oversight

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Responsibilities for Developing Explosives and Narcotics Detection Technologies

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1997-04-15.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                  United States General Accounting Office

GAO               Report to Congressional Requesters




April 1997
                  TERRORISM AND
                  DRUG TRAFFICKING
                  Responsibilities for
                  Developing Explosives
                  and Narcotics
                  Detection Technologies




GAO/NSIAD-97-95
      United States
GAO   General Accounting Office
      Washington, D.C. 20548

      National Security and
      International Affairs Division

      B-276298

      April 15, 1997

      The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman
      Chairman
      The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton
      Ranking Minority Member
      Committee on International Relations
      House of Representatives

      The ability to detect hidden explosives and narcotics is important to U.S.
      national security. The problems of finding a small quantity of explosives
      concealed aboard an airplane or a shipment of narcotics smuggled through
      U.S. ports of entry are tremendous challenges to the technology
      community. While various technologies can be used to detect both
      explosives and narcotics, relatively little equipment has been deployed at
      airports and U.S. ports of entry. Recent events, such as recommendations
      of a presidential commission on aviation security, raise questions as to
      how well U.S. government agencies responsible for developing
      technologies to detect explosives and narcotics are working together.

      As you requested, we have examined how the U.S. government is
      organized to develop technologies for detecting explosives and narcotics.
      This report discusses (1) the roles, responsibilities, and authority of
      agencies that establish policy, provide funds or oversee funding requests,
      and develop explosives and narcotics detection technologies;
      (2) mechanisms used to coordinate the joint development of technologies;
      and (3) efforts to strengthen detection technology development.

      This report is one of a series you requested dealing with explosives and
      narcotics detection. The first report discussed the threats of terrorist
      attacks on civil aviation and of narcotics trafficking into the United States,
      strategies developed to meet those threats, and planned deployments of
      detection technologies to combat terrorism and interrupt the shipment of
      narcotics.1 Another report in the series discussed explosives and narcotics
      detection technologies that are available or under development.2 This
      report completes our work dealing with explosives and narcotics
      detection technologies. We also testified before various congressional



      1
       Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Threats and Roles of Explosives and Narcotics Detection Technology
      (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR, Mar. 27, 1996).
      2
       Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Technologies for Detecting Explosives and Narcotics
      (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-252, Sept. 4, 1996).



      Page 1                                        GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
                   B-276298




                   committees on technology’s role in addressing vulnerabilities in aviation
                   security and issued two classified reports on the threat of terrorism.


                   Terrorism and drug trafficking exact a tremendous cost from society.
Background         According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the estimated cost
                   of one bombed aircraft is about $1 billion, including the price of litigation
                   for the loss of human lives and property loss. This estimate does not
                   include the cost to national security in terms of U.S. military and law
                   enforcement response or terrorism’s psychological effect on
                   society—neither of which has been measured. FAA is expected to spend an
                   estimated $281 million on aviation security during fiscal year 1997 for
                   research and development, the purchase of detection technology
                   equipment, regulatory enforcement, and policy- and rule-making.

                   The annual social cost3 of narcotics, according to the Office of National
                   Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), is estimated to be about $67 billion, mostly
                   from the consequences of drug-related crime. This cost does not include
                   what Americans spend to purchase illegal drugs, estimated at $49 billion
                   for 1993, the last year for which data is available. Federal agencies are
                   expected to spend about $15 billion during fiscal year 1997 on drug control
                   activities, including research and development, law enforcement, demand
                   reduction, interdiction, and international programs.


                   Numerous federal organizations—supported by a variety of working
Results in Brief   groups, panels, and committees—are involved in developing technologies
                   for detecting explosives and narcotics. The Federal Aviation
                   Administration is the key agency responsible for developing explosives
                   detection technologies for civil aviation security. In response to the
                   explosion of TWA flight 800, the President established the White House
                   Commission on Aviation Security and Safety to recommend ways of
                   improving security against terrorism. The Commission’s recommendations
                   included assigning a new role to the U.S. Customs Service in screening
                   outbound, international cargo for explosives. In September 1996, Congress
                   gave the Secretary of the Treasury authority to develop governmentwide
                   standards for canine teams.

                   Regarding narcotics detection, the Office of National Drug Control Policy
                   is responsible for coordinating federal counterdrug technology efforts and

                   3
                    These social costs include the expense of health care for addicts, extra law enforcement, crime, and
                   lost productivity resulting from substance abuse.



                   Page 2                                         GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
    B-276298




    assessing and recommending detection technologies. In addition,
    Customs, with technology development support and funding from the
    Department of Defense, ultimately decides which technologies will be
    developed and deployed at U.S. ports of entry. Customs has not deployed
    some technologies, developed at a cost of about $30 million, because it did
    not believe that they were affordable, safe, or operationally suitable for its
    needs. In addition, Customs and the Office of National Drug Control Policy
    have differing views regarding the types of detection technologies needed
    along the southwest border.

    Joint technology development is important because the types of
    technologies used to detect explosives and narcotics are similar. The
    developers of narcotics detection technologies have not always
    participated in committees that oversee the development of explosives
    detection technologies. In the future, Customs plans to participate in these
    committees. At the direction of Congress, an interagency working group
    on counterterrorism plans to spend $19 million to develop a system for
    detecting explosives that Customs may possibly use in a seaport
    environment to detect drugs.

    The following efforts are underway to strengthen development of
    explosives and narcotics technologies, including the use of canines:

•   The Federal Aviation Administration and Customs are preparing a
    memorandum of understanding setting out how they will share
    information and possibly conduct joint research and development projects
    regarding detection technologies of mutual interest.
•   The Federal Aviation Administration and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
    and Firearms are cochairing a group reviewing certification standards for
    explosives detection canines.
•   Customs and the Office of National Drug Control Policy are working on a
    5-year plan to develop new detection technologies, and Customs intends to
    develop a deployment plan acceptable to the Office of National Drug
    Control Policy.
•   Customs will participate in the interagency development of a relocatable
    explosives detection system that may have counterdrug application, thus
    possibly benefiting both the counterterrorism and counterdrug
    communities.

