The Results Act: Observations on DOD's Draft Strategic Plan

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1997-08-05.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                     United States
GAO                  General Accounting Office
                     Washington, D.C. 20548

                     National Security and
                     International Affairs Division


                     August 5, 1997

                     The Honorable Richard K. Armey
                     Majority Leader
                     House of Representatives

                     The Honorable John R. Kasich
                     Chairman, Committee on the Budget
                     House of Representatives

                     The Honorable Dan Burton
                     Chairman, Committee on Government
                       Reform and Oversight
                     House of Representatives

                     The Honorable Bob Livingston
                     Chairman, Committee on Appropriations
                     House of Representatives

                     Subject: The Results Act: Observations on DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan

                     On June 12, 1997, you asked us to review the draft strategic plans
                     submitted by cabinet departments and selected major agencies to facilitate
                     consultations with the Congress as required by the Government
                     Performance and Results Act of 1993 (the Results Act). This letter is our
                     response to that request concerning the Department of Defense (DOD).

                     Our overall objective was to review and evaluate DOD’s draft strategic plan.
Objectives, Scope,   Specifically, you asked us to review the draft plan and assess (1) whether
and Methodology      it complies with the act’s requirements and its overall quality, (2) whether
                     it reflects DOD’s key statutory authorities, (3) whether it reflects
                     interagency coordination of crosscutting functions, (4) whether it
                     addresses major management problems we have previously identified, and
                     (5) whether DOD’s data and information systems can provide reliable
                     information about performance.

                     The Secretary of Defense states in DOD’s May 1997 Quadrennial Defense
                     Review (QDR) report that the report will serve as DOD’s overall strategic
                     planning document and is intended to fulfill the requirements of the
                     Results Act. On June 23, 1997, the Secretary submitted to the
                     congressional authorization committees and the Senate and House

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             Appropriations Committees a letter summarizing how DOD believes the QDR
             complies with Results Act planning requirements. Congressional staff
             asked us to review this summary letter for compliance with the Results
             Act. Since the letter describes how DOD believes the QDR meets strategic
             planning requirements, we analyzed both the letter and the QDR report
             together and refer to them in this letter as DOD’s draft strategic plan. We
             sought to determine whether the letter and the QDR report, taken together,
             contained the elements that were required by the Results Act and the other
             elements you asked us to look for in agencies’ plans. We did not evaluate
             the assumptions underlying the QDR report and made no judgment about
             them or whether the QDR report met the purposes of the National Defense
             Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, which required the review. We are,
             however, evaluating certain aspects of the QDR report in a separate review.

             Our overall assessment of DOD’s draft strategic plan (the May 1997 QDR
             report and the June 1997 summary letter) was generally based on our
             knowledge of DOD’s operations and programs, our numerous reviews of
             DOD, and other information available at the time of our assessment.
             Specifically, the criteria we used to determine whether the draft plan
             complied with the requirements of the Results Act were the act itself,
             supplemented by the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) guidance
             on developing the plans (Circular A-11, Part 2). To make judgments about
             the overall quality of the draft plan and its elements, we used our May 1997
             guidance for congressional review of the plans as a tool.1 To determine
             whether the draft plan contained information on interagency coordination
             and addressed major management challenges, we relied on our general
             knowledge of DOD’s operations and programs and the results of our
             previous reports. A list of our major related products on DOD operations is
             included at the end of this letter.

             As you requested, we coordinated our work on DOD’s key statutory
             authorities and DOD’s capacity to provide reliable information with the
             Congressional Research Service and the DOD Inspector General’s office,
             respectively. We did our work between July 7 and July 25, 1997, in
             accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

             DOD has a $250 billion budget, which is 15 percent of the federal budget
Background   and an estimated 3.2 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product, to
             provide for national security. It currently has 1.45 million active duty

              Agencies’ Strategic Plans Under GPRA: Key Questions to Facilitate Congressional Review
             (GAO/GGD-10.1.16, May 1997).

             Page 2                                         GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan

    military personnel, 900,000 military reserve personnel, and 800,000 civilian
    personnel. In addition to the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine
    Corps, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
    DOD includes 24 defense agencies, such as the Defense Logistics Agency
    and the Defense Special Weapons Agency. With 10 active Army divisions, 3
    Marine expeditionary forces, 13 active Air Force fighter wings, 202
    bombers, 11 active aircraft carriers, 10 active naval air wings, 12
    amphibious ready groups, 73 attack submarines, 128 surface combatant
    ships, and reserve units and other equipment, and with 200,000 of its
    troops overseas, DOD maintains worldwide influence.

    DOD has been involved in strategic planning for many years, and the QDR is
    the fourth major review of the military since the end of the Cold War.2 DOD
    intended the QDR to be a fundamental and comprehensive examination of
    America’s defense needs from 1997 to 2015, including potential threats,
    strategy, force structure, readiness posture, military modernization
    programs, defense infrastructure, and other elements of the defense
    program. Additional planning efforts are underway or planned, however.
    Included in these efforts are

•   a separate force structure assessment, which is required by the National
    Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 to be undertaken by a
    nonpartisan, independent national defense panel and provided to Congress
    no later than December 1997;
•   a report on defense reforms, which is to be provided by a DOD task force in
    November 1997; and
•   a report with recommendations on DOD headquarters and cross-service
    occupational specialties, which is to be provided in August 1997.

    Planning is a dynamic process, and the ongoing and planned activities,
    along with any additional input from OMB, congressional staff, and other
    stakeholders, could result in changes to DOD’s plan. It is important to
    recognize that, under the Results Act, a plan is not due until September 30,
    1997. Furthermore, the Results Act anticipated that it may take several
    planning cycles to perfect the process and that the plan due September 30
    itself would be continually refined as various planning cycles occur. Thus,
    our comments reflect a snapshot status of DOD’s plan at this time.

    The Results Act requires an agency’s strategic plan to contain six critical
    components. They are (1) a comprehensive mission statement;

    The other three reviews were the 1991 Base Force Review, the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, and the 1995
    Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces.

    Page 3                                        GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan

                       (2) agencywide long-term goals and objectives for all major functions and
                       operations; (3) approaches (or strategies) and the various resources
                       needed to achieve the goals and objectives; (4) a relationship between the
                       long-term goals and objectives and the annual performance goals; (5) an
                       identification of key factors, external to the agency and beyond its control,
                       that could significantly affect the achievement of the strategic goals; and
                       (6) a description of the program evaluations used to establish or revise
                       strategic goals and a schedule for future program evaluations.

