oversight

National Missile Defense: Schedule and Technical Risks Represent Significant Development Challenges

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1997-12-12.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                  United States General Accounting Office

GAO               Report to Congressional Requesters




December 1997
                  NATIONAL MISSILE
                  DEFENSE
                  Schedule and Technical
                  Risks Represent
                  Significant
                  Development
                  Challenges




GAO/NSIAD-98-28
             United States
GAO          General Accounting Office
             Washington, D.C. 20548

             National Security and
             International Affairs Division

             B-275013

             December 12, 1997

             The Honorable Carl Levin
             Ranking Minority Member
             Committee on Armed Services
             United States Senate

             The Honorable Jeff Bingaman
             Ranking Minority Member
             Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
             Committee on Armed Services
             United States Senate

             In response to your request, we are providing an initial assessment of the
             technical and schedule risks associated with the National Missile Defense
             (NMD) program. The Department of Defense (DOD) has indicated that it
             intends to ask for $2.3 billion more for this program but has not released
             final plans showing how it intends to use the additional funds. The
             information provided in this letter is necessarily limited to the NMD
             acquisition strategy formally defined and approved by DOD as of
             September 19, 1997. Although changes are expected when final plans are
             released, the information in this letter should be a useful point of
             reference from which to analyze those new plans. We will continue to
             obtain information on these risks and other issues you asked us to
             examine.


             While the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) had been
Background   developing and maturing technologies for use in an NMD system for a
             number of years, in October 1996 it began developing a specific NMD
             system to provide protection against limited ballistic missile attacks
             targeted at the United States. Its mission is to detect, identify, engage,
             intercept, and destroy threatening ballistic missiles prior to their impact
             on any of the 50 states. The program focuses on the development of a
             system that could support a deployment readiness review in fiscal year
             2000. The review would determine whether the initial system has been
             adequately demonstrated and if the existing threat justifies deployment of
             an initial capability by fiscal year 2003. This plan is commonly referred to
             as the “3+3” program. Figure 1 shows the program schedule, assuming a
             decision in fiscal year 2000 to deploy the system.




             Page 1                              GAO/NSIAD-98-28 National Missile Defense Risks
                                    B-275013




Figure 1: NMD Program Schedule


   Task name          1996   1997   1998       1999    2000       2001      2002        2003       2004

Start date for the
development of
the 3+3 Program


Prime Contract
Award



Integrated System
Test


Deployment
Readiness Review
(system deployment
decision)


Initial Operational
Capability




                                    While DOD is still determining the specific design of the initial NMD system,
                                    its features will include (1) space-based and ground-based sensors to
                                    provide early warning of attacking missiles; (2) ground-based radars to
                                    identify and track the threatening warheads; (3) ground-based interceptors
                                    to collide with and destroy incoming warheads; and (4) a battle
                                    management, command, control, and communications system. The NMD
                                    system architecture would evolve over time through incorporation of
                                    advanced element technologies to defend against more sophisticated
                                    threats. For example, the Space and Missile Tracking System, a
                                    space-based sensor constellation of infrared tracking and discrimination
                                    satellites providing early-trajectory capabilities, will be added to the
                                    system at a later time.



                                    Page 2                               GAO/NSIAD-98-28 National Missile Defense Risks
                          B-275013




                          DOD faces significant challenges in the NMD program because of high
Results in Brief          schedule and technical risks. Schedule risk is high because the schedule
                          requires a large number of activities to be completed in a relatively short
                          amount of time. The sequential nature of key development activities—such
                          as not being able to proceed in earnest until a prime NMD contractor is
                          selected in the spring of 1998—magnifies time pressures. Furthermore,
                          developing and deploying an NMD system in the 6 years allotted under the
                          3+3 program will be a significant challenge for DOD given its past history
                          with other weapon systems. For example, NMD’s acquisition schedule is
                          about one-half as long as that of the only other U.S.-based ballistic missile
                          defense system. DOD acknowledges the high schedule risk.

                          Technical risks are high because the compressed development schedule
                          only allows limited testing. The NMD acquisition strategy calls for
                          conducting (1) one system test prior to the initial system deployment
                          decision—a test that would not include all system elements or involve
                          stressing conditions such as threats employing sophisticated
                          countermeasures or multiple warheads—and (2) one test of the integrated
                          ground-based interceptor before production of the interceptor’s booster
                          element must begin. If subsequent tests reveal problems, costly redesign
                          or modification of already produced hardware may be required.