    Despite these efforts, we found that the cognizant agencies have not yet
    agreed to formal understandings on how to establish standards for
    explosives detection systems, profiling and targeting systems, and



    Page 3                              GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
                       B-276298




                       deploying canine teams at airports. In addition, they have not agreed on
                       how to resolve issues related to a joint-use strategy and liability.
                       Furthermore, key decisionmakers are not receiving periodic
                       comprehensive reports on the aggregated efforts of the various
                       government entities to develop and field explosives and narcotics
                       detection technologies. To address these issues, we have included a
                       recommendation to the involved agencies and a matter for congressional
                       consideration.


                       Four organizations—FAA, the National Security Council (NSC), the Office of
Organizations          Management and Budget (OMB), and the Department of
Involved With          Transportation—are responsible for overseeing or developing explosives
Developing             detection technologies. FAA has the primary responsibility for the
                       development of explosives detection technologies used to protect
Explosives Detection   commercial aircraft. From fiscal year 1992 to 1996, FAA provided about
Technologies           $131 million, or an average of $26.2 million per year, for detection
                       technology development.

                       NSC established the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) in 1986 to
                       oversee and coordinate counterterrorism research and development,
                       including explosives detection technology.4 TSWG funding for explosives
                       detection efforts totaled about $14.3 million during fiscal years 1992-96.

                       OMB and the Department of Transportation play more limited roles in
                       overseeing the FAA budget dealing with explosives detection technologies.
                       OMB officials explained that OMB’s role is limited because of the small size
                       of FAA’s explosives detection technology development program. The
                       Department of Transportation has played a somewhat more active role in
                       FAA and interagency working groups that assess the capabilities of the
                       technologies to detect explosives.

                       In the aftermath of the TWA 800 explosion in July 1996, the President
                       established the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security.
                       The Commission recommended, among other things, that Customs assume
                       an enhanced role in screening outbound international air cargo for
                       explosives. In September 1996, Congress provided the Secretary of the
                       Treasury the authority to establish scientific certification standards for
                       explosives detection canines and to provide for the certification of canines
                       used for such purposes at U.S. airports. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,

                       4
                        The Department of State provides overall policy guidance to and oversees the operations of the
                       TSWG. The Departments of Defense (DOD) and Energy cochair the TSWG. All three agencies fund the
                       TSWG program, with DOD providing most of the funding.



                       Page 4                                      GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
                            B-276298




                            and Firearms (ATF) has assumed responsibility for this effort. In
                            February 1997, the Commission recommended that ATF continue to work
                            to develop governmentwide standards for canine teams.


History of FAA Technology   Senior FAA officials have stressed that delays in deploying advanced
Planning and Development    explosives detection technology are, in part, a function of the history of
                            their technology planning and development efforts. FAA was criticized in
                            1990 when it announced plans to mandate the deployment of a specific
                            technology5 for screening checked baggage on international flights
                            following the December 1988 crash of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie,
                            Scotland. At the time, the technology could not detect the amount of
                            explosives that blew up Pan Am 103 without an unacceptably high rate of
                            false alarms. The airline industry objected to the technology’s high cost,
                            large size, slow speed in processing baggage, and high rate of false alarms.

                            The Aviation Security Improvement Act (P.L. 101-604 of
                            Nov. 1990) provided a framework for FAA’s technology planning. The act
                            prohibited FAA from mandating a particular technology until it was
                            certified as capable of detecting various types and quantities of explosives,
                            using certification procedures developed in conjunction with the scientific
                            community.6 In addition, the act required that FAA establish a scientific
                            advisory panel7 to review its counterterrorism research and development
                            program and recommend future program areas, including the need for
                            long-range research to prevent catastrophic damage to commercial aircraft
                            by the next generation of terrorist weapons.

                            FAA’s scientific advisory panel recently recommended, among other things,
                            a reallocation of 1997 research and development funds to provide an
                            immediate increase in resources for long-term research to identify and
                            counter emerging terrorist threats. In response, FAA increased its request
                            for fiscal year 1997 funding for aircraft hardening and chemical weapons
                            detection.




                            5
                             The technology, known as Thermal Neutron Analysis (TNA), uses low-energy neutrons to probe
                            targets for the presence of nitrogen in explosives.
                            6
                             FAA Reauthorization Act of 1996 allows FAA to deploy commercially available equipment on an
                            interim basis until the certified equipment is operationally tested, if the Administrator determines the
                            deployment will significantly enhance aviation security.
                            7
                            The panel is referred to as the Security Research and Development Subcommittee of the Research,
                            Engineering, and Development Advisory Committee.



                            Page 5                                          GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
                      B-276298




                      In its final report dated February 12, 1997, the White House Commission
                      on Aviation Safety and Security addressed the question of whether FAA is
                      the appropriate government agency to regulate aviation security. The
                      Commission concluded that because of its extensive interactions with
                      airlines and airports, FAA is the appropriate agency. However, the
                      Commission also stressed that the intelligence and law enforcement
                      agencies’ roles in supporting FAA must be clearly defined and coordinated.


NSC Provides          NSC provides a number of forums for coordinating explosives detection
Coordinating Forums   technology issues. As the primary agency responsible for aviation security,
                      FAA sought interagency support within one of NSC’s forums in early 1996 for
                      a proposal to improve aviation security. Another forum, TSWG, has been
                      involved in developing detection technology for countering the threat from
                      terrorist use of explosives for several years.

                      In January 1996, FAA briefed the NSC’s Coordinating Sub-Group on
                      Terrorism8 on threats to civil aviation and the need for a high-level
                      national policy review on ways of increasing domestic aviation security.
                      FAA used this forum because it believed that the threat of terrorism in the
                      United States was not limited to aviation and responsibilities for
                      countering terrorism crossed federal agency lines. Although FAA discussed
                      the possible use of a presidential commission to obtain consensus and a
                      legislative mandate on increasing aviation security domestically, it was
                      agreed instead to establish a working group within FAA to review the threat
                      against aviation and recommend options for increasing security in the
                      United States.

                      On July 17, 1996, FAA’s Aviation Security Advisory Committee9 formed a
                      Baseline Working Group to examine everyday security measures at U.S.
                      airports and recommend specific initiatives to strengthen those measures.
                      On December 12, 1996, the group recommended several immediate and
                      long-term improvements, including expansion of FAA’s research and
                      development efforts for explosives detection.

