oversight

Afloat Prepositioning: Not All Equipment Meets the Army's Readiness Goal

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1997-07-23.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                   United States General Accounting Office

GAO                Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee
                   on Readiness, Committee on Armed
                   Services, U.S. Senate


July 1997
                   AFLOAT
                   PREPOSITIONING
                   Not All Equipment
                   Meets the Army’s
                   Readiness Goal




GAO/NSIAD-97-169
             United States
GAO          General Accounting Office
             Washington, D.C. 20548

             National Security and
             International Affairs Division

             B-277122

             July 23, 1997

             The Honorable James M. Inhofe
             Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness
             Committee on Armed Services
             United States Senate

             Dear Mr. Chairman:

             This report provides information on the readiness of the Army’s war
             reserve equipment prepositioned afloat.1 Specifically, this report discusses
             the extent to which the brigade set of war reserve equipment, which is
             prepositioned on ships, meets the Army’s readiness goal. It also addresses
             the status of the Army’s efforts to establish facilities to maintain this
             brigade set of equipment and develop an information system that
             accurately measures and reports the readiness condition of war reserve
             equipment.


             The Department of Defense (DOD) maintains stocks of supplies and
Background   equipment, called war reserves, to support military units during a war or
             mobilization. War reserves stored within the continental United States are
             distributed as needed by airlift or sealift. War reserves are also stored, or
             prepositioned, overseas on land or on ships near an area of potential
             conflict. By prepositioning war reserves overseas, U.S. military forces have
             the ability to respond quickly to a contingency. For example, at the
             beginning of the Persian Gulf War deployment in August 1990, equipment
             and supplies prepositioned aboard ships arrived at the theater more
             quickly than if they had been sealifted from the United States. At that time,
             the Army’s prepositioning fleet consisted of four ships used primarily for
             carrying ammunition and port handling equipment.

             Because afloat prepositioning proved successful during the Persian Gulf
             War, DOD’s January 1992 Mobility Requirements Study identified a need for
             the Army to preposition additional combat, combat support, and combat
             service support equipment and supplies aboard ships.2 Later that year, we
             reported on the Army’s use of prepositioning ships during the Persian Gulf
             War and examined Army plans to expand its prepositioning fleet by adding


             1
              Afloat prepositioning involves keeping ships continuously stored with supplies, combat equipment,
             and support items.
             2
             This requirement was revalidated in the 1995 Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review
             Update.



             Page 1                                                  GAO/NSIAD-97-169 Afloat Prepositioning
B-277122




roll-on/roll-off ships to accommodate additional equipment to support a
brigade.3 We recommended that the Army plan for and provide resources
for maintaining its additional equipment on prepositioned ships.

The brigade set of equipment, which is prepositioned afloat, consists of
145 individual unit sets of equipment for an armored combat brigade and
combat support and service support units. Specific pieces of combat
equipment include tanks and infantry fighting vehicles for 4,500 soldiers.
Combat support and combat service support equipment for an additional
5,300 soldiers includes multiple launch rocket systems, self-propelled
howitzers, cargo trucks, tractors, chemical detection and decontamination
equipment, and communications gear.

The Army’s general standard for maintaining equipment is the Technical
Manual –10/-20 standard. It requires that equipment be maintained in
near-perfect operating condition and capable of performing all assigned
missions.4 The Army reports the readiness of unit sets and the brigade set
of equipment according to Army Regulation 220-1, Unit Status Reporting.
This regulation measures readiness in terms of a lower, fully mission
capable standard that only requires that mission-essential subsystems be
available and operational. As a result, a vehicle with a cracked windshield
might not meet the –10/-20 standard but could be considered fully capable
of performing its war-fighting mission. The Army’s readiness goal is that
90 percent of the equipment in the prepositioned brigade set meets the
fully mission capable standard. For readiness purposes, the Army reports
the status of 51 of the 145 unit equipment sets prepositioned afloat. These
51 unit equipment sets are authorized to contain primary weapon systems
or equipment considered critical for accomplishing and sustaining a unit’s
mission.

In August 1993, the Deputy Secretary of Defense designated Charleston
Naval Weapons Station in South Carolina as the site for development of a
maintenance base for the brigade set of equipment. In late fall 1993, the
Army began loading available equipment aboard seven roll-on/roll-off
ships that had been added to its prepositioning fleet. To maintain the
brigade set of equipment, the Army hired contractors to (1) modify
existing maintenance facilities and construct new facilities at the base,
(2) develop and implement a program for cyclical maintenance operations,

3
 Military Afloat Prepositioning: Wartime Use and Issues for the Future (GAO/NSIAD-93-39, Nov. 4,
1992).
4
 The Technical Manual –10/-20 standard is based on preventive maintenance checks and services for
each piece of Army equipment. The “-10” and “-20” refer to operator- and organization-level
maintenance tasks, respectively.



