oversight

Force Structure: Army Support Forces Can Meet Two-Conflict Strategy With Some Risks

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1997-02-28.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                  United States General Accounting Office

GAO               Report to Congressional Committees




February 1997
                  FORCE STRUCTURE
                  Army Support Forces
                  Can Meet Two-Conflict
                  Strategy With Some
                  Risks




                   G       A            O
                               years
                               1921 - 1996

GAO/NSIAD-97-66
      United States
GAO   General Accounting Office
      Washington, D.C. 20548

      National Security and
      International Affairs Division

      B-272600

      February 28, 1997

      The Honorable Strom Thurmond
      Chairman
      The Honorable Carl Levin
      Ranking Minority Member
      Committee on Armed Services
      United States Senate

      The Honorable Floyd D. Spence
      Chairman
      The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
      Ranking Minority Member
      Committee on National Security
      House of Representatives

      This report discusses how the Army determines its support force requirements, and the results
      of its most recent process for allocating support forces, known as Total Army Analysis 2003. It
      also discusses the Army’s progress to streamline its infrastructure or institutional force
      structure. We are sending this report to you in response to a provision of the fiscal year 1996
      National Defense Authorization Act requiring us to review these issues and report our results to
      Congress by March 1. The information in this report should be useful to your Committees in
      their deliberations on the future size and composition of the Army. This report contains
      recommendations to the Secretary of the Army.

      We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, and
      the Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available to others on
      request.

      If you or your staff have any questions on this report, please call me on (202) 512-3504. Major
      contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI.




      Richard Davis
      Director, National Security
        Analysis
Executive Summary


             In the last 2 fiscal years, the Army has drawn down its active military
Purpose      forces from 540,000 to 495,000. A key issue that has evolved is whether the
             Army’s active end strength should be reduced to achieve savings to help
             pay for force modernization. In 1996, Congress established an active Army
             military personnel end strength floor of 495,000 out of concern that further
             downsizing would impair the Army’s ability to support the national
             military strategy of responding to two nearly simultaneous major regional
             conflicts (MRC), as well as deploying to operations other than war (OOTW).
             As the first of a series of congressionally required reviews of Army end
             strength issues, GAO reviewed (1) the extent to which the Army’s process
             for assessing its active and reserve support forces resulted in sufficient
             support force structure to meet the requirements of the two-MRC scenario
             and OOTWs; (2) whether the Army’s streamlining initiatives have identified
             opportunities to reduce Army personnel resources devoted to institutional
             functions; and (3) the feasibility of reducing active Army end strength, a
             matter Congress will review when it deliberates future Army end strength
             authorizations.


             Most of the active Army is divided between operational (63 percent) and
Background   institutional forces (25 percent), with the remainder of the force in
             temporary status, such as students (12 percent). Historically, these
             percentages have remained relatively constant. Operational forces are
             generally those forces that deploy to MRCs and other military operations.
             The operational force is further divided into the 10 war-fighting divisions
             and 2 armored cavalry regiments, and the deployable combat support and
             combat service support units needed to sustain this force in wartime.
             Combat support includes such specialties as chemical, engineering,
             military intelligence, and military police, while combat service support
             includes specialties such as transportation, medical, finance,
             quartermaster, and ordnance. The institutional force, called the Table of
             Distribution and Allowances (TDA) force, provides generally
             nondeployable support to the Army infrastructure, including training,
             doctrine development, base operations, supply, and maintenance.

             The Army uses different processes to determine requirements and allocate
             resources to each portion of the active Army. Combat forces are
             determined by defense guidance, which establishes the number of
             divisions, and Army doctrine, which establishes the number and type of
             forces dedicated to those divisions. The Army uses a process known as
             Total Army Analysis (TAA) to determine the number and types of support
             units needed to support the Army’s combat forces and to allocate



             Page 2                                          GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
                   Executive Summary




                   personnel authorizations to required units. TAA results are determined
                   biennially. For example, TAA 2003, which was completed in January 1996,
                   projects requirements through the year 2003. Resourcing decisions made
                   as a result of TAA are used to develop future Army budgets. Requirements
                   for the Army’s institutional forces are determined outside the TAA process
                   and are allocated largely at the major command level.

                   In 1995, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), motivated by a need
                   to identify additional funds for Army modernization, directed the Army to
                   reduce its end strength to 475,000 by 1999 based on the potential for
                   achieving efficiencies under the Army’s Force XXI redesign initiative.1 OSD
                   projected this lower Army end strength by 1999 in the Fiscal Year 1997
                   Future Years Defense Program. The Future Years Defense Program is an
                   authoritative record of current and projected force structure, costs, and
                   personnel levels that have been approved by the Secretary of Defense. The
                   Army was opposed to reducing its active end strength by 20,000 and was
                   permitted to reallocate funds in its proposed budget for fiscal years 1998
                   through 2003 to remain at an active end strength of 495,000.


                   It does not appear feasible to have a smaller active Army support force at
Results in Brief   this time because this could increase the Army’s risk of carrying out
                   current defense policy. However, new initiatives being explored by the
                   Army regarding its combat and institutional forces could lead to a smaller
                   active force in the future. Further, improvements in the requirements
                   determination process for both support forces and institutional forces
                   could provide greater assurance that the size and composition of the Army
                   is appropriate to meet war-fighting needs.

                   On the basis of TAA 2003 results, the Army believes it can deploy sufficient
                   support forces to meet the requirements of two nearly simultaneous MRCs
                   with moderate risk. The Army’s assessment of risk is based on several
                   factors. First, because it lacks adequate active support forces and must
                   rely on reserve forces that take more time to be readied to deploy, an
                   estimated 79,000 support forces needed in the first 30 days would arrive
                   late. Second, support forces needed for the second conflict would consist
                   of only 12-percent active forces. High reliance on reserves for use in the
                   second MRC may entail risk if the second MRC occurs without warning, or if
                   mobilization is delayed. Third, existing active support units are short


                   1
                    The Army’s initiative to redesign its combat divisions and incorporate information age technology on
                   the battlefield is known as Force XXI. As part of Force XXI, the Army is also examining ways to
                   streamline and re-engineer its institutional force.



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Executive Summary




another 19,200 required positions and some required support units exist
only on paper.

However, TAA 2003 had some limitations and the Army’s risk assessment
depends largely on the assumptions and model inputs that were adopted
for TAA 2003. The Army used many favorable assumptions that, although
consistent with defense guidance, understated risk. For example, it
assumed that forces committed to OOTWs would be immediately available
to redeploy and U.S. forces would have immediate access to overseas
ports and airfields. Less optimistic assumptions would have led to higher
support requirements. On the other hand, the Army did not use all
available resources to satisfy its unmet support force requirements, such
as support forces that currently exist in the Army’s eight National Guard
divisions and the active Army’s institutional forces, and support available
from outside contractors and defense civilians. The Army could have used
these personnel to meet some of its requirements for later deploying units
that exist only on paper. Nonetheless, considering these assets would not
solve the Army’s shortage of active support forces to meet its
requirements during the first 30 days of the first MRC.

The Army’s recent efforts to streamline the institutional active Army by
identifying better ways to organize and adopt more efficient business
practices have identified up to 4,000 military positions that the Army plans
to use to offset active support shortfalls. Moreover, the Army is continuing
its streamlining efforts and may reduce the number of major commands,
which could result in some additional force savings in the future.
However, the Army’s efforts to make its institutional force more efficient
and potentially smaller are hampered by long-standing weaknesses in its
process to determine institutional force requirements. Specifically, many
of the Army’s institutional requirements are not determined through an
analysis of workload to include analyzing what work needs to be done
based on mission and assessing how processes can be improved. Such
analysis, when combined with the Army’s efforts to re-engineer its overall
organization through functional assessments, would help the Army
determine how big its force needs to be and allocate resources efficiently
toward its highest priority institutional needs.

GAO’sanalysis indicates that the Department of Defense (DOD) has not
supported its proposal to reduce the active Army to 475,000 by 1999 with
sound analysis. Neither TDA streamlining nor the Army’s ongoing Force
XXI combat forces redesign initiative will achieve sufficient end strength
savings to permit a 20,000-cut by 1999. However, the Army might be able to



Page 4                                          GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
                             Executive Summary




                             achieve efficiencies and further reduce the size of its active institutional
                             force in the future by reducing the number of major commands and
                             adopting workload-based requirements. Moreover, the Army’s combat
                             redesign effort may eventually reduce requirements for active combat
                             forces by capitalizing on digital technology and more efficient logistics
                             concepts. Other options to restructure the Army’s combat forces also
                             exist. For example, some variant of the former reserve round-out concept,
                             perhaps at the battalion level rather than brigade level, could reduce the
                             number of active personnel committed to combat divisions. DOD has an
                             opportunity to explore these and other alternatives during its Quadrennial
                             Defense Review of defense strategy and force structure mandated by the
                             National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997.



Principal Findings

The Army Can Support         TAA is the Army’s process to determine the number and types of support
Two MRCs With Moderate       units it needs to execute the national military strategy and to allocate the
Risk                         Army’s personnel authorizations, both active and reserve, among these
                             support force requirements to minimize war-fighting risks. The Army
                             defines war-fighting risk as

                         •   forces needed in the first 30 days of the first MRC, which would arrive late;
                         •   insufficient active component support forces for the second MRC;
                         •   required units for which no personnel have been authorized or required
                             units that exist, but have been allocated fewer positions than required; and
                         •   the number of anticipated casualties for a given force.

                             Based on TAA 2003 results, the Army believes it can provide support forces
                             for two MRCs at a moderate level of risk. However, moderate risk means
                             that about 79,000 support forces needed in the first 30 days of the first MRC
                             would arrive late because the Army lacks sufficient numbers of active
                             support forces to meet its requirements and must rely on reserve forces
                             that generally require more than 30 days to mobilize and deploy. Late
                             support forces represent 30 percent of the 260,000 total authorized Army
                             force needed during this time period, and 42 percent of the Army support
                             forces required. DOD officials believe that even if it were possible to
                             replace reservists with active support personnel during the first 30 days,
                             some forces would still arrive late due to strategic lift constraints during
                             that time frame.




                             Page 5                                           GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
                                Executive Summary




                                The Army also found that support forces required for the second MRC will
                                consist of only about 12 percent of the active forces compared with
                                47 percent in the first MRC. The risk of late arrival would apply here if
                                mobilization of reserve forces was delayed. In addition, existing active
                                units have been authorized 19,200 fewer positions than Army wartime
                                needs require because total Army requirements exceed authorized
                                personnel. Also, units required by Army doctrine totaling 58,400 support
                                positions were not allocated any personnel and exist only on paper. The
                                Army estimates that support from host nations could meet over 14,000 of
                                this shortfall, reducing the Army’s shortage to about 44,000. The Army also
                                plans to implement an option developed by the Army National Guard
                                Division Redesign Study to convert 42,700 Army National Guard combat
                                division positions to required support positions. This option would
                                eliminate most of the remaining shortage, but will cost up to $2.8 billion
                                and could take many years to complete. Finally, TAA modeled risk in terms
                                of expected casualties. (Casualty numbers are classified.)

Some Modeling Assumptions       During TAA, many of the Army’s key assumptions in modeling the two MRCs
Understated Support             were identical or similar to assumptions cited in defense guidance. Some
Requirements                    of these assumptions were favorable; that is, they minimized risk to U.S.
                                forces. If less favorable assumptions were used, force requirements would
                                be even greater. For example, TAA 2003 assumed

                            •   immediate access to all ports and airfields in the theater of operations,
                            •   rapid decision-making by the national command authorities to mobilize
                                reserve forces and activate the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, and
                            •   limited use of chemical weapons employed against U.S. forces.

                                Support force requirements also would have been higher had the Army
                                considered support force requirements for coalition partners.

                                Also, TAA 2003 requirements do not adequately reflect the U.S. role in
                                OOTWs. The Army bases its force structure on fighting two MRCs and
                                assumes those forces will be adequate to support OOTWs. This is consistent
                                with defense guidance. As a result, the Army assumed that it could extract
                                as many as 15,000 troops engaged in an OOTW and redeploy them so that
                                they would be available for the early phases of an MRC. Commanders in
                                Chief of the European, Central, and Atlantic Commands, as well as some
                                Army officials, are concerned that not allowing for delays associated with
                                the extraction and redeployment of these forces, as well as a degradation
                                in capability from OOTWs is unrealistic. However, unless defense guidance




                                Page 6                                          GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
                              Executive Summary




                              changes, the Army has no plans to change its approach to OOTWs in TAA
                              2005, which is now underway.

Available Support Personnel   TAA does not include all available personnel in arriving at its resourcing
Were Excluded From TAA        decisions, missing opportunities to mitigate risk. For example, the Army
Process                       did not include support forces in the eight Army National Guard divisions
                              that the Army does not envision using during a two-conflict scenario. In
                              1995, GAO recommended that as part of TAA 2003, the Army identify the
                              specific unfilled support requirements that could be met using the support
                              forces embedded in these divisions and develop a plan to employ this
                              capability.2 Army officials indicated that the Army would use these
                              personnel if needed, but to date, they have not been considered in the TAA
                              process. The Army also did not include the potential use of TDA military
                              personnel (with the exception of medical forces) or defense civilians, even
                              though, in some instances, these personnel can and do deploy, sometimes
                              on very short notice. Finally, TAA did not determine how much of the
                              Army’s requirement could be met through the Logistics Civil Augmentation
                              Program, which the Army has been using to provide logistical and
                              construction support to overseas operations. However, most of the above
                              personnel would not be available in the first 30 days of the first MRC.
                              Therefore, the Army will not be able to rely on them to meet its early
                              deployment needs.

                              TAA is an analytically rigorous process that relies on extensive modeling
                              and the judgment of senior Army officials to derive the composition of the
                              Army’s support force. However, some aspects of TAA’s methodology could
                              be improved. For example, not all TAA model inputs were scrutinized to
                              ensure they were free from error; the process does not easily
                              accommodate changes that occur during its 2-year implementation cycle;
                              and senior leaders do not prioritize deficiencies that remain and develop
                              action plans to mitigate risk. In addition, TAA models are run in the early
                              stages of the process using the required force structure to fight the war.
                              The Army does not rerun its models at the conclusion of the requirements
                              determination phase to further assess how mobility limitations affect risk.




                              2
                               Force Structure: Army National Guard Divisions Could Augment Wartime Support Capability
                              (GAO/NSIAD-95-80, Mar. 2, 1995).



                              Page 7                                                       GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
                         Executive Summary




The Army Plans to        About 25 percent of the Army’s active positions are allocated to the Army’s
Eliminate Some           institutional force. However, long-standing weaknesses in the institutional
Institutional Military   force requirements determination process leave the Army unable to ensure
                         that military personnel are being used efficiently and assess what risks
Positions but Is         would be assumed by eliminating TDA positions. Also, allocating positions
Constrained by a Weak    based on available budgets, without defining workload requirements, leads
Requirements Process     to across-the-board cuts that reduce funds available to all commands
                         irrespective of relative need. Senior Army officials acknowledged that the
                         Army’s limited progress in defining TDA in terms of workload remains a
                         weakness, and GAO found varying levels of compliance with
                         workload-based standards at the major commands that GAO contacted.
                         Senior Army officials are taking steps to promote workload-based
                         requirements by increasing its review of major commands’ requirements
                         determination processes and establishing a methodology to analyze what
                         work needs to be done based on mission and how to improve processes
                         through better methods, benchmarking, capital investment, automation,
                         and improved facilities. The Army is also pilot testing an automated
                         system to collect and analyze workload information and monitor
                         efficiency. However, the long-standing weakness with the Army’s process,
                         despite numerous efforts to improve it, suggest that a higher level of
                         reporting and oversight may be warranted. The Army has not reported its
                         historic lack of compliance with its workload-based allocation policy as a
                         material weakness under the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act
                         (P.L. 97-255). Policy implementing the act requires agencies to report
                         material weaknesses that significantly weaken safeguards against waste.

                         The Army could potentially transfer up to 4,000 authorized positions from
                         its institutional force to its support force as a result of its initial
                         institutional streamlining initiatives and some recent policy decisions. TAA
                         2003 had anticipated shifting 2,000 of those positions to offset unmet
                         support requirements. Army officials said that the remaining positions will
                         also be transferred to fill support force shortfalls, but they could not
                         specify which units. However, many of the potential transfers are based on
                         plans that have not been finalized and cannot be counted on with
                         certainty.

                         Some potential to further reduce institutional forces may exist but is
                         difficult to quantify. As part of its continuing redesign effort, the Army is
                         evaluating several options to reduce the number of major commands and
                         align their responsibilities according to core processes such as training
                         and requirements development. These options are intended to eliminate
                         duplication, establish clearer lines of authority, and streamline resource



                         Page 8                                           GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
                           Executive Summary




                           management, and could result in fewer TDA positions. However, such
                           efforts will be weakened without a requirements determination process
                           based on workload. Such a process, when combined with the Army’s
                           efforts to re-engineer its overall organization through functional
                           assessments, would help the Army allocate resources efficiently toward its
                           highest priority institutional needs.

                           The Army must also consider legislative, regulatory, and budgetary
                           constraints in its efforts to streamline the institutional Army. These
                           actions can influence the size and composition of the institutional Army
                           force, but are outside the Army’s span of control. For example, although
                           GAO has identified some military positions that could be converted to
                           generally less expensive civilian positions,3 DOD’s planned civilian
                           drawdown may make such conversions difficult to implement. Further,
                           commanders are reluctant to replace military personnel with civilian
                           personnel because military personnel are funded from the Army’s
                           centralized military personnel account, while civilians are funded from the
                           command’s operations and maintenance account. This reluctance stems
                           from the fact that operations and maintenance funds are more likely to be
                           cut and result in insufficient funds to hire civilian replacements. Finally, by
                           2001, 37 percent of the Army’s TDA positions will be controlled by either
                           legislative mandate, DOD directive, or other agencies. For example, about
                           5,000 TDA military personnel are required for positions in joint
                           organizations such as OSD and the war-fighting commands’ headquarters.