                      TSWG has an Explosives Detection Technology Subgroup, chaired by an FAA
                      representative, to ensure compatibility between TSWG and FAA research and

                      8
                       The Special Assistant to the President (NSC) chairs the Coordinating Sub-Group on Terrorism, which
                      is comprised of officials at the level of assistant secretary or the equivalent and convenes regularly to
                      review ongoing counterterrorism issues in policy, program, and operational areas.
                      9
                       Following the explosion of Pan Am 103, the Secretary of Transportation established the Aviation
                      Security Advisory Committee in April 1989 to advise FAA on the operational impacts of aviation
                      security initiatives.



                      Page 6                                          GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
                          B-276298




                          development programs in the explosives detection technology arena. TSWG
                          funds explosives detection technology projects near the $2.9 million level
                          annually.

                          NSC  uses TSWG to develop coordinated views regarding the development of
                          explosives detection technologies. For example, in August 1996, the NSC
                          Coordinating Sub-Group on Terrorism requested the State Department’s
                          Coordinator for Counterterrorism10 to review research in explosives
                          detection equipment and to determine whether additional funds should be
                          invested in such research. The Coordinator directed TSWG to undertake
                          this task. In October 1996, TSWG recommended (1) accelerating the
                          development of methods that reduce or eliminate the human element from
                          the initial threat detection process, (2) increasing the emphasis on and
                          funding for explosive detection research and development, and
                          (3) improving the interagency exchange of information. According to an
                          NSC official, the first two recommendations have been implemented
                          through increased funding. Regarding the third, he pointed out that
                          improved information exchange is the constant goal of all agencies.


Customs Given an          The White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security
Enhanced Role in          recommended new roles for Customs in screening outbound international
Screening Air Cargo for   air cargo for explosives, including updating and acquiring technologies to
                          do that screening. Customs had previously not been involved in developing
Explosives                explosives detection technologies, although it had developed technologies
                          to screen cargo for various types of contraband. Consequently, it had not
                          worked closely with FAA, the airlines, or TSWG on specifically developing
                          explosives detection technologies.

                          In response to the Commission’s recommendations, Customs is using
                          $16 million to develop a system to identify high-risk cargo for closer
                          inspection and $34 million to purchase detection technologies. Customs is
                          now determining how to develop an automated targeting system to
                          process outbound cargo information. In addition, Customs may develop a
                          new X-ray technology for examining pallets or improve other technologies
                          before acquisition.



                          10
                            The Department of State’s Coordinator for Counterterrorism is the Vice Chairman of NSC’s
                          Coordinating Sub-Group on Terrorism. Through the Interagency Working Group on Counterterrorism,
                          which the Coordinator chairs, and through various functional interagency sub-working groups, which
                          report to the Coordinator (including the Technical Support Working Group), the Coordinator ensures
                          that U.S. government counterterrorism programs, strategies, and activities are developed, coordinated,
                          and executed.



                          Page 7                                         GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
                           B-276298




                           Customs’ new role presents challenges in coordinating its efforts with FAA
                           and the aviation industry. For example, the Customs’ targeting system may
                           be adapted to enable FAA to screen domestic cargo shipments transported
                           within the United States. In addition, Customs may be required to ensure
                           that its narcotics detection technologies can meet FAA standards for
                           screening cargo for explosives. To date, Customs and FAA have held
                           informal discussions on technical issues but have not prepared a
                           memorandum of understanding setting out their respective roles to help
                           meet these challenges.

                           As a part of its new role, Customs must also enter into agreements with
                           the airline industry for the joint use of the detection technologies.11 In a
                           letter to the Commission dated January 13, 1997, Customs stated that a
                           memorandum of understanding is being established with FAA to coordinate
                           the identification and deployment of the “joint use” screening equipment.
                           Customs has decided that such an agreement will be limited to sharing
                           information and to possibly developing joint research and development
                           projects. FAA strongly believes that such a memorandum of understanding
                           should include standards for the use of explosives detection systems,
                           development of a joint-use strategy, the resolution of liability concerns,
                           and the development of profiling and targeting systems to identify
                           potentially threatening passengers and cargo.


ATF’s New Role in          Although FAA has used canines for explosives detection at airports since
Developing Standards for   the 1970s, in September 1996 Congress authorized the Secretary of the
Explosives Detection       Treasury to develop governmentwide explosives detection certification
                           standards for canines and to certify such canines for use at airports. ATF
Canines                    has assumed responsibility for this effort, and an interagency working
                           group has been established to develop uniform standards. FAA believes that
                           a memorandum of understanding is needed with ATF to address the
                           deployment of canine teams at airports.

                           Both FAA and ATF have canine programs. As of February 25, 1997, FAA’s
                           program had 81 certified explosives detection canine teams deployed to
                           31 airports. FAA requires intensive training in aviation environments on
                           aircraft, in terminals, and around baggage, airport vehicles, and cargo. In
                           fiscal year 1997, FAA received $8.9 million for certifying an additional
                           114 canines.


                           11
                            The Omnibus Appropriations Act for 1997 provides funds for the purchase and installation of
                           advanced cargo inspection equipment technology for the joint use of air carriers, airports, or other
                           cargo authorities and Customs.



                           Page 8                                          GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
                          B-276298




                          ATF has certified 115 explosives and firearms detection canine teams for
                          use by 7 foreign countries in support of the Department of State’s
                          Antiterrorism Assistance Program. According to an ATF official, these
                          ATF-certified canines are trained to perform preblast detection duties in
                          various overseas environments, including airports. In fiscal year 1997, ATF
                          received $7.5 million, of which $3.5 million was specifically earmarked for
                          construction and expansion of a canine training facility. Congress also
                          authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to establish scientific
                          certification standards for canines and to certify, on a reimbursable basis,
                          canines employed by federal agencies at airports in the United States.

                          In 1996, the House Appropriations Committee expressed concern about
                          multiple and possibly duplicative or wasteful programs for training dogs to
                          detect explosives. The Committee directed that ATF establish a pilot canine
                          explosives detection program with FAA to foster cooperation, coordination,
                          and consistency between their two programs. The two agencies are
                          working out the details for the pilot program.