Page 2                                                  GAO/NSIAD-97-169 Afloat Prepositioning
                   B-277122




                   and (3) develop an automated information system to manage maintenance
                   and inventory operations and report on the condition of war reserve
                   equipment.

                   In February 1995, the Army contracted with the developers of the Marine
                   Corps’ inventory system to create an automated inventory system to meet
                   Army prepositioned war reserve requirements. This system is expected to,
                   among other things, maintain an accurate accountability of items, compare
                   authorized and on-hand quantities, and report on the maintenance and
                   readiness status of war reserve equipment. In March 1996, the Army
                   established the War Reserve Support Command to manage its war reserve
                   program as a subordinate command of the Industrial Operations
                   Command and the Army Materiel Command.


                   Of the unit sets considered when reporting the readiness of the brigade set
Results in Brief   of war reserve equipment, about 25 percent do not meet the Army’s
                   readiness goal for full mission capability. As of April 1997, equipment in 13
                   of 51 reportable unit sets did not meet the 90-percent readiness goal. Five
                   of those unit sets did not have on hand authorized primary weapon
                   systems or equipment considered critical for accomplishing and sustaining
                   the units’ mission. As a result, these five unit sets had a fully mission
                   capable rating of zero. According to Army maintenance records, some
                   equipment aboard prepositioning ships had been reported as non-mission
                   capable since September 1995. These records also erroneously identified
                   some non-mission capable equipment as repairable aboard ship, although
                   Army officials said that many repairs could not be made until the
                   equipment was downloaded.

                   One factor that contributed to lower readiness rates was that some
                   equipment was not fully mission capable when it was originally loaded on
                   prepositioning ships. Other factors include the deterioration of the
                   equipment while in storage aboard ships and the limited ability to conduct
                   maintenance on the equipment while in storage. The Army plans to repair
                   equipment that does not meet readiness standards by conducting
                   maintenance on prepositioning ships every 30 months. In addition, Army
                   doctrine calls for logistics support teams to perform maintenance on
                   prepositioned war reserve equipment when it is downloaded before a
                   deployment. Further, the Army is currently transferring equipment to
                   prepositioning ships that have been designed to better control the
                   humidity of the shipboard environment. This improved environment
                   should help reduce the amount of deterioration of equipment while it is



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                       B-277122




                       stored aboard prepositioned ships. Further, the Army has given priority to
                       prepositioned ships in its plans to redistribute equipment from central
                       Europe; this should improve the readiness of those unit sets currently
                       lacking equipment required for meeting the Army’s readiness goal.

                       Army maintenance facilities in Charleston, South Carolina, were originally
                       scheduled to be completed before October 1996—in time for the facilities
                       to be used to conduct maintenance on the first full shipload of equipment
                       prepositioned afloat. However, contracts for development of the site and
                       construction and renovation of buildings had not been completed, and the
                       maintenance contractor had to continue to rely on temporary shelters and
                       had to develop less efficient maintenance processes. According to Army
                       and contractor officials, the use of temporary facilities did not prevent the
                       successful completion of the maintenance mission. They said the impact
                       was limited to a slight but unquantifiable increase in the cost of
                       maintaining the equipment.

                       Basic elements of the Army’s automated inventory system for management
                       of war reserves have been put in place, including maintenance and
                       readiness reporting software modules. As of July 1997, the Army was still
                       developing and implementing its information system. Proposed
                       improvements to the system include linking the system database to
                       existing Army maintenance management systems and incorporating a
                       requisitioning capability.


                       As of April 1997, 13 of the 51 unit sets of equipment that are assigned to
Not All Equipment      Army prepositioning ships and considered for readiness reporting, or
Prepositioned Afloat   about 25 percent, did not meet the Army’s readiness goal that 90 percent of
Meets Army             available war reserve equipment be fully mission capable. Equipment in
                       two unit sets was less than 75 percent fully mission capable, and five unit
Readiness Goal         sets had a fully mission capable rating of zero because they did not have
                       on hand any authorized primary weapon systems or equipment considered
                       critical for accomplishing and sustaining a unit’s mission. For example,
                       one unit set designated to support a heavy equipment transport company
                       did not have any of its authorized trucks or trailers.