A Smaller Active Army      OSD  did not support its plan to reduce the Army’s active end strength with
Support Force Does Not     detailed analysis. OSD’s March 1995 directive to reduce the Army to 475,000
Appear Feasible at This    by 1999 cited the Army’s Force XXI redesign initiative as a basis for the
                           decrease. However, the results of the Army’s Force XXI redesign of its
Time, but a Smaller        combat forces will not be known for years, and this initiative is not
Combat and Institutional   specifically intended to identify how to make the Army smaller. Although
Force May Be Possible in   the institutional force redesign component of Force XXI has identified a
the Future                 potential to reduce up to 4,000 active military positions, the Army plans to
                           use these savings to meet existing active support force shortfalls identified
                           in TAA 2003. Further, OSD’s recently completed assessment of TAA 2003 did
                           not examine active Army end strength issues, assess the risk associated
                           with different end strengths, or justify force reductions. OSD believes the
                           Army’s overall operational force requirements may be overstated based on
                           its analysis of selected model inputs and the results of a recent war game

                           3
                           DOD Force Mix Issues: Greater Reliance on Civilians in Support Roles Could Provide Significant
                           Benefits (GAO/NSIAD-95-5, Oct. 19, 1994).



                           Page 9                                                        GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
                      Executive Summary




                      and has recommended that the Army further review issues related to
                      casualty estimates, fuel consumption, and host nation support. These
                      studies are ongoing.

                      Options may exist to reduce active Army end strength if the Army were to
                      restructure its active combat and institutional forces to achieve
                      efficiencies and reap the benefits of new technology. TDA streamlining may
                      identify additional opportunities to reduce active TDA personnel by
                      reducing the number of major commands, while broader use of
                      workload-based requirements could ensure that military personnel are
                      used efficiently. Force XXI’s emphasis on digital technology and more
                      efficient logistics practices may result in smaller combat divisions in the
                      future. Other options to restructure combat forces include reassessing the
                      mix of heavy and light divisions and assigning reserve forces a role in later
                      deploying active divisions. For example, as a result of the Bottom-Up
                      Review and the Army’s experience in Desert Storm, the Army discontinued
                      its use of reserve component round-up or round-out brigades. However,
                      options may exist to adopt some variant of this concept, such as
                      integrating reserve forces at the battalion level. The upcoming
                      Quadrennial Defense Review, mandated by the National Defense
                      Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, tasks DOD to examine a wide range
                      of issues that could impact future Army end strength, including changes to
                      the national military strategy and force structure.


                      To improve TAA’s ability to accurately project war-fighting requirements
Recommendations       and allocate the Army’s personnel resources, GAO recommends that the
                      Secretary of the Army

                  •   reexamine key model inputs to ensure they are accurate and consistent
                      with war-fighting scenarios;
                  •   perform analysis to determine how multiple OOTW support force
                      requirements might differ from support force requirements based on two
                      MRCs and bring any variances to the attention of the Secretary of Defense
                      so that he can consider them in developing defense guidance;
                  •   perform sensitivity analyses on significant model inputs, assumptions, and
                      resourcing decisions to determine their impacts on war-fighting risk. For
                      example, although the Army used assumptions established by defense
                      guidance, determining the implications of less favorable conditions, such
                      as delayed call-up of reserves, would provide the Army with additional
                      information on which to base its assessment of risk;




                      Page 10                                         GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
                      Executive Summary




                  •   rerun TAA models with the required force to assess the impact of force size
                      on mobility requirements; and
                  •   determine how support units resident within the eight National Guard
                      Divisions, TDA military personnel, contractor personnel, and DOD civilians
                      can be used to fill some support force requirements.

                      To improve the management and allocation of personnel resources to the
                      institutional Army, GAO also recommends that the Secretary of the Army

                  •   report to the Secretary of Defense the Army’s long-standing problem with
                      implementing workload-based analysis as a material weakness under the
                      Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act to maintain visibility of the issue
                      and ensure action is taken and
                  •   closely monitor the military positions the Army plans to save as the result
                      of Force XXI initiatives and have a contingency plan in place in the event
                      that these savings do not materialize.


                      DOD  generally agreed with the report, fully concurring with six of the
Agency Comments       recommendations and partially concurring with one. DOD noted that the
                      Army has already planned some actions to resolve issues GAO presented in
                      a draft of this report. Specifically, the Army plans to (1) scrutinize key
                      model inputs in preparation for TAA 2005, (2) conduct additional analyses
                      involving OOTWs, (3) conduct sensitivity analyses and excursions in TAA
                      2005 beyond those required by current defense guidance, and (4) rerun TAA
                      models with the required force to improve its analysis of risk. However,
                      DOD only partially concurred with our recommendation to consider other
                      personnel resources in filling its support force requirements. The Army
                      plans to consider some types of Army National Guard Division assets to fill
                      support force shortfalls where the capabilities are nearly a match, such as
                      aviation assets. The Army also plans to further analyze how to use its
                      institutional force structure to meet both OOTW and war-fighting
                      requirements. However, DOD differs with GAO on recognizing civilian
                      contractor personnel in TAA. The Army believes that while contractor
                      personnel enhance the Army’s capabilities, they should not be considered
                      an available resource in TAA since contractor personnel are not funded in
                      the outyears of the Program Objective Memorandum. The Army also
                      expressed concern about its ability to provide security to contractors in an
                      MRC environment. Because contractor personnel have historically been
                      used by the Army to provide support in many different types of overseas
                      environments, both OOTWs and MRCs, GAO believes that, as a minimum, the
                      Army could treat contractor personnel in the same way it treats host



                      Page 11                                         GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Executive Summary




nation support—as an offset to unmet requirements. The Army can make
assumptions concerning the funding of the Logistics Civil Augmentation
Program, just as it makes assumptions about such issues as the availability
of host nation support, the size of the active Army force, or the level of
modernization of the force in future years.

DOD  agreed with both of GAO’s recommendations relating to the
institutional Army, including GAO’s recommendation that the Secretary of
the Army report its long-standing problems in managing its institutional
personnel as a material weakness under the Federal Managers’ Financial
Integrity Act. DOD’s comments on a draft of this report are reprinted in
appendix I.




Page 12                                        GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Page 13   GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Contents



Executive Summary                                                                                2


Chapter 1                                                                                       18
                         Active Army Has Been Downsized and Restructured in                     18
Introduction               Accordance With the BUR
                         Not All Army Forces Deploy                                             19
                         Total Army Analysis Is One of Several Army Resourcing                  21
                           Processes
                         DOD’s 1997 FYDP Reduces Army End Strength While Increasing             23
                           Modernization Funding
                         Objectives, Scope, and Methodology                                     23

Chapter 2                                                                                       26
                         TAA Process Balances War-Fighting Risk With Resource                   26
Army Can Support           Constraints
Two MRCs With            Army Assesses Its War-Fighting Risk as Moderate                        27
                         Some Modeling Assumptions Lead to Understated Requirements             32
Moderate Risk            TAA Requirements Do Not Adequately Reflect U.S. Role in                35
                           OOTWs
                         Available Support Personnel Were Excluded From TAA Process             38
                         Some Aspects of TAA’s Methodology Could Be Improved                    40
                         Conclusions                                                            43
                         Recommendations                                                        44
                         Agency Comments and Our Evaluation                                     45

Chapter 3                                                                                       47
                         Institutional Requirements Are Not Well Supported                      47
The Army Plans to        The Army Is Streamlining Its Institutional Force                       51
Eliminate Some           Division Between TOE and TDA Is Becoming Less Distinct                 56
                         Conclusions                                                            57
Institutional Military   Recommendations                                                        57
Positions but Is         Agency Comments and Our Evaluation                                     57
Constrained by a
Weak Requirements
Process




                         Page 14                                    GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
                         Contents




Chapter 4                                                                                          59
                         OSD Did Not Base Its Plan to Reduce the Army’s End Strength on            59
A Smaller Active           Detailed Analysis
Army Support Force       OSD Assessment of TAA 2003 Did Not Address Active Army End                61
                           Strength
Does Not Appear          Quadrennial Defense Review May Impact Army Active Military                63
Feasible at This Time,     Personnel Requirements
but a Smaller Combat     Conclusions                                                               63
                         Agency Comments and Our Evaluation                                        64
and TDA Force May
Be Possible in the
Future
Appendixes               Appendix I: The TAA Process                                               66
                         Appendix II: Reserve Mobilization Process                                 70
                         Appendix III: Comparison of TAA 2001 and TAA 2003 Unmet                   72
                           Requirements Data
                         Appendix IV: Key Assumptions Used in TAA 2003                             73
                         Appendix V: Comments From the Department of Defense                       76
                         Appendix VI: Major Contributors to This Report                            81

Tables                   Table 1.1: Comparison of Fiscal Years 1994 and 1996 Active Army           19
                           Force Structure
                         Table 1.2: Breakdown of Fiscal Year 1998 Total Army End                   22
                           Strength by Type and Resourcing Process
                         Table 2.1: Calculation of TAA 2003 Shortfall                              30
                         Table 2.2: Major Category Adjustments to Authorized Positions             31
                         Table 3.1: Distribution of Authorized TDA Military Positions for          48
                           Fiscal Year 1998
                         Table 3.2: Core Competency, Capabilities, and Processes of the            53
                           Institutional Army
                         Table 3.3: Comparison of “Fenced” TDA Positions, 1991 and 2001            55

Figures                  Figure 1.1: Percentage of the Army’s Forces Represented by TOE,           21
                           TDA, and TTHS Forces, Fiscal Years 1988 Through 2001
                         Figure I.1: The TAA Process                                               67
                         Figure II.1: Reserve Mobilization Timeline                                71




                         Page 15                                       GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Contents




Abbreviations

AFPDA      Army’s force planning data and assumptions
BUR        Bottom-Up Review
CINC       commander in chief
DOD        Department of Defense
FASTALS    Force Analysis Simulation of Theater Administration and
                Logistics Support
FYDP       Future Years Defense Program
MRC        major regional conflict
OOTW       operations other than war
OSD        Office of the Secretary of Defense
TAA        Total Army Analysis
TDA        Table of Distribution and Allowances
TOE        Table of Organization and Equipment
TRADOC     Training and Doctrine Command
TTHS       trainees, transients, holdees, and students


Page 16                                     GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Page 17   GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Chapter 1

Introduction


                       The Army has completed its drawdown of active forces in accordance with
                       the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) force structure and defense guidance calling
                       for a force of 495,000. To ensure that the Army will be able to maintain the
                       minimum strength necessary to successfully respond to two nearly
                       simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRC), Congress established a
                       permanent legislative end strength floor of 495,000 in its fiscal year 1996
                       National Defense Authorization Act. However, the Department of
                       Defense’s (DOD) fiscal year 1997 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)1
                       reduced active Army end strength 20,000 below the congressionally
                       mandated floor by 1999. A key impetus behind this plan is the concern
                       within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) that funding the
                       existing active Army force level of 495,000 will prevent the Army from
                       buying the new equipment it needs to modernize the active force for the
                       21st century.


                       The BUR strategy called for a force of 10 active Army combat divisions and
Active Army Has Been   2 active armored cavalry regiments to fight and win 2 nearly simultaneous
Downsized and          MRCs. This force was far smaller than the Cold War Army, which

Restructured in        comprised 18 active divisions and 770,000 personnel in fiscal year 1989, as
                       well as the Base Force, which in fiscal year 1994, consisted of 12 active
Accordance With the    combat divisions and 540,000 active personnel.
BUR
                       Following the BUR, the Army reorganized its active combat division
                       structure. Two division headquarters were eliminated, thus reducing the
                       number of active divisions from 12 to 10 as specified in the BUR. Another
                       significant change was that the Army discontinued its reliance on reserve
                       component “round-up” or “round-out” units to bring the active divisions to
                       full combat strength for wartime deployment. Instead, the Army
                       determined that each of the remaining 10 combat divisions would
                       comprise 3 fully active ground maneuver brigades. This decision was
                       endorsed by the Secretary of Defense during development of the BUR out
                       of concern that relying on reserve brigades could slow down a U.S.
                       response to aggression. Therefore, as a result of the BUR, only two active
                       maneuver brigades were eliminated from Army force structure—
                       12 combat divisions with a combined total of 32 active brigades were
                       reduced to 10 divisions with 30 active brigades. Also, the Army decided
                       that all 10 remaining divisions would be authorized 100 percent of their
                       wartime military personnel requirement.



                       1
                        The FYDP is an authoritative record of current and projected force structure, costs, and personnel
                       levels that have been approved by the Secretary of Defense.



                       Page 18                                                         GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
                                        Chapter 1
                                        Introduction




                                        Overall, the reduction in forces, when combined with the force reductions
                                        resulting from the withdrawal of 20,000 military personnel from Europe
                                        between fiscal years 1994 and 1995, brought the force level down to within
                                        10,000 of the fiscal year 1996 end strength goal of 495,000. The remaining
                                        personnel reductions came from the institutional portions of the active
                                        Army. No cuts were made in “non-divisional” level support forces that
                                        would deploy with combat divisions,2 since the Army had previously found
                                        that support shortages already existed in these forces. A comparison of
                                        fiscal years 1994 and 1996 active Army force structure is shown in
                                        table 1.1.

Table 1.1: Comparison of Fiscal Years
1994 and 1996 Active Army Force         1994                                                 1996
Structure                               • 540,000 end strength.                              • 495,000 end strength.
                                        • 12 combat divisions.                               • 10 combat divisions.
                                            32 active maneuver brigades.                     • 20,000 troops from Europe reduced from
                                                                                             the force.
                                        • Some divisions have fewer than three               • All active divisions have three maneuver
                                        active brigades. Reserve personnel meant             brigades. After restructuring divisions, only
                                        to fill the remainder of maneuver and                two division headquarters and two full
                                        divisional support requirements. These are           brigades had to be eliminated
                                        referred to as “round-up” or “round- out”            (16,000-18,000).
                                        units.
                                        • Some maneuver brigades authorized at               • All maneuver brigades authorized at
                                        less than 100 percent of requirements.               100 percent of requirements.
                                                                                             • Remaining personnel reductions taken
                                                                                             from the nondeployable Army.
                                        Source: Department of the Army Headquarters, Washington, D.C.




                                        The active Army force of 495,000 is comprised of both deployable and
Not All Army Forces                     nondeployable forces. The deployable force (63 percent) includes the
Deploy                                  combat divisions, separate brigades, armored cavalry regiments, and
                                        special forces groups, as well as the Corps level combat support and
                                        combat service support forces that would accompany them to the war
                                        fight. Taken together, these deployable operational forces are organized
                                        according to Army Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) and are
                                        commonly referred to as TOE forces. Combat forces are referred to as
                                        “above-the-line” TOE, and combat support/combat service support forces
                                        are referred to as “below-the-line” TOE. Combat support includes such
                                        specialties as engineering, military intelligence, chemical, and military


                                        2
                                         A Corps provides non-divisional support for two to five combat divisions.



                                        Page 19                                                         GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Chapter 1
Introduction




police, while combat service support includes specialties such as
transportation, medical, finance, quartermaster, and ordnance.

The generally nondeployable portion of the Army (historically about
25 percent) is often referred to as the “institutional” force that supports
the Army infrastructure by performing such functions as training, doctrine
development, base operations, supply, and maintenance. These forces are
organized according to Army Tables of Distribution and Allowances (TDA)
and are simply referred to as TDA forces. Another 12 percent of the active
Army force is in a temporary status at any given time and is referred to as
“trainees, transients, holdees and students” or TTHS. These forces are also
considered to be nondeployable. Historically, the percentages of the active
force devoted to TOE, TDA, and TTHS have remained relatively constant. (See
fig. 1.1.)




Page 20                                        GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
                                       Chapter 1
                                       Introduction




Figure 1.1: Percentage of the Army’s
Forces Represented by TOE, TDA, and
TTHS Forces, Fiscal Years 1988         In percent
Through 2001
                                       70

                                       60

                                       50

                                       40

                                       30

                                       20

                                       10

                                        0
                                                 1988     1991      1993      1995      1997       1999     2001

                                                                    TOE     TDA    TTHS




                                       Source: Department of the Army Headquarters, Washington, D.C.



                                       The Army uses different resourcing processes for each portion of the
Total Army Analysis Is                 active Army (see table 1.2). Defense guidance specifies the number of
One of Several Army                    active divisions the Army must have in its structure. The elements of these
Resourcing Processes                   divisions are sized according to Army doctrine. The Army’s 10 divisions
                                       range in size from 10,000 to 15,000 active personnel, depending on mission
                                       (e.g., light and heavy) and type of equipment. The Army uses a biennial
                                       process known as the Total Army Analysis (TAA) to determine the number
                                       of support units needed to support these combat forces, and how available
                                       personnel authorizations will be allocated to these requirements. TDA
                                       resources are allocated in a separate resource management process,
                                       primarily driven by the Army major commands but subject to some
                                       Department of the Army headquarters oversight. TTHS is essentially an



                                       Page 21                                                    GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
                                         Chapter 1
                                         Introduction




                                         allocation rather than a managed resource, although Army policy
                                         decisions can influence its size.


Table 1.2: Breakdown of Fiscal Year 1998 Total Army End Strength by Type and Resourcing Process
Initial resource
allocation           Force type           Resourcing processa                Active National Guardb                   Reserve
Directed by the Army   TOE combat       Defense planning                          176,000      191,000 to             2,000
Chief of Staff                          specifies 10 and                                       203,000
                                        two-third active
                                        divisions and 15
                                        National Guard
                                        enhanced brigades.

                                        Division and brigade
                                        size determined by
                                        Army doctrine.
                       TOE support      TAA determines the                        136,000      136,000 to             137,000
                                        Army support structure                                 162,000
                                        needed to execute the
                                        two-MRC scenario.
                       TDA              Department of the                         124,000      40,000                 69,000
                                        Army Headquarters
                                        allocates TDA to major
                                        commands, based on
                                        their inputs.
                       TTHS             Set aside.                                  59,000     Not applicable         Not applicable
Total component                                                                   495,000      367,000 to             208,000
end strength                                                                                   405,000
Total Army end                                                                                 1,070,000 to
strength                                                                                       1,108,000
                                         a
                                          Because TAA 2003 provides the force structure for the 1998-2003 Army Program Objective
                                         Memorandum, the Army uses fiscal year 1998 end strength goals as the starting point to
                                         determine requirements and make resourcing decisions.
                                         b
                                          The 1998-2003 Army Program Objective Memorandum is built on the following end strength
                                         assumptions: (1) 495,000 active end strength and (2) 575,000 reserve end strength (up to
                                         208,000 reserve and up to 367,000 National Guard). However, Congress allows the National
                                         Guard force structure to be larger than its authorized end strength to provide the necessary
                                         organizational framework to support the division headquarters.