                       DOD’s draft plan includes discussions of each of the six critical components
Results in Brief       required in strategic plans. Overall, while some of the plan’s components
                       are of higher quality than others, the plan represents an adequate start for
                       addressing the requirements of the Results Act. Of note, the draft plan
                       contains a succinct mission statement and general goals and objectives
                       that cover DOD’s major functions and operations. However, the overall plan
                       could be improved by clarifying sections, adding information, and
                       improving the plan’s format. For example, the plan’s overall quality could
                       be enhanced by

                   •   stating more completely and explicitly its strategies for achieving each
                       goal and including schedules for initiating and completing significant
                   •   discussing more clearly how external factors link to and could affect
                       achieving its goals;
                   •   describing in more detail the program evaluations used in establishing its
                       strategic goals and identifying the key issues to be addressed in future
                   •   addressing what DOD has done or plans to do to resolve its persistent
                       management problems, including specific steps it plans to take, the time
                       frames and resources needed to implement its plans, and identification of
                       any external factors that could impede resolution;
                   •   beginning now to work closely with Congress and other stakeholders in
                       developing performance goals and measures;
                   •   identifying programs and activities that crosscut with other agencies’
                       programs and discussing how those efforts are being coordinated; and
                   •   developing one clear and succinct document primarily based on the QDR
                       and formatted to correspond with the Results Act’s requirements and the
                       other expectations for Results Act plans.

                       Further, to its credit, DOD’s plan included some discussion of formidable
                       management problems DOD currently faces. These problems are important

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                       because they could affect DOD’s ability to meet its strategic goals and
                       objectives. However, DOD’s discussions of management problems could be
                       more complete. For example, the significant problems DOD faces with
                       managing its contract operations were not discussed. Additionally, DOD’s
                       major concern about the reliability of program-related and financial
                       management information systems does not mention how data limitations
                       would affect its ability to measure performance and ultimately to
                       effectively manage its programs.

                       Addressing these areas would provide decisionmakers and stakeholders
                       the information necessary to ensure that DOD has strategies that are well
                       thought-out for resolving ongoing problems, achieving its goals and
                       objectives, and becoming more results-oriented, as expected by the
                       Results Act.

                       DOD’s draft plan includes discussions of each of the six critical components
DOD’s Draft Plan       required in strategic plans. Overall, while some of the plan’s components
Discusses the Act’s    are of higher quality than others, the plan represents an adequate start for
Requirements but       addressing the requirements of the Results Act. However, its plan could be
                       improved if it were to more closely follow the guidance provided in OMB
Could Elaborate on     Circular A-11 and to include more comprehensive discussions for each of
Some Components        the required components. Two exceptions are the mission statement,
                       which succinctly states DOD’s mission, and the general goals and
                       objectives, which cover DOD’s major functions and operations.

Mission Statement      A mission statement provides an agency focus by explaining why it exists
                       and what it does. OMB Circular A-11 states that an agency’s mission
                       statement should briefly define the basic purpose of the agency, with
                       particular focus on its core programs and activities. DOD’s draft plan
                       includes a concise mission statement that meets this criterion. It states,
                       “The mission of the Department of Defense is to support and defend the
                       Constitution of the United States, to provide for the common defense of
                       the United States, its citizens and its allies, and to protect and advance
                       U.S. interests around the world.”

Goals and Objectives   DOD’s draft plan covers its major functions and operations under the
                       following six goals and objectives:

                       1. Harness the unmatched capabilities of the U.S. armed forces to

                       Page 5                              GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan

•   shape the international security environment in favorable ways by
    promoting regional stability, preventing crises and reducing threats, and
    deterring adversaries on a day-to-day basis;
•   respond to the full spectrum of crises—from deterrence to smaller-scale
    contingency operations to major theater war—when it is in the U.S.
    interests to do so and maintain the capability to deter and, if necessary,
    defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in
    overlapping time frames, preferably in concert with regional allies; and
•   prepare now to meet the challenges of an uncertain future by transforming
    U.S. combat capabilities and support structures to be able to shape and
    respond effectively well into the 21st century.

    2. Recruit and retain well-qualified military personnel and provide them
    with an equal opportunity and a high quality of life.

    3. Support friends and allies by sustaining and adapting security alliances,
    enhancing coalition warfighting, and forging military relationships that
    protect and advance U.S. security interests.

    4. Pursue a focused modernization effort that maintains U.S. qualitative
    superiority in key warfighting capabilities, exploits the Revolution in
    Military Affairs,3 and supports the joint operational concepts delineated in
    Joint Vision 2010.4

    5. Maintain the U.S. edge in combat readiness while seeking efficiencies
    and improved operating procedures. 6. Fundamentally reengineer DOD and
    achieve a 21st century infrastructure by reducing costs and eliminating
    unnecessary expenditures while maintaining required military capabilities
    across all DOD mission areas. Employ modern management tools and
    exploit the Revolution in Business Affairs.5

     The Revolution in Military Affairs refers to efforts to develop the improved capabilities needed to
    significantly enhance joint military operations, particularly improved information and command and
    control capabilities that can provide DOD an advanced, secure, open command, control,
    communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability.
     Joint Vision 2010 is the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s conceptual template for how America’s armed forces
    plan to channel the vitality and innovation of their people and leverage technological opportunities to
    achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting. It develops four operational concepts for
    fighting in the early 21st century—dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional
    protection, and focused logistics.
     The Revolution in Business Affairs refers to DOD’s efforts to reengineer its infrastructure and
    business practices, such as outsourcing and privatizing a wide range of support activities and reducing
    unneeded standards and specifications.

    Page 6                                            GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan

                      The Results Act requires an agency’s plan to include outcome-related goals
                      and objectives that relate to the agency’s general goals and objectives for
                      its major functions and operations. Also, our May 1997 guidance for
                      congressional review of agencies’ strategic plans states that an agency’s
                      strategic goals should explain what results are expected from the agency’s
                      major functions. DOD’s goals address its major mission-related
                      functions—preparing for and defending the United States and its
                      interests—and generally appear to be oriented to outcomes. However,
                      DOD’s goals are expressed in terms that may make it difficult for DOD to
                      translate them into quantitatively measurable performance goals so that
                      stakeholders and decisionmakers can determine whether the goals are
                      actually being achieved.

Strategies and the    DOD’s  draft plan includes considerable discussion of the strategies it will
Resources Needed to   use to achieve its goals and objectives. However, although the discussions
Achieve Goals and     in general could be more complete and explicit, discussions are more
                      informative for some goals than for others. The draft plan also discusses in
Objectives            general the resources that will be needed to achieve the goals, such as a
                      stable budget, the number of military and civilian personnel, the force
                      structure, and some of the technologies. It does not, however, contain the
                      schedules for initiating or completing significant strategy actions that OMB
                      Circular A-11 guidance requires in agencies’ strategic plans. DOD could
                      improve the plan and provide stakeholders and decisionmakers a more
                      complete understanding of its strategies by fully and explicitly listing the
                      strategies for achieving each of its general goals and objectives and
                      including, where feasible, schedules for initiating and completing
                      significant strategy actions.