                          In August 1996, the Coordinating Sub-Group on Terrorism requested a
                          study on the use of canines for counterterrorism purposes. As a result, a
                          joint effort was begun by FAA and ATF, which agreed to rely principally on a
                          group comprised of various agencies’ chemists and canine trainers to
                          make recommendations to them. Since 1992, TSWG has used its own funds,
                          as well as funds provided by DOD, FAA, and ONDCP, for canine research
                          projects.

                          The White House Commission of Aviation Safety and Security
                          recommended that FAA establish federally mandated standards for security
                          enhancements, including the deployment of explosive detection canine
                          teams. FAA believes that a memorandum of understanding is needed with
                          ATF to address standards for deploying canine teams at airports because
                          ATF has assumed responsibility for establishing governmentwide
                          certification standards for explosives detecting canines.


OMB Oversees Explosives   OMB  officials said that they play a limited role in overseeing FAA’s
Detection Technology      explosives detection technology development program because of the
Funding Requests          small amount of funding for that program relative to funding for all of FAA.
                          They also told us that the extent of their oversight has traditionally been to
                          ensure that the FAA budget meets presidential priorities and is adequately
                          justified.




                          Page 9                              GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
                      B-276298




                      However, OMB became more active and participated in FAA’s Baseline
                      Working Group because of the increased threat of terrorism. Several FAA
                      officials stated that OMB participation was important because the cost of
                      improving security was being estimated at billions of dollars and
                      consideration was being given to shifting the responsibility of funding
                      from the airlines to the government. An OMB official expressed the view
                      that the government might need to be more concerned about research and
                      development efforts if it has to pay for equipment resulting from such
                      efforts.

                      In addition, OMB prepared the President’s fiscal year 1997 antiterrorism
                      proposal, including incorporating the recommendations of the White
                      House Commission. As such, OMB worked with FAA on such issues as
                      pricing explosives detection technologies that FAA would purchase with
                      the additional funding.


                      Four agencies—ONDCP, Customs, DOD, and OMB—are primarily responsible
Agencies Involved     for coordinating or developing narcotics detection technologies. The
With Developing       congressionally established Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center
Narcotics Detection   (CTAC) within ONDCP is responsible, among other things, for coordinating
                      federal counterdrug technology efforts and assessing and recommending
Technologies          narcotics detection technologies. Customs, because of its mission to
                      interdict drugs at U.S. ports of entry, is ultimately responsible for deciding
                      on the types of technologies to be developed and used. As congressionally
                      directed, DOD has been primarily responsible for funding and developing
                      most of the innovative narcotics detection technologies for Customs.
                      Recently, OMB became involved in overseeing Customs’ plans for
                      developing and deploying narcotics detection technologies.

                      Agencies have not always agreed on the most appropriate technologies to
                      detect narcotics at U.S. ports of entry. Two technologies funded at about
                      $30 million have been developed but not deployed. More recently, differing
                      views between ONDCP and Customs regarding the type of systems needed
                      along the southwest border led to varying directions from congressional
                      committees. These differing views between ONDCP and Customs stem, in
                      part, from recommendations presented in a congressionally mandated
                      study on costs and benefits of specific technologies. These differences
                      may be resolved as Customs, in coordination with ONDCP, develops a
                      methodology and a 5-year plan for transitioning technologies from
                      development to deployment.




                      Page 10                             GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
                           B-276298




CTAC Coordinates           CTAC coordinates the counterdrug technology research and development
Development of Narcotics   efforts of 21 federal agencies. In addition, CTAC funds its own development
Detection Technologies     projects to address gaps in technologies that provide the greatest support
                           to the various counterdrug activities of federal, state, and local agencies.
                           During fiscal years 1992-96, CTAC funding for detection technologies
                           amounted to about $8.4 million, or an average of about $1.7 million per
                           year.

                           In coordinating the counterdrug research and development program, CTAC
                           attempts to prevent duplication of effort and to ensure that, whenever
                           possible, those efforts provide capabilities that transcend the needs of any
                           single agency. CTAC relies on its interagency Science and Technology
                           Committee to help prioritize projects supported with CTAC funds. The
                           projects are generally managed by a member agency. In addition, a
                           Contraband Detection Working Group was established under this
                           Committee to provide an interagency forum to focus other agencies’
                           research activities on technology areas that support the contraband
                           detection requirements of law enforcement agencies.

                           In August 1996, the Director, ONDCP, committed to revitalizing the Science
                           and Technology Committee and its working groups. Among other things,
                           the Director proposed that the Committee act as a steering body with
                           membership at a level senior enough to make commitments to research
                           and development policy decisions. An ONDCP official informed us that the
                           Committee is currently focusing on developing a 5-year technology plan.


Customs Relies on DOD to   While Customs has the operational need for detection technologies,
Develop Most Narcotics     Congress tasked DOD to develop most of these technologies because DOD
Detection Technologies     was already developing technologies that could be adapted for narcotics
                           detection. During fiscal years 1992-96, DOD funded detection technologies
                           for about $73 million, or an average of about $14.6 million per year. Over
                           the same period, Customs funded detection technologies amounting to
                           about $3.1 million, or an average of about $620,000 per year.

                           In 1990, the House Appropriations Committee tasked DOD, in coordination
                           with Customs, to develop a comprehensive plan for developing drug
                           detection technology for use in inspecting cargo containers. The
                           Committee cited cargo containers as a major threat for the import of
                           illegal drugs into the United States and identified specific technologies
                           that should be pursued.




                           Page 11                            GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
                         B-276298




                         In April 1994, DOD began testing a high-energy X-ray system12 capable of
                         penetrating fully loaded containers, at a specially constructed port in
                         Tacoma, Washington. DOD and CTAC viewed the system as a key step
                         toward the development of effective, nonintrusive cargo inspection
                         technologies.13 The tests showed that high-energy X-ray technology could
                         be an effective tool in detecting drugs in a broad range of vehicles and in
                         containers carrying varying types of cargo. DOD spent about $15 million for
                         facility construction and system testing. However, ONDCP, Customs, and
                         DOD agreed in December 1994 to dismantle the site because Customs did
                         not believe that the system was affordable, safe, or operationally suitable
                         for its needs.