                                         Source: Department of the Army Headquarters, Washington, D.C.



                                         TAA determines the number and types of support units needed to support
                                         war-fighting missions, regardless of whether active or reserve positions
                                         would be used to meet these requirements. The process then allocates
                                         forces from the active Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army
                                         Reserve to fill those requirements. The results of TAA 2003 were reported in




                                         Page 22                                                        GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
                     Chapter 1
                     Introduction




                     January 1996 and fed into the 1998-2003 Army Program Objective
                     Memorandum.3 A detailed discussion of the TAA process, assumptions, and
                     results can be found in chapter 2. Chapter 3 discusses the TDA
                     requirements process.


                     Although Congress established a permanent active Army end strength
DOD’s 1997 FYDP      floor of 495,000 in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
Reduces Army End     1996, DOD’s fiscal year 1997 FYDP reduced active Army end strength below
Strength While       this level beginning in fiscal year 1998. Congress established a permanent
                     end strength floor to ensure that each service, including the Army, had the
Increasing           minimum force necessary to fulfill the national military strategy. However,
Modernization        DOD may reduce forces below the floor if it notifies Congress and may also
                     increase authorized end strength as much as 1 percent in any given fiscal
Funding              year. According to the 1997 FYDP, DOD intends to keep Army military
                     personnel appropriation dollars relatively flat from fiscal years 1995 to
                     2001. Because these appropriations will not sustain a force level of
                     495,000, DOD planned to reduce the Army’s end strength by 10,000 in fiscal
                     year 1998 and an additional 10,000 in fiscal year 1999.

                     DOD’s 1997 FYDP increases the percentage of the Army budget devoted to
                     procurement from 10 percent in 1995 to 16 percent by 2001. This increase
                     is consistent with DOD’s view that modernization is key to long-term
                     readiness. In his March 1996 testimony, the Secretary of Defense said that
                     in recent years, DOD had taken advantage of the drawdown and slowed
                     modernization in order to fully fund those expenditures that guarantee
                     near-term readiness, such as spare parts, training, and maintenance. As a
                     result, modernization funding in fiscal year 1997 was said to be the lowest
                     it had been in many years, about one-third of what it was in fiscal
                     year 1985. To reverse this trend, DOD plans to increase funding to procure
                     new equipment, including funding for “everyday equipment” ground forces
                     needed in the field, such as tactical communications gear, trucks, and
                     armored personnel carriers. Likewise, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
                     has expressed concern about the future readiness of Army forces given
                     reduced levels of modernization funding.


                     As required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
Objectives, Scope,   1996, we reviewed (1) the extent to which TAA 2003 resulted in sufficient
and Methodology      combat support/combat service support force structure to meet the


                     3
                      The Army Program Objective Memorandum is a biennial publication that defines Army programs for
                     6 years into the future and tabulates funding anticipated for these programs.



                     Page 23                                                      GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Chapter 1
Introduction




support requirements of the two-MRC scenario and also operations other
than war (OOTW), (2) whether the Army’s streamlining initiatives have
identified opportunities to further reduce Army personnel resources
devoted to institutional Army (TDA) functions, and (3) the feasibility of
further reducing active Army end strength.

In conducting our assessment, we did not examine DOD’s rationale for
requiring 10 active combat divisions or the Army’s rationale for using three
full active brigades per division instead of round-out or round-up reserve
brigades. We also did not fully assess ongoing studies concerning the
future use of reserve forces or analyze potential changes to the current
national military strategy. Since much of the Army’s analysis in TAA 2003 is
based on the combat forces assigned to it by the BUR and the then current
defense planning strategy, any changes in this guidance would likely alter
Army support force requirements.

To determine the extent to which TAA 2003 resulted in sufficient combat
support/combat service support force structure to support the two-MRC
scenario and OOTWs, we reviewed the Army’s documentation on TAA
processes, assumptions, and results. We interviewed Army officials at
Department of the Army Headquarters, Washington, D.C.; Concepts
Analysis Agency, Bethesda, Maryland; U.S. Forces Command, Fort
McPherson, Georgia; and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC), Fort Monroe, Virginia, and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Our review of TAA 2003 included analyses of the risks associated with the
number and type of active and reserve support forces allocated to support
war-fighting requirements; how the Army’s assumptions compared to
those in defense guidance, previous TAAs, or used in other DOD, Army, or
external defense studies; and how the major assumptions used in TAA can
affect force structure outcomes (including measures of risk). We also
examined TAA processes to determine if the Army (1) obtained adequate
participation by stakeholders in the process, including major commands
and commanders in chief (CINC) and (2) scrutinized data inputs used in its
war-fight models to determine if they were free from error. In addition, we
discussed TAA 2003 results and methodology with OSD officials. Further, to
better understand how the requirements of the joint war-fighting
commands are considered in the TAA process and how CINCs are affected
by TAA results, we requested information and received formal responses
from the CINCs of the U.S. Atlantic Command, the U.S. Central Command,
the U.S. European Command, and the U.S. Pacific Command.




Page 24                                        GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Chapter 1
Introduction




To assess Army streamlining initiatives and their potential for reducing
military personnel devoted to institutional Army functions, we obtained
documentation and held discussions with officials from the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; the
Army’s Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation; the Army Budget
Office; Department of the Army Headquarters; the U.S. Army Force
Management Support Agency, Washington, D.C.; U.S. Army Forces
Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia; U.S. TRADOC, Fort Monroe, Virginia,
and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; the U.S. Army Medical Command, Fort
Sam Houston, Texas; and the U.S. Army Materiel Command’s Management
Engineering Activity, Huntsville, Alabama. We reviewed major commands’
TDA requirements processes and discussed proposals for increased use of
workload-based management to assess the TDA requirements
determination process. To assess TDA streamlining, we identified and
reviewed Army streamlining studies, including Force XXI, major command
reengineering, and Army headquarters policy initiatives that resulted in
reductions in military and civilian resources, as well as budgetary savings.
We also assessed limitations to further streamlining of the TDA force due to
legal, cultural, and operational requirements. We did not review the
justification for TDA positions that are required by law or controlled by
other agencies.

To assess the implications of DOD’s planned reduction in active Army end
strength, we examined the objectives and implementing guidance for the
Army’s Force XXI campaign,which DOD cited as justification for the
reduction, and the personnel reductions realized or anticipated as a result
of these initiatives. We also considered OSD’s internal assessment of the
Army’s TAA 2003 process and the potential for changes in defense strategy
resulting from the Quadrennial Defense Review. Lastly, we considered the
current status of TDA streamlining and the results of TAA 2003.

DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report. These comments
are discussed and evaluated in chapters 2 and 3 and are reprinted in
appendix V. Additional comments from the Army are discussed and
evaluated in chapter 4.

We conducted our review from September 1995 to October 1996 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.




Page 25                                        GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Chapter 2

Army Can Support Two MRCs With
Moderate Risk

                       The Army believes that it can provide support forces for two MRCs at a
                       moderate level of risk. However, in assessing risk, the Army found that
                       42 percent of all support forces required in the first 30 days of the first MRC
                       would be late arriving to theater because they cannot mobilize and deploy
                       in time. The Army also found that it would have very few active support
                       forces available to send to the second MRC—only 12 percent of the total
                       support forces needed. In addition, the Army did not authorize 19,200
                       positions that are needed to bring some existing units up to their full
                       required strength. Finally, units totaling 58,400 positions were not
                       authorized any personnel because the Army’s total wartime support
                       requirement exceeds available personnel authorizations.

                       The Army’s risk assessment depends largely on the assumptions and
                       model inputs that were adopted for TAA 2003. Some of these assumptions
                       were favorable in that they minimized risks to U.S. forces. For example, to
                       be consistent with defense guidance, TAA assumed that U.S. forces had
                       immediate access to ports and airfields in the theater of operations, faced
                       limited chemical attacks, and were immediately available for
                       redeployment if previously committed to OOTWs. Less optimistic
                       assumptions would have led to higher support requirements. On the other
                       hand, the Army did not consider all available resources to satisfy its unmet
                       support force requirements, such as some support force capabilities that
                       currently reside in the Army’s eight National Guard divisions and the TDA
                       force, and support available from outside contractors and defense
                       civilians. Also, while TAA is an analytically rigorous process, some aspects
                       of its methodology could be improved. For example, TAA lacks
                       mechanisms for adjusting to change during its 2-year cycle; some model
                       inputs, such as consumption of fuel and water, were not sufficiently
                       scrutinized; and sensitivity analyses were generally not used to measure
                       the impact of alternative assumptions and resourcing decisions on risk.
                       Changes to any of the key assumptions or other model inputs could
                       produce significantly different force structure requirements than those
                       determined in TAA 2003, and potentially different risk levels.


                       Based on defense guidance, other Army guidance and inputs, wargaming
TAA Process Balances   assumptions, unit allocation rules,1 and logistical data, TAA determines the
War-Fighting Risk      number and type of support units the Army needs to execute the national
With Resource          military strategy. TAA then allocates Army personnel authorizations, both
                       active and reserve, among these support force requirements to minimize
Constraints
                       1
                        Unit allocation rules quantify each type of support unit’s capability, mission, and doctrinal
                       employment as applied to specific wartime scenarios.



                       Page 26                                                            GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
                       Chapter 2
                       Army Can Support Two MRCs With
                       Moderate Risk




                       war-fighting risk. TAA is an advance planning tool that tries to anticipate
                       potential war-fighting scenarios and personnel availability approximately
                       9 years in the future.

                       TAA consists of a series of campaign simulation models and force structure
                       conferences attended by representatives from key Army staff offices and
                       commands, as well as the unified commands. A strategic mobility analysis
                       is performed to determine the arrival times of Army forces in theater and
                       identify shortfalls. This is followed by a theater campaign analysis to gauge
                       force movement and unit strength over time, as well as personnel and
                       equipment losses. Outputs from these models, along with approved unit
                       allocation rules and logistics data, are input into the final Army model,
                       Force Analysis Simulation of Theater Administration and Logistics
                       Support. This model generates the required support forces by type and
                       quantity, and specifies when they are needed in theater and what their
                       supply requirements would be. The support forces identified by the model
                       are then matched to actual Army support units.

                       At this point, priorities are established among the competing requirements,
                       and approaches are discussed to mitigate the risks of unmet requirements.
                       One approach has been to authorize fewer personnel to some units than
                       are required to meet their full wartime requirement. Additionally, the
                       active/reserve force mix is examined on a branch by branch2 basis to
                       assess whether sufficient active forces are available to meet early
                       deployment requirements. The approved force structure is forwarded to
                       the Army’s Chief of Staff for final approval as the base force for
                       programming Army resources for the next Program Objective
                       Memorandum. A more detailed description of the Army’s TAA process is
                       provided in appendix I.


                       The Army concluded that its authorized support forces, resulting from TAA
Army Assesses Its      2003, were consistent with the moderate risk force delineated in the
War-Fighting Risk as   October 1993 BUR. This force, among other things, must be able to fight
Moderate               and win two MRCs that occur nearly simultaneously. To assess the risk
                       level associated with its support forces, the Army employed four
                       measures: late risk, second MRC risk, unmet requirements risk, and
                       casualty risk. Each of the risks was quantified; however, their collective
                       impact on the war fight was not modeled by the Army. Rather, the Army’s
                       overall assessment of moderate risk is based on military judgment.

                       2
                        Individuals in the Army are assigned to specialties or branches of the Army according to the functions
                       they would perform in combat or in support of the combat units.



                       Page 27                                                          GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
                             Chapter 2
                             Army Can Support Two MRCs With
                             Moderate Risk




42 Percent of Required       TAA  stipulates that support units needed in the first 30 days of the first MRC
Support Forces Arrive Late   should be drawn from the active force because of the time needed to
                             mobilize, train, and deploy reserve units. This is consistent with defense
                             guidance. However, TAA 2003 found that about 79,000 of the more than
                             188,000 support force positions required in the first 30 days of the first MRC
                             do not arrive on time because the Army lacks sufficient numbers of active
                             support forces to meet these requirements and must rely on reserve forces
                             instead. This represents 30 percent of the 260,000 total authorized Army
                             force needed during this time period, and 42 percent of the Army support
                             forces required. Branches with the most late arrivals include engineering,
                             transportation, quartermaster, and medical—branches with high
                             concentrations of reserve personnel. This risk is exacerbated when the
                             Army relies on reserve forces during the first 7 days of the war fight.
                             Almost one-quarter of the reserve support forces assigned to meet
                             requirements during the first 30 days (19,200 positions) are needed in the
                             first 7 days of the MRC.

                             The 30-day time frame to mobilize and deploy reserve support forces is
                             substantiated in classified studies by the RAND Corporation that
                             examined the availability of reserve forces and by Army officials
                             responsible for reserve mobilization activities. The Army estimates that
                             mobilizing reserve forces, from unit recall to arrival at the port of
                             embarkation, takes about 15 days for a small support unit and 31 days for
                             a large unit. Personnel may be transported by air, but their equipment
                             likely will be shipped by sea. Depending on whether the equipment sails
                             from the east or west coast and to which theater, it will take an additional
                             12 to 30 days to arrive, unload, and assemble the equipment. Therefore, a
                             small reserve unit will be available for the war fight no earlier than 27 days
                             after call-up, and a large reserve unit will require at least 43 days.
                             (See app. II for a listing of mobilization tasks and the time required to
                             complete them.)

                             OSDofficials believe that if it were possible to reduce late risk by making
                             more active forces available during the first 30 days, strategic lift
                             constraints would limit the number of active support forces that could be
                             moved to theater. Army officials noted that to the extent that any active
                             support personnel are available to replace late reservists and could be
                             moved, the Army’s risk of late arrivals would be lower.


Few Active Support Forces    The availability of active support forces for the second MRC was another
Available for Second MRC     risk measure used in TAA 2003. Specifically, as the availability of active



                             Page 28                                           GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
                            Chapter 2
                            Army Can Support Two MRCs With
                            Moderate Risk




                            forces declined—and with it a corresponding increased reliance on
                            reserve forces—risk was assumed to increase. The second MRC will have
                            access to relatively small numbers of active support forces, most of them
                            having deployed already in support of the first MRC. Consequently, the
                            Army must rely on reserve component forces to meet most of its
                            requirements in the second MRC. Only 12 percent of the support forces
                            needed in the second MRC are active, compared with 47 percent in the first
                            MRC. Branches with low representation of active forces in the second MRC
                            include engineer, transportation, quartermaster, and artillery. High
                            reliance on reserves for use in the second MRC may not entail greater risk
                            assuming there is adequate warning time and mobilization has already
                            occurred. The same risk of late arrival would apply if mobilization was
                            delayed.


Units Totaling 58,400       An objective of TAA is to allocate resources among competing support
Positions Exist Only on     force requirements. In the case of TAA 2003, the Army’s force structure
Paper, and Some Active      requirements initially exceeded its authorized positions by 144,000
                            positions. At the conclusion of TAA, units totaling 58,400 positions were not
Units Are Allocated Fewer   allocated any positions and exist only on paper, and other existing active
Positions Than Required     units were allocated 19,200 fewer positions than needed to meet mission
                            requirements.

                            Table 2.1 illustrates the Army’s approach to allocating its resources in TAA
                            2003. Drawing from its active, National Guard, and Reserve forces, the
                            Army identified 528,000 authorized TOE positions that it could apply to its
                            672,000 Army requirement to fight two MRCs, leaving an initial imbalance of
                            144,000 positions. The Army’s total TOE force is actually higher than
                            528,000 positions (see table 2.1), but some resources are excluded from
                            consideration in TAA, such as the eight National Guard divisions the Army
                            considers as a strategic hedge, and forces needed to perform unique
                            mission requirements.




                            Page 29                                         GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
                                     Chapter 2
                                     Army Can Support Two MRCs With
                                     Moderate Risk




Table 2.1: Calculation of TAA 2003
Shortfall                                                                                                       Action to         TAA 2003
                                                                                                             reduce TAA          remaining
                                     Description of Army action                                                  shortfall         shortfall
                                     Army TOE requirement to fight two MRCs (including                           672,000
                                     both combat and support forces)

                                     Less: Available Army position authorizations                                528,000

                                     Initial shortfall calculated by TAA                                         144,000
                                     Less: Positions converted from lower priority units                          66,000
                                     to other types

                                     Remaining Shortfall                                                          78,000a

                                     Comprised of:
                                     Units totally unstaffed                                                                             58,400b
                                     Understaffed active support units                                                                   19,200
                                     a
                                         Rounded.
                                     b
                                         Host nation support reduces the Army’s shortfall to about 44,000.

                                     Source: Department of the Army Headquarters, Washington, D.C.



                                     The Army then analyzed all of its support forces at Corps level and above
                                     to determine how it could reduce the risk associated with its shortfall.
                                     This resulted in the Army shifting about 66,0003 active and reserve
                                     positions from support units excess to the war fight to higher priority
                                     support units. Units providing fire fighting, engineering, and medical
                                     support were among those selected for conversion. After these
                                     conversions, the Army was left with a shortfall of about 78,000 positions.
                                     This shortfall was allocated as follows. Some existing active support units
                                     were authorized fewer positions than are needed to meet their full
                                     wartime requirement.4 In TAA 2003, these amounted to about 19,200
                                     positions. The expectation is that these understrength units would be
                                     brought up to full strength before being mobilized. These additional
                                     personnel would come from the Individual Ready Reserve5 or new
                                     recruits. The remaining shortfall of 58,400 positions represents units that


                                     3
                                      Converting these 66,000 active and reserve support positions to different positions will cost an
                                     estimated $2.6 billion.
                                     4
                                      The Army allocates authorized positions to units commensurate with their mission and when they are
                                     scheduled to deploy. A unit allocated its full wartime requirement has an authorized level of
                                     organization of one, whereas a unit authorized to fill 80 percent of its required positions has an
                                     authorized level of organization of three.
                                     5
                                      The Individual Ready Reserve is a manpower pool of pretrained individuals who have already served
                                     in active units or in the reserves and may have some part of their military service obligation remaining.