                          Under the formally defined acquisition strategy, a large number of
Compressed NMD            activities need to be completed in a relatively short time frame, and recent
Schedule Presents         slips in program events have increased the program’s schedule risk. DOD
Challenges                and BMDO officials have acknowledged the high schedule risk. According to
                          testimony by the former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
                          Technology, the program’s schedule will remain high risk despite planned
                          funding increases recommended by the recent Quadrennial Defense
                          Review (QDR). DOD does not yet have a firm plan for how the additional
                          funds will be used. Developing the NMD system will present DOD with
                          significant challenges. The NMD schedule is shorter than most other major
                          system acquisition programs.


Many Activities Must Be   Even though the NMD development program officially began in
Accomplished in Short     October 1996, many development activities cannot proceed in earnest until
                          BMDO selects a firm to serve as the prime contractor for the system. This
Time Frame
                          underlines the sequential nature of many planned development activities.
                          BMDO does not expect to complete this selection process until the spring of
                          1998. Then, the final design process cannot begin until the selected prime



                          Page 3                             GAO/NSIAD-98-28 National Missile Defense Risks
                            B-275013




                            contractor has time to examine and analyze the requirements and
                            architectures. For example, one of the prime contractor’s responsibilities
                            will be to develop and procure one or more radars for the system. There
                            are two radar candidates, and until the prime contractor has had time to
                            examine them, analyze their performance in selected settings and
                            architectures, and make a selection of one or more of the candidates, the
                            radar procurement process cannot begin. Similarly, the acquisition of the
                            booster for the ground-based interceptor cannot begin until the prime
                            contractor has assessed the alternatives, which include developing a new
                            booster, using an existing booster, or modifying an existing design to meet
                            the NMD requirements.

                            Furthermore, a number of activities are dependent on the final system
                            design. For example, after the design is determined, sites will have to be
                            selected. DOD will have to obtain land, build or modify facilities, and
                            conduct environmental impact studies. According to a preliminary analysis
                            by the NMD system engineering contractor,1 the ability to (1) construct and
                            install radars and interceptor communication sites in the 3-year
                            deployment window; (2) obtain easements, land, and rights-of-way for
                            sites; and (3) conduct environmental impact studies by 2003 will present a
                            significant challenge.


Recent Delays Have          Recent delays have increased schedule risk. Since the 3+3 program was
Increased Schedule Risk     approved, BMDO has experienced a 7-month delay in establishing the joint
                            program office to manage the acquisition and a 6-month delay in awarding
                            concept definition contracts leading to the selection of a prime contractor.
                            Also, a sensor flight-test failure resulted in a 6-month testing delay.2
                            According to the former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
                            Technology, these slips have increased the schedule risk.


Schedule Risk Will Remain   DOD officials have acknowledged the high risk involved in the schedule. In
High Despite Funding        order to help maintain the fiscal year 2003 deployment option, the
Increases                   Department’s recent QDR recommended significant increases in program
                            funding through fiscal year 2000. The QDR was commissioned to provide a
                            comprehensive examination of the defense strategy, force structure, force
                            modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of

                            1
                             The system engineering contractor is responsible for helping the NMD project office generate, verify,
                            and validate requirements while the prime contractor will be responsible for designing, developing,
                            integrating, and testing the NMD system.
                            2
                             This test was rescheduled and flown in June 1997, and according to BMDO, the test was successful.



                            Page 4                                          GAO/NSIAD-98-28 National Missile Defense Risks
                          B-275013




                          the defense program and policies. It considered three alternatives for
                          dealing with the future of the NMD program. Two of the alternatives would
                          have slipped the earliest possible schedule for system deployment to a
                          date later than fiscal year 2003. The alternative selected in the QDR is
                          predicated on adding an estimated $2.3 billion to the program in fiscal
                          year 1998 through fiscal year 2003, while retaining the potential
                          deployment of the system in fiscal year 2003. However, according to the
                          former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, the
                          additional funding will not reduce the high schedule risk inherent in the
                          program. DOD does not yet have a firm plan for how the additional funds
                          will be used.