                         Based on experiences with the Tacoma high-energy system, Customs and
                         DOD  entered into a restructured development program to ensure that DOD
                         would develop only those technologies that would be transitioned by
                         Customs into an operational environment. Based on this understanding,
                         DOD also discontinued work on a Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis project14
                         after spending about $15 million because Customs was likewise concerned
                         about its affordability, safety, and operational suitability.


OMB Oversees Narcotics   For fiscal years 1996 and 1997, OMB questioned Customs’ funding requests
Detection Technology     for truck X-ray systems to be placed at U.S. ports of entry along the
Funding Requests         southwest border. These systems use a low-energy X-ray source15 capable
                         of penetrating empty trucks and other conveyances. OMB limited Customs’
                         use of the funds until certain conditions were met, citing its concern that a
                         low-energy system had limited capabilities for inspecting fully loaded
                         containers. OMB requested a comprehensive border technology plan that
                         would focus effective inspection technologies in the areas of greatest
                         need.



                         12
                           The system scans a target with X-ray at an energy level of 8 million electron volts, or about 50 to 70
                         times the energy of a typical airport passenger X-ray.
                         13
                          Nonintrusive inspection technology refers to a variety of advanced systems that will permit Customs
                         officials to inspect cargo and conveyances for the presence of narcotics without physically opening or
                         entering the shipment.
                         14
                           Like the TNA mentioned on page 5, the Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis probes targets, using neutrons,
                         for the presence of explosives or narcotics. However, unlike TNA, it uses high-energy neutrons as
                         opposed to low-energy neutrons, allowing reliable detection of carbon and oxygen found in narcotics
                         as well as nitrogen found in explosives.
                         15
                          Rated at 450 thousand electron volts, about three or four times the energy of a typical passenger
                         X-ray system at an airport.



                         Page 12                                          GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
                           B-276298




                           In response, Customs prepared a plan favoring the use of fixed-site truck
                           X-ray systems as well as mobile or relocatable systems. Customs stated
                           that the large number of empty trucks crossing the southwest border
                           presents a very high threat because they sometimes carry drugs. As a
                           result, Customs wanted a system to inspect for drugs concealed within the
                           structure of the truck. Customs stated that the low-energy X-ray system
                           has been effective in detecting drugs concealed in these empty trucks, is
                           safe, and fits into available space. In addition, acquisition costs are
                           estimated at $3 million, operating expenses are low, and training
                           requirements are minimal compared to the high-energy X-ray system built
                           at Tacoma and the Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis system.

                           OMB continues to believe that Customs needs a range of technologies for
                           the southwest border. Thus, OMB plans to stay informed on issues dealing
                           with the development of those technologies and has started attending
                           ONDCP meetings on developing narcotics detection technologies so that it
                           can become aware of emerging issues.


Effect of Differences      Congressional committees have provided differing direction regarding the
Between ONDCP and          development and acquisition of narcotics detection technologies. One
Customs on Congressional   committee, supporting Customs needs, recommended funding for a certain
                           technology, while another committee, responding to ONDCP concerns,
Direction                  directed a moratorium on the purchase of such technology. The
                           differences stem, in part, from recommendations presented in a
                           congressionally mandated study on costs and benefits of specific
                           technologies.

                           In September 1994, Congress mandated a study on the cost and benefit
                           tradeoffs in different nonintrusive inspection systems. The study, released
                           in September 1996, concluded that Customs should accelerate the
                           development and implementation of an automated system for screening
                           documents to target cargo for further inspection. For land ports, the study
                           recommended that only the automated targeting system be deployed.

                           Conferees on the National Defense Appropriations Act for 1997 provided
                           DOD with $6 million for DOD’s purchase of low-energy truck X-ray systems
                           to be used by Customs. Conferees to the 1997 Treasury, Postal Service,
                           and General Appropriations Act stated that they were aware of the
                           tradeoff study’s conclusion that deployment of advanced technology at
                           land sites and seaports can make a significant improvement to drug
                           interdiction efforts. The conferees directed a moratorium on the purchase



                           Page 13                           GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
                            B-276298




                            of the low-energy systems until Customs reevaluated its plans regarding
                            the automated targeting system and to both low- and high-energy systems.
                            They further directed that Customs present Congress with an integrated
                            plan responding to the recommendations in the tradeoff study.

                            Customs issued a response February 6, 1997, which stated that empty
                            trucks crossing the southwest border are a very high threat. As a result,
                            Customs wanted a system to examine trucks returning empty to the
                            United States. Customs also stated that it would work with DOD and ONDCP
                            to identify and evaluate new inspection technologies that would
                            complement the capabilities of the low-energy system. According to ONDCP,
                            a promising technology currently under development may be as effective.
                            This system, which will be mobile, is expected to cost about one fifth the
                            estimated $3 million cost of the low-energy system. Over the next few
                            months, Customs and DOD will evaluate this new technology to inspect
                            empty trucks.


Customs Supports a          Development of the current generation of narcotics detection technologies
Methodology for             is nearing completion, but Customs does not have a detailed methodology
Deployment and a Plan for   for determining which technologies should be acquired. Nonetheless,
                            Custom’s future development efforts are expected to be a part of the
Development                 Director of ONDCP’s recent proposal for a 5-year technology plan for
                            developing narcotics supply and demand reduction technologies.16

                            The congressionally mandated tradeoff study recommended that Customs
                            adopt a methodology similar to the one it used for assessing procurement
                            options. The study also pointed out that the variation among the ports
                            require a port-by-port analysis to assess the need for specific technologies
                            at each port. Customs has acknowledged that a methodology was needed
                            but noted that the methodology presented in the study was only one of
                            several possible approaches and did not realistically consider personnel
                            and funding constraints.

                            ONDCP  and other federal agencies are creating a 5-year technology plan. As
                            part of this plan, the agencies will prepare a road map for developing
                            nonintrusive inspection technologies and upgrading existing systems. For
                            example, Customs and DOD are expected to set out their plans for




                            16
                              Supply technologies are used for interdiction, including detection, while demand reduction
                            technologies focus on education, training, prevention, and rehabilitation.



                            Page 14                                        GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
                       B-276298




                       developing mobile or relocatable high-energy systems17 for drug
                       interdiction. Both Customs and DOD plan to evaluate the capabilities of the
                       high-energy X-ray system for its ability to detect narcotics concealed in
                       cargo containers. ONDCP plans to review the results of this evaluation.