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                                        are needed to meet a wartime requirement but have not been allocated any
                                        position authorizations, that is, units that exist only on paper. Table 2.2
                                        shows how each of the Army’s major support branches will be affected by
                                        the conversions and where the remaining 58,400 positions in vacant units
                                        reside.6 Among the branches benefiting most were quartermaster and
                                        transportation, which accounted for more than half of the initial shortfall
                                        in totally vacant units.

Table 2.2: Major Category Adjustments
to Authorized Positions                                                                                         Shortage of authorized
                                                                                    Initial shortage of            positions after TAA
                                        Branch                                   authorized positions                     adjustments
                                        Chemical                                                   1,100                              700
                                        Engineer                                                   4,400                            2,900
                                        Artillery                                                  1,200                            1,200
                                        Medical                                                   12,400                            2,000
                                        Ordnance                                                   3,700                              100
                                        Quartermaster                                             31,600                           21,300
                                        Signal                                                     3,800                            4,000
                                        Personnel service support                                  1,200                              300
                                        Armor                                                      1,100                            1,100
                                        Military police                                            2,400                                 0
                                        Special operations                                         1,700                                 0
                                        Air defense                                                4,600                            4,300
                                        Headquarters                                                 300                              200
                                        Transportation                                            45,100                           20,400
                                        Logistics                                                    500                                 0
                                                                                                          a
                                        Total                                                    124,800                           58,400a
                                        a
                                            Does not add due to rounding.

                                        Source: Department of the Army Headquarters, Washington, D.C.



                                        Two additional actions were taken by the Army to mitigate the risk
                                        associated with its remaining unmet requirements. The Army estimates
                                        that host nations will be able to provide the equivalent of over 14,000
                                        positions to offset some requirements, leaving a shortfall of about 44,000
                                        positions in vacant units. The Army also plans to implement an option
                                        developed by the Army National Guard Division Redesign Study to convert
                                        42,700 Army National Guard combat division positions to required support
                                        positions—eliminating most of the remaining vacant units. However,

                                        6
                                         For many years, the Army’s support force requirements have greatly exceeded the number of support
                                        forces authorized. See appendix III for a comparison of TAA 2003 and TAA 2001 unmet requirements.



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                          according to the study, these conversions will cost up to an additional
                          $2.8 billion and could take many years to complete.


Expected Casualties Are   The Army computes the number of casualties expected for each MRC as
Another Measure of        another measure of risk.7 Casualties are computed through a model that
War-Fight Risk            uses the Army’s full two-conflict requirement of 672,000, rather than the
                          528,000 authorized Army positions to meet that requirement. The number
                          of casualties is a function of the population at risk, which is reflected in
                          defense guidance; the wounded in action rate, which is calculated in the
                          TAA modeling; and the disease, nonbattle injury rate, which is established
                          by the Army Surgeon General. Campaign simulations generate the
                          combatant battle casualties, which accounts for about 80 percent of all
                          casualties. The remaining 20 percent are extended to support forces with
                          algorithms. Variables that are considered in arriving at casualty estimates
                          include the battlefield location (e.g., brigade area, division rear, and
                          communications zone); intensity of the war fight (e.g., defend, attack, and
                          delay); and the weapon systems involved. The Army uses a high-resolution
                          model that pits individual weapon systems against one another to project
                          equipment and personnel killed or injured for a multitude of platforms
                          (e.g., 12 different types of tanks, light armored vehicles, and helicopters),
                          according to their lethality under various conditions (e.g., moving,
                          stationary, and exposed).

                          Once the Army computes its casualties for each MRC, it does not increase
                          its force requirements to provide casualty replacements. Otherwise, its
                          personnel requirements would be much higher and shortfalls would be
                          greater. The Army reasons that given the anticipated short duration of the
                          MRCs, there will be little opportunity for significant replacements of
                          individuals killed or otherwise unavailable for duty. However, if a need
                          arose, individual replacements likely would be drawn from soldiers who
                          had just completed their introductory training or by mobilizing the
                          Individual Ready Reserve.


                          Some of the assumptions and model inputs adopted for TAA 2003 lead to
Some Modeling             understated support force requirements. Without rerunning the theater
Assumptions Lead to       campaign models with different assumptions and model inputs, the Army
Understated               cannot determine the impact of changes in most of these assumptions,
                          such as delaying the call-up of reserve forces on force requirements.
Requirements              However, some assumptions lend themselves to estimable force level

                          7
                           Casualty numbers are classified.



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                            equivalents, such as coalition support requirements. To the extent that less
                            favorable assumptions would increase the Army’s support requirements,
                            the risks associated with the current force may be higher than suggested
                            by TAA 2003 results.


TAA 2003 Used Many of       During TAA, the Army used many key assumptions in modeling the two
the Same Favorable          MRCs that were identical or similar to assumptions cited in the defense

Assumptions Cited in        guidance then in effect. Some of these assumptions were favorable, that is,
                            they tended to minimize risk to U.S. forces and objectives. These included:
Defense Guidance
                        •   Immediate access to ports and airfields. TAA assumed that U.S. forces
                            would have immediate, unobstructed access to ports and airfields in the
                            theater of operation. An adverse case excursion was modeled in which
                            immediate access to primary ports and airfields was denied in a one-MRC
                            scenario. This excursion reflected a requirement for additional positions
                            above that needed for two nearly simultaneous MRCs when it was assumed
                            that immediate access would be available. Over 90 percent of this
                            additional requirement was for transportation and quartermaster
                            positions—positions already in short supply. However, in stating its
                            requirements for TOE forces, the Army used the base case requirement of
                            672,000 positions.
                        •   Timely decisions by the National Command Authorities. TAA assumed that
                            the call-up of reserve forces coincided with the day U.S. forces deploy to
                            the first MRC and that the activation of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, civilian
                            aircraft that augment the military in wartime, occurs early.8 For the
                            reserve call-up to occur on the same day as the first deployment of U.S.
                            forces assumes that it occurs at the earliest feasible opportunity.
                        •   Limited chemical use. TAA assumed limited use of chemical weapons by
                            enemy forces in each of the MRCs. Because of the constrained amount of
                            chemical weapons modeled, some TAA participants did not believe the
                            scenario provided a realistic representation. A more intensive chemical
                            attack was modeled in a single MRC adverse case excursion. Results of this
                            excursion indicated a requirement for additional support forces, but this is
                            not reflected in the overall TAA base case requirement of 672,000 spaces.
                            For example, casualties resulting from chemical attacks were not modeled
                            in TAA 2003 to identify the medical support requirement.

                            Changes to any of these assumptions would have resulted in higher force
                            requirements than those determined in TAA 2003. However, rather than

                            8
                            Under 10 U.S.C. 12304, the President can activate up to 200,000 reservists for not more than 270 days,
                            without a declaration of war or other national emergency.



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                          present a range of requirements to reflect the results of less favorable
                          assumptions, the Army focused solely on the base case in arriving at the
                          results of TAA 2003. A list of the key assumptions used in TAA 2003 is
                          provided in appendix IV.


Other Assumptions Also    Support force requirements would also have been higher had the Army not
Resulted in Lower Force   taken steps to eliminate some workload requirements from consideration
Requirements              in TAA. For example, no requirements were added to support coalition
                          partners, although historically the Army has provided such support. OSD
                          officials estimate that support to coalition partners would result in an
                          additional requirement of from 6,500 to 20,000 spaces.

                          Also, support force requirements were determined based on a steady state
                          demand rate, which does not account for above average periods of
                          demand. This approach, called smoothing, disregards the cumulative
                          effect of work backlogs. Smoothing can be problematic for units whose
                          resources are based on the amount of workload to be performed, such as
                          transportation, fuel supply, and ammunition supply units.9 For example,
                          fuel off-loaded onto a pier will remain on the pier until transportation is
                          available to move it. With smoothing, this backlog of fuel is forgotten; no
                          resources are applied toward it because the Army model does not take
                          into account workload that was not performed previously. Rather, the
                          model considers each time period during the operation as a discrete,
                          independent event.

                          The effects of smoothing tend to diminish over time. However, for
                          relatively short wars, such as those envisioned in illustrative planning
                          scenarios contained in defense guidance, the impact can be significant.
                          For TAA 2003, the effect of smoothing understated the support force
                          requirement by more than 28,000 positions, according to Army officials.
                          The branches most affected by smoothing were transportation (more than
                          18,400 positions) and quartermaster (more than 3,800 positions), the two
                          branches with the highest number of unmet requirements, smoothing
                          notwithstanding. Army officials told us that the requirement for cargo
                          transfer and truck companies during the first 30 days of the first MRC is
                          almost twice as great (183 percent) when the requirement is not smoothed,
                          and three times as great over the entire conflict.




                          9
                           Exceptions are medical and some combat engineer units. Their requirements were not smoothed, but
                          rather computed to handle peak requirements.



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                          Since TAA 2003 requirements are based on the two-MRC scenario, some
TAA Requirements Do       officials have questioned whether the Army has given adequate attention
Not Adequately            to the role of OOTWs in the post-Cold War period and the demands these
Reflect U.S. Role in      operations place on Army forces. In particular, some DOD officials,
                          including CINCs, have concerns that the Army has not adequately
OOTWs                     considered delays or degradation in capability resulting from the
                          extraction of forces from an OOTW to an MRC, or to the potential demands
                          on supporting forces resulting from multiple OOTWs. Despite these
                          concerns, the Army has no plans to change its approach to OOTWs in the
                          currently ongoing TAA 2005.


Army Follows Defense      Defense guidance directed the Army to base TAA 2003 requirements on
Guidance on OOTWs but     either two nearly simultaneous MRCs or on one MRC and one OOTW,
Could Experience          whichever produced the greater requirement. To make this assessment,
                          the Army modeled the force structure requirements of four individual
Shortages in Some Types   OOTW excursions using defense illustrative planning scenarios and
of Units                  supporting intelligence and threat analysis information. These included
                          requirements for a peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance,
                          peacekeeping, and a lesser regional contingency operation.

                          Based on its modeling results, the Army concluded that requirements for
                          one OOTW plus an MRC was less than the two-MRC war-fight requirement. In
                          fact, the Army found that the aggregate support requirements of all four
                          OOTWs were less than the support requirements for one MRC. Accordingly,
                          the Army believes the needs of OOTWs can be satisfied by fulfilling the MRC
                          requirements.

                          The Army also observed that OOTWs could stress certain support
                          specialties and used its excursion results to help “sharpen its assessment”
                          of how Army resources should be allocated. For example, the Army
                          conducted quick reaction analyses of the operational concept for
                          employment and support of forces under the four defense planning OOTW
                          scenarios. Among other results, these analyses identified a need for
                          additional active Army support specialties, including transportation and
                          quartermaster capability. The Army also found these specialties to be in
                          short supply when it examined the impact of redeploying forces from an
                          OOTW to an MRC. During OOTWs, the Army relies on active support forces
                          and reserve volunteers, prior to a presidential call-up of reserve forces. To
                          help mitigate this risk, Army officials told us they decided, to the extent
                          possible, to redistribute resources during TAA to help overcome these key
                          shortfalls. As shown on table 2.2, the Army shifted positions from other



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                           lower priority requirements to both the transportation and quartermaster
                           branches in TAA 2003, although shortages remain and these branches are
                           still heavily reliant on reserve forces.


TAA Assumes That Forces    In the event the United States becomes involved in a major conflict,
Assigned to OOTWs Can      defense guidance assumes that the Army will withdraw its forces
Readily Redeploy to MRCs   committed to OOTWs to respond to an MRC. Neither the Army nor the
                           defense guidance acknowledges any potential for delays or degradation of
                           mission capability of forces previously assigned to OOTWs in determining
                           the Army’s support force requirements. However, both the Army’s own
                           analyses and comments from the CINCs question this assumption.

                           For example, as part of its risk assessment for TAA, the Army conducted an
                           excursion to determine whether involvement in a significant OOTW would
                           result in insufficient support force structure for the first 30 days of an MRC.
                           The Army analysis found that about 15,000 active support forces
                           participating in a sizable OOTW were required for this first MRC. The Army
                           assumed it could extract these forces from the OOTW without delays or
                           degradation in capability, but it provided no analysis to support this
                           position. In contrast, TRADOC Analysis Center, in conducting a classified
                           study on strategic risks, assumed as a given, that 20,000 Army active
                           component resources would be committed to one or more OOTWs and
                           would not be available to participate in the two-MRC war fight. Another
                           TRADOC analysis has highlighted the reconstitution challenges encountered
                           when moving support forces from an OOTW environment to an MRC, where
                           personnel and equipment requirements frequently differ. During the
                           planning phase of TAA 2003, the Forces Command commander
                           recommended that the Army first determine the level of force structure it
                           was willing to commit to OOTWs and then exclude this OOTW force from
                           participating in the first MRC war fight. Both the TRADOC Analysis Center
                           and the Forces Command commander were acknowledging that
                           extraction from OOTWs could not be performed without consequences.

                           CINCs also expressed concern regarding the Army’s handling of OOTWs in
                           TAA 2003. For example, the CINC, U.S. Atlantic Command, stated that his
                           major concern was in transitioning from an OOTW to an MRC, especially in
                           the case of units with unique or highly specialized training and/or
                           equipment. Similarly, the CINC, U.S. European Command asserted that
                           some allowance must be developed in TAA to account for OOTW-type
                           requirements, considering (1) their impact on a heavily committed
                           resource base (i.e., active Army combat and support personnel) and



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                       (2) the time necessary to extract the troops from such missions if U.S.
                       forces must be shifted to contend with an overwhelming threat to U.S.
                       strategic interests. The CINC believes this is particularly important because
                       U.S. commitments to these operations are significant and the trend to
                       involve U.S. forces in such operations is on the rise.

                       Our past review further supports the CINCs’ concerns. We reported that
                       critical support and combat forces needed in the early stages of an MRC
                       may be unable to redeploy quickly from peace operations because certain
                       Army support forces are needed to facilitate the redeployment of other
                       military forces.10 In addition, our follow-on peace operations study cited
                       this deficiency as significant, because in the event of a short-warning
                       attack, forces are needed to deploy rapidly to the theater and enter the
                       battle as quickly as possible to halt the invasion.11


Multiple OOTWs Could   As part of its analysis of the four OOTW excursions, the Army developed
Add to Army Risk       troop lists and overall size estimates for each type of OOTW. These force
                       size estimates suggest that multiple OOTWs could result in a major
                       commitment of personnel resources—resources that have not been fully
                       evaluated in the TAA process. This is the view of the current CINC, U.S.
                       European Command, based on his expanded troop involvement in Bosnia,
                       Macedonia, Turkey, and Africa. The CINC asserts that essential support
                       personnel have been stretched to the limit for resourcing the above
                       military operations in his area of geographic responsibility, including those
                       associated with providing fuel supply and distribution capacity, heavy
                       truck transportation, military police, fuel handling, and communications
                       repair. By their nature, these operations tend to be manpower intensive.
                       Thus, the CINC stated that the next TAA process should consider how to
                       include specific operational scenarios of a lesser regional scale (i.e.,
                       OOTWs), in addition to the two MRCs.


                       The Army lacks the quantitative data to assess how such potentially
                       burdensome and repeated deployments of support troops in OOTW-like
                       operations impact the Army. However, comments from both the CINCs and
                       some Army officials suggest the need for improved force structure
                       planning for such contingencies. Army officials responsible for TAA
                       responded that the Army must assume that the forces needed for
                       OOTW-type operations will come from the same pool of forces identified for


                       10
                         Bottom-Up Review: Analysis of Key DOD Assumptions (GAO/NSIAD-95-56, Jan. 31, 1995).
                       11
                        Peace Operations: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect Response to Regional Conflicts
                       (GAO/NSIAD-95-51, Mar. 8, 1995).



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                      use in the event of one or more MRCs, because this is a defense guidance
                      requirement. As a result, the Army plans no future changes in how TAA
                      approaches multiple OOTWs and their resourcing implications. This
                      includes TAA 2005, which is now underway.


                      In resourcing the Army’s support requirements for fighting two MRCs, the
Available Support     Army did not consider all available personnel at its disposal. By better
Personnel Were        matching available personnel with its requirements, we believe the Army
Excluded From TAA     could mitigate some of the risks disclosed in TAA 2003 results. Specifically,
                      TAA did not consider support capabilities that currently exist in the
Process               National Guard’s eight divisions, civilian contractor personnel, TDA military
                      personnel, or civilian defense personnel. Considering these personnel,
                      most of which would be suitable to meet requirements for later deploying
                      units, could enable the Army to somewhat reduce its shortfall of support
                      personnel. However, it would not resolve the Army’s shortage of active
                      support personnel to meet requirements in the first 30 days. TAA gave
                      limited recognition to some host nation support to reduce the number of
                      positions in unresourced units to 44,000, but is reluctant to place greater
                      reliance on this resource until DOD resolves major issues as to when and
                      how much support host nations will provide.


Army National Guard   In TAA 2003, the Army did not consider how to use the support capability
                      that currently exists in the eight Army National Guard divisions that the
                      Army does not envision using during a two-conflict scenario. Based on the
                      Army’s analysis, some support capabilities in the National Guard divisions
                      are similar or identical to support units in short supply. In our March 1995
                      report,12 we found that personnel in these divisions could be used to fill
                      100 percent of the vacant positions for 321 types of skills, including
                      helicopter pilots, communications technicians, repair personnel, military
                      police officers, intelligence analysts, and fuel and water specialists. In
                      response, DOD formally concurred with our recommendation that the Army
                      identify specific support requirements that could be met using National
                      Guard divisional support units and develop a plan for accessing that
                      support capability. This capability was not considered in TAA 2003 and we
                      know of no plans to consider it in TAA 2005.13 Army officials advised us that


                      12
                       See pp. 5-7 of our report, Force Structure: Army National Guard Divisions Could Augment Wartime
                      Support Capability (GAO/NSIAD-95-80, Mar. 2, 1995).
                      13
                       These National Guard support capabilities exist today —they do not hinge on the Army’s action to
                      convert 42,700 combat positions to support positions at a cost of $2.8 billion, as detailed in a May 1996
                      National Guard division redesign study.