Acquisition Schedule Is   The acquisition schedule is about one-half as long as the Safeguard’s—the
Shorter Than Most Other   only other U.S.-based ballistic missile defense system.3 The NMD schedule
Major Systems             is also shorter than schedules projected for acquisition of most other U.S.
                          missile defense programs. For example, the Theater High Altitude Area
                          Defense program is currently projected to require 13 years to reach its first
                          unit-equipped milestone. The Patriot PAC-3 system is projected to take
                          5 years from the beginning of engineering and manufacturing development
                          to reach the first unit-equipped date, even though it is only a modification
                          to an existing air defense system.

                          The NMD acquisition schedule is also shorter than the average time
                          projected to acquire and field 59 other major weapon systems that we
                          examined.4 These are the programs for which DOD had Selected
                          Acquisition Reports in December 1996. These systems are projected to
                          take an average of just under 10 years from the beginning of their
                          development until they reach an initial operating capability date. The
                          estimated fielding times for the 59 programs ranged from 5 years to
                          19 years. (See app. I.)




                          3
                           Development of Safeguard system components began in 1963 and the system’s single site at Grand
                          Forks, North Dakota, achieved full operational capability in 1975. The program was terminated in 1976.
                          4
                           We reviewed all of the December 31, 1996, Selected Acquisition Reports for systems that contained
                          both (1) an acquisition milestone I date (approval to begin developing a new system) or a milestone II
                          date (approval to begin engineering and manufacturing development) and (2) an initial operating
                          capability date. We measured the time estimated from either milestones I or II to the initial operating
                          capability date for the 59 programs that met that criteria. The mean time between these milestones
                          was 9.9 years. The median was 9.1 years.



                          Page 5                                          GAO/NSIAD-98-28 National Missile Defense Risks
                            B-275013




                            Because of the compressed development schedule, only a limited amount
Limited Testing             of flight test data will be available for the system deployment decision in
Planned Before              fiscal year 2000. By that time, BMDO will have conducted only one
Possible Deployment         system-level flight test, and that test may not include all system elements
                            or involve stressing conditions such as targets that employ sophisticated
Decision in Fiscal          countermeasures or multiple warheads. As a result, not all technical
Year 2000                   issues, such as discrimination,5 will be resolved by the time of the
                            deployment review. Also, the current schedule will permit only a single
                            test of the integrated ground-based interceptor before production of the
                            interceptor’s booster element6 must begin. If subsequent tests reveal
                            problems, costly redesign or modification of already produced hardware
                            may be required.


Few Flight Tests Prior to   The current development schedule provides for only three flight intercept
Deployment Decision         tests prior to the fiscal year 2000 deployment decision. Only one of these
                            will be an integrated system test, and that test will not be comprehensive
                            because it will not include all system elements. If the test fails, the
                            deployment review would be left with only ground test data and
                            partial-system flight data when considering the deployment option. This
                            presents a high performance and schedule risk to the program. According
                            to BMDO, the lack of back-up test hardware is a primary contributor to
                            program risk. For example, this lack of a back-up target caused the
                            6-month delay in rescheduling the sensor flight test after the January 1997
                            test failure.

                            Additionally, the single integrated system test planned prior to the fiscal
                            year 2000 deployment review will not assess the NMD system’s capabilities
                            against stressing threats such as those that use sophisticated
                            countermeasures or multiple warheads. The test is to be conducted
                            against a single target with only simple countermeasures such as decoys.
                            No test against multiple warheads is planned.

                            The integrated system test, as currently planned, will not include all
                            elements of the planned system. For example, the current plan is to use a
                            payload launch vehicle rather than the actual ground-based interceptor
                            booster because, according to NMD program officials, it will probably not


                            5
                             Discrimination is the system’s ability to distinguish between warheads and other, nonthreatening
                            objects such as decoys and debris that may be present and detected by radars and other sensors.
                            6
                             The ground-based interceptor will consist of a booster and an exo-atmospheric kill vehicle. The
                            booster is to propel the kill vehicle to a point in space near the attacking warhead. The kill vehicle is to
                            locate, identify, and collide with the attacking warhead.



                            Page 6                                            GAO/NSIAD-98-28 National Missile Defense Risks
                             B-275013




                             be available in time for the test. A lack of flight test data on the booster
                             before the deployment review could impact the credibility of the
                             interceptor’s performance evaluation as well as the overall system
                             assessment. According to the NMD program’s system engineering
                             contractor, there is a high risk that the evaluation of the NMD capability will
                             be incomplete or not representative of the true system capability. DOD
                             acknowledged the testing limitations and they were highlighted in the
                             program’s own risk assessment.