                       We reported earlier that various technologies, with modifications, can be
Coordination of        used to detect both explosives and narcotics.18 During work on this report,
Detection Technology   we found that formal coordination between developers of explosives and
Development Efforts    narcotics detection technologies was not a two-way street. We did find,
                       however, that results of research and testing are shared among the
                       technology developers and overseers through personal contacts or
                       through symposiums. In addition, Customs and FAA have done joint work
                       on systems such as TNA and trace detectors. Canines provide a special
                       opportunity for coordination because they can be trained to respond in
                       specific ways to smells of explosives and narcotics.

                       The developers of explosives detection technologies are active
                       participants on committees that oversee the development of narcotics
                       detection technologies. FAA has participated in ONDCP’s Science and
                       Technology Committee and its Contraband Detection Working Group
                       since their inception to provide a linkage between explosives and
                       narcotics detection technology development. However, the developers of
                       narcotics detection technologies have generally not been included in
                       committees that oversee the development of explosives detection
                       technologies. Customs has not been a member of the scientific advisory
                       panel that reviews FAA’s research and development program and
                       recommends ways to improve the program. Based on our inquiries, an FAA
                       official said that including Customs on the panel may add some additional
                       insight from the developers of narcotics detection technologies. FAA
                       included Customs as a member of the panel effective February 13, 1997.

                       Although Customs is a member of TSWG, it has not participated in the
                       explosives detection subgroup. Officials agreed that Customs would
                       benefit from participating in this subgroup because of its interagency
                       coordination activities. Customs says that it plans to begin participating in
                       the subgroup.



                       17
                        High energy systems are defined as having an energy level of at least 2 million electron volts, about
                       13 to 18 times the energy of a typical X-ray system found at an airport.
                       18
                        Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Technologies for Detecting Explosives and Narcotics
                       (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-252, Sept. 4, 1996).



                       Page 15                                         GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
                           B-276298




                           The relocatable Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis system is an example of a
                           technology development that may benefit from closer coordination. In
                           fiscal year 1996, Congress provided TSWG with $6.2 million to evaluate the
                           capabilities of a relocatable Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis system to detect
                           explosives hidden in cargo. This evaluation will cover a 30-month period
                           and eventually cost about $19 million. As noted earlier, this technology
                           was developed to detect narcotics concealed in large containers but was
                           not adopted for use by Customs because it did not believe that the system
                           was affordable, safe, or operationally suitable for its needs.

                           Customs advised TSWG that it wants to participate in the development of
                           the system. A Customs official said that should the system meet concerns
                           about safety and other operational issues, they would support its
                           installation at a seaport where fully load containers are of concern and its
                           performance could be assessed for both counterdrug and
                           counterterrorism applications.


                           Our work identified efforts underway that if successfully completed could
Opportunities to           significantly strengthen development of explosives and narcotics
Strengthen Detection       technologies. For example, in explosives detection technology
Technology                 development, FAA is working closely with Customs and ATF, both of which
                           have new roles to play. In narcotics detection technology development,
Development                Customs is working with ONDCP on a 5-year technology plan and with TSWG
                           on an explosives detection system that may have application to narcotics
                           detection. However, these agencies have not yet established formal
                           understandings on how to develop standards for aviation security
                           enhancements and numerous related issues. Moreover, comprehensive
                           reports on the U.S. government’s efforts to develop explosives and
                           narcotics detection technology are not periodically provided to key
                           decisionmakers.

                           Regarding explosives detection technology development, we found that:

                       •   FAA and Customs are preparing a memorandum of understanding setting
                           out how they will share information and possibly conduct joint research
                           and development projects regarding detection technologies of mutual
                           interest.
                       •   ATF has assumed a new role to develop governmentwide standards for
                           explosives detection canines and has begun a joint effort with FAA by
                           cochairing a policy group. They agreed to rely principally on a group




                           Page 16                            GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
    B-276298




    comprised of various agencies’ chemists and canine trainers, including a
    representative from TSWG, to make recommendations to the policy group.

    FAA strongly believes that memorandums of understanding are needed
    with Customs and ATF for developing standards for aviation security
    enhancements, including the use of explosives detection systems,
    development of a joint-use strategy, resolution of liability concerns,
    development of profiling and targeting systems to identify potentially
    threatening passengers and cargo, and deployment of canine teams at
    airports. However, to date, little or no progress has been made in
    achieving such understandings, and the involved agencies have not
    developed a coordinated approach for handling such issues.

    Regarding narcotics detection technology development, we found the
    following:

•   ONDCP and Customs disagree on the appropriate methodology for deciding
    which technologies to transition from development to deployment.
    According to ONDCP, the methodology should require a port-by-port
    analysis to assess the need for specific technologies at each port. On the
    other hand, Customs prefers a methodology that does not add to its or
    industry’s data-reporting requirements. Nevertheless, both agencies are
    working on a 5-year technology plan to develop new detection
    technologies, and Customs told us that it intends to develop a
    methodology that is acceptable to ONDCP.
•   Customs advised the NSC’s TSWG that it would participate in the
    development of a system that may have counterdrug application. In
    addition, a Customs official has been informally monitoring the system’s
    development. However, as now being developed, the system will not
    include requirements unique to a narcotics detection application. ONDCP
    believes that Customs’ involvement with the system will be a worthwhile
    effort.

    Our review indicated that no one in the executive branch has aggregated
    into a single report information on the totality of what is being done on the
    development of explosives and narcotics detection technology, the nature
    and extent of resources that the various agencies are applying, the
    informal coordination and integration efforts, and the types of emerging
    issues that must be addressed. Currently, no reports are periodically
    provided to key decisionmakers in the executive branch or Congress.




    Page 17                            GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
                  B-276298




                  We generally endorse the actions being undertaken by the agencies as the
Conclusion        initial steps to strengthening the coordination of explosives and narcotics
                  detection technology development. However, FAA, Customs, and ATF need
                  to work closer as a team to solve complex technological issues.
                  Establishing memorandums of understanding among the agencies could
                  help define the agencies’ roles and enhance cooperation in resolving the
                  numerous issues associated with the development of standards for
                  aviation security enhancements. Further, the resolution of differences in
                  views between ONDCP and Customs on needed technology should help
                  serve as a springboard to acting jointly on the broader problems. In
                  addition, joint development of technology may prove beneficial for both
                  explosives and narcotics detection. Periodic reports to oversight
                  authorities can help keep focus on the efforts being taken to develop and
                  deploy technologies at ports of entry, including airports.