                       The status of the equipment in April 1997 had significantly changed from
                       October 1996, when 43 of the 51 unit sets did not meet the Army’s goal. At
                       that time, equipment in 10 unit sets was less than 75 percent fully mission
                       capable, and 17 unit sets had a fully mission capable rating of zero because
                       they did not have any of their authorized reportable equipment on hand.



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                                                  B-277122




                                                  Army officials attributed the improvement as of April 1997 primarily to the
                                                  transfer of key pieces of equipment considered for readiness reporting
                                                  from lower priority units not considered for readiness reporting to higher
                                                  priority units that are considered for readiness reporting.5 The officials
                                                  said that maintenance on the equipment between October 1996 and
                                                  April 1997 also contributed to the increase in the number of unit sets that
                                                  met the Army’s readiness goal. Figure 1 compares the status of equipment
                                                  sets in October 1996 and April 1997.



Figure 1: Number of Equipment Sets That Did Not Meet the Army’s Readiness Goal in October 1996 and April 1997

                                   October 1996                                                         April 1997


                                                                                   Met 90% goal 38
                     75-89%   16


                                                            Met 90% goal   8




                                                                                                                                       0% 5



Less than 75%   10
                                                                                                                                  Less than 75%   2
                                                  0%   17
                                                                                                                     75-89%   6


                                                  Note: The unit sets that had a fully mission capable rating of zero did not have any reportable
                                                  equipment on hand.

                                                  Source: Our analysis of War Reserve Support Command data.




                                                  According to Army and contractor officials, many of the faults that render
                                                  equipment non-mission capable do not require extensive maintenance to
                                                  repair. Army officials said that many of the pieces of equipment that were
                                                  considered non-mission capable needed only replacement of missing fire
                                                  extinguishers and dead batteries. However, our review of maintenance
                                                  records showed that, as of April 1997, missing fire extinguishers and dead



                                                  5
                                                   This accountability transfer occurred within the automated information system and did not require
                                                  actual movement of the equipment.



                                                  Page 5                                                   GAO/NSIAD-97-169 Afloat Prepositioning
                                       B-277122




                                       batteries only accounted for about 11 percent of the total non-mission
                                       capable faults reported for equipment prepositioned afloat.6

                                       The Army’s equipment status data, as of April 1997, showed that faults
                                       rendering specific pieces of equipment non-mission capable had remained
                                       uncorrected since September 1995. Figure 2 shows the amount of time that
                                       uncorrected faults have rendered equipment prepositioned afloat
                                       non-mission capable and the portion of those faults that the Army
                                       considered to be repairable while in storage aboard prepositioning ships.


Figure 2: Amount of Time That
Uncorrected Faults Have Rendered
                                       Number of faults
Equipment Non-Mission Capable (as of
Apr. 1997)                             500



                                       400



                                       300



                                       200



                                       100



                                           0
                                                         1-6                      7-12                           13-18
                                                                              Number of months

                                                               Repairable aboard ship        Repairable off ship only

                                       Note: Data reflects all ships as of April 1997 with the exception of one for which data was only
                                       available as of January 1997.

                                       Source: Our analysis of War Reserve Support Command data.




                                       6
                                        Defective seals and gaskets accounted for an additional 8 percent of the faults rendering equipment
                                       non-mission capable. The remaining faults were almost all different and therefore could not be easily
                                       categorized.



                                       Page 6                                                   GAO/NSIAD-97-169 Afloat Prepositioning
                             B-277122




                             According to the Army’s April 1997 Warfighter Equipment Status Report,
                             about 60 percent of the faults that rendered equipment non-mission
                             capable were repairable aboard ship.7 However, this designation is
                             misleading. Army officials said that many of these faults are impossible to
                             repair until the equipment is taken off the ship because of the heavy
                             weight of items and lack of maneuverability, among other things. Thus, the
                             information in the report does not accurately represent the ability of
                             maintenance personnel to repair faults that render equipment non-mission
                             capable.


Key Factors Contributed to   In October 1995, the Army Inspector General reported that maintenance
Lower Readiness Rates        standards were not enforced during the initial loading of the brigade set of
                             equipment aboard Army ships in the fall of 1993.8 As a result, during
                             Operation Vigilant Warrior in October 1994, the actual fully mission
                             capable rate of the equipment downloaded from five of the seven
                             roll-on/roll-off ships was significantly less than reported. According to the
                             report, most of this equipment required maintenance before deploying,
                             and several pieces of equipment were not cost-effective to repair. The
                             report also stated that the readiness of the deployed equipment improved
                             as a result of Army maintenance efforts during the operation.