                      One of the more informative presentations of strategies to achieve a goal
                      was DOD’s discussion of its sixth goal—fundamentally reengineering DOD.
                      Our work has shown that it will be key for DOD to continue working to
                      change its culture to one that is more acceptive of modern business
                      practices to successfully implement this strategy. Among DOD’s strategies
                      for this goal are (1) outsourcing certain Defense Logistics Agency
                      functions; (2) consolidating Defense Information Service Agency
                      information processing centers; (3) conducting public-private
                      competitions for certain depot maintenance work; (4) streamlining the
                      security investigative process at the Defense Investigative Service;
                      (5) taking maximum advantage of acquisition reform; (6) increasing
                      cooperative development programs with allies; (7) competing,
                      outsourcing, or privatizing military department infrastructure functions

                      Page 7                              GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan

                       that are closely related to commercial enterprises; (8) reducing unneeded
                       standards and specifications; (9) integrating process and product
                       development; and (10) increasing the use of commercial technology,
                       dual-use technology, and open systems. Further, DOD expects additional
                       reengineering ideas and recommendations to result from an August 1997
                       report on the study of headquarters and cross-service occupational
                       specialties and in a November 1997 report from the Task Force on Defense
                       Reform. Another of its strategies for reengineering is to seek legislation for
                       two more base realignment and closure rounds and relief from the
                       statutory requirement that at least 60 percent of depot maintenance
                       activities be done in DOD depots. DOD also plans to make additional
                       legislative proposals to further streamline and increase efficiency in its

                       On the other hand, DOD’s discussion for its second goal—recruiting and
                       retaining well-qualified military personnel and providing them an equal
                       opportunity and a high quality of life—was less informative. The draft plan
                       notes that DOD (1) has identified where policy or practice changes that will
                       improve quality-of-life can be made and will implement them; (2) remains
                       committed to funding pay raises and other compensation; (3) will make
                       every effort to continue its commitment to provide adequate funding in
                       areas such as housing, community and family support, transition
                       assistance as further reductions are made in military forces, and morale
                       and recreation activities; and (4) will continue placing a priority on
                       educational assistance.

Relating Annual        DOD’s draft plan represents a good start toward trying to link DOD’s general
Performance Goals to   goals with quantitatively measurable annual performance goals or
General Goals and      descriptions of what would represent progress toward achieving general
                       goals. Such a linkage is important because it would allow Congress to
Objectives             judge whether DOD is achieving its goals. The Results Act calls for
                       quantifiable performance measures, if feasible. If such measures are not
                       feasible, however, the act allows, with authorization from OMB, for the use
                       of descriptive statements of both a minimally effective and a successful
                       program. The draft plan states that its annual performance plan, which the
                       Results Act first requires for fiscal year 1999 and is not yet completed, will
                       include the required performance measures or descriptive statements
                       along with the general goals to which they relate. However, DOD’s goals are
                       expressed in terms that may make it difficult for DOD to translate them into
                       quantitatively measurable performance goals that will enable stakeholders
                       and decisionmakers to determine the extent to which they are actually

                       Page 8                               GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan

                           being achieved. That could be the reason some measures DOD is currently
                           planning to use measure resource inputs or outputs rather than results.
                           For example, DOD currently plans to compare the force structure it will
                           need with the force structure included in its future budgets as a measure
                           of achieving its first goal—shaping the international security environment,
                           responding to crises, and preparing now to meet uncertain future
                           challenges. As another example, DOD plans to report the number of major
                           joint exercises conducted during a fiscal year as one measure of its fifth
                           goal—maintaining the U.S. edge in combat readiness. DOD’s draft plan
                           notes that it plans to work with key stakeholders in developing the Results
                           Act performance plan that is first required for fiscal year 1999. By
                           beginning now to work closely with Congress and other stakeholders to
                           develop its performance measures and goals, DOD might improve the
                           specificity with which it could relate general goals and objectives and
                           performance goals and measures in its strategic plan and also better
                           assure that its annual performance plan, when completed, will meet the
                           purposes of the Results Act.

Key External Factors       OMB Circular A-11 points out that agencies’ achievement of their goals and
                           objectives can be influenced by certain external factors that exist, occur,
                           or change over the time period covered by their plans. The circular notes
                           that these factors can be economic, demographic, social, or environmental
                           in nature. It states that the strategic plan should describe each external
                           factor, indicate its link with a particular goal(s), and describe how
                           achieving the goal could be affected by the factor.

                           DOD’sdraft plan identified the following factors it believes are external and
                           could influence the achievement of its goals and objectives:

                       •   The uncertainty of the international environment, particularly the potential
                           emergence of a regional great power or near-peer competitor in the
                           1997-2015 time frame or of “wild card” scenarios, such as the
                           unanticipated emergence of new technological threats, for which the
                           United States is unprepared.
                       •   The possibility that Congress may not enact legislative changes DOD
                           included among its strategies for achieving its sixth goal about
                           fundamentally reengineering the Department, particularly authority for
                           two more base realignment and closure-type processes to help reduce DOD
                           infrastructure and relief from the statutory requirement to perform at least
                           60 percent of depot maintenance activities in DOD depots.

                           Page 9                               GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan

                              •   The possibility that annual appropriations could fall below the $250 billion
                                  per year, adjusted for inflation, which DOD says will be needed to achieve
                                  its goals. (We believe this should not be considered an external factor,
                                  because receiving a reasonable budget is the basis of an agency’s strategic
                                  plan under the Results Act.)

                                  DOD  could improve the draft plan by clearly discussing the linkage of each
                                  external factor with the goals and the effect of each external factor on the
                                  goals. DOD’s draft plan does not clearly link the international environment
                                  factor with particular goals or discuss the implications on goal
                                  achievement. The draft plan does indicate that if the legislative changes
                                  are not made and savings in infrastructure costs are not realized, DOD may
                                  not have the level of procurement funding it will need to achieve its fourth
                                  goal—modernizing the force. DOD plans to use savings from reducing
                                  infrastructure to increase its procurement funding from the $42.6 billion it
                                  requested for fiscal year 1998 to $60 billion a year by fiscal year 2001.

Program Evaluations               The Results Act requires an agency’s plan to include a description of the
                                  program evaluations that were used in establishing its strategic goals and
                                  to lay out a schedule for future program evaluations. OMB’s Circular A-11
                                  guidance calls for a brief description of the program evaluations that were
                                  used in preparing the plan and for the plan to outline (1) the general scope
                                  and methodology for planned future evaluations, (2) key issues to be
                                  addressed, and (3) a schedule for future evaluations.

                                  Although DOD’s draft plan identifies various reviews DOD relied on in
                                  developing the draft, particularly reviews of strategy, force structure,
                                  readiness, modernization, infrastructure, human resources, and
                                  information operations and intelligence, it does not clearly discuss how
                                  program evaluations were used in establishing the strategic goals. A clear
                                  and complete discussion would improve the plan. Additionally, although
                                  the draft plan states that future evaluations will be done annually in the
                                  May to September time frame, it does not clearly outline the key issues to
                                  be addressed. Including a fuller discussion of the key issues to be
                                  addressed is another way the draft plan could be improved.

Observations on the               Although the draft plan discusses each of the six Results Act’s
Overall Quality of the Plan       requirements, the overall quality of the plan could be improved by
                                  incorporating the suggestions discussed in the prior sections. For
                                  example, we noted the plan could be improved if DOD more completely and

                                  Page 10                             GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan

                       explicitly stated its strategies for achieving each goal and included
                       schedules for initiating and completing significant strategy actions.