                  In line with the White House Commission of Aviation Safety and Security’s
Recommendation    call for more clearly defining and coordinating the roles of law
                  enforcement agencies in supporting the FAA, we recommend that the
                  Secretaries of Transportation and the Treasury establish a memorandum
                  of understanding on how FAA, Customs, ATF, and other agencies are to
                  work together in establishing standards, including the use of explosives
                  detection systems, development of a joint-use strategy, resolution of
                  liability concerns, development of profiling and targeting systems to
                  identify potentially threatening passengers and cargo, and deployment of
                  canine teams at airports.


                  Because no single agency in the executive branch has aggregated into a
Matter for        single report information on what is being done on the development of
Congressional     explosives and narcotics detection technology, Congress may wish to
Consideration     direct the Secretaries of Transportation and the Treasury and the Director,
                  ONDCP, to jointly provide to appropriate congressional oversight
                  committees an annual report on all of the government’s efforts to develop
                  and field explosives and narcotics detection technology.


                  NSC, the Departments of State and Transportation, FAA, ATF, ONDCP,
Agency Comments   Customs, DOD, and OMB reviewed a draft of this report and provided oral or
                  written comments. They generally agreed with the facts presented, and
                  their suggested technical corrections have been incorporated where




                  Page 18                            GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
              B-276298




              appropriate. The written comments of State, FAA, Customs, ATF, and DOD
              are presented in appendixes I, II, III, IV, and V, respectively.

              In responding to a draft of this report, FAA, Customs, and ATF have taken
              varying positions on how to develop standards for aviation security
              enhancements and address numerous related issues. We have therefore
              modified the report to recommend that the department secretaries
              establish a memorandum of understanding for FAA, Customs, ATF, and
              other agencies to work together on these issues.


              Based on previous work,19 we initially focused on five agencies that play
Scope and     the largest roles in developing detection technologies. During the course
Methodology   of our work, we identified other agencies that are beginning to play larger
              roles in technology development.

              For our work on agencies involved with developing explosives detection
              technologies or coordinating their development, we contacted officials of
              the Departments of Transportation, Defense, and State; FAA; NSC; OMB;
              Customs; and ATF. We interviewed officials to identify processes and
              mechanisms to resolve conflicts when establishing policy, setting
              priorities, selecting projects, and requesting funding. We also obtained and
              reviewed key documents, such as FAA’s research and development plan,
              and identified circumstances surrounding cases in which agencies
              disagreed on technology development.

              For our work on agencies involved with developing narcotics detection
              technologies or coordinating their development, we contacted officials of
              ONDCP, Customs, DOD, and OMB. We again interviewed officials to identify
              processes and mechanisms to resolve conflicts when establishing policy,
              setting priorities, selecting projects, and requesting funding. We also
              obtained and reviewed key documents, such as the ONDCP’s counterdrug
              research and development plan, and identified circumstances surrounding
              cases in which agencies disagreed on technology development.

              To identify mechanisms for coordinating joint development, we
              interviewed officials and gathered information from the NSC’s TSWG and FAA
              on the committees that oversee explosives detection technology
              development efforts. In addition, we interviewed officials and gathered
              information from ONDCP on similar committees that oversee ONDCP’s

              19
               Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Technologies for Detecting Explosives and Narcotics
              (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-252, Sept. 4, 1996).



              Page 19                                      GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
B-276298




narcotics detection technology development efforts. We analyzed the
membership of these committees to see if there is representation from
both the explosives and narcotics detection technology development
communities. We also examined the minutes of the committees’ meetings
to verify that member agencies from both communities participated in
these meetings. In addition, we gathered information on a particular
technology to show the benefits of coordination between the two
communities. Finally, we asked about attendance at various symposiums
or other professional forums.

Based on our objectives, we identified efforts being initiated to strengthen
coordination of detection technology development and opportunities to
enhance that development.

OMB  did not provide us with all the information we requested. OMB officials
met with us but did not provide documentation on its interactions with
other federal agencies responsible for developing explosives and narcotics
detection technologies. As a result, we relied on other agencies’ records to
document OMB’s role. In addition, NSC officials declined to meet with us to
clarify its interaction with the other agencies.

We performed this phase of work between October 1996 and
February 1997 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.


We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking
Minority Members of other appropriate congressional committees; the
Secretaries of the Treasury, State, Defense, and Transportation; the
Directors, OMB, ONDCP, and ATF; the Administrator, FAA; and the
Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service.

If you have any questions regarding this report, please call me on
(202) 512-4841. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI.




Louis J. Rodrigues
Director
Defense Acquisitions Issues
Page 20                            GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Page 21   GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Contents



Letter                                                                        1


Appendix I                                                                   24

Comments From the
Department of State
Appendix II                                                                  29

Comments From the
Federal Aviation
Administration
Appendix III                                                                 32

Comments From the
U.S. Customs Service
Appendix IV                                                                  36

Comments From the
Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and
Firearms
Appendix V                                                                   38

Comments From the
Department of
Defense
Appendix VI                                                                  40

Major Contributors to
This Report




                        Page 22   GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Contents




Abbreviations

ATF        Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
CTAC       Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center
DOD        Department of Defense
FAA        Federal Aviation Administration
MOU        memorandum of understanding
NSC        National Security Council
OMB        Office of Management and Budget
ONDCP      Office of National Drug Control Policy
TNA        Thermal Neutron Analysis
TSWG       Technical Support Working Group


Page 23                        GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Appendix I

Comments From the Department of State


Note: GAO comments
supplementing those in the
report text appear at the
end of this appendix.




                             Page 24   GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
                 Appendix I
                 Comments From the Department of State




Now on page 4.

See comment 1.




Now on page 4.

See comment 1.




Now on page 4.

See comment 2.




Now on page 6.

See comment 2.




                 Page 25                                 GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
                 Appendix I
                 Comments From the Department of State




Now on page 6.

See comment 2.