                             Also, Army and maintenance contractor officials said that the tendency of
                             equipment to deteriorate while in storage aboard ships continually lowers
                             readiness rates. For example, gaskets and seals dry rot, tires go flat,
                             equipment rusts, and batteries die.

                             Further, Army officials and contractors stated that the ability of shipboard
                             maintenance teams to conduct inspections and maintenance on equipment
                             prepositioned aboard ships is limited due to the lack of accessibility to
                             equipment and environmental concerns regarding the use of oil and other
                             hazardous substances. As a result, the teams are only able to (1) perform
                             minor maintenance, such as replacing batteries, changing filters, and
                             tightening plugs; (2) make visual inspections to check for fluid leaks, loss
                             of tire pressure, the condition of glass, lights, and fire extinguisher, and
                             the presence of required documentation and inventory labels; and (3) start
                             vehicles periodically and check their instrumentation. Because of the


                             7
                              This data reflects the condition of equipment prepositioned afloat as of April 3, 1997, with the
                             exception of equipment aboard one ship for which such information was unavailable. To complete the
                             data set and include all equipment aboard ships, we used data available as of January 31, 1997, for that
                             ship.
                             8
                              Assessment of Army War Reserve Materiel, Army Inspector General, October 1995.



                             Page 7                                                    GAO/NSIAD-97-169 Afloat Prepositioning
                        B-277122




                        limitations on inspections, Army officials said that the condition of
                        equipment prepositioned afloat could not be definitively determined until
                        each ship was fully unloaded and inspected.


Army Plans to Improve   The Army has recognized the need to conduct repairs on equipment that
Equipment Readiness     deteriorates in storage or does not meet Technical Manual –10/-20
                        standards. In addition to planned maintenance cycles every 30 months,
                        Army doctrine calls for an Army Materiel Command logistics support team
                        to provide limited depot-level maintenance support to fix many of the
                        uncorrected equipment faults after the equipment is downloaded and
                        accountability of the equipment is transferred to the war-fighting units
                        during deployments.

                        The Army is currently transferring equipment aboard the seven
                        roll-on/roll-off ships to five larger temporary ships and then ultimately to
                        eight new Large Medium-Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off ships by 2000. These
                        prepositioning ships have been designed to provide a better
                        controlled-humidity environment below deck, which should help reduce
                        the deterioration of equipment while stored aboard the ships. The Army
                        plans to inspect the equipment as it is transferred between ships, repair
                        the equipment that does not meet Technical Manual –10/-20 standards, and
                        modernize equipment as needed. In addition, the eight new ships will more
                        than double the amount of space available to store equipment
                        prepositioned afloat.

                        To improve the readiness of unit equipment sets aboard prepositioning
                        ships, the Army has given priority to the afloat program in its plans to
                        redistribute equipment from central Europe. As the unit sets aboard
                        prepositioning ships are filled, readiness rates should improve.

                        As of April 1997, equipment on four ships had been fully unloaded.
                        According to Army maintenance plans, the equipment aboard the
                        remaining three ships will be downloaded and restored to –10/-20
                        standards by June 1998. However, officials in the Office of the Deputy
                        Chief of Staff for Logistics said that the Army may withhold $18 million in
                        funding from the fiscal year 1997 afloat prepositioning program to help pay
                        for operations in Bosnia. These officials stated that this reduction could
                        prevent equipment prepositioned afloat from being maintained at
                        Technical Manual –10/-20 standards. As a result, equipment loaded onto
                        prepositioning ships later this year may be maintained only to the fully
                        mission capable level.



                        Page 8                                    GAO/NSIAD-97-169 Afloat Prepositioning
                        B-277122




                        The Army received a total of $45.7 million in fiscal year 1995 and 1996
Status of Maintenance   appropriations for construction of a maintenance facility at Charleston,
Facility Construction   South Carolina. The site preparation and the initial phase of construction
                        were originally scheduled to be completed before October 1996—in time
                        for the facilities to be used to conduct maintenance on the first full
                        shipload of the brigade set of equipment, which is prepositioned afloat.
                        However, contractors did not complete scheduled construction and
                        renovation projects in time. As a result, the maintenance contractor had to
                        continue to rely on temporary shelters instead (see fig. 3) and had to
                        develop less efficient maintenance processes.