Some Technical Issues Will   There are a number of technical concerns that will not be resolved by the
Not Be Resolved in Tests     time of the potential fiscal year 2000 deployment decision. For example,
                             DOD still has not shown that the type of interceptors planned for the
                             system—hit-to-kill interceptors—can provide a reliable defense under
                             stressing conditions. To date, there have been very few tests of hit-to-kill
                             interceptors and even fewer successful intercepts. Of the 20 intercept
                             attempts since the early 1980s, only 6, or about 30 percent, have been
                             successful. While these intercepts provide proof of the principle of
                             hit-to-kill intercept, they do not demonstrate that the concept can be
                             employed reliably or under stressing conditions.

                             Also, according to the system engineering contractor, the test program will
                             not test system-level discrimination capabilities sufficiently to ensure that
                             requirements can be met. The accurate discrimination of incoming threat
                             objects from nonthreatening objects such as decoys and debris that may
                             be present is vital to the system’s ability to successfully defend the United
                             States from an attack. Without discrimination, too many interceptors may
                             be wasted on nonthreatening objects and attacking warheads could escape
                             identification. To perform the discrimination task, data from a number of
                             different types of sensors—both internal and external to the system—will
                             have to be obtained, correlated, associated, or fused by the battle
                             management, command, control, and communications system. According
                             to the system engineering contractor, NMD system discrimination
                             requirements will exceed previous experience and a number of concerns
                             exist. These include concerns about the development and validation of
                             algorithms for (1) optical and infrared sensor discrimination, (2) fusing
                             data from sensors of different technologies, and (3) resolving any
                             differences or ambiguities between radar and optical data.


Limited Number of            The tentative schedule for the ground-based interceptor shows that
Interceptor Tests            full-scale production would need to start by January 2000 to achieve an
Represents Risk              initial operating capability by 2003. To meet this schedule, DOD would have


                             Page 7                              GAO/NSIAD-98-28 National Missile Defense Risks
                  B-275013




                  to award the contract for interceptor production after only one flight test
                  of the combined booster and its designated kill vehicle. If subsequent tests
                  reveal problems, the design may have to be revised and costly,
                  time-consuming changes made.


                  In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred that the NMD
Agency Comments   program faces significant challenges because of high schedule and
                  technical risk. It also stated that the report is generally accurate, but
                  provided some clarifying comments on the program’s status, comparison
                  of certain flight tests, and impact of testing and test hardware on risk.
                  DOD’s comments and our evaluation are presented in appendix II. DOD also
                  provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.


                  To assess the NMD program’s schedule and technical risks, we reviewed
Scope and         available program plans, test plans, milestone schedules, requirements
Methodology       documents, and management reports. To determine the level of risk and
                  major factors contributing to it, we analyzed the program’s status, strategy
                  for accomplishing the remaining development work and meeting fielding
                  requirements, and approaches to demonstrating the system’s capabilities
                  and military suitability. We also discussed schedule and technical risks
                  and plans for mitigating them with officials at the Ballistic Missile Defense
                  Office, Washington, D.C.; the Office of the Director, Operational Test and
                  Evaluation, Alexandria, Virginia; and the Army NMD Project Office,
                  Huntsville, Alabama. To provide a basis for comparison with the NMD
                  program schedule, we obtained schedule data for 59 other major
                  acquisition programs from DOD’s Selected Acquisition Reports.

                  We conducted our work from September 1996 through September 1997 in
                  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.


                  As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
                  earliler, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from its
                  issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to other
                  interested congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the
                  Directors of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization and the Office of
                  Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available to others
                  upon request.




                  Page 8                               GAO/NSIAD-98-28 National Missile Defense Risks
B-275013




If you or your staff have questions concerning this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-4841. The major contributors to this report were
Lee Edwards, Bobby Hall, and Tom Hopp.