Now on page 7.

See comment 2.




Now on page 7.

See comment 2.




                 Page 26                                 GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
                  Appendix I
                  Comments From the Department of State




Now on page 7.

See comment 2.




Now on page 19.

See comment 2.




                  Page 27                                 GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
               Appendix I
               Comments From the Department of State




               The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State’s letter
               dated March 20, 1997.


               1. We have not shown the Departments of Defense (DOD), State, and
GAO Comments   Energy as agencies responsible for overseeing or developing explosives
               detection technologies. Instead of showing these agencies separately, we
               have grouped them under the National Security Council’s Technical
               Support Working Group (TSWG). Specifically, we state on page 4 that the
               Department of State provides overall policy guidance to and oversees the
               operations of TSWG and that DOD and the Department of Energy cochair
               TSWG. We also state that all three agencies fund the TSWG program, with DOD
               providing most of the funding.

               We also have not shown the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
               (ATF) as an agency responsible for overseeing or developing explosives
               detection technologies. In the introduction to the explosives section, we
               say that ATF and Customs have assumed new roles. We believe that the
               reference to ATF at this point is sufficient.

               2. We have modified the report to reflect this comment.




               Page 28                                 GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Appendix II

Comments From the Federal Aviation
Administration

Note: GAO comments
supplementing those in the
report text appear at the
end of this appendix.




See comment 1.




                             Page 29   GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
                 Appendix II
                 Comments From the Federal Aviation
                 Administration




See comment 2.




See comment 2.




See comment 2.




                 Page 30                              GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
               Appendix II
               Comments From the Federal Aviation
               Administration




               The following are GAO’s comments on the Federal Aviation
               Administration’s (FAA) letter dated March 28, 1997.


               1. We have incorporated FAA’s technical comments in the text where
GAO Comments   appropriate.

               2. We have modified the report to reflect these comments.




               Page 31                              GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Appendix III

Comments From the U.S. Customs Service


Note: GAO comments
supplementing those in the
report text appear at the
end of this appendix.




                             Page 32   GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
                 Appendix III
                 Comments From the U.S. Customs Service




Now on pages 3
and 16.




See comment 1.

See comment 2.




See comment 1.




See comment 1.




See comment 1.



Now on page 7.

See comment 3.




                 Page 33                                  GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
                  Appendix III
                  Comments From the U.S. Customs Service




Now on page 8.

See comment 4.




Now on page 13.

See comment 3.




                  Page 34                                  GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
               Appendix III
               Comments From the U.S. Customs Service




               The following are GAO’s comments on the U.S. Customs Service letter
               dated March 20, 1997.


               1. In a letter dated January 13, 1997, to the White House Commission on
GAO Comments   Aviation Safety and Security, Customs stated a memorandum of
               understanding (MOU) is being established with the FAA to coordinate the
               identification and deployment of “joint use” screening equipment. The
               letter further stated that a strategy for the joint-use resources is being
               developed, with a target date of January 30, 1997, for completion. Based
               on Customs’ response to a draft of this report, we have concluded that
               Customs has changed its position on establishing an MOU on joint-use.

               In its response to our draft report, FAA supports the establishment of such
               an MOU covering a number of issues. As a result, there appears to be
               disagreement between Customs and FAA as to how they should address
               these important issues. We have therefore modified the report to
               recommend that the department secretaries establish a MOU for FAA,
               Customs, ATF, and other agencies to work together on these issues and
               have also suggested that Congress may wish to require the involved
               agencies to periodically report on these efforts.

               2. We have modified the report to state that Customs and FAA are
               developing an MOU for sharing information and possibly conducting
               joint-use research and development projects.

               3. We have modified the report to reflect this comment.

               4. FAA has informed us that it may adapt the Customs’ targeting system for
               screening domestic cargo shipments transported within the United States.
               FAA pointed out that the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and
               Security’s report, dated February 12, 1997, states that Customs and FAA are
               working with an FAA contractor to study technical issues associated with
               converting Customs’ targeting system, which was originally designed for
               sea cargo analysis, to air cargo analysis.




               Page 35                                  GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Appendix IV

Comments From the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms

Note: GAO comments
supplementing those in the
report text appear at the
end of this appendix.




See comment 1.




                             Page 36   GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
              Appendix IV
              Comments From the Bureau of Alcohol,
              Tobacco, and Firearms




              The following is GAO’s comment on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
              Firearm’s letter dated March 25, 1997.


              1. We have incorporated ATF’s technical comments in the text where
GAO Comment   appropriate.




              Page 37                                GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Appendix V

Comments From the Department of Defense


Note: GAO comments
supplementing those in the
report text appear at the
end of this appendix.




See comment 1.




                             Page 38   GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
              Appendix V
              Comments From the Department of Defense




              The following is GAO’s comment on DOD’s letter dated March 24, 1997.


              1. We have incorporated DOD’s technical comments in the text where
GAO Comment   appropriate.




              Page 39                              GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Appendix VI

Major Contributors to This Report


                        David E. Cooper
National Security and   Ernest A. Döring
International Affairs   Charles D. Groves
Division, Washington,   John K. Harper
                        John P.K. Ting
D.C.




(707220)                Page 40             GAO/NSIAD-97-95 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Ordering Information

The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free.
Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the
following address, accompanied by a check or money order
made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when
necessary. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also.
Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address
are discounted 25 percent.

Orders by mail:

U.S. General Accounting Office
P.O. Box 6015
Gaithersburg, MD 20884-6015

or visit:

Room 1100
700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW)
U.S. General Accounting Office
Washington, DC

Orders may also be placed by calling (202) 512-6000
or by using fax number (301) 258-4066, or TDD (301) 413-0006.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and
testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any
list from the past 30 days, please call (202) 512-6000 using a
touchtone phone. A recorded menu will provide information on
how to obtain these lists.

For information on how to access GAO reports on the INTERNET,
send an e-mail message with "info" in the body to:

info@www.gao.gov

or visit GAO’s World Wide Web Home Page at:

http://www.gao.gov




PRINTED ON    RECYCLED PAPER
United States                       Bulk Rate
General Accounting Office      Postage & Fees Paid
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001           GAO
                                 Permit No. G100
Official Business
Penalty for Private Use $300

Address Correction Requested