                        Page 9                                   GAO/NSIAD-97-169 Afloat Prepositioning
                                    B-277122




Figure 3: Temporary Maintenance
Shelters at the Charleston, South
Carolina, Site




                                    Page 10    GAO/NSIAD-97-169 Afloat Prepositioning
                        B-277122




                        According to Army officials, the construction delays were primarily due to
                        poor soil conditions and the removal of unanticipated hazardous waste,
                        such as asbestos and pigeon droppings, from existing structures.9 The
                        officials said that the continued reliance on temporary maintenance
                        facilities did not delay the successful upload of fully mission capable
                        equipment. They also said that the only discernable impact of these less
                        efficient working conditions was a slight but unquantifiable increase in the
                        amount of overtime charged to the contract. The Army plans to complete
                        the transition of maintenance operations from the temporary shelters to
                        the permanent facilities in fall 1997. In accordance with the original facility
                        funding plan, the Army requested $7.7 million in fiscal year 1998 for
                        further construction at the site, making the total estimated cost for the
                        facility $53.4 million.


                        The Army awarded a contract in February 1995 to develop an automated
Status of War Reserve   inventory system to manage its prepositioned war reserves. Upgrades to
Information System      the system were subsequently developed to collect and report
                        maintenance and readiness data. Until July 1996, the Army reported the
                        readiness of war reserve equipment sets in terms of the full mission
                        capability of the 20 most important weapon systems. At that time, the
                        Army established a requirement for reporting the readiness condition of
                        the equipment in accordance with Army Regulation 220-1, Unit Status
                        Reporting.

                        In January 1997, the Army began having difficulty developing and
                        implementing that portion of the information system designed to report
                        the readiness of war reserve equipment. For example, the Army’s
                        January 1997 quarterly report was not produced on time and did not
                        accurately portray the true readiness condition of war reserve equipment.
                        These problems were the result of software changes that had not been
                        adequately evaluated. Specifically, changes in equipment data tables
                        caused the software to omit some equipment from the report. Army
                        officials said that they resolved software problems for the April 1997
                        readiness report by reverting to the equipment data tables used before the
                        software upgrade.

                        As of July 1997, the Army was still developing and implementing its
                        information system. The projected total cost of the Army’s contract
                        through September 1997 was about $17 million. Army officials estimated

                        9
                         According to Army officials in Charleston, pigeon droppings are considered hazardous waste because
                        exposure may cause histoplasmosis. This disease is a fungal infection that most often occurs in the
                        lungs.



                        Page 11                                                GAO/NSIAD-97-169 Afloat Prepositioning
                  B-277122




                  that development costs of the system were about $9.5 million and that the
                  costs of the contractors’ test, implementation, operation, and other
                  support efforts were about $7.5 million. Proposed improvements to the
                  system include linking the system database to existing Army maintenance
                  management systems and incorporating a requisitioning capability.


                  Because of the tendency for equipment to deteriorate while prepositioned
Recommendations   aboard ships and the inherent limitations in the Army’s ability to conduct
                  maintenance aboard ships, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense
                  direct the Secretary of the Army to ensure that unit sets of equipment that
                  affect the readiness of the brigade set are filled to their authorized levels
                  and that the equipment is maintained at the Army’s Technical Manual
                  –10/-20 standards before it is loaded onto prepositioning ships. These
                  actions would increase the probability that the Army’s goal of 90 percent
                  full mission capability is achieved.

                  To improve the quality of Army equipment status reporting, we
                  recommend that the War Reserve Support Command, along with intended
                  users of the Warfighter Equipment Status Reports, establish more accurate
                  designations for the status of non-mission capable equipment. These
                  designations should differentiate among items that can be repaired aboard
                  ship, items that are to be repaired by the logistics support team upon
                  download before deployment, and items that may not be readily repaired
                  and should be replaced.


                  In its comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
Agency Comments   recommendations and stated that several ongoing initiatives are aimed at
                  improving the readiness of Army equipment prepositioned afloat. For
                  example, DOD indicated that a multistage sealift modernization program
                  would improve readiness by transferring equipment from existing ships to
                  newer and larger vessels specially designed to store equipment at sea. DOD
                  stated that, as equipment is moved between ships, it will be upgraded to
                  the Technical Manual –10/-20 standards cited in our report. Also, DOD
                  stated that the Army is improving an information reporting system to
                  enhance visibility into equipment readiness. This action is consistent with
                  one of our recommendations. DOD’s comments appear in appendix I.