Allen Li
Associate Director
Defense Acquisitions Issues




Page 9                             GAO/NSIAD-98-28 National Missile Defense Risks
Appendix I

Time Required to Develop and Field Major
Systems


                                                                                                 Initial operational   Elapsed time
System                                                            Begin development              capability                 (years)
Program 1a                                                        b                              a
                                                                                                                                  7
Joint Direct Attack Munition for F/A-18                           Oct. 1993                      Sept. 1999                       6
Brilliant Anti-Tank                                               Feb. 1985                      Nov. 1999                       15
Army Tactical Missile System Block II                             May 1995b                      Mar. 2004                        9
           a                                                      c                              a
Program 3                                                                                                                         8
Longbow Apache-Airframe Modifications                             Aug. 1985                      Oct. 1998                       13
Sense and Destroy Armor                                           Mar. 1988b                     July 1999                       11
Javelin                                                           May 1986                       Oct. 1996                       10
Comanche Program                                                  June 1988                      July 2006                       18
           a                                                      c                              a
Program 4                                                                                                                         8
Program 5a                                                        b                              a
                                                                                                                                  7
F-22                                                              Oct. 1986                      Nov. 2004                       18
Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile                          Nov. 1978                      Sept. 1991                      13
                                                                              b
Navy EHF SATCOM Program                                           Jan. 1982                      Apr. 1994                       12
DDG-51 Guided Missile Destroyer                                   June 1981                      Feb. 1993                       12
New SSN/New Attack Submarine                                      Aug. 1994                      Oct. 2005                       11
High Speed Nuclear Attack Submarine                               Dec. 1983                      May 1997                        13
Trident II Missile                                                Oct. 1977                      Mar. 1990                       12
Airborne Warning and Control System Radar System Improvement      Dec. 1988b                     Dec. 1999                       11
                                                                                  b
Joint Stars                                                       Sept. 1985                     Sept. 1997                      12
Minuteman III Guidance Replacement Program                        Aug. 1993                      Jan. 2000                        6
                                                                              b
Minuteman III Propulsion Replacement Program                      June 1994                      Jan. 2002                        8
Program 7 a                                                       b                              a
                                                                                                                                 11
Abrams Tank Upgrade                                               Feb. 1985b                     Feb. 1993                        8
Army Tactical Missile System-Antipersonnel/Antimateriel Warhead   Feb. 1986b                     Aug. 1990                        5
Longbow Hellfire                                                  Aug. 1985                      July 1998                       13
Cooperative Engagement Capability                                 May 1995b                      July 2000                        5
                                                                                  b
Hawkeye (mission computer upgrade only)                           Sept. 1994                     June 1999                        5
LHD1 Amphibious Assault Ship                                      Oct. 1981                      Nov. 1990                        9
           a                                                      c                              a
Program 8                                                                                                                        11
MIDS-LVT                                                          Dec. 1993b                     Apr. 2000                        6
                                                                           b
Multi-Mission Helicopter Upgrade (SH-60R)                         July 1993                      Oct. 2002                        9
Tomahawk Improvement Program (RGM-109)                            Sept. 1994b                    Aug. 2000                        6
                                                                              b
Marine Corps H-1 Upgrade Program                                  Oct. 1996                      June 2005                        9
Jet Flight Training System                                        Sept. 1984                     Apr. 1993                        9
Strategic Sealift                                                 Aug. 1992                      Jan. 1998                        5
Coastal Minehunter Ship (MHC-51)                                  June 1986                      Sept. 1996                      10
                                                                                                                         (continued)


                                            Page 10                                   GAO/NSIAD-98-28 National Missile Defense Risks
                                                 Appendix I
                                                 Time Required to Develop and Field Major
                                                 Systems




                                                                                                                 Initial operational       Elapsed time
System                                                                              Begin development            capability                     (years)
F/A-18E/F Naval Strike Fighter (Hornet)                                             May 1992b                    Sept. 2000                          8
Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft                                      Dec. 1982                    July 2001                          19
AOE6 Class Fast Combat Support Ship                                                 July 1982                    June 1995                          13
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle                                                 Mar. 1995                    June 2006                          11
B-1B Mission Upgrade Program-Computer                                               Apr. 1993                    Dec. 2001                           9
Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System                                       May 1984                     Jan. 1997                          13
Crusader Field Artillery System                                                     Nov. 1994                    June 2006                          12
Combat Service Support System Version 3                                             Dec. 1990                    Oct. 1997                           7
                                                                                                b
Forward Area Air Defense Command, Control, and Intelligence                         July 1986                    Sept. 1994                          8
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles                                                  May 1987                     Jan. 1996                           9
Airborne Laser                                                                      Nov. 1996                    Sept. 2006                         10
Milstar Satellite                                                                   June 1983                    June 1997                          14
Joint Service Imagery Processing System                                             July 1986                    Dec. 1994                           8
Bradley Fighting Vehicle Upgrade                                                    Jan. 1994                    Aug. 2000                           7
Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System                                     Feb. 1976                    Dec. 1990                          15
C-17 Globemaster III                                                                Feb. 1985b                   Jan. 1995                          10
Joint Primary Aircraft Training System                                              Jan. 1993                    Aug. 2001                           9
Program 9a                                                                          b                            a
                                                                                                                                                     8
             a                                                                      b                            a
Program 10                                                                                                                                          11
All Source Analysis System                                                          Sept. 1993b                  Dec. 1999                           6
B-1 Conventional Mission Upgrade Program—Joint Direct Attack Munition               Apr. 1993                    Dec. 1998                           6
National Airspace System—Air Traffic Control                                        July 1992                    Apr. 2000                           8
Average                                                                                                                                             9.9

