Defense Acquisitions: Reduced Threat Not Reflected in Antiarmor Weapon Acquisitions

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1999-07-22.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                   United States General Accounting Office

GAO                Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee
                   on Defense, Committee on
                   Appropriations, House of

July 1999

                   Reduced Threat Not
                   Reflected in Antiarmor
                   Weapon Acquisitions

United States General Accounting Office                                                 National Security and
Washington, D.C. 20548                                                           International Affairs Division

                                    B-280327                                                                Letter

                                    July 22, 1999

                                    The Honorable Jerry Lewis
                                    Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense
                                    Committee on Appropriations
                                    House of Representatives

                                    Dear Mr. Chairman:

                                    In its report on the Fiscal Year 1999 Defense Appropriations Bill, the House
                                    Committee on Appropriations expressed concern with the Cold War
                                    mindset of the services, which are continuing to develop and procure an
                                    increasing number of tank-killing weapons. The Committee questioned
                                    whether current antiarmor acquisition plans are appropriate at a time when
                                    potential adversaries have smaller armored forces than during the Cold
                                    War. Accordingly, the Committee directed the Secretary of Defense to
                                    develop an antiarmor master plan to be submitted with the fiscal year 2000
                                    budget. The plan is to identify the projected armored threat and the
                                    quantity of all antiarmor weapons, with the purpose of eliminating excess
                                    antiarmor weapon capabilities. The last master plan was prepared in
                                    September 1990.

                                    You requested that we independently review and comment on the master
                                    plan. Specifically, you asked that we evaluate the plan’s findings and
                                    conclusions, its underlying data and analyses, and its key assumptions, as
                                    well as overall antiarmor funding trends. As of June 30, 1999, the Secretary
                                    of Defense had not submitted the plan. As agreed with your office, we are
                                    therefore providing information we have gathered that addresses the parts
                                    of your request that we could complete without the Department of
                                    Defense’s (DOD) plan. For this report, we (1) identified changes in armored
                                    threats from 1990 to 1997, (2) compared the number and makeup of the
                                    1990 antiarmor weapon inventory with those of the 1998 inventory, and
                                    (3) identified the funding trends of past and future antiarmor
                                    procurements. When the master plan is issued, we will review it and issue
                                    our final report to you.

Results in Brief                    The number of potential enemy armored targets U.S. forces expect to face
                                    has decreased considerably since 1990. During the Cold War, the services
                                    considered the greatest threat to be a massive land attack spearheaded by

                   Leter            Page 1                                    GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions

                     thousands of armored vehicles in Central Europe. Today’s conditions,
                     however, are significantly different, and military planners consider smaller
                     regional conflicts as the threat basis when developing war-fighting plans
                     and requirements. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency’s latest
                     biannual Outyear Threat Report, issued in 1997, the number of armored
                     targets is less than 20 percent of the number considered in 1990.

                     The overall size of DOD’s current antiarmor weapons inventory is
                     approximately the same as during the Cold War, and inventories of the
                     more sophisticated and lethal antiarmor weapons have actually increased.
                     Currently, there are 35 different types of antiarmor weapons in the
                     inventory and 10 other types in production. While today’s inventory
                     weapons have similar capabilities to those in the 1990 inventory, the 10 new
                     weapons are expected to provide improved targeting, lethality, and
                     survivability capabilities developed in response to the anticipated future
                     tank threat.

                     The services continue to invest in antiarmor weapons and are planning
                     funding increases. They estimate they will spend $11.1 billion in total
                     procurement funding to acquire the 10 antiarmor weapons currently in
                     production, which includes $4.2 billion for fiscal years 2000 through 2003.
                     In addition, DOD is developing nine new antiarmor weapons at an
                     estimated cost of $3.5 billion. The procurement costs for six of the nine
                     new programs have not yet been determined, but the remaining three have
                     an estimated procurement cost of about $4.7 billion. Plans to acquire large
                     quantities of new and improved antiarmor weapons do not appear
                     consistent with the reduced size of the armored threat and the existing
                     large and capable inventory of antiarmor weapons.

Background           Antiarmor weapons are capable of destroying targets such as tanks,
                     armored combat vehicles, and/or artillery. To determine weapon
                     requirements, the services use the Defense Intelligence Agency’s latest
                     biannual Outyear Threat Report estimates. The current report modeled a
                     scenario in which U.S. forces would fight two major regional conflicts.

                     In October 1998, the administration issued “A National Security Strategy
                     for a New Century,” which describes the new and different threats facing
                     the United States since the end of the Cold War. Similarly, the Under
                     Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) testified in October
                     1998 that the military needs to change the way it fights, the weapons it uses,
                     and the way it acquires weapons to successfully meet the new anticipated

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                        threats. According to the Under Secretary, the most likely future combat
                        scenarios include information warfare, urban combat, chemical/biological
                        attack, terrorism, and nuclear attack. He noted that the dilemma the
                        military faces is how to fund competing demands to develop weapons to
                        achieve the goals of the early 21st century and meet current readiness
                        needs. The Under Secretary stressed that the military needs to shift away
                        from traditional weapons designed to counter a Cold War threat. He
                        specifically stated that one required action is to reduce the number of
                        traditional weapons now in acquisition to fund the required newer
                        weapons. This, he said, would enable the military to reallocate resources to
                        top-priority modernization programs for communications, sensors,
                        space-based reconnaissance, and computer systems.

                        DOD’s 1990 antiarmor master plan was a single integrated document
                        describing the development and acquisition of weapons capable of
                        defeating armored threats. Prior to 1990, antiarmor requirements were
                        primarily justified according to the potential threat of a Central European
                        conflict. A principle component of this threat was the very large Soviet and
                        Warsaw Pact inventories of armored vehicles. While the 1990 plan still
                        concluded that the Soviet Union would retain major conventional and
                        strategic forces and would remain the major concern of defense planning,
                        it recognized that the Warsaw Pact was no longer a credible military

                        In 1993, we reported that DOD had not sufficiently reexamined its
                        antiarmor needs since the decline of the Warsaw Pact.1 DOD reported that
                        the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation had plans to conduct a
                        2-year study of the antiarmor mission. However, according to a Program
                        Analysis and Evaluation official, the Office terminated the study before it
                        was completed, and no reportable results were obtained.

Armored Threat          DOD reports as well as testimony by top Defense officials show that the
                        armored threat facing the United States has dropped substantially since
Substantially Reduced   1990. A comparison of the armored targets in the 1990 antiarmor master
                        plan with those in the 1997 Defense Intelligence Agency Outyear Threat
                        Report shows that the number of armored targets U.S. forces expect to face
                        has dropped significantly during the period. Figure 1 shows the number of

                        Antiarmor Weapons Acquisitions: Assessments Needed to Support Continued Need and Long-term
                        Affordability (GAO/NSIAD-93-49, Mar. 4, 1993).

                        Page 3                                              GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions

enemy tanks and armored combat vehicles in the 1997 Outyear Threat
Report is less than 20 percent of the number in 1990 antiarmor master plan.

Figure 1: Comparison of Enemy Tanks and Armored Combat