launched during fiscal years 1998 through 2003 as the
transition is made to EELV. Although these satellites were designed to be
launched on either Titan IV vehicles or the Space Shuttle, the last satellite
is now planned to be launched on the EELV heavy-lift test vehicle in fiscal
year 2003. According to program representatives, an additional $29 million
is needed for hardware and cable associated with satellite and vehicle
integration.

The Global Positioning System (GPS) is currently launched on Delta II
vehicles, and the satellite system is undergoing a redesign, referred to as a
block change, from the IIR to the IIF version. Although most of the IIF
satellites are planned to be launched on EELV, the first satellite must be
launched on Delta II. This is because the scheduled launch date is in fiscal
year 2001 and the first operational EELV flight is not scheduled until fiscal
year 2002. In addition, according to a program official, all IIF satellites
need to be compatible with both launch vehicles because there is some
uncertainty regarding the stress anticipated with an EELV launch. GPS
program representatives informed us that about $35 million would be
needed to develop and build a payload interface adapter for EELV.

The new Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) satellite program includes a
geosynchronous earth orbit component and a low-earth orbit component.
This program is intended to replace the DSP satellite system. SBIRS program
officials initially intended to use EELV for the first geosynchronous launch
scheduled for fiscal year 2002. However, because they want to mitigate the
risk of delay in EELV availability, SBIRS is to be compatible with both EELV
and Atlas. The deployment schedule for the low-earth orbit component is
yet to be finalized. DOD originally scheduled the first launch for fiscal year
2006 using EELV; the Congress directed the first launch to be in fiscal year
2002; and now DOD is revising its schedule for launch in fiscal year 2004.




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                       The Delta, Atlas, and Titan programs are managed under separate Air
Vehicle Transition     Force production contracts and each have a different expiration date.
Plans Contain Future   Considering when the last procurement action is scheduled under these
Satellite Launch       vehicle contracts relative to the schedule for the first EELV system
                       development test flight, DOD appears to be taking some risk regarding
Schedule and Mission   future satellite launch schedules and missions. Figure I.2 shows the last
Risks                  scheduled procurement actions and the last planned launches for the
                       government’s existing launch vehicles, relative to key EELV scheduled
                       events.




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                                         Program Plans and Issues




Figure I.2: Last Procurement Action and Launch for the Government’s Existing Launch Vehicles Relative to Key EELV
Scheduled Events



Delta II


Atlas II


Titan II
(No production)

Titan IV


EELV
  System test flights
                                                                              (Medium lift)   (Heavy lift)
   Initial production
     Initial production
     launches

                          1995    1996   1997      1998 1999         2000      2001      2002 2003      2004   2005
                                                                 Fiscal year

                              Last procurement                 Last launch



                                         Source: Air Force Program acquisition plans.




                                         The last of 21 Delta II launch vehicles for the government is to be procured
                                         in fiscal year 2000—1 year before the first EELV system development test
                                         flight. The last government Delta launch is planned for fiscal year
                                         2002—the same year that medium-lift EELV operational flights are to begin.




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                              Regarding Atlas II, a contract option is to be executed for the last of six
                              government launch vehicles in fiscal year 1998—3 years before the first
                              EELV system development test flight. The last government Atlas launch is
                              planned for fiscal year 2002—the same year that medium-lift EELV
                              operational flights are to begin.

                              The Titan II space launch vehicles were converted from deactivated
                              intercontinental ballistic missiles, thus there was no production activity.
                              According to program officials, after the last Titan II launch in fiscal year
                              1999, the Air Force plans to deactivate the launch pad.

                              Since 1991, Titan IV production rates have declined from 10 to 2 vehicles
                              per year because of reduced requirements, with the resulting effect of
                              increasing unit costs. The last Titan IV purchase was in fiscal year 1995 for
                              2 of 41 vehicles. Any follow-on procurement is in doubt because of
                              uncertainties regarding future DOD heavy-lift requirements. The last Titan
                              IV launch is planned to occur 2 years after the scheduled heavy-lift test
                              flight.

                              In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD indicated that although these
                              last procurement actions are scheduled, the vehicle contracts will still be
                              in place, giving DOD the opportunity to procure additional vehicles, if
                              required. However, such extensions usually require contract
                              renegotiations, and the result is usually price increases. DOD also indicated
                              that commercial launch vehicles may be available to mitigate some of the
                              risk.


                              There are three factors affecting a smooth launch facility transition at the
Launch Facility               Cape Canaveral and Vandenberg launch ranges—existing facility conflicts,
Transition                    environmental regulatory requirements, and the amount of time needed
Requirements Could            for facility construction.

Delay Program
Existing Facility Conflicts   In April 1996, the Air Force Space Command prepared an EELV plan that
                              identified the need to coordinate efforts at the Cape Canaveral and
                              Vandenberg launch ranges for making the transition from existing launch
                              vehicles to EELV. At these ranges, the competing contractors were
                              expected to use a combination of existing facilities, modified facilities, and
                              possibly new facilities for the various launch support functions, such as




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                            material receiving and storage, vehicle and upper stage processing,
                            payload integration, final assembly, and launch services and operations.

                            In August 1996, the Command completed a launch site facility baseline
                            study to provide the EELV program office with facility information
                            necessary for risk assessment, management decisions, and answering
                            contractors’ questions. The study identified several existing facilities at
                            Cape Canaveral and Vandenberg that were of interest to the EELV
                            contractors but that were being used by other government or commercial
                            programs. Some of these facilities were forecasted to be used through
                            mid-to-late fiscal year 2000 or beyond and would require negotiations with
                            the existing user regarding availability for EELV. Although resolution of
                            several conflicts is the responsibility of Air Force launch range officials,
                            there were indications that significant issues associated with certain
                            facility priorities may have to be addressed at the DOD level. (Specific
                            conflicts are considered competition sensitive and therefore not
                            disclosed.)