                       Additionally, we believe that the plan’s overall quality would be
                       significantly enhanced if the entire plan was presented in one clear and
                       succinct document formatted in sections to correspond to the six critical
                       components required in the plans and included the additional factors, such
                       as major management problems and crosscutting functions, that you
                       indicated should be discussed in agencies’ plans.

                       DOD’s was the only draft agency strategic plan we obtained that used a
                       planning document prepared to meet another requirement for its Results
                       Act plan. Other agencies’ draft plans were prepared specifically to meet
                       the requirements of the Results Act. We understand the Secretary of
                       Defense’s intent to use the results of the QDR in meeting the strategic
                       planning requirements of the Results Act. However, as DOD’s draft plan is
                       currently constructed, two documents are required for stakeholders and
                       decisionmakers to fully understand the degree to which DOD complies with
                       Results Act strategic planning requirements—the QDR report and the
                       June 23, 1997 summary letter that describes how the QDR meets the
                       requirements by linking the requirements to the QDR report. We think that
                       one document—a stand alone strategic plan prepared specifically to meet
                       the requirements of the Results Act, regardless of the base from which it
                       was drawn—could significantly improve stakeholders’ and
                       decisionmakers’ understanding of how DOD is meeting the strategic
                       planning requirements of the Results Act.

                       DOD’s strategic plan does not discuss the major pieces of legislation that
DOD’s Statutory        serve as the basis for its mission statement. However, in its statements of
Responsibilities Are   mission, goals, and objectives, DOD’s plan reflects its broad statutory
Reflected in Its       defense responsibilities. DOD’s statutory responsibilities are primarily
                       found in title 10 of the United States Code. The organizational structure of
Mission, Goals, and    the Department of Defense was established by the National Security Act of
Objectives             1947. The current structure also reflects the Goldwater-Nichols
                       Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, which modified how
                       DOD’s mission is implemented. With the Secretary of Defense as its head,
                       DOD is composed of several entities, including the three military
                       departments. The Secretary is vested with the authority, direction, and
                       control of the Department (10 U.S.C. 113), but it is the component military
                       departments, not the Secretary, that are vested with the specific
                       authorities reflected in DOD’s mission statement and goals. Generally, these

                       Page 11                              GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan

                   authorities pertain to the defense of the United States, supporting national
                   policies, implementing national objectives, and waging war (10 U.S.C. §§
                   3062, 5062, and 8062). Additionally, the secretaries of the military
                   departments, while subject to the authority, direction, and control of the
                   Secretary of Defense, have broad governance over their respective
                   departments in such areas as recruiting, organizing, equipping, supplying,
                   and training (10 U.S.C. §§ 3013, 5013, and 8013).

                   Crosscutting functions are not identified as such in DOD’s draft plan, nor
Including          are the statutes that authorize DOD operations in areas of concern to other
Crosscutting       federal agencies specifically mentioned. A key area where coordination
Activities Would   with other agencies is essential to the accomplishment of DOD’s mission is
                   in the development and implementation of national security strategy and
Improve DOD’s      the shaping of the international environment. In addition to DOD, other
Strategic Plan     agencies with key roles include the Department of State, the National
                   Security Council, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the
                   Department of Energy, and to a lesser extent, the U.S. Agency for
                   International Development. For example, failed or failing states such as
                   Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Albania create instability, internal
                   conflict, and humanitarian crises that require a joint and coordinated
                   response by several U.S. agencies. Moreover, DOD, State, and other
                   agencies cooperate in a number of programs and activities aimed at
                   helping to shape the international environment. These include security
                   assistance programs, the International Military Education and Training
                   program, and other international arms agreements. While DOD’s draft
                   strategic plan acknowledges that DOD’s efforts in these areas are clearly
                   integrated with U.S. diplomatic efforts, the extent and mechanisms for
                   cooperation and coordination are not described.

                   The federal government’s adaptive responses over time to new needs and
                   problems have also contributed to fragmentation and overlap in a host of
                   other program areas. DOD, for example, has crosscutting programs in such
                   diverse areas as education, telemedicine, personnel security,
                   environmental compliance, export promotion, and community
                   development, among others. Although DOD’s plan touches briefly on
                   biological and chemical threats, its interaction with other agencies on
                   these matters, such as assisting the Attorney General in an emergency
                   situation, is not dealt with in detail. Similarly, DOD’s plan does not discuss
                   its interaction with various law enforcement agencies in our country’s war
                   on drugs. For example, the plan does not mention that DOD is the lead
                   agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of

                   Page 12                              GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan

                      illegal drugs in support of the counterdrug activities of federal, state, local,
                      and foreign law enforcement agencies or that it is authorized to share
                      information with and make equipment available to law enforcement
                      agencies. Further, although DOD and other agencies involved with
                      environmental issues have experimented with a wide range of
                      partnerships in recent years, the plan does not discuss these efforts.

                      Consultation and coordination are important for these and other
                      crosscutting programs because successfully meeting program goals may
                      depend on actions by both DOD and partner agencies. In the environmental
                      area, for example, cooperative efforts with other agencies, conservation
                      organizations, and concerned citizens can be an important tool in ensuring
                      timely and cost-effective environmental protection. Overlapping and
                      fragmented programs waste scarce funds, confuse and frustrate program
                      customers, and limit the overall effectiveness of the federal effort.
                      Additionally, the Results Act’s focus on results implies that federal
                      programs contributing to the same or similar results should be closely
                      coordinated to ensure that goals are consistent, and as appropriate,
                      program efforts are mutually reinforcing. Therefore, we believe DOD’s
                      strategic plan should include a discussion of crosscutting programs to
                      provide decisionmakers and other stakeholders the information necessary
                      to help ensure that DOD has designed well thought-out strategies in
                      consultation with partner agencies to achieve programmatic and other

                      Over the years, we, the DOD Inspector General, and the services’ inspectors
Strategic Plan’s      general have reported on major management problems that DOD faces in
Coverage of Major     carrying out its mission. More recently, in our high-risk series report6 and
Management            related testimony,7 we noted that DOD has long-standing management
                      problems in six high-risk areas: financial management, information
Challenges Is Mixed   technology, weapon systems acquisition, contract management,
                      infrastructure, and inventory management. DOD also reported material
                      internal control weaknesses related to all of these areas except weapon
                      systems acquisition and infrastructure in its fiscal year 1996 Federal
                      Managers’ Financial Integrity Act report to the President and Congress. It
                      is important for DOD to correct these management problems because every
                      dollar it spends inefficiently is one less dollar it has to spend on
                      modernizing its forces and keeping them ready to perform their missions.

                       High-Risk Series: An Overview (GAO/HR-97-1, Feb. 1997).
                       DOD High-Risk Areas: Eliminating Underlying Causes Will Avoid Billions of Dollars in Waste
                      (GAO/T-NSIAD/AIMD-97-143, May 1, 1997).

                      Page 13                                         GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan

DOD has taken or plans actions to correct most of these problems and has
made progress in some areas. For example, in response to our
recommendations, DOD implemented certain commercial practices in its
inventory management area, such as direct vendor delivery for medical8
and food9 items, and states in the plan that it will continue to take
advantage of business process improvements being pioneered in the
private sector. DOD, to its credit, also included some discussion in the draft
plan of what it is doing or plans to do to resolve most of these problems.