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                    while the National Guard units have specific personnel and equipment that
                    could be used in wartime, the units do not clearly correlate with support
                    units, and would likely deploy piecemeal rather than as full units, as the
                    Army prefers. For this reason, Army officials advised us that there are no
                    efforts underway to consider these personnel in TAA, as we recommended,
                    even though in a wartime situation, the Army would, in fact, make use of
                    these resources as a “fallback.” Since Army officials agreed that in some
                    cases (for example, transportation), there may be potential for deployment
                    to MRCs, planning how to access these forces in advance could reduce the
                    number of unfilled positions in TAA. However, it would not reduce the
                    Army’s late risk (i.e., the risk that forces might not arrive in the first 30
                    days of the first MRC), since these forces could not be mobilized, trained,
                    and deployed in time.


Civilian Contract   Contract personnel were also not considered in TAA 2003. The Army is
Personnel           already making greater use of contract personnel to provide many of the
                    support services typically provided by its combat service support
                    personnel. For example, through its Logistics Civil Augmentation Program,
                    the Army has used contractor personnel to provide base camp
                    construction and maintenance, laundry, food supply and service, water
                    production, and transportation. In terms of timing, the Army’s current
                    contract calls for logistical and construction support to be initiated within
                    15 days of the Army’s order. Among the most recent operations using
                    contractor personnel are: Operation Restore Hope (Somalia); Operation
                    Support Hope (Rwanda); Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti); Operation
                    Joint Endeavor (Bosnia); and Operation Deny Flight (Aviano, Italy).
                    Civilian contractors were also used extensively in both the Korean and
                    Vietnam wars to augment the logistical support provided to U.S. forces.
                    However, the Army made no assessment in TAA 2003 to determine how
                    much of its unresourced requirement could potentially be offset by
                    contractor personnel.


TDA Personnel       TAA 2003 also did not consider the potential use of TDA military personnel
                    (with the exception of medical) and civilians, even though, in some
                    instances, these personnel can and do deploy—sometimes on very short
                    notice. Chapter 3 will discuss the need to unify the Army’s separate
                    processes for allocating personnel to TOE and TDA, so that personnel who
                    perform similar functions are considered together.




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Host Nation Support   Another potential resource pool the Army could consider to a greater
Reduces Unmet         extent is host nation support. To minimize war-fight risk, the Army does
Requirements          not use host nation support to offset requirements without a signed
                      agreement from the host nation, and then only in cases where the joint
                      war-fighting command is confident the support will be provided when and
                      where needed. Host nation support that meets this test is only used to
                      offset requirements for units that were not allocated any positions in TAA.
                      In TAA 2003, host nation support offset over 14,000 of these positions.

                      OSD officials who have reviewed TAA 2003 suggested that the Army place a
                      greater reliance on host nation support by relaxing the requirement that
                      the United States have formal agreements with the host nation to provide
                      the support. OSD estimates that the Army could reduce its support force
                      shortfall by as much as 42,000 if it were to count on likely host nation
                      support even though formal agreements may not be in place. However, the
                      Army’s current position is consistent with that of the Secretary of Defense,
                      as reported in the Fiscal Year 1995 Annual Statement of Assurance to the
                      President and Congress, under the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity
                      Act. In that statement, the Secretary cites a material weakness in the
                      Central Command’s program for validating quantities of wartime host
                      nation support presumed to be available for use by U.S. forces, but not
                      documented by formal agreements.

                      The Central Command’s corrective action plan requires that lists of
                      commodities and services required from the host nations be organized by
                      location and time of availability and that the host nations’ political and
                      military leaderships agree to these lists. We followed up with the Central
                      Command to determine the status of their corrective action plan and were
                      told that while efforts were underway to obtain such agreements, nothing
                      was definite. Chapter 4 addresses further actions under way to respond to
                      OSD’s analysis.



                      While TAA is an analytically rigorous process, it is not an exact science.
Some Aspects of       There are many assumptions and uncertainties involved in sizing Army
TAA’s Methodology     support forces, and seemingly small changes can dramatically alter its
Could Be Improved     final outcome. Among TAA’s strengths are that it bases many of its
                      decisions on established Army doctrine, involves senior leadership
                      throughout the process, and includes consensus building mechanisms
                      among the branches. On the other hand, the Army may be able to improve
                      some aspects of TAA’s methodology. For example, not all TAA model inputs
                      were scrutinized to ensure they were free from error; the process does not



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                          easily accommodate changes that occur during its 2-year implementation
                          cycle; TAA’s transportation model is not rerun with the required force; and
                          the Army does not prioritize deficiencies that remain and develop action
                          plans to mitigate risk.


Participants Questioned   Participants’ exposure to TAA modeling was limited and focused on the
Validity of TAA Model     results of the war gaming, not its methodology and detailed assumptions.
Inputs                    Nonetheless, in TAA 2003, participants detected errors in model inputs late
                          in the process, after the models had been run and requirements had been
                          identified. While allocating positions, participants began to question
                          whether fuel and water consumption rates had been understated. Since
                          the TAA process had already been delayed as the Army considered how to
                          account for OSD’s planned 20,000 reduction in end strength, the Army had
                          an opportunity to convene a supplemental conference to allow time to
                          rerun the models with revised inputs. The result was an additional support
                          requirement of 48,000 positions. This experience caused some participants
                          to question the degree to which the Army had scrutinized its planning data
                          and assumptions. It also provides an illustration of how changes in the
                          model inputs can dramatically alter the final results of TAA.

                          In another example, the Army was able to reduce its medical-related
                          support requirements in TAA 2003 by reducing the medical evacuation time
                          from 30 to 15 days. Previously, the policy was 15 days within the first 30
                          days of the conflict and 30 days thereafter. This one change, which was
                          supported by the Army’s medical branch, reduced the need for hospital
                          beds in theater by 35 percent. This change led to reductions in branches
                          like engineer and quartermaster, and in some types of medical units. Both
                          OSD and Army officials agree that key model inputs, such as those for fuel,
                          ammunition, and medical, need to be reviewed and validated because they
                          can have such a significant impact on TAA results.

                          The Army is responsible for providing certain logistics support to the other
                          services during the two MRCs. TAA acknowledged the need for Army
                          personnel to support the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps forces,
                          and the Army solicited their wartime requirements through the
                          war-fighting CINCs. For example, in TAA 2003, the Army’s assistance
                          consisted primarily of providing overland transport of bulk fuel and
                          ammunition. Based on CINC inputs, the Army added about 24,000 support
                          positions to assist the other services in these areas, meeting 79 percent of
                          their requirements. According to a Forces Command official, during a war,
                          the war-fighting CINCs determine where to allocate these personnel.



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                               Additionally, some Army officials believe that some of the logistical
                               support requirements such as those for transportation may be understated
                               because the Army typically receives a poor response from the CINCs
                               concerning the other services’ requirements. The Army acknowledges it
                               needs more accurate estimates of the other services’ needs.


TAA Results Can Be             Because of the time needed to complete a full TAA cycle, almost 2 years,
Overtaken by Events            the Army may find that key assumptions or data inputs, while valid at the
                               time, have essentially been overtaken by events. TAA has a limited ability to
                               accommodate changes in strategy or key assumptions that occur beyond
                               its initial planning phase. This inability to accommodate change undercuts
                               the Army’s case that TAA is focused on the future, that is, Army force
                               structure required 9-years out. The following examples in TAA 2003
                               illustrate this point.

                           •   First, soon after TAA 2003 was completed, the Secretary of Defense issued
                               new guidance reflecting a significant change in scenarios. TAA 2003
                               assumed that the MRCs would be sequenced differently, consistent with
                               earlier guidance. A subsequent analysis by the Army showed that if the
                               more current guidance had been used, an additional 40,000 warfight
                               support positions would have been required. TAA 2005 could also be
                               impacted by changes in defense strategy since the Army plans to run its
                               models based on the existing two-conflict strategy. The ongoing
                               Quadrennial Defense Review could change this strategy and lessen the
                               usefulness of the Army’s TAA results.
                           •   Second, in the middle of the TAA 2003 process, OSD issued a directive for
                               the Army to reduce its active end strength by 20,000 toward a goal of
                               475,000 as early as practical, but no later than 1999. Army officials told us
                               that TAA could not accommodate this change since it could not anticipate
                               what parts of its force would be affected by the mandated cut, and any
                               changes to its combat forces would affect how the Army fights. This, in
                               turn, would result in changes to various inputs to the war fight model
                               itself.


TAA Transportation Model       The TAA process could be enhanced if additional analyses were conducted
Not Rerun With Required        to reveal the impact of force size on the movement of forces to fight two
Force                          major conflicts. The Army could have refined its mobility assessment by
                               running the TAA 2003 required force through its transportation model,
                               rather than exclusively relying on the earlier TAA 2001 required force. TAA
                               models were run in the early stages of the process using a prior TAA (i.e.,



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                         TAA 2001) generated force structure to establish a baseline for flowing
                         forces into theater and to fight the war. At the conclusion of this phase of
                         TAA, the Army determines its total war-fighting requirement. However, the
                         Army does not rerun its models with this “required” TAA 2003 force to
                         assess the impact of this larger force on moving forces to theater. Army
                         officials agreed that rerunning its transportation model using the required
                         force would improve TAA, and the Army is currently considering how to
                         use its iterative modeling capability to its best advantage in TAA 2005.


Remaining Deficiencies   The Army does not prioritize force deficiencies that remain after TAA is
Are Not Prioritized      completed and all force structure decisions are made, nor does it indicate
                         what is being done to mitigate war-fighting risks. Examples of risk
                         reduction measures include: use of new technology to overcome
                         personnel shortages; new training initiatives (e.g., cross training personnel
                         to perform more than one function); changing doctrine where appropriate;
                         or drawing on other resource pools not addressed in TAA (e.g., civilians,
                         reserves, and contractors). Although not formally documented in the TAA
                         2003 process, the Director of Army Force Programs told us that he is
                         identifying actions to further mitigate the risks identified in TAA 2003. The
                         Director cited studies on the feasibility of home station deployment and
                         having unequipped reservists falling in on prepositioned equipment
                         located in counterpart active Army units (e.g., the Army’s truck fleet could
                         handle a greater workload if it had more drivers to take more shifts). In a
                         period of declining resources, actions such as these could help the Army
                         use its available resources more efficiently.


                         While the Army believes it can support two MRCs, given existing force
Conclusions              levels, and 10 fully active divisions, it has accepted some risks—most
                         notably the lack of sufficient active support forces during the first 30 days
                         of an MRC. TAA results indicate that 42 percent of all required support
                         forces needed in the first 30 days of the first conflict will arrive
                         late—about 79,000 soldiers. These late arrivers are tasked to provide
                         essential services such as medical, engineering, transportation, and
                         quartermaster support. The Army is also counting on the arrival of about
                         15,000 predominantly support personnel previously deployed to OOTWs
                         during the first 30 days, even though CINC and Army officials question their
                         availability and readiness during this time frame. Further, because the
                         Army discounts peaks in demand in establishing its requirements through
                         a technique called “smoothing,” actual workload for some types of units
                         during the first 30 days is actually much higher than TAA 2003 requirements



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                  reflect—almost twice as high for some transportation units. Finally, TAA
                  results reveal that the Army will have few active support forces—about
                  12 percent of total support forces required—available to support the
                  second MRC and that 19,200 required active support positions in existing
                  units are not authorized to be filled. Moreover, units totaling 58,400
                  positions are not authorized any personnel at all because the Army’s total
                  wartime support requirement exceeds available personnel authorizations.
                  The Army plans to mitigate this risk by relying on host nation personnel
                  and converting some Army National Guard combat forces to support
                  forces. These conversions are not yet funded and could take many years to
                  be accomplished.

                  Our examination of TAA assumptions and model inputs found that the
                  Army used many favorable assumptions that may have understated risks
                  to U.S. forces, such as limited chemical use by the enemy, assured port
                  availability, and no delays in the call-up of reserves forces. In particular,
                  the Army does not appear to have adequately considered delays or
                  degradation in capability resulting from the extraction of forces from an
                  OOTW to a major conflict, or to the potential demands on support forces
                  resulting from multiple OOTWs. War-fighting commanders believe that such
                  multiple OOTWs will add to the Army’s war-fighting risk. Since the Army
                  does not conduct sensitivity analyses to assess the impact of less favorable
                  assumptions, it does not know the extent to which changes in these
                  underlying assumptions would increase Army support requirements and
                  related risks. On the other hand, the Army could mitigate some risks by
                  expanding its resource pool to include support capabilities that currently
                  exist in the National Guard and TDA forces, as well as contract
                  services—resources that, with the exception of medical, are presently
                  excluded from TAA.

                  While TAA is an analytically rigorous process with extensive modeling and
                  wide participation by key Army personnel, some aspects of its
                  methodology could be improved. Some participants questioned whether
                  the Army had sufficiently scrutinized key model inputs, such as
                  consumption factors for fuel and water. In addition, by not rerunning the
                  campaign models with its required force, the Army missed an opportunity
                  to fully assess how mobility limitations affected risk.


                  To improve TAA’s ability to accurately project war-fighting requirements
Recommendations   and allocate the Army’s personnel resources, we recommend that the
                  Secretary of the Army



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                     •   reexamine key model inputs to ensure they are accurate and consistent
                         with war-fighting scenarios;
                     •   perform analysis to determine how multiple OOTW support force
                         requirements might differ from support force requirements based on two
                         MRCs and bring any variances to the attention of the Secretary of Defense
                         so that he can consider them in developing defense guidance;
                     •   perform sensitivity analyses on significant model inputs, assumptions, and
                         resourcing decisions to determine their impacts on war-fighting risk. For
                         example, although the Army used assumptions established by defense
                         guidance, determining the implications of less favorable conditions, such
                         as delayed call-up of reserves, would provide the Army with additional
                         information on which to base its assessment of risk;
                     •   rerun TAA models with the required force to assess the impact of force size
                         on mobility requirements; and
                     •   determine how support units resident within the eight National Guard
                         divisions, TDA military personnel, contractor personnel, and DOD civilians
                         can be used to fill some support force requirements.


                         In written comments on a draft of this report DOD fully concurred with four
Agency Comments          of our recommendations and partially concurred with one (see app. V).
and Our Evaluation       DOD noted that the Army has already planned some actions to resolve
                         issues we identified. For example, DOD stated the Army is closely
                         scrutinizing its model inputs for TAA 2005, beginning with a rigorous review
                         of all 3,000 allocation rules, and major studies to review fuel consumption
                         factors and casualty rates. The Army also plans to analyze the impact of
                         multiple OOTWs on support requirements and agreed that the current
                         assumption that all units involved in OOTWs will be immediately available
                         for the war fight is flawed and overly optimistic. The Army also plans to
                         conduct other sensitivity analyses and excursions in TAA 2005, beyond
                         those required by defense guidance. Further, the Army will rerun TAA
                         models with the required force to provide the force flow data needed to
                         improve its analysis of risk.

                         However, DOD only partially concurred with our recommendation to
                         consider other personnel resources in filling its support force
                         requirements. The Army plans to consider some types of Army National
                         Guard Division assets to fill support force shortfalls where the capabilities
                         are nearly a match, such as aviation assets. The Army also plans to further
                         analyze how to use its TDA structure to meet both OOTW and war-fighting
                         requirements. In the future, deployable TDA forces will be considered part
                         of the Army’s operating force. However, DOD differs with us on recognizing



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civilian contractor personnel in TAA. The Army believes that while
contractor personnel enhance the Army’s capabilities, they should not be
considered an available resource in TAA since contractor personnel are not
funded in the outyears of the Program Objective Memorandum. The Army
also expressed concern about its ability to provide security to contractors
in an MRC environment. Because contractor personnel have historically
been used by the Army to provide support in many different types of
overseas environments, both OOTWs and MRCs, we believe that, as a
minimum, the Army could treat contractor personnel in the same way it
treats host nation support—as an offset to unmet requirements. The Army
can make assumptions concerning the funding of the Logistics Civil
Augmentation Program, just as it makes assumptions about such issues as
the availability of host nation support, the size of the active Army force, or
the level of modernization of the force in future years.




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The Army Plans to Eliminate Some
Institutional Military Positions but Is
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Process
                       Despite numerous Army initiatives to improve its TDA requirements
                       determination process since the late 1970s, the Army cannot allocate its
                       TDA personnel based on the workload required to complete TDA missions.
                       As a result, the Army does not have a tool to prioritize TDA functions and
                       has made across-the-board cuts in TDA that are not analytically based.
                       Ongoing command and Army-wide initiatives to manage TDA based on
                       workload, to include analyzing what work needs to be done and assessing
                       how processes can be improved, will require senior Army leadership
                       support for successful implementation.

                       The Army has reviewed some TDA functions and identified a potential to
                       reduce its TDA by up to 4,000 military positions as a result of its initial
                       streamlining efforts. However, the Army’s end strength will not be
                       reduced; rather, the positions will be used to offset shortfalls in TOE
                       support forces. Plans for some of these initiatives, however, have not been
                       finalized and it is difficult to definitively quantify some savings. Army TDA
                       streamlining will continue through 2007. The Army is evaluating several
                       options to consolidate its major commands, which could further reduce
                       TDA requirements for active military personnel and introduce more
                       efficient business practices. However, such a reorganization could be
                       hampered without workload-based requirements. The Army’s potential for
                       streamlining TDA will also be limited by several laws and regulations, such
                       as civilian downsizing and TDA positions that are protected from Army
                       force reduction initiatives.

                       Finally, some personnel in TOE and TDA units perform similar functions
                       which calls into question the need for separate resourcing processes.
                       Some features of the Army’s process for using TDA medical personnel to fill
                       positions in TOE medical units may provide a model for other functions
                       with both TOE and TDA missions.


                       Weaknesses in the Army’s ability to fully define force requirements for the
Institutional          institutional Army in terms of workload are long standing and have been
Requirements Are Not   reported by us and the Army since the late 1970s. Workload-based
Well Supported         management is designed to help managers determine the resources
                       needed to complete a job and logically respond to resource cuts. For
                       example, using workload-based management, a manager could determine
                       how many trainers would be required to train a certain number of students
                       in a specified period of time. Weaknesses in its program leave the Army
                       unable to analytically support its TDA requirements or define the risks of
                       reducing this portion of the Army forces. Further, a weak requirements



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                                         process prevents the Army leadership from making informed choices as to
                                         possible trade-offs among TDA functions and commands based on highest
                                         priority needs.