Environmental Regulatory    Before construction of EELV facilities can begin at the Cape Canaveral and
Requirements                Vandenberg launch ranges, the Air Force must complete an environmental
                            impact statement. According to the EELV acquisition plan, the
                            environmental process, which is based on National Environmental Policy
                            Act requirements, is to be completed during the pre-EMD phase, prior to
                            committing EMD funds. However, the plan also states that it takes about
                            24 months to obtain approval. A representative from the Air Force Center
                            for Environmental Excellence confirmed this estimate.

                            EELV program officials informed us that some preliminary environmental
                            work was started during the low-cost concept validation phase. However,
                            the actual contract for the environmental effort was not awarded until
                            February 1997. This means that to initiate EMD on schedule in June 1998,
                            only 16 months are available to complete the nominal 24-month
                            environmental effort. Thus, the EMD contract award could be delayed up to
                            8 months, until February 1999.


Facility Modification and   Existing facilities cannot be modified and new facilities cannot be
Construction                constructed at the launch sites until (1) all environmental requirements are
Requirements                completed and (2) DOD decides to proceed into the EMD phase. In its
                            transition plan, the Air Force Space Command urged that sufficient time
                            be set aside to allow for facility planning, programming, design,



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                           construction, and acceptance. It used traditional planning factors in
                           estimating the duration of facility projects, such as 2 to 3 years for
                           modifications to existing facilities and 4 years for new construction.

                           According to EELV program officials, the nominal facility construction time
                           is 36 months. Given the requirement for a sequential environmental and
                           construction process, and the possible 8-month delay in initiating EMD
                           because of environmental regulatory requirements, the first system
                           development test flight could be delayed by 8 months from the preferred
                           date of June 2001 to February 2002.


                           The Air Force identified vehicle propulsion, systems integration, and
Potential Performance      software as technical risk items. EELV propulsion could be a primary area
Issues                     of risk because of the significant anticipated development. Although
                           systems integration, including development and reuse of software, is a
                           common risk area, it is expected to be a major system development
                           challenge. Problems in these areas could result in an adverse effect on
                           EELV program cost and schedule goals.



Propulsion Could Be a      From inception, the EELV system design was intended to be evolved from
Primary Risk               the existing medium- and heavy-lift vehicles into one family of vehicles.
                           Despite this evolutionary concept, major changes in vehicle propulsion
                           systems are expected that could require significant development.
                           Changing propulsion systems appears to be necessary considering that the
                           1994 space launch modernization plan stated that (1) existing propulsion
                           systems (both solid and liquid propellent variants) were the cause for 25 to
                           50 percent of the launch vehicle failures in previous years and (2) there
                           was general consensus that propulsion technology was the most serious
                           area of deficiency in the existing U.S. launch vehicle fleet. In addition to
                           the expected technical risk, propulsion represents a significant portion of
                           the estimated launch vehicle costs. Thus, development, testing, and
                           integration of propulsion components could pose special challenges to the
                           EELV program.



Systems Integration and    Systems integration involves combining all design, engineering, testing,
Software Are Usual Risks   manufacturing, and launch functions, as well as the software information
                           system, that are essential to complete the intended project. Systems
                           integration problems can occur, even though the various components and
                           subsystems performed successfully on previous systems. As an example,



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similar to EELV, the Air Force’s C-17 aircraft program intended to use
current, available, and proven technology to minimize development costs
and structure a low technical risk effort. The integration of sophisticated
technologies into a workable aircraft design was a major engineering and
management task that eventually contributed to significant cost increases
and schedule delays.5 EELV system integration could be similarly
challenging.

Air Force officials informed us that new computer software would be
developed and existing software (from other programs) would be reused
for EELV. They stated that software issues are particularly challenging and
that program cost and schedule could be affected. Because of this, they
have performed an assessment of the contractors’ ability to develop
software and intend to perform another one to help mitigate the risk.

Reusing software can be cost-effective, but it can present significant
problems. For example, in June 1996, the initial flight of the European
Ariane 5 launch vehicle failed because of inadequate software testing. The
software was used successfully on previous Ariane 4 launch vehicles and
then reused on Ariane 5. According to the report of an inquiry board
established to perform an investigation, the failure was caused by the
complete loss of guidance and attitude information resulting from
specification and design errors in the software of the inertial reference
system. The report stated that (1) there was inadequate analysis and
testing of systems that included the reused software and (2) if testing had
been performed, the potential failure could have been detected.




5
 Military Airlift: Cost and Complexity of the C-17 Aircraft Research and Development Program
(GAO/NSIAD-91-5, Mar. 19, 1991).



Page 28                                                       GAO/NSIAD-97-130 Access to Space
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense




              Page 29         GAO/NSIAD-97-130 Access to Space
                  Appendix II
                  Comments From the Department of Defense




Now on pp. 8-9.




Now on p. 9.




                  Page 30                                   GAO/NSIAD-97-130 Access to Space
               Appendix II
               Comments From the Department of Defense




Now on p. 9.




               Page 31                                   GAO/NSIAD-97-130 Access to Space
Appendix II
Comments From the Department of Defense




Page 32                                   GAO/NSIAD-97-130 Access to Space
Appendix III

Major Contributors to This Report


                        Homer H. Thomson
National Security and
International Affairs
Division, Washington,
D.C.
                        Samuel S. Van Wagner
Los Angeles Office      Allen D. Westheimer
                        Larry J. Bridges
                        Lorene S. Sarne




(707131)                Page 33                GAO/NSIAD-97-130 Access to Space
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