                  Page 12                                    GAO/NSIAD-97-169 Afloat Prepositioning
              B-277122




              To determine the extent to which war reserve equipment prepositioned
Scope and     afloat met the Army’s readiness goal and the key factors contributing to
Methodology   the condition of the equipment, we analyzed monthly Warfighter
              Equipment Status Reports developed by the Army’s maintenance
              contractor and materiel condition status reports used for readiness
              reporting developed by the Army’s information systems contractor. We did
              not validate the computer-generated data in these status reports; however,
              we discussed data reliability and quality with agency officials, and they
              stated that the data was reliable and accurately reflected the condition of
              war reserve equipment. We determined the major factors that contributed
              to the current condition of the equipment by interviewing Army and
              maintenance contractor officials. We also interviewed these officials to
              obtain their views on the effect of the shipboard maintenance environment
              and observed shipboard storage conditions. We obtained maintenance
              records and information on Technical Manual –10/-20 standards and
              discussed them with Army and maintenance contractor officials.

              To determine the status of the Army’s efforts to establish facilities to
              maintain war reserve equipment, we observed ongoing construction
              projects, including those at the wharf, staging areas, roadways, and
              maintenance facilities. We also observed the maintenance contractor’s use
              of temporary maintenance shelters. We examined records of construction
              contractors’ performance and interviewed Army and maintenance
              contractor officials to determine the effect of the incomplete facilities on
              the maintenance cycle. We obtained cost data on the construction projects
              from Army officials.

              To determine the status of the Army’s efforts to develop information
              systems to accurately measure and report the readiness condition of war
              reserve equipment, we obtained and discussed information on the status
              of the system with the automated information systems contractor. We also
              talked with Army officials at the Combat Equipment
              Group—Asia—Charleston Naval Weapons Station, South Carolina; Deputy
              Chiefs of Staff for Operations and Plans and for Logistics, Office of the
              Secretary of the Army, Washington, D.C.; and the War Reserve Support
              Command, Rock Island, Illinois.

              We conducted our review from August 1996 to July 1997 in accordance
              with generally accepted government accounting standards.




              Page 13                                   GAO/NSIAD-97-169 Afloat Prepositioning
B-277122




We are sending copies of this report to the Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on Readiness, Senate Committee on Armed Services; the
Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members, Senate and House Committees
on Appropriations; and the Secretaries of Defense and the Army. Copies
will also be made available to others on request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-5140 if you or your staff have any questions
concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in
appendix II.

Sincerely yours,




Mark E. Gebicke
Director, Military Operations
  and Capabilities Issues




Page 14                                  GAO/NSIAD-97-169 Afloat Prepositioning
Page 15   GAO/NSIAD-97-169 Afloat Prepositioning
Contents



Letter                                                                                              1


Appendix I                                                                                         18

Comments From the
Department of
Defense
Appendix II                                                                                        22

Major Contributors to
This Report
Figures                 Figure 1: Number of Equipment Sets That Did Not Meet the                    5
                          Army’s Readiness Goal in October 1996 and April 1997
                        Figure 2: Amount of Time That Uncorrected Faults Have                       6
                          Rendered Equipment Non-Mission Capable
                        Figure 3: Temporary Maintenance Shelters at the Charleston,                10
                          South Carolina, Site




                        Abbreviations

                        DOD       Department of Defense


                        Page 16                                 GAO/NSIAD-97-169 Afloat Prepositioning
Page 17   GAO/NSIAD-97-169 Afloat Prepositioning
Appendix I

Comments From the Department of Defense




             Page 18        GAO/NSIAD-97-169 Afloat Prepositioning
                   Appendix I
                   Comments From the Department of Defense




Now on pp. 4-7.




Now on pp. 9-11.




                   Page 19                                   GAO/NSIAD-97-169 Afloat Prepositioning
                    Appendix I
                    Comments From the Department of Defense




Now on pp. 11-12.




                    Page 20                                   GAO/NSIAD-97-169 Afloat Prepositioning
Appendix I
Comments From the Department of Defense




Page 21                                   GAO/NSIAD-97-169 Afloat Prepositioning
Appendix II

Major Contributors to This Report


                        Sharon A. Cekala
National Security and   Elliott C. Smith
International Affairs   Karen S. Blum
Division, Washington,
D.C.
                        Christopher A. Keisling
Atlanta Field Office
                        C. Douglas Mills, Jr.
Norfolk Field Office    John R. Beauchamp




(703159)                Page 22                   GAO/NSIAD-97-169 Afloat Prepositioning
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