                                         According to Army regulation and policy, force requirements are to be
                                         logically developed from specific workload requirements derived from
                                         mission directives. Responsibility for allocating personnel resources to
                                         fulfill TDA missions belongs to the major commands. For fiscal year 1998,
                                         the Army projects its TDA force at over 123,000 military positions and over
                                         247,000 civilian positions. Although TDA functions are carried out by
                                         military and civilian personnel depending on the type of mission, our focus
                                         was on the active military Army. Table 3.1 shows the distribution of active
                                         military TDA positions for fiscal year 1998.

Table 3.1: Distribution of Authorized
TDA Military Positions for Fiscal Year   Command                                                                  Military TDA Positions
1998                                     Training and Doctrine Command                                                               44,823
                                         Medical Command                                                                             25,229
                                         Forces Command                                                                              13,278
                                         Intelligence and Security Command                                                            6,303
                                         Army Materiel Command                                                                        3,057
                                         U.S. Army Europe                                                                             3,025
                                         Special Operations Command/ Special Operations Forces                                        2,812
                                         U.S. Army Pacific                                                                            2,499
                                         Eighth U.S. Army                                                                             1,429
                                         Military District Washington                                                                 1,381
                                         Personnel Command                                                                            1,112
                                         U.S. Military Academy                                                                          928
                                         U.S. Army South                                                                                528
                                         Corps of Engineers                                                                             505
                                         Criminal Investigation Command                                                                 390
                                         Othera                                                                                      16,148
                                         Total Authorized TDA Positions                                                            123,447
                                         a
                                          Category includes positions allocated to the Army National Guard, field operating agencies, and
                                         Joint and Defense agencies.

                                         Source: Army force structure database as of November 1996.



                                         In response to our 1979 report criticizing the Army for its lack of
                                         workload-based information on which to determine personnel
                                         requirements, the Army developed a workload-based personnel allocation



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                          system, known as the Manpower Staffing Standards System. This system
                          was intended to determine minimum essential requirements to accomplish
                          TDA workload and identify operational improvements to increase
                          efficiency and effectiveness. However, command officials told us that this
                          process was time consuming and labor intensive, taking as long as 3 years
                          to analyze a single function, and that the standards generated by it were
                          often obsolete by the time they were issued. In 1994, the Army Audit
                          Agency found that, as a result of these problems and lack of management
                          tools to collect workload data, managers were not able to effectively
                          determine or manage their TDA workloads and thus could not be assured
                          that limited personnel resources were being distributed to the highest
                          priority functions.


Commands Employ           During our review, Army headquarters officials acknowledged that the
Varying Levels of         Army cannot articulate its TDA force structure in terms of workload, and
Workload-Based Analysis   we found varying levels of compliance with the Army’s workload-based
                          management regulation at the major commands we contacted. The
                          Intelligence and Security Command, with a 1998 TDA active end strength
                          authorization of over 6,000, does not have a formal manpower study
                          program due to downsizing and changes in workload. Allocation of TDA
                          resources is done based on command guidance with functional staff’s
                          input. An official at Forces Command, which has a 1998 active component
                          TDA of about 13,000, told us that workload-based manpower management
                          had not been a high priority in recent years because of turmoil in the
                          workforce caused by downsizing and reallocation of workload due to base
                          realignments and closures. Forces Command has a plan to conduct a
                          comprehensive manpower assessment at each of its installations by the
                          year 2000. This assessment will include validating work requirements,
                          developing manning levels based on workload, and using cross-installation
                          comparisons of functions to establish a model for future manpower
                          requirements determination.

                          TRADOC,   the Medical Command, and the Army Materiel Command had
                          more extensive workload-based management processes. Both the Medical
                          Command and TRADOC employ workload-based standards for about
                          60 percent of their TDA positions and have processes to review workloads
                          and resource allocations according to established requirements. The Army
                          Materiel Command, which has a largely civilian workforce, began a review
                          of all of its functions in March 1995 and completed this review of over
                          60,000 authorized military and civilian positions in January 1997. The
                          review includes validating units’ requirements, analyzing and projecting



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                      workload, and applying available resources to that workload. Having
                      visibility over the workload and the resources needed to complete it gives
                      commanders greater control over their resources and enables them to
                      identify inefficiencies. For example, at the Medical Command, the Surgeon
                      General holds “bankruptcy hearings” for units that exceed established
                      workload benchmarks.


Army Secretariat Is   The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
Promoting             has developed a new methodology for workload-based management that is
Workload-Based        intended to address concerns that the Army does not know how big its
                      institutional force needs to be to satisfy its requirements. The Army’s
Management            methodology includes an analysis of (1) the work that needs to be done
                      based on organizational mission, (2) how to improve processes through
                      better methods, benchmarking, capital investment, automation and
                      improved facilities, and (3) the most appropriate technique for linking
                      people to work. In addition, the Army is pilot testing an automated system
                      for collecting and analyzing workload information and monitoring
                      efficiency based on time spent completing functions. Army officials told us
                      that the system could provide managers at all levels significant visibility
                      over TDA resources and could ultimately be used to make trade-offs among
                      TDA functions Army-wide. The Assistant Secretary’s office is also
                      increasing its review of major commands’ requirements determination
                      processes.

                      Differing management philosophies on the use of workload-based
                      requirements could challenge the Army-wide adoption of workload-based
                      management. For example, one resource management official told us that
                      he preferred across-the-board percentage cuts rather than cuts weighted
                      according to workload, because this allows the commanders more
                      autonomy in how they allocate their resources. In October 1996, the
                      Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs stated
                      that a challenge to adopting workload-based management will be changing
                      the perspective of resourcing officials from a philosophy of managing
                      personnel resources based on budget to managing personnel resources
                      based on workload.

                      Although managing to budget allows commanders to allocate resources
                      based on available budgets, we believe that using it as the sole-allocation
                      process does not provide the commander a vision of what cannot be done
                      as a result of declining budgets and may discourage commands from
                      identifying efficiencies if they know they will be receiving a cut regardless.



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                      In addition, managing to budget does not provide an analytical basis on
                      which to make trade-offs among TDA workload priorities. For example,
                      during deliberations for TAA 2001, which was completed in 1993, an
                      attempt by major command representatives to allocate a cut in TDA
                      positions among their commands ended in gridlock, in part due to the lack
                      of an analytical basis on which to divide the resources. The result was that
                      each command’s TDA military positions were cut by 7.5 percent, regardless
                      of its individual missions or requirements. Such a cut impacts some
                      commands more than others. For example, Intelligence and Security
                      Command officials told us that 75 percent of its officers were controlled
                      by other agencies; therefore, it could not eliminate any of these positions.
                      As a result, an across-the-board 7.5 percent reduction applied to
                      Intelligence and Security Command officers fell disproportionately on the
                      remaining 25 percent of its officers that the command had authority over.

                      Efforts to allocate resources based on workload will require the support of
                      the Army leadership to be successful. The long-standing weaknesses with
                      the Army’s process, despite numerous efforts to improve it, suggest that a
                      higher level of reporting and oversight may be warranted. However, the
                      Army has not reported its historic lack of compliance with its
                      workload-based allocation policy as a material weakness under the
                      Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act (P.L. 97-255). Policy
                      implementing the act requires agencies to establish internal controls to
                      provide reasonable assurance that programs are efficiently and effectively
                      carried out in accordance with applicable law and policy. One criterion for
                      determining whether an internal control weakness is material is if it
                      significantly weakens safeguards against waste. If lack of workload
                      analysis, which does not comply with Army policy and does not safeguard
                      against waste, was reported to the Secretary of Defense as a material
                      weakness, the Secretary of the Army would be required to develop a
                      corrective action plan with milestones for completion. As required by OSD
                      guidance, responsible OSD officials would then need to assess whether this
                      problem is a DOD-wide systemic weakness and whether it is a weakness of
                      sufficient magnitude to be reported in OSD’s annual statement of assurance
                      to the President and Congress.


                      Despite the lack of workload data to define specific requirements of the
The Army Is           TDA force, the Army is re-engineering its processes and redesigning the
Streamlining Its      overall TDA organization through a series of streamlining initiatives.
Institutional Force   Although these efforts have some aspects that are similar to workload
                      analysis, these are one-time, Army-wide assessments intended to provide a



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forum for re-engineering many Army functions. The Army defines
re-engineering as a “fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of
business processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical,
contemporary measures of performance.” In contrast, workload
management is a tool for conducting more micro-levels of analysis on a
unit-by-unit basis.

The streamlining and re-engineering effort, known as the Force XXI
Institutional Army Redesign, is one component of the overall Force XXI
redesign. The other two components are the redesign of the combat forces
and an effort to incorporate information age technology into the
battlefield. The institutional redesign will take place in three phases to
correspond with presidential budget cycles. Phase I, completed in
March 1996, resulted in modifications to the 1998-2003 Army Program
Objective Memorandum. Phases II and III will be completed in time to
update the 2000-2005 and the 2002-2007 budgets, respectively.

As a result of the phase I reviews of TDA missions, to include acquisition,
training, mobilization, recruiting, personnel management and redesign of
the Department of Army Headquarters, the Army eliminated 13
headquarters offices, realigned a major command, and identified almost
4,000 active military positions that will be cut from TDA and transferred to
the TOE end strength between 1998 and 2003. Before the TDA cuts were
identified, TAA 2003 applied 2,000 TDA positions to unmet support force
requirements in anticipation of the streamlining results. Officials told us
that the remaining 2,000 positions will also be transferred to the
deployable portion of the force to fill shortages in units that are at less
than full strength, although they could not specify the units. Furthermore,
many of the 4,000 positions that are being shifted are based on initiatives
that have not been fully tested or approved. Thus, the expected savings are
not assured.

The largest single planned transfer of 2,100 positions is the result of an
Army proposal to replace active TDA military assigned to the Senior
Reserve Officer Training Corps with reserve component,
noncommissioned and retired officers. This proposal is being studied by
TRADOC and would require a change in legislation to authorize the use of
retired and additional reserve personnel, according to the Army. If pilot
testing shows the concept is infeasible, or if the legislative enabler the
Army is proposing is not passed, the Army would need to find a means to
accomplish this function since it has already taken these TDA reductions. In




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                                     another example, the Army anticipates reducing attrition,1 thereby freeing
                                     up 750 TDA positions associated with training and recruiting. The Army’s
                                     plan to reduce attrition is based primarily on establishing an advisory
                                     council to provide commanders with attrition statistics and review policies
                                     that impact attrition. As a result, the Army cannot be certain that the
                                     anticipated TDA transfers can be realistically accomplished.


Ongoing Organizational               The Army’s efforts to streamline its institutional force are linked to a
Reviews Could Reduce                 conceptual model delineated in a draft Department of the Army Pamphlet,
TDA Positions                        100xx entitled “Force XXI Institutional Force Redesign.” The model
                                     identifies the core competency of the TDA force, divides this competency
                                     into 4 core capabilities, and divides the 4 capabilities into 14 core
                                     processes, as shown in table 3.2.

Table 3.2: Core Competency,
Capabilities, and Processes of the   Core competency                      Core capabilities                  Core processes
Institutional Army                   Create, provide and sustain          Direct and resource the            Planning and policy
                                     the land component of the            force                                 development
                                     combatant commander’s                                                   Direction and assessment
                                     joint/multinational force                                               Financial management
                                                                                                             Information management
                                                                          Develop the force                  Develop doctrine
                                                                                                             Devevelop requirements
                                                                                                             Acquire and sustain
                                                                                                               individuals
                                                                                                             Identify and develop leaders
                                                                          Generate and project the           Tailor, mobilize and project
                                                                          force                                land power
                                                                                                             Support organizational
                                                                                                               training
                                                                          Sustain the force                  Acquire, maintain, and
                                                                                                               sustain equipment
                                                                                                             Maintain and sustain land
                                                                                                               operations
                                                                                                             Acquire and sustain facilities
                                                                                                             Operate installations
                                     Source: Department of the Army Pamphlet 100xx (final draft as of October 15, 1996).



                                     The Army plans to align its organizations around the core capabilities and
                                     core processes, so that there would be one office with lead responsibility
                                     for each process. For example, under the current structure, several
                                     commands, including TRADOC, the Intelligence and Security Command, and
                                     U.S. Army, Europe, have responsibility to develop Army doctrine. Under

                                     1
                                      Attrition is defined as a soldier leaving the Army before his or her term of enlistment has expired.



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                             the streamlined model, TRADOC would have the lead responsibility for
                             doctrine writing.

                             The Army will use this framework to align the TDA organization with core
                             processes. The Army has developed three organizational models that
                             would reduce the number of major commands and are intended to
                             eliminate duplication, establish clearer lines of authority, streamline
                             resource management, and could further reduce TDA military personnel.
                             For example, one model would reduce the Army from its current structure
                             of 14 major commands to a total of 10 commands, with 3 major commands
                             and 7 Army service component commands to support the CINCs. The three
                             major commands would be aligned to the “Develop the Force,” “Generate
                             and Project the Force,” and the “Sustain the Force” core capabilities with
                             the Department of the Army Headquarters assuming responsibility for the
                             “Direct and Resource” capabilities. However, these models are illustrative
                             and were presented as a starting point for further discussion and do not
                             directly address shortfalls in defining requirements based on workload. As
                             such, officials said they could not provide a specific date on which any of
                             these models would be in place or estimate how many positions might be
                             saved through streamlining.


Army Must Consider           Additional streamlining of the Army’s TDA force must accommodate
Legislative and Regulatory   limitations from legislative, regulatory, and budgetary guidance. These
Guidance When                actions can influence the size and composition of the institutional Army
                             force, but are outside the Army’s span of control. For example, DOD’s
Streamlining TDA             ongoing civilian drawdown limits the Army’s ability to convert military
                             positions to generally less expensive civilian positions. In 1994 and 1996,
                             we reported that there were opportunities for the Army to convert certain
                             enlisted and officer support positions from military to civilian status, but
                             to overcome impediments to conversion, the Secretary of Defense would
                             need to slow the civilian drawdown, or the Congress would need to
                             reprogram funding.2 Further, officials in the commands we visited pointed
                             to budgetary challenges to converting military positions to civilians. First,
                             the commands are reluctant to convert military positions to civilian
                             positions because they cannot be assured that operations and
                             maintenance money, which funds civilian pay, will be available to hire a
                             new civilian. Officials told us that the transfer of a military position to a
                             civilian position is authorized years before the civilian is hired and
                             sometimes by the year of execution, inadequate operations and

                             2
                             DOD Force Mix Issues: Greater Reliance on Civilians in Support Roles Could Provide Significant
                             Benefits (GAO/NSIAD-95-5, Oct. 19, 1994) and DOD Force Mix Issues: Converting Some Support
                             Officer Positions to Civilian Status Could Save Money (GAO/NSIAD-97-15, Oct. 23, 1996).



                             Page 54                                                       GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
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                                    The Army Plans to Eliminate Some
                                    Institutional Military Positions but Is
                                    Constrained by a Weak Requirements
                                    Process




                                    maintenance funding prevent the command from hiring a new civilian.
                                    Second, local commanders have a disincentive to civilianize because
                                    civilian positions are paid in full from the installation’s budget while
                                    military personnel are paid out of the Army’s centralized military
                                    personnel budget.

                                    Also, some active military TDA positions are required by law or controlled
                                    by other agencies. As a percentage of the active component TDA force,
                                    these positions, sometimes referred to as “fenced” positions, will have
                                    increased from 29 percent in 1991 to a projected 37 percent in 2001. For
                                    example, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991
                                    restricts the Secretary of Defense from reducing medical personnel
                                    without providing certification to Congress that the number reduced is in
                                    excess of that required and that the reduction would not cause an increase
                                    in costs to those covered under the Civilian Health and Medical Program
                                    of the Uniformed Services. Positions controlled by other agencies include
                                    those assigned to the National Foreign Intelligence Program. Under
                                    executive order, these positions are required and budgeted by the Director
                                    of Central Intelligence and cannot be reallocated without his permission.
                                    Table 3.3 summarizes the major categories of fenced positions and the
                                    change from 1991 to 2001.

Table 3.3: Comparison of “Fenced”
TDA Positions, 1991 and 2001                                              1991 End strength              2001 End strength
                                                                        Number of       Percent of      Number of   Percent of
                                    Category                                TDA              TDA            TDA          TDA
                                    National Foreign Intelligence              11,276             7         7,719             6
                                    Program
                                    Special Operations Forces                   2,326             1         2,863             2
                                    Joint                                       5,108             3         5,039             4
                                    Defense Health                             30,123            18        25,096            20
                                    Active Component Support to                    0              0         5,000             4
                                    the Reserves
                                    Total fenced positions                     48,833            29        45,717            37
                                    TDA                                       169,605          100        125,120            100
                                    Source: The 1991 and 1997 Army submittals to President’s Budgets.



                                    Although fencing ensures that selected high-priority missions are
                                    adequately staffed, to the extent positions are fenced, the Army must
                                    disproportionately reduce other non-fenced TDA categories to absorb
                                    across-the-board reductions.




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                   Institutional Military Positions but Is
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                   Process




                   The distinction of a deployable TOE force and a nondeployable TDA force is
Division Between   becoming less clear and calls into question the necessity of maintaining
TOE and TDA Is     separate processes to allocate personnel resources. The draft Army
Becoming Less      Pamphlet 100xx acknowledges a blurred distinction between operational
                   and institutional forces because institutional forces are increasingly being
Distinct           called on to perform tactical support functions in areas such as
                   intelligence, communications, transportation, logistics, engineering, and
                   medical support. For example, an Intelligence and Security Command
                   official told us that all of its TDA military personnel along with almost 600
                   civilians at the command are considered deployable. At Forces Command,
                   we were told that TDA personnel assigned to directly support a TOE unit are
                   expected to deploy with that unit. Another example is military police. In
                   recognition of historical deployments of TDA military police to support law
                   and order operations in theater, the Army plans to convert 1,850 TDA
                   military police positions to TOE. The initiative would establish modular
                   military police organizations that would be designed to provide
                   capabilities in peace, conflict, and war.