The extent of DOD’s coverage of these persistent management problems
(high-risk areas) in its draft plan is mixed, however, as noted in table 1. In
determining the extent of coverage given these areas, we considered
several factors, including whether DOD’s draft plan identified (1) the
actions it had taken, was taking, or planned to take to resolve the
problems; (2) the time frames for correcting the problems; (3) the
resources needed to resolve the problems; and (4) any external factors
that might impede DOD’s efforts.

Using these criteria, the high-risk area with the best
coverage—infrastructure—lists several steps DOD has taken or is planning
to take, such as requesting authority for two additional rounds of base
realignments and closures; restructuring laboratories and research,
development, and test facilities; outsourcing and privatizing noncore
activities; and taking advantage of private sector practices, among others.
It includes time frames, needed resources, and external factors for some
but not all elements of its strategy to resolve this problem. In the area with
the least coverage—contract management—the plan merely states that
DOD will streamline vendor pay but does not discuss how past control
problems over contract expenditures are being or will be addressed.

Most of the other management problems lack specificity in terms of steps
DOD will take to resolve them, time frames for resolution, needed
resources, or external factors that could affect successful resolution. At a
minimum, in problem areas where DOD has taken successful corrective
actions, it would be useful for DOD to discuss how it addressed the
problems and intends to prevent them from resurfacing. The plan could
identify other problems where DOD may have had less success and discuss
how it plans to resolve them. Such details could be useful in determining

 DOD Medical Inventory: Reductions Can Be Made Through the Use of Commercial Practices
(GAO/NSIAD-92-58, Dec. 5, 1991).
 DOD Food Inventory: Using Private Sector Practices Can Reduce Costs and Eliminate Problems
(GAO/NSIAD-93-110, June 6, 1993).

Page 14                                       GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan

the extent to which these persistent management problems could impede
DOD’s efforts to achieve its goals and objectives or its efforts at measuring
performance. DOD could significantly improve its strategic plan by
including this degree of specificity, since its ability to successfully
implement the Results Act could be hampered by these persistent
management problems.

Page 15                              GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan

Table 1: Extent to Which Persistent
Management Problems Are Covered in    High-risk area   The problem                            Coverage in the plan
DOD’s Strategic Plan                  Financial        DOD does not have adequate             Partial. The plan states that DOD
                                      management       financial management                   plans to consolidate and
                                                       processes in place to produce          outsource much of this function.
                                                       the information it needs for
                                                       making decisions affecting its
                                                       operations and accountability.
                                      Information      DOD spends billions annually on        Partial. The plan states that DOD
                                      management and   information technology but             plans to consolidate 16 large
                                      technology       makes system selections without        information processing centers
                                                       appropriately analyzing costs,         into 6 but lacks specific
                                                       benefits, and technical risks;         discussion of how it will ensure
                                                       establishing realistic project         the systems are compatible and
                                                       schedules; or considering how          the data produced are reliable.
                                                       business process improvements
                                                       could affect technology
                                      Weapon systems   Wasteful practices, including          Partial. The plan states DOD will
                                      acquisition      establishing questionable              take maximum advantage of
                                                       requirements for weapon                acquisition reform but lacks
                                                       systems; projecting unrealistic        specificity on how the reforms
                                                       cost, schedule, and                    are expected to address the
                                                       performance estimates; and             problems.
                                                       beginning production before
                                                       adequate testing has been
                                                       completed, add billions of
                                                       dollars to defense weapon
                                                       systems acquisition costs.
                                      Contract         Inadequate controls over               None. The plan does not
                                      management       contract expenditures risk             discuss how controls will be
                                                       millions of dollars in                 strengthened, only that DOD will
                                                       overpayments to contractors.           streamline vendor pay.
                                      Infrastructure   In recent years, DOD has               Partial. The plan discusses
                                                       undergone substantial                  specific steps DOD is taking or
                                                       downsizing in force structure but      plans to take to reduce
                                                       commensurate reductions in             infrastructure and quantifies the
                                                       operations and support costs           expected reductions.
                                                       have not been achieved.
                                      Inventory        Fundamental control                    Partial. The plan discusses DOD
                                      management       deficiencies in inventory              initiatives such as Joint Total
                                                       management systems and                 Asset Visibility and the Global
                                                       procedures make DOD                    Combat Support System but
                                                       vulnerable to billions of dollars in   lacks specifics and time frames.
                                                       unneeded inventory.

                                      Page 16                                GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan

                             A lack of reliable management information is a serious problem
DOD Does Not Have            throughout DOD. Until the DOD can reliably obtain such information, its
Reliable Information         ability to effectively oversee and manage its vast operations, including
for Helping Achieve          developing and implementing a viable strategic plan for achieving the
                             performance measurement objectives of the Results Act, will continue to
Its Goals or Measuring       be impaired. If DOD is to obtain reliable management information, it must
Its Results                  overcome a number of challenging problems, particularly those in the
                             critical areas of financial management and information systems

                             DOD has acknowledged a departmentwide problem in accumulating
                             accurate and complete cost accounting information. Without reliable cost
                             and other management information, DOD will be limited in its ability to
                             establish reasonable performance measures and to reliably assess
                             progress against these measures across the spectrum of its operations. As
                             DOD faces difficult decisions associated with balancing scarce resources
                             with critical needs, accurate, reliable, and timely information on financial
                             aspects of performance will be particularly important to consider in
                             judging program results. In addition, DOD has had only limited success in
                             implementing departmentwide information technology initiatives. Yet,
                             many of the goals and objectives included in the DOD’s draft plan rely
                             heavily on the effective use of information technology.

DOD Faces Considerable       Financial statements, prepared and audited in accordance with the Chief
Challenge If It Is to        Financial Officers’ (CFO) Act, provide an annual scorecard to measure
                             DOD’s progress in resolving its financial management reporting
Develop Reliable Financial
                             deficiencies. Since 1991, several of the military services and major DOD
Information                  components have attempted to prepare financial statements in accordance
                             with the CFO Act’s requirements. None of the financial statements prepared
                             by the military services or major DOD components have been sufficiently
                             reliable to withstand the scrutiny of a financial statement audit. In
                             addition, auditors found that DOD’s first attempt to prepare
                             departmentwide financial statements for fiscal year 1996 were unauditable
                             due to problems within DOD’s accounting systems and internal control

                             Deficiencies identified in auditors’ reports have prevented DOD managers
                             from obtaining reliable financial information needed for sound
                             decisionmaking across the spectrum of the Department’s financial
                             operations. In addition, auditors have consistently found that DOD financial
                             data available for decisionmaking have been adversely affected because

                             Page 17                              GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan

many basic control procedures either were not in place or were not
followed. Auditors have also reported that DOD lacks reliable information
on billions of dollars of disbursements as well as on other critical areas of
the Department’s operations.