                                                 a
                                                  Initial operational capability dates for these systems are classified. To avoid classification,
                                                 system name and milestone dates are not shown.
                                                 b
                                                  Date reflects beginning of milestone II (approval to enter engineering and manufacturing
                                                 development) because these systems began in that phase.
                                                 c
                                                  Date reflects beginning of milestone I (approval to begin development of a new program)
                                                 because these systems began in that phase.

                                                 Source: DOD Selected Acquisition Reports, December 31, 1996.




                                                 Page 11                                            GAO/NSIAD-98-28 National Missile Defense Risks
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense


Note: GAO comments
supplementing those in the
report text appear at the
end of this appendix.




                             Page 12   GAO/NSIAD-98-28 National Missile Defense Risks
                 Appendix II
                 Comments From the Department of Defense




See comment 1.




See comment 2.




See comment 3.




                 Page 13                               GAO/NSIAD-98-28 National Missile Defense Risks
                 Appendix II
                 Comments From the Department of Defense




See comment 4.




                 Page 14                               GAO/NSIAD-98-28 National Missile Defense Risks
               Appendix II
               Comments From the Department of Defense




               The following are GAO’s comments on DOD’s letter dated November 14,
               1997.


               1. As requested, we focused on the program’s schedule and technical risk.
GAO Comments   However, we revised the text to show that a lengthy period of technology
               development preceded the specific program’s initiation in October 1996
               and that successful testing has occurred. Even though DOD has built
               structural facilities for the prototype radar and is on track to meet
               established ground and flight tests, the program’s schedule and technical
               risks remain high, as DOD itself acknowledges.

               2. We do not state that the risk from limited flight testing was not known
               when the program was initiated or that officials did not know at that time
               that the flight tests would be constrained by range safety and other
               considerations. Even though known, the test limitations significantly
               increase the level of technical risk. We clarified the text to show that DOD
               acknowledges these limitations and that they were highlighted in the
               program’s own risk assessment.

               3. We agree that the testing programs are not directly comparable and
               revised the text to delete the comparison. The point we were making is
               that because of the constrained schedule, the amount of flight testing is
               less than would normally be expected. This point remains valid.

               4. We added information to show that the lack of back-up hardware
               contributes to program risk and that the lack of a back-up target caused
               the 6-month delay in rescheduling the sensor flight test.




(707208)       Page 15                               GAO/NSIAD-98-28 National Missile Defense Risks
Ordering Information

The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free.
Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the
following address, accompanied by a check or money order
made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when
necessary. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also.
Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address
are discounted 25 percent.

Orders by mail:

U.S. General Accounting Office
P.O. Box 37050
Washington, DC 20013

or visit:

Room 1100
700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW)
U.S. General Accounting Office
Washington, DC

Orders may also be placed by calling (202) 512-6000
or by using fax number (202) 512-6061, or TDD (202) 512-2537.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and
testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any
list from the past 30 days, please call (202) 512-6000 using a
touchtone phone. A recorded menu will provide information on
how to obtain these lists.

For information on how to access GAO reports on the INTERNET,
send an e-mail message with "info" in the body to:

info@www.gao.gov

or visit GAO’s World Wide Web Home Page at:

http://www.gao.gov




PRINTED ON    RECYCLED PAPER
United States                       Bulk Rate
General Accounting Office      Postage & Fees Paid
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001           GAO
                                 Permit No. G100
Official Business
Penalty for Private Use $300

Address Correction Requested