                   However, with the exception of medical, TDA specialties with potential use
                   in a deployment are not considered available to be distributed among
                   requirements in the TAA process. TAA does not model the relative risks of
                   reducing TDA units compared to reducing below-the-line support TOE units.
                   Nor does it consider trade-offs between below-the-line support units and
                   support units embedded in combat divisions. Thus, the Army could
                   overstate the risk of shortages in a below-the-line TOE branch, when in
                   practice, TOE support units in combat divisions or TDA personnel are
                   capable of performing similar functions. A unified resourcing process
                   would give the Army visibility over all capabilities available to complete its
                   missions, regardless of their classification as TOE or TDA.

                   The Army’s process for handling medical requirements may provide a
                   model for functions that are resident and required in both TOE and TDA
                   forces. During peacetime, some deployable hospitals are maintained by a
                   small cadre of personnel. During deployments, these hospitals are filled in
                   with designated TDA medical personnel whose peacetime TDA mission is to
                   staff Army medical treatment facilities. Medical reservists are in turn
                   called up to back fill the medical treatment facilities. In TAA 2003, about
                   5,000 requirements were filled with predesignated TDA medical positions.
                   While it may not be feasible to back fill certain specialties with reservists,
                   two features of the medical model could be reviewed for broader
                   application. First, the medical model formally recognizes and quantifies
                   the dual duties of personnel assigned to TDA functions in peacetime but



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                         The Army Plans to Eliminate Some
                         Institutional Military Positions but Is
                         Constrained by a Weak Requirements
                         Process




                         expected to deploy in operations. Second, it gives visibility to all medical
                         assets, regardless of their classification as TOE or TDA forces.


                         Army initiatives to analytically define and allocate TDA resources according
Conclusions              to workload have not been effective. Although ongoing initiatives show
                         some promise, they will require significant support by the Army
                         leadership. If implemented, workload-based management could identify
                         opportunities to streamline TDA functions and ensure that active military
                         positions are allocated most efficiently.

                         Of the potential 4,000 required positions for transfer to TOE by the Force
                         XXI institutional redesign, many are contingent on Army plans that have
                         either not been finalized or that are difficult to quantify. As a result, the
                         anticipated reallocation should be viewed with caution. There is potential
                         for further savings as the Army streamlines its TDA by aligning the
                         organization with TDA core processes; however, streamlining may be
                         limited by legislative, regulatory, and budgetary guidance.

                         The reliance of TOE units on TDA personnel to complete missions calls into
                         question the need for separate resourcing processes. A more unified
                         process would permit the Army to consider how it can best meet
                         requirements from a wider range of personnel at its disposal. In addition, it
                         would allow for better management of personnel resources—one of the
                         Army’s most expensive budget items.


                         To improve the management and allocation of personnel resources to the
Recommendations          institutional Army, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army

                     •   report to the Secretary of Defense the Army’s long-standing problem with
                         implementing workload-based analysis as a material weakness under the
                         Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act to maintain visibility of the issue
                         and ensure action is taken and
                     •   closely monitor the military positions the Army plans to save as the result
                         of Force XXI initiatives and have a contingency plan in place in the event
                         that these savings do not materialize.


                         DOD’scomments on these recommendations appear in appendix V. DOD
Agency Comments          agreed that the Secretary of the Army should report its long-standing
and Our Evaluation       problems in managing its institutional personnel as a material weakness



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Process




under the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act and develop a sound
basis for allocating resources to these functions. As part of this effort, the
Army intends to assess the potential benefit to the Army of new
workload-based management tools being pilot tested by an office of the
Assistant Secretary of the Army. DOD also concurred with our
recommendation that the Secretary of the Army closely monitor the
military positions saved under Force XXI. The Army’s intent is to apply
any such savings to authorization shortfalls in existing support units.
However, the Army acknowledges that it is too soon to speculate on the
size of any future savings.




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Chapter 4

A Smaller Active Army Support Force Does
Not Appear Feasible at This Time, but a
Smaller Combat and TDA Force May Be
Possible in the Future
                       Reducing active Army support forces does not appear feasible now based
                       on TAA 2003 results, which show that the Army cannot meet its early
                       deployment needs. But a smaller combat and TDA force may be possible in
                       the future, based on ongoing Army initiatives and efforts under way to
                       review U.S. defense strategy and forces.

                       Nevertheless, OSD’s current position on active Army end strength was not
                       supported by detailed analysis. OSD cited potential end strength savings
                       from the Army’s Force XXI streamlining initiatives as a basis to reduce the
                       Army’s end strength to 475,000. However, while Force XXI’s emphasis on
                       digitization and more efficient logistics practices may achieve end strength
                       savings in the long term, these savings do not appear likely to occur by
                       1999, the time frame OSD established to achieve the 20,000 position
                       drawdown. Following its decision to reduce the Army by 20,000 positions,
                       OSD reviewed TAA 2003 results. OSD’s study questioned the Army’s
                       determination of its support requirements but did not examine downsizing
                       of the active Army.

                       OSD’s assessment of the appropriate size of the active Army could change
                       as a result of the congressionally mandated Quadrennial Defense Review.
                       DOD is expected to assess a wide range of issues, including the defense
                       strategy of the United States, the optimum force structure to implement
                       the strategy, and the roles and missions of reserve forces. The number of
                       divisions required or the mix of heavy and light divisions may change if a
                       new strategy is adopted. Also, options may exist for restructuring the
                       Army’s active divisions by integrating some reserve forces. Options to
                       expand the role of the reserves would have the effect of reducing
                       requirements for active combat forces.


                       In April 1995, to free resources for modernization programs, OSD directed
OSD Did Not Base Its   the Army to reduce its end strength by 20,000 no later than 1999. This
Plan to Reduce the     guidance was reflected in DOD’s 1997 FYDP, which reduced the Army’s
Army’s End Strength    active force by 10,000 positions in both 1998 and 1999, along with related
                       military personnel funding. However, in March 1996, the Army Chief of
on Detailed Analysis   Staff testified that the active Army should not get any smaller. Instead, the
                       Army planned to identify savings within its own budget sufficient to avoid
                       the 20,000 position reduction.

                       A memorandum from the Secretary of Defense cited the Army’s Force XXI
                       initiative as the means by which the Army would identify efficiencies to
                       reduce the force. However, according to Army documentation, Force



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Not Appear Feasible at This Time, but a
Smaller Combat and TDA Force May Be
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XXI’s primary focus is to increase capability by leveraging technology, not
to attain specific end strength reductions. The Army is experimenting with
ways to streamline its TOE forces through its Force XXI redesign of its
combat divisions, known as Joint Venture. For example, Joint Venture’s
focus on increasing situational awareness by digitizing the battlefield and
better managing logistics could reduce the size of Army divisions.
However, the division redesign is not yet finalized and will not be fully
implemented until 2010. The Army’s streamlining of its TDA force under
Force XXI has identified about 4,000 excess active military spaces, but the
Army plans to reallocate those spaces to fill unmet requirements in active
TOE support forces.


The Army’s efforts to streamline TDA under Force XXI, and additional
streamlining initiatives and policy changes proposed by Army leadership,
enabled the Army to increase its military personnel account throughout its
fiscal year’s 1998-2003 Program Objective Memorandum to pay for the
20,000 spaces eliminated in DOD’s 1997 FYDP. Based on Army projections,
we estimate that from 1998 to 2003, the Army will need about $3 billion in
savings to pay for the 20,000 positions. The Army has identified almost
$9 billion in savings over that same period, but considers only about
$2 billion of those savings as finalized; the remaining $7 billion will require
coordination and oversight among several Army organizations to be
realized. For example, recommendations to reduce logistics costs,
including reductions in acquisition lead time and spare parts inventories,
account for over $2 billion in savings and will result in overhead cuts to
the logistics community. The benefit of the overhead cuts will be realized
by the commands through lower logistics costs. An Army official told us
that such a disconnect between the entity doing the cutting and the entity
receiving reductions in cost could make some of the initiatives difficult to
manage. Further, some of the savings are based on across-the-board cuts
to headquarters overhead that are not analytically based.

As discussed in chapter 3, the Army has identified a potential to reduce its
TDA force by 4,000 active military positions as a result of its initial Force
XXI streamlining initiatives. Ongoing streamlining initiatives could further
reduce TDA requirements for active military personnel.




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                          A Smaller Active Army Support Force Does
                          Not Appear Feasible at This Time, but a
                          Smaller Combat and TDA Force May Be
                          Possible in the Future




                          As a separate initiative, OSD reviewed TAA 2003’s methodology and results,
OSD Assessment of         but did not examine the issue of active Army end strength. OSD questioned
TAA 2003 Did Not          whether the Army’s 672,000 TOE requirement was high based on its analysis
Address Active Army       of selected TAA assumptions and model inputs, and its comparison of Army
                          support requirements based on TAA to those used in a 1995 DOD war game
End Strength              known as Nimble Dancer. OSD’s assessment was limited to an analysis of
                          TOE forces, both active and reserve, and did not consider the question of
                          availability of reserve forces during the first 30 days of a conflict, as did
                          the Army’s TAA analysis. Nor did OSD assess another risk factor the Army
                          deemed important, availability of active forces for the second MRC. The OSD
                          study did not recommend a smaller Army, but did ask it to study some
                          issues that affect the size of its TOE force.


OSD Questioned TAA        The Army did not agree that its support force requirements were high.
Model Inputs and          However, at the direction of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Army
Assumptions               did agree to review model inputs and assumptions that OSD questioned and
                          to determine the impact of any changes on the size of the Army’s support
                          forces. The Army also responded that it would make adjustments to TAA
                          2003 results if any errors were identified. Among OSD’s principle concerns
                          were the following:

                      •   Casualty estimates. OSD questioned whether the TAA models produced valid
                          casualty estimates because of variances between Army casualty estimates
                          and actual casualties experienced in battles dating back to World War II.
                          Army casualty estimates are not used to size the Army medical force, but
                          do influence support requirements in the theater of operations such as for
                          quartermaster and engineer branches.
                      •   Fuel consumption. OSD questioned whether Army fuel consumption rates
                          were high based on a review of actual fuel issued to units during the Gulf
                          War.
                      •   Host nation support. OSD believed the Army could reduce its active support
                          requirements by placing greater reliance on support from host nations.
                          Currently, the Army reduces its unmet requirements by the amount of host
                          nation support it expects to receive, based on signed agreements. (See
                          chapter 2 for a discussion of material weaknesses in DOD’s host nation
                          support program.)

                          The Army has arranged for an independent analysis of its casualty
                          estimation methodology and has asked the Director of the Joint Staff to
                          query the CINCs concerning the availability of additional host nation




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                        A Smaller Active Army Support Force Does
                        Not Appear Feasible at This Time, but a
                        Smaller Combat and TDA Force May Be
                        Possible in the Future




                        support. The Army is conducting its own detailed analysis of its fuel
                        consumption rates.


OSD Believes TAA        OSD used the 1995 DOD war game Nimble Dancer to evaluate the
Requirements Are High   reasonableness of the Army TOE requirements. By comparing the Nimble
Compared to Nimble      Dancer Army force level requirement of 457,000 TOE spaces to the TAA 2003
                        Army-generated war fight requirement of 672,000 TOE spaces (195,000
Dancer                  combat and 477,000 support forces), OSD identified a potential
                        overstatement of 215,000 spaces. After adjusting for different assumptions
                        used in TAA 2003 and Nimble Dancer, OSD concluded that the Army TAA
                        2003 requirements were high.

                        While there may be insights to be gained by analyzing some aspects of the
                        Nimble Dancer war game, we believe comparing the Army’s TAA 2003 force
                        requirements against the Nimble Dancer force is problematic. In Nimble
                        Dancer, DOD identified the availability of sufficient support forces as
                        critical to the outcome of the conflict and determined that shortages could
                        delay the start of the counterattack in the second MRC. However, as we
                        noted in our June 1996 report on Nimble Dancer,1 DOD did not model or
                        analyze in detail the sufficiency of support forces during the war game.
                        For purposes of its baseline modeling, DOD assumed that support forces
                        would accompany combat units when they deployed. Game participants
                        held discussions concerning the impact of support force shortfalls, but
                        deferred further analysis to the Army’s TAA 2003. The 457,000 spaces OSD
                        used as a baseline for comparison to TAA 2003 was a notional Army force
                        based on TAA 2001 and its purpose was to assess mobility, not end
                        strength, requirements. Only the combat forces were played in the war
                        game itself. Given the limited consideration given to support forces in
                        Nimble Dancer, we do not believe comparisons with Army TAA 2003 are
                        meaningful.

                        Although OSD asserts that Army support requirements are high, it endorsed
                        the concept of converting reserve positions from combat to support to fill
                        the Army’s unmet requirements. These conversions were recommended by
                        us in past reports, the Commission on Roles and Missions and most
                        recently in a National Guard Division Redesign Study.

                        In addition to the studies previously mentioned, the Deputy Secretary of
                        Defense directed OSD analysts to assess whether DOD has sufficient

                        1
                         Bottom-Up Review: Analysis of DOD War Game to Test Key Assumptions (GAO/NSIAD-96-170,
                        June 21, 1996).



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                       A Smaller Active Army Support Force Does
                       Not Appear Feasible at This Time, but a
                       Smaller Combat and TDA Force May Be
                       Possible in the Future




                       mobility assets to move (1) the Army’s full TOE requirement of 672,000, and
                       (2) the force actually planned in the Army’s fiscal year’s 1998-2003
                       Program Objective Memorandum. In particular, the Deputy Secretary is
                       interested in how scenario timelines would be affected if mobility assets
                       are constrained to those actually planned. During TAA 2003, the Army
                       relied on the Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update to
                       establish available lift to move forces to theater. This was consistent with
                       Secretary of Defense guidance.


                       The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 requires DOD
Quadrennial Defense    to conduct a Quadrennial Defense Review by May 15, 1997. An
Review May Impact      independent panel of defense experts will submit a comprehensive
Army Active Military   assessment of DOD’s report and conduct an assessment of alternative force
                       structures by December 1, 1997. In conducting its review, DOD must assess
Personnel              a wide range of issues, including the defense strategy of the United States,
Requirements           the force structure best suited to implement the strategy, the roles and
                       mission of reserve forces, the appropriate ratio of combat forces to
                       support forces, and the effect of OOTWs on force structure. The number of
                       Army divisions or the mix of heavy and light divisions may change as a
                       result of this study, particularly if a new strategy is adopted. For example,
                       a strategy that places more emphasis on OOTWs might result in an active
                       Army that has fewer heavy divisions and assigns a higher percentage of its
                       active forces to support units. The review will also provide an opportunity
                       to reassess the role of the Army’s reserve forces. For example, as a result
                       of the BUR and the Army’s experience in the Persian Gulf War, the Army
                       discontinued its reliance on reserve component “round-up” and
                       “round-out” brigades to bring the active divisions to full combat strength
                       during wartime. However, options may exist to adopt some variant of this
                       concept, such as integrating reserve forces at the battalion level or
                       assigning reserve forces a role in later deploying active divisions. Options
                       to expand the role of the reserves would have the effect of reducing
                       requirements for active combat forces.


                       OSD did not support its plan to reduce the Army’s active end strength with
Conclusions            detailed analysis. OSD’s assessment of TAA 2003 identified issues worthy of
                       further analysis, but did not draw conclusions about the size of the active
                       Army.

                       Future active Army end strength will likely be affected by several ongoing
                       Army streamlining initiatives, and potential changes to military strategy



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                     A Smaller Active Army Support Force Does
                     Not Appear Feasible at This Time, but a
                     Smaller Combat and TDA Force May Be
                     Possible in the Future




                     and the role of reserve forces resulting from the upcoming Quadrennial
                     Defense Review. TDA streamlining may identify additional opportunities to
                     reduce active TDA personnel by reducing the number of major commands
                     and adopting broader use of workload analysis. Force XXI’s emphasis on
                     digital technology and just in time logistics may result in smaller combat
                     divisions in the future. Other options for restructuring combat forces
                     include reassessing the mix of heavy and light divisions and assigning
                     reserve forces a role in later deploying active divisions. However, given the
                     risks the Army has accepted in its active support forces, we do not believe
                     it is feasible for the Army to reduce its active support forces at this time.


                     In addition to DOD’s official agency comments (see app. V), the Army
Agency Comments      provided technical comments on a draft of this report concerning the role
and Our Evaluation   of reserve forces in any new strategy proposed by the Quadrennial
                     Defense Review. The Army believes that the use of round-up/round-out
                     brigades is a Cold War concept not viable for an early response power
                     projection force. However, the Army says it is currently studying options
                     to employ “multi-component” units, that is, combining an active unit with
                     an associated reserve unit that is organized with fully trained personnel
                     and minimal equipment. Upon mobilization, associate units would deploy
                     and augment the active component unit, or earlier deploying reserve
                     component units, increasing their capability by adding qualified personnel.

                     Our report does not recommend a return to the round-up and round-out
                     concept used in the past. Rather, our intention was to suggest that there
                     may be a variant of this concept that would allow the Army to make
                     greater use of its reserve forces. The Quadrennial Defense Review
                     provides an opportunity for such new concepts to be considered. We have
                     not reviewed the multi-component concept currently being analyzed by
                     the Army, but agree that new approaches that better integrate the Army’s
                     active and reserve forces and optimize the use of available equipment
                     should be explored.




                     Page 64                                         GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Page 65   GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Appendix I

The TAA Process


             The Total Army Analysis (TAA) is a phased force structure analysis process
             that the Army conducts biennially to determine its support force
             requirements. TAA does this by modeling a theater-level war fight for a
             combat force. This combat simulation considers and generates
             information on a multitude of planning factors and consumption rates,
             including ammunition, equipment repair, and casualty rates; unit arrival
             dates; and geographical characteristics of the theater. Military judgment
             then is applied to this quantitative analysis to produce the Army’s support
             force required to (1) execute the national military strategy as set forth in
             the defense guidance, (2) compare the program force to war-fight
             requirements, and (3) enable the Army to make force programming
             decisions which balances war-fighting risk and resource constraints.

             Initial broad guidance for TAA is provided by the Office of the Secretary of
             Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff. This guidance includes the number, size,
             and type of combat forces; troop strength levels in Europe and Korea;
             Army funding levels; and representative war-fight scenarios. The focus of
             TAA is primarily to support the theater war fight outlined in the defense
             guidance MRC scenarios. No allowances are made for other contingency
             requirements, such as Bosnia, or training, mobilization, and deployment
             requirements.