Our and DOD auditors’ reports have confirmed that DOD does not have
accurate cost data for almost all of its assets, such as inventories of
equipment, aircraft, and missiles, nor can DOD accumulate reliable
information on the cost of its business activities and critical operations.
For example, auditors have reported that DOD managers did not have
accurate information on actual operating and capital costs to consider
when making decisions to replace or upgrade weapon systems or on the
actual costs associated with base closure and realignment decisions. Our
reports have also disclosed that pervasive weaknesses in DOD’s general
computer controls placed DOD at risk of improper modification or loss of
sensitive financial data. In addition, as discussed in the following section,
DOD’s information system efforts, including systems relied on to provide
financial data, will be critical to reliably measuring performance. DOD
relies on an estimated 10,000 automated systems to carry out its mission,
including accounting, finance, logistics, personnel, budgetary, and other
management information. Few of these systems are effectively tied
together. DOD has acknowledged that its financial operations are plagued
with duplicative processes and are slow and error prone.

DOD has recognized the importance of tackling these financial management
deficiencies and has many initiatives planned or underway that are
intended to address them. One of the major initiatives directed at
improving its cost accounting capabilities was the establishment of a set of
working capital funds intended to focus attention on the total costs of
carrying out certain critical DOD business operations, including helping to
better manage the costs associated with maintaining DOD’s weapon
systems. However, DOD’s efforts in this area have been plagued with
implementation problems. For example, past financial reports on the
funds’ operations were not sufficiently reliable to determine whether they
met their financial goal of operating on a break-even basis. DOD has also
begun an initiative directed at better ensuring that senior DOD managers
play a more active role in correcting poor controls.

To its credit, DOD has also recognized business process reengineering as a
key element in its financial management reform initiatives. However, we
have expressed concern over whether reengineering efforts have focused
largely on greater use of technology within existing processes and

Page 18                              GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan

                             organizations. Using this approach may not result in the radical
                             improvements in processes and practices—and associated financial
                             management information—DOD envisioned.

                             We believe that DOD’s draft plan could be significantly enhanced by
                             addressing how it will ensure that financial data used to measure and
                             manage program performance are complete, reliable, and timely. At a
                             minimum, DOD’s strategic plan could include a discussion of what DOD has
                             done, is doing, and plans to do to address financial data problems,
                             particularly those highlighted through the annual public scorecard
                             provided by the CFO Act financial statement audits, and the ease or
                             difficulty it anticipates in obtaining financial data needed to assist in
                             measuring results. Because of the widespread nature of acknowledged
                             financial management deficiencies and the large number of DOD
                             components relied on to carry out the DOD’s financial operations, it is also
                             critical for DOD’s plan to address the development of actions to unite the
                             organizational support and commitment of DOD’s logistics, personnel,
                             accounting, and budget components.

DOD Faces Considerable       Many of DOD’s general goals and objectives rely on the effective use of
Challenge in Managing        information technology to obtain the stated goal, as well as to measure
Information Technology If    progress toward its achievement. For example, DOD’s sixth goal—to
                             fundamentally reengineer the Department to reduce infrastructure costs
It Is to Achieve Its Goals   by using modern management tools and exploiting the Revolution in
                             Business Affairs—will require fundamental changes in the underlying
                             support systems. Further, DOD’s first strategic goal for harnessing the
                             capabilities of the U.S. armed forces also relies on the effective use of
                             information technology. For example, in discussing in its draft plan the
                             critical enablers necessary to sustain military capabilities, DOD states that
                             “our global communications must allow for the timely exchange of
                             information, data, decisions, and orders. . . The ability to gather, process,
                             and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of reliable and precise information
                             anywhere in the world and under any conditions is a tremendous strategic
                             and military advantage.” To achieve this capability, DOD must develop
                             computer systems and communications channels that interoperate
                             seamlessly, develop and enforce data standards, and greatly reduce system

                             We have consistently reported that DOD has not succeeded in its efforts to
                             modernize its information infrastructure. In fact, we placed DOD’s
                             Corporate Information Management (CIM) initiative on our list of

                             Page 19                              GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan

government information management and technology programs at high
risk. CIM was intended, in large part, to reengineer key business processes
and reduce the number of redundant DOD systems. With CIM, DOD intended
that business services such as logistics and health care would be improved
and that costs would be greatly reduced. This effort has not succeeded, in
part, because of DOD’s difficulty in managing large-scale technology
initiatives across the Department. The prevailing culture too frequently
demands unique solutions at each organizational level.

The Clinger-Cohen Act was enacted in 1996 to foster better management
of technology resources at all levels by encouraging strong leadership in
technology management oversight, calling for effective controls over
technology investments, and requiring agencies to consider alternatives
before making substantial investments in technology upgrades or systems
modernization. Because DOD’s strategic goals are so fundamentally linked
to technology and because DOD has experienced significant difficulties in
managing technology initiatives, we believe its strategic plan would be
significantly enhanced by more explicitly linking these goals to a strategy
for improving management and oversight through implementation of the
Clinger-Cohen Act.

Additionally, DOD should recognize the dramatic impact the year 2000
problem10 will likely have on computer operations throughout the
agency—including the mission critical applications identified in its draft
strategic plan. Our initial review of DOD components’ response to the year
2000 problem has been mixed. While some small segments within DOD are
responding well to the issue, other organizational units face a potential
disaster unless planning and implementation activities are dramatically

Finally, DOD needs to recognize in its plan that many of its individual
systems are extremely vulnerable to data loss, unwanted browsing, and
loss of access due to computer hacking. Our 1996 report showed that DOD
suffered over 250,000 hacker attacks in 1995, with over 60 percent of the
attacks successfully gaining access.11 In discussing the global security
environment, DOD’s draft plan recognizes that information warfare
capability is one of a number of areas of “particular concern,” especially as

 On January 1, 2000, many computer systems, including DOD and defense contractor systems, if not
adequately modified, will either fail to run or malfunction simply because the equipment and software
were not designed to accommodate the change of the date to the new millennium.
 Information Security: Computer Attacks at Department of Defense Pose Increasing Risks
(GAO/AIMD-96-84, May 22, 1996).

Page 20                                          GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan

                         it involves vulnerabilities that could be exploited by potential opponents.
                         Again, this problem is so pervasive throughout DOD and so critical to
                         successful implementation of its goals that we believe its plan should
                         specifically address this issue.

                         On July 30, 1997, we provided a draft of this letter to DOD for comment. On
Agency Comments          July 31, 1997, we met with Department officials, who agreed that DOD’s
and Our Evaluation       strategic plan could be improved in some respects. They indicated that as
                         DOD’s planning processes move forward, DOD will consider the suggestions
                         made in our letter.

                         Regarding our discussion on crosscutting federal agencies’ programs, DOD
                         officials stated that DOD coordinates and cooperates with other federal
                         agencies extensively as part of its ongoing strategic planning process.
                         They believed such coordination and cooperation were consistent with
                         DOD’s effort to make the most efficient use of government resources.

                         Regarding our discussion on persistent management problems, the
                         officials said that addressing persistent management problems in an
                         agency’s strategic plan is not required by the Results Act. They noted,
                         however, that each management problem identified in our letter is being
                         actively addressed in DOD. Much of the detail, they said, can be found in
                         underlying DOD strategic plans, such as the DOD Logistics Strategic Plan,
                         which provides DOD managers and stakeholders with comprehensive
                         planning information. They added that DOD managers, oversight bodies,
                         and stakeholders can get a better understanding of how the Department is
                         addressing these areas by referring to these lower-level plans. DOD officials
                         said that the persistent management problems mentioned in our letter are
                         addressed in the following lower level-plans.

                     •   Financial Management: DOD Chief Financial Officer’s Financial
                         Management Report and 5 Year Plan 1996-2000 and the Defense Finance
                         and Accounting Service, Accounting Systems Strategic Plan (Apr. 1997).
                     •   Information Management and Technology: DOD Information Technology
                         Management Plan (Mar. 1997).
                     •   Weapons Systems Acquisition: Acquisition Reform - Mandate for Change
                         (Feb. 1994); Defense Acquisition Pilot Programs Annual Report (1996);
                         Acquisition Reform Benchmarking Group Final Report (June 1997); and
                         DOD’s Three Year Acquisition Goals as a designated National Performance
                         Review Reinvention Impact Center (RIC) (July 1997).

                         Page 21                              GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan

•   Contract Management: Defense Logistics Agency Performance Report
    (May 1997).
•   Infrastructure: the Secretary of Defense commissioned a report from the
    Task Force on Defense Reform, which is due in November 1997.
•   Inventory Management: DOD Logistics Strategic Plan (June 1996); update
    expected in October 1997.

    We did not evaluate or comment in this letter on DOD’s efforts to address
    persistent management problems or its coordination and cooperation with
    other agencies on crosscutting programs. Our point is that DOD could
    improve its draft strategic plan by including more of a discussion of these
    topics. With respect to major management problems, we recognize that
    this type of information is not specifically required to be included in DOD’s
    plan. However, as we state in our letter, DOD’s persistent management
    problems could impede its efforts to achieve its goals and objectives and
    to measure performance. Therefore, we continue to believe that DOD’s
    strategic plan should include a more extensive discussion of the steps it
    has taken or plans to take to resolve its management problems.

    As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents
    earlier, we plan no further distribution of this letter until 30 days from its
    issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this letter to the Minority
    Leader of the House of Representatives; Ranking Minority Members of
    your Committees; the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of other
    Committees that have jurisdiction over DOD activities; the Secretary of
    Defense; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will
    be made available to others on request.

    Please contact me at (202) 512-8412 or Ken Knouse at (202) 512-9280 if you
    or your staff have any questions concerning this letter. Major contributors
    to this report are listed in enclosure I.

    David R. Warren, Director
    Defense Management Issues

    Page 22                               GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan
Page 23   GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan
Enclosure I

Major Contributors to This Report

                        Charles I. (Bud) Patton, Jr.
National Security and   Kenneth R. Knouse, Jr.
International Affairs   F. Earl Morrison
Division Washington,    Yolanda C. ElSerwy
                        Harold J. Johnson, Jr.
D.C.                    Barbara L. Wooten

                        Jack L. Brock, Jr.
Accounting and          Geoffrey B. Frank
Management Division
Washington, D.C.
                        William T. Woods
Office of General
Counsel, Washington,

                        Page 24                        GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan
Page 25   GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan
Page 26   GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan
Page 27   GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan
Related GAO Products

                    DOD High-Risk Areas: Eliminating Underlying Causes Will Avoid Billions of
High-Risk Areas     Dollars in Waste (GAO/T-NSIAD/AIMD-97-143, May 1, 1997).

                    Defense Financial Management (GAO/HR 97-3, Feb. 1997).

                    Defense Contract Management (GAO/HR-97-4, Feb. 1997).

                    Defense Inventory Management (GAO/HR 97-5, Feb. 1997).

                    Defense Weapon Systems Acquisition (GAO/HR 97-6, Feb. 1997).

                    Defense Infrastructure (GAO/HR 97-7, Feb. 1997).

                    Information Management and Technology (GAO/HR 97-9, Feb. 1997).

                    Financial Management: DOD Inventory of Financial Management Systems Is
Defense Financial   Incomplete (GAO/AIMD-97-29, Jan. 31, 1997).
                    DOD Accounting Systems: Efforts to Improve System for Navy Need Overall
                    Structure (GAO/AIMD-96-99, Sept. 30, 1996).

                    Navy Financial Management: Improved Management of Operating
                    Materials and Supplies Could Yield Significant Savings (GAO/AIMD-96-94,
                    Aug. 16, 1996).

                    CFOAct Financial Audits: Navy Plant Property Accounting and Reporting Is
                    Unreliable (GAO/AIMD-96-65, July 8, 1996).

                    Financial Management: DOD Needs to Lower the Disbursement
                    Prevalidation Threshold (GAO/AIMD-96-82, June 11, 1996).

                    Information Security: Computer Attacks at Department of Defense Pose
                    Increasing Risks (GAO/AIMD-96-84, May 22, 1996).

                    Navy Anti-Deficiency Act Training (GAO/AIMD-96-53R, Apr. 12, 1996).

                    Defense Business Operations Fund: DOD Is Experiencing Difficulty in
                    Managing the Fund’s Cash (GAO/AIMD-96-54, Apr. 10, 1996).

                    CFOAct Financial Audits: Increased Attention Must Be Given to Preparing
                    Navy’s Financial Reports (GAO/AIMD-96-7, Mar. 27, 1996).

                    Page 28                              GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan
                    Related GAO Products

                    Financial Management: Challenges Facing DOD in Meeting the Goals of the
                    Chief Financial Officers Act (GAO/T-AIMD-96-1, Nov. 14, 1995).

                    Financial Management: Challenges Confronting DOD’s Reform Initiatives
                    (GAO/T-AIMD-95-146, May 23, 1995).

                    Financial Management: Challenges Confronting DOD’s Reform Initiatives
                    (GAO/T-AIMD-95-143, May 16, 1995).

                    Financial Management: Control Weaknesses Increase Risk of Improper
                    Navy Civilian Payroll Payments (GAO/AIMD-95-73, May 8, 1995).

                    Travel Process Reengineering: DOD Faces Challenges in Using Industry
                    Practices to Reduce Costs (GAO/AIMD/NSIAD-95-90, Mar. 2, 1995).

                    Defense Business Operations Fund: Management Issues Challenge Fund
                    Implementation (GAO/AIMD-95-79, Mar. 1, 1995).

                    Contract Management: Fixing DOD’s Payment Problems Is Imperative
Defense Contract    (GAO/NSIAD-97-37, Apr. 10, 1997).
                    Defense Depot Maintenance: Privatization and the Debate Over the
                    Public-Private Mix (GAO/T-NSIAD-96-146, Apr. 16, 1996).

                    DOD Procurement: Use and Administration of DOD’s Voluntary Disclosure
                    Program (GAO/NSIAD-96-21, Feb. 6, 1996).

                    DODProcurement: Millions in Contract Payment Errors Not Detected and
                    Resolved Promptly (GAO/NSIAD-96-8, Oct. 6, 1995).

                    High-Risk Series: Defense Contract Management (GAO/HR-95-3, Feb. 1995).