             There is substantial qualitative review of model results in the form of
             Army-wide conferences. These conferences are attended by colonel- and
             general officer-level representatives from the Army Staff, the major
             commands, schools and integrating centers, the war-fighting CINCs, the
             National Guard Bureau, and Office of the Chief of the Army Reserves. This
             broad participation is intended to ensure accuracy, credibility, and
             acceptance of TAA results throughout the Army. The final product of TAA is
             the approved force structure baseline of the Army, the Army’s Program
             Objective Memorandum force. TAA consists of four phases: Phase I, Force
             Guidance; Phase II, Quantitative Analysis; Phase III, Qualitative Analysis;
             and Phase IV, Leadership Review and Program Objective Memorandum
             Development. These phases are depicted in figure I.1.




             Page 66                                         GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
                                               Appendix I
                                               The TAA Process




Figure I.1: The TAA Process

                  Unit
               allocation
                  rules


                                                                                                                       AA
                                                                                                                       AA
             Logistics data                                                                                            AA
                                       Force
                  and                                       General Officer
                                     Structure
             consumption                                 Steering Committee I
                                    Conference I
                factors
                                                                                                                    Force
                                                                                                                 requirements

                                                                                Campaign simulation modeling
               Defense
               guidance



           Phase I Force Guidance                                               Phase II Quantitative Analysis




                                            General
                      Force                                          Senior                                        Budget
                                            Officer
                    Structure                                      leadership            Resourcing              submission
                                           Steering
                   Conference II                                     review
                                          Committee II


                  Phase III Quantitative Analysis                 Phase IV Leadership Review




Phase I, Force Guidance                        Phase I is the forum where all model input and planning assumptions are
                                               reviewed and approved. Two key data sources are the Army’s force
                                               planning data and assumptions (AFPDA) and unit allocation rules. The AFPDA
                                               is a single-source document that the Army relies on for developing
                                               planning factors for its theater-level studies such as TAA. The AFPDA
                                               contains logistics data and information on consumption rates for all
                                               classes of supply based on the intensity of the war fight. Data regarding
                                               threat and allied forces, support to and from other services, and other
                                               planning factors crucial to force structure development also are
                                               considered. Unit allocation rules translate the capabilities of specific
                                               support units into quantitative statements of a unit’s capability, mission,
                                               and doctrinal employment as it applies to a specific scenario. Over 1,500
                                               different allocation rules were applied in TAA 2003 for each theater.




                                               Page 67                                                         GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
                         Appendix I
                         The TAA Process




                         The three principal unit allocation rules are existence, workload, and
                         manual. An existence-based rule allocates units depending on the
                         existence of other units. For example, for each division in a corps there
                         are two military police companies. A workload-based rule ties unit
                         requirements to a measurable task. For example, for every 30,000
                         personnel there is one post office. Workload driven requirements can vary
                         according to the nature of the threat, the environment (e.g., arid
                         conditions require more water for consumption), lines of communication,
                         and other factors. A manual-based rule allocates units without a standard
                         basis, to reflect a theater’s physical or organizational structure. For
                         example, allocating a number of units to link communications systems
                         based on a theater’s geographic characteristics and the number of
                         headquarters needing such connectivity. Phase I does not differentiate
                         between active and reserve forces when establishing the force
                         requirements.


Phase II, Quantitative   During phase II, the Army employs a suite of campaign simulation models
Analysis                 to estimate the number and type of support forces required to sustain the
                         combat force, unconstrained by available resources. A strategic mobility
                         analysis is performed to determine the arrival times of Army forces in
                         theater and identify strategic mobility shortfalls. This is followed by a
                         theater campaign analysis to gauge force movement and unit strength over
                         time, as well as personnel and equipment losses. Outputs from these
                         models, along with approved unit allocation rules and logistics data, are
                         used to determine support force requirements using the Force Analysis
                         Simulation of Theater Administration and Logistics Support (FASTALS)
                         model. FASTALS generates the required support forces by type, quantity,
                         when they are needed in theater, and their supply requirements. The
                         support forces identified by FASTALS are then matched to actual Army
                         support units using other models. The matching process contains an
                         embedded logic that guides unit assignment. For example, it ensures that
                         active units are applied to forward stationed requirements. Army units are
                         applied toward requirements until the unit inventory is exhausted. The
                         difference between the required force and the inventory of actual Army
                         units is evaluated during phase III.


Phase III, Qualitative   During phase III, the initial Army Program Objective Memorandum force is
Analysis                 developed, constrained by upfront end strength and fiscal guidance.
                         During this phase, the FASTALS-generated support force requirements and
                         the analysis of those requirements are validated. Units that cannot be



                         Page 68                                       GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
                       Appendix I
                       The TAA Process




                       matched to war-fight requirements are characterized as either (1) strategic
                       reserve (such as the 8 Army National Guard divisions and certain
                       enhanced brigades); (2) unique (such as units in Europe and Panama that
                       perform unique strategic, allied, or national missions, and the Old Guard);
                       or (3) excess forces that do not match up with a war-fight requirement.

                       Where possible, these excess forces are converted to match a
                       corresponding war-fight requirement. Each specialty is analyzed to
                       determine the effect of resourcing units at less than their full requirement,
                       and the active reserve force mix is examined on a case-by-case basis.
                       Conference participants discuss approaches to mitigate risk and establish
                       priorities among competing requirements for limited resources.


Phase IV, Leadership   During phase IV, a force program review is convened to resolve any
Review and Program     support force resourcing issues not resolved in phase III. This review is
Objective Memorandum   chaired by the Army Vice Chief of Staff. The approved force structure is
                       forwarded to the Army Chief of Staff for final approval as the base force
Development            for programming resources for the Army’s Program Objective
                       Memorandum.




                       Page 69                                          GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Appendix II

Reserve Mobilization Process


                  The Army estimates that mobilizing reserve forces, from unit recall to
                  arrival at the port of embarkation, takes about 15 days for a small support
                  unit and 31 days for a large unit. Representative tasks associated with the
                  mobilization process follow. The time it takes to complete them are
                  presented in figure II.1.

              •   Pre-mobilization phase
                  • Maintain personnel mobilization packets.
                  • Ensure medical and dental examinations are current.
                  • Ensure personnel have required security clearances.
                  • Complete family care plans.
                  • Screen personnel for members not available for mobilization.
                  • Prepare and maintain a unit alert roster.
                  • Establish liaison with the mobilization station.
                  • Ensure continual maintenance of all equipment.
              •   Alert phase
                  • Coordinate mission related travel.
                  • Identify advance party members.
                  • Screen and promote eligible personnel.
                  • Order unit members to active duty.
                  • Respond to press inquiries.
                  • Prepare and submit property requisitions.
                  • Prepare and assemble logistics documentation.
                  • Request convoy movement frequencies.
              •   Home station phase
                  • Identify medically disqualified personnel.
                  • Verify financial and insurance options.
                  • Conduct personal affairs briefing.
                  • Prepare unit status report.
                  • Conduct physical inventory of all assigned property.
                  • Prepare security clearance rosters.
                  • Process record of emergency data.
                  • Verify identification cards and tags.
              •   Mobilization phase
                  • Move personnel to the mobilization station.
                  • Conduct medical and dental exams.
                  • Ensure all administrative and finance matters are in order.
                  • Conduct training assessment and schedule training.
                  • Perform individual and unit level training.
                  • Perform theater-specific and new equipment training.
                  • Perform required maintenance of unit equipment.
                  • Pack and load.




                  Page 70                                         GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
                                                 Appendix II
                                                 Reserve Mobilization Process




                                             •   Port of embarkation phase
                                                 • Move equipment to the seaport of embarkation.
                                                 • Move unit to the airport of embarkation.




Figure II.1: Reserve Mobilization Timeline


Support unit size




Small



Large




         -10      -5        M         +5         +10       +15        +20       +25   +30   +35
                                                       Days

           M    Mobilization day

                Pre-mobilization and alert phases

                Home station phase

                Mobilization station phase

                Port of embarkation phase




                                                 Page 71                                     GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Appendix III

Comparison of TAA 2001 and TAA 2003
Unmet Requirements Data


                                                Units required that exist
                                                    only on papera                  Total Positionsa
               Branch                              TAA 2001       TAA 2003        TAA 2001       TAA 2003
               Quartermaster                             209             158         11,749          21,295
               Transportation                            230             122         30,244          20,370
               Air Defense                                 31             10          8,604              4,266
               Signal                                      12             16          3,958              4,084
               Engineer                                  323             759          2,720              2,860
               Medical                                     32             39          1,231              1,986
               Artillery                                   26               2         2,379              1,150
               Armor                                        0               2              0             1,100
               Chemical                                     3               4           327               674
               Special Operations Forces                   20               0         3,660                 0
               Personnel Service Support                   82            104          1,180               347
               Theater/Corps Headquarters                104              94            276               188
               Ordnance                                  184              22          2,965               102
               Aviation                                     1               0           298                 0
               Combat Service Support                       1               0           193                 0
               Military Intelligence                        3               0           444                 0
               Military Police                              1               0           176                 0
               Multifunctional Logistics and                1               0           115                 0
               Headquarters
               Totals                                  1,263           1,332         70,519          58,422
               a
                TAA 2001 and TAA 2003 were developed using different defense guidance and end strength
               numbers, thus their results cannot be directly correlated.




               Page 72                                                   GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Appendix IV

Key Assumptions Used in TAA 2003



TAA 2003 assumption                                                         Army rationale
Active Army end strength will be 495,000.                                   The Army reached its 495,000 active end strength target in fiscal
                                                                            year 1996 and assumed that this end strength would be
                                                                            maintained through fiscal year 2003. Since OSD announced its
                                                                            intention to reduce Army end strength by 20,000 during the TAA
                                                                            2003 process and did not provide guidance on the composition of
                                                                            the proposed 475,000 active force, the Army opted to retain its
                                                                            495,000 active end strength for TAA 2003.
The Army will have 10 active Army combat divisions, 15 National             TAA 2003 requirement for two MRCs will consider only those units
Guard enhanced brigades, and 8 National Guard divisions, as                 with a war-fight mission, which can reasonably be expected to
specified in defense guidance.                                              deploy to theater.

The Army will employ all 10 of its active divisions and some                Army National Guard divisions and remaining enhanced brigades
enhanced brigades in the two-MRC scenario.                                  are considered a strategic reserve to respond to adverse
                                                                            situations.
TOE requirements (both combat and support) are based on units               Doctrinally correct TOEs for combat and support forces were
resourced at 100 percent of their personnel authorizations (full            modeled in TAA 2003. However, adjustments were made,
authorized level of organization).                                          reducing TOE requirements from 690,000 to 672,000.
Units due to arrive in theater in the first 30 days of the first MRC will   This is consistent with defense guidance. The Army determined
be predominantly in the active component.                                   that time delays associated with the call-up and mobilization of
                                                                            reserve forces generally preclude their arrival in theater in the first
                                                                            30 days. The Army estimates that a large support unit would be
                                                                            available in 31 days after mobilization, and a small support unit
                                                                            would be available in 15 days. This does not count transit time to
                                                                            the theater for personnel and equipment.
Operations other than war (OOTW) force requirements will not be             According to defense guidance, the Army can base its TOE
added to the two-MRC force requirements. Rather, adjustments will           requirements on either two nearly simultaneous MRCs or on one
be made within the two-MRC requirement to satisfy the needs of              MRC and one OOTW, whichever produced the greater force
OOTWs.                                                                      requirement.
There will be no force requirement for casualty replacements.               Although the Army does not include casualty replacements in
                                                                            calculating its force requirements, the TAA war-fight model
                                                                            estimates their numbers. If individual replacements were needed,
                                                                            they would likely be drawn from active soldiers who had just
                                                                            completed their introductory training or from the Individual Ready
                                                                            Reserves.
Host nation support will be considered if stipulated in signed              The Army wants assurances that its support needs in the early
agreements with the host nations’ military/political leadership. This       stages of the war fight will be met and is unwilling to accept the
support is considered in the resourcing phase of TAA, not in                risk that the host nation may not make that support available in the
requirements determination. An exception to this rule is positions          time frames required. In the absence of formal agreements, the
attributed to pipeline usage and the handling of some enemy                 Army will consider some host nation support as offsets to unfilled
prisoners of war. These positions are assumed to be filled by host          requirements during the TAA resourcing phase.
nations and are not given visibility in either requirements
determination or resourcing.
The TOE requirement for two MRCs will be based on the use of                The Army is reluctant to offset its TOE requirements with
uniformed military personnel (active and reserve) only. TAA 2003            contractor personnel because it cannot foresee the status of
will not consider the potential use of contractor personnel.                contracts 9 years into the future.
All of the modernization force enablers identified in defense               These force enablers include strategic lift, additional
guidance will be available on time and in the quantities                    prepositioned equipment in theater, and increased stocks of
programmed.                                                                 antiarmor precision-guided munitions.
                                                                                                                                       (continued)



                                                  Page 73                                                      GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
                                               Appendix IV
                                               Key Assumptions Used in TAA 2003




TAA 2003 assumption                                                   Army rationale
The Army will have immediate access to ports and airfields in the     Defense guidance assumes U.S. forces will have immediate
theaters of operation.                                                access to ports and airfields. An excursion run in TAA 2003 in
                                                                      which immediate access was denied indicated additional support
                                                                      force requirements.
There will be no delays or degradation of capability resulting from   Defense guidance assumes that U.S. forces assigned to an
the transfer of support forces from an OOTW to an MRC.                OOTW are immediately available to redeploy to an MRC. An
                                                                      excursion was run in TAA 2003 in which the Army tested whether
                                                                      it has sufficient active support force structure for the first 30 days
                                                                      of an MRC while involved in a significant OOTW. Results indicated
                                                                      that force requirements do not increase significantly.
No additional requirement will be provided for post-hostility         This is consistent with defense guidance. The Army assumed that
operations.                                                           the forces needed for post-hostility operations would be drawn
                                                                      from the force structure needed to execute the two MRCs.
Medical support requirements will be based on casualty and            The TAA war-fight model generated casualty estimates for combat
disease, nonbattle injury rates and on the theater medical            troops; algorithms were used to apply casualty rates to support
evacuation policy.                                                    personnel. Disease, nonbattle injury rates were set by the Army
                                                                      Surgeon General.
Unique force structure requirements outside of the two-MRC            The Army allocates resources to unique force structure
scenario will not be included in the 672,000 TOE war-fight            requirements and then applies remaining resources to the
requirement.                                                          war-fight requirement.
Active units will arrive in theater on time.                          The Army assumes that strategic lift force enhancers have been
                                                                      implemented on schedule, thus permitting active forces to arrive
                                                                      on time.
No force requirements will be added for support to coalition          The Army did not add force requirements to support coalition
partners.                                                             partners in TAA 2003 because it cannot quantify their needs.
                                                                      Historically, the Army has provided support to coalition partners.
Requirements for the first MRC will be determined without             This is consistent with defense guidance. It precludes reserving
foreknowledge of the second MRC.                                      forces and assets for the second MRC.
The MRCs will occur in the sequence established by defense            Defense guidance used for TAA 2003 reversed the order of the
guidance published in May 1994.                                       MRCs modeled in TAA 2001.
Separation time between the two MRCs will be consistent with          The Army followed defense guidance.
defense guidance.
The Army will begin the counteroffensive phase of an MRC when         The counteroffensive in the second MRC occurs later in TAA 2003
adequate support forces arrive in theater.                            than in the DOD wargame Nimble Dancer. Nimble Dancer did not
                                                                      analyze support forces in detail and initiated the counteroffensive
                                                                      before adequate support forces arrive.
A 15-day theater medical evacuation policy will be used.              MRCs are estimated to be high intensity and of short duration.
                                                                      Casualties unable to return to duty within 15 days are not
                                                                      expected to be needed for the war fight. By reducing the
                                                                      evacuation policy from 30 days to 15 days from TAA 2001 to TAA
                                                                      2003, the Army was able to reduce the number of hospitals
                                                                      needed in theater and the related transportation and other
                                                                      support requirements associated with those hospitals.
TDA medical personnel will deploy to the MRCs.                        In TAA 2003, active TDA medical personnel deploy to meet
                                                                      war-fight requirements. TDA personnel who deploy are replaced
                                                                      with reservists.
Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up occurs on the day U.S.          This is consistent with defense guidance.
forces deploy to the first MRC.
                                                                                                                                (continued)



                                               Page 74                                                   GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
                                                Appendix IV
                                                Key Assumptions Used in TAA 2003




TAA 2003 assumption                                                   Army rationale
Theater stockage policy will be 30 days of supply.                    This is consistent with current Army policy.
U.S. Army forces in Europe and the Pacific will be available to       There is a legislative mandate to maintain overseas troop
deploy to an MRC.                                                     strengths of 65,000 and 26,000 forces in Europe and the Pacific,
                                                                      respectively. Forces which deploy to an MRC may be replaced
                                                                      with reserve forces based in the United States.
Adversaries will not use nuclear or biological weapons and will use   This is consistent with defense guidance. An excursion was run in
a limited amount of chemical weapons.                                 TAA 2003 in which the amount of chemical weapons was
                                                                      increased. Excursion results indicated additional support force
                                                                      requirements.
Army forces will not swing from one MRC to the other.                 This is consistent with defense guidance.
All units will have a readiness rating of C-3 or better before        This is consistent with defense guidance.
deploying.




                                                Page 75                                                 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Appendix V

Comments From the Department of Defense




             Page 76          GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
                Appendix V
                Comments From the Department of Defense




Now on p. 45.




Now on p. 45.




                Page 77                                   GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
                Appendix V
                Comments From the Department of Defense




Now on p. 45.




Now on p. 45.




Now on p. 45.




                Page 78                                   GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
                        Appendix V
                        Comments From the Department of Defense




Now on p. 57.




Now on pp. 57 and 58.




                        Page 79                                   GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Appendix V
Comments From the Department of Defense




Page 80                                   GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Appendix VI

Major Contributors to This Report


                        Carol R. Schuster, Associate Director
National Security and   Janet A. St. Laurent, Assistant Director
International Affairs   Gwendolyn R. Jaffe, Evaluator-in-Charge
Division, Washington,   Joseph J. Faley, Senior Evaluator
                        Margaret A. Klucsarits, Senior Evaluator
D.C.                    Marc J. Schwartz, Senior Evaluator
                        Joseph W. Kirschbaum, Evaluator




(701065)                Page 81                                    GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
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