                    DODProcurement: Overpayments and Underpayments at Selected
                    Contractors Show Major Problem (GAO/NSIAD-94-245, Aug. 5, 1994).

                    DOD Procurement: Millions in Overpayments Returned by DOD Contractors
                    (GAO/NSIAD-94-106, Mar. 14, 1994).

                    Inventory Management: The Army Could Reduce Logistics Costs for
Defense Inventory   Aviation Parts by Adopting Best Practices (GAO/NSIAD-97-82, Apr. 15, 1997).

                    Page 29                              GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan
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                      Defense Inventory Management: Problems, Progress, and Additional
                      Actions Needed (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-109, Mar. 20, 1997).

                      1997 DOD Budget: Potential Reductions to Operation and Maintenance
                      Program (GAO/NSIAD-96-220, Sept. 18, 1996).

                      Defense IRM: Critical Risks Facing New Materiel Management Strategy
                      (GAO/AIMD-96-109, Sept. 6, 1996).

                      Navy Financial Management: Improved Management of Operating
                      Materials and Supplies Could Yield Significant Savings (GAO/AIMD-96-94,
                      Aug. 16, 1996).

                      Inventory Management: Adopting Best Practices Could Enhance Navy
                      Efforts to Achieve Efficiencies and Savings (GAO/NSIAD-96-156, July 12, 1996).

                      Defense Logistics: Requirement Determinations for Aviation Spare Parts
                      Need to Be Improved (GAO/NSIAD-96-70, Mar. 19, 1996).

                      Best Management Practices: Reengineering the Air Force’s Logistics
                      System Can Yield Substantial Savings (GAO/NSIAD-96-5, Feb. 21, 1996).

                      Inventory Management: DOD Can Build on Progress in Using Best Practices
                      to Achieve Substantial Savings (GAO/NSIAD-95-142, Aug. 4, 1995).

                      Best Practices Methodology: A New Approach for Improving Government
                      Operations (GAO/NSIAD-95-154, May 1995).

                      Defense Business Operations Fund: Management Issues Challenge Fund
                      Implementation (GAO/NSIAD 95-79, Mar. 1, 1995).

                      High-Risk Series: Defense Inventory Management (GAO/HR-95-5, Feb. 1995).

                      Defense Supply: Inventories Contain Nonessential and Excessive
                      Insurance Stocks (GAO/NSIAD-95-1, Jan. 20, 1995).

                      Defense Supply: Acquisition Leadtime Requirements Can Be Significantly
                      Reduced (GAO/NSIAD-95-2, Dec. 20, 1994).

                      Defense Aircraft Investments: Major Program Commitments Based on
Defense Weapon        Optimistic Budget Projections (GAO/NSIAD-T-97-103, Mar. 5, 1997).
Systems Acquisition

                      Page 30                              GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan
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                 Weapons Acquisition: Better Use of Limited DOD Acquisition Funding
                 Would Reduce Costs (GAO/NSIAD-97-23, Feb. 13, 1997).

                 Acquisition Reform: Implementation of Title V of the Federal Acquisition
                 Streamlining Act of 1994 (GAO/NSIAD-97-22BR, Oct. 31, 1996).

                 Combat Air Power: Joint Mission Assessments Needed Before Making
                 Program and Budget Decisions (GAO/NSIAD-96-177, Sept. 20, 1996).

                 Best Practices: Commercial Quality Assurance Practices Offer
                 Improvements for DOD (GAO/NSIAD-96-162, Aug. 26, 1996).

                 Navy Aviation: F/A-18E/F Will Provide Marginal Operational Improvement
                 at High Cost (GAO/NSIAD-96-98, June 18, 1996).

                 Comanche Helicopter: Testing Needs to Be Completed Prior to Production
                 Decisions (GAO/NSIAD-95-112, May 18, 1995).

                 Tactical Aircraft: Concurrency in Development and Production of F-22
                 Aircraft Should Be Reduced (GAO/NSIAD-95-59, Apr. 19, 1995).

                 High-Risk Series: Defense Weapon Systems Acquisition (GAO/HR-95-4,
                 Feb. 1995).

                 Electronic Warfare: Most Air Force ALQ-135 Jammers Procured Without
                 Operational Testing (GAO/NSIAD-95-47, Nov. 22, 1994).

                 Air Force Depot Maintenance: Privatization-in-Place Plans Are Costly
Defense          While Excess Capacity Exists (GAO/NSIAD-97-13, Dec. 31, 1996).
                 Army Depot Maintenance: Privatization Without Further Downsizing
                 Increases Costly Excess Capacity (GAO/NSIAD-96-201, Sept. 18, 1996).

                 Navy Depot Maintenance: Cost and Savings Issues Related to
                 Privatizing-in-Place at the Louisville, Kentucky, Depot (GAO/NSIAD-96-202,
                 Sept. 18, 1996).

                 Defense Acquisition Infrastructure: Changes in RDT&E Laboratories and
                 Centers (GAO/NSIAD-96-221BR, Sept. 13, 1996).

                 Page 31                              GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan
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                 Defense Infrastructure: Cost Projected to Increase Between 1997 and 2001
                 (GAO/NSIAD-96-174, May 31, 1996).

                 Military Bases: Opportunities for Savings in Installation Support Costs Are
                 Being Missed (GAO/NSIAD-96-108, Apr. 23, 1996).

                 Military Bases: Closure and Realignment Savings Are Significant, but Not
                 Easily Quantified (GAO/NSIAD-96-67, Apr. 8, 1996).

                 Defense Infrastructure: Budget Estimates for 1996-2001 Offer Little
                 Savings for Modernization (GAO/NSIAD-96-131, Apr. 4, 1996).

                 Defense Transportation: Streamlining of the U.S. Transportation
                 Command Is Needed (GAO/NSIAD-96-60, Feb. 22, 1996).

                 Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 1995 Process and Recommendations for
                 Closure and Realignment (GAO/NSIAD-95-133, Apr. 14, 1995).

                 Defense IRM: Strategy Needed for Logistics Information Technology
Information      Improvement Efforts (GAO/AIMD-97-6, Nov. 14, 1996).
Management and
Technology       DODAccounting Systems: Efforts to Improve Systems for Navy Need
                 Overall Structure (GAO/AIMD-96-99, Sept. 30, 1996).

                 Defense IRM: Critical Risks Facing New Materiel Management Strategy
                 (GAO/AIMD-96-109, Sept. 6, 1996).

                 Defense Transportation: Migration Systems Selected Without Adequate
                 Analysis (GAO/AIMD-96-81, Aug. 29, 1996).

                 Defense Management: Selection of Depot Maintenance Standard System
                 Not Based on Sufficient Analyses (GAO/AIMD-95-110, July 13, 1995).

                 Defense Management: Impediments Jeopardize Logistics Corporate
                 Information Management (GAO/NSIAD-95-28, Oct. 21, 1994).

                 Defense Management: Stronger Support Needed for Corporate
                 Information Management Initiative to Succeed (GAO/AIMD/NSIAD-94-101,
                 Apr. 12, 1994).

(709284)         Page 32                             GAO/NSIAD-97-219R DOD’s Draft Strategic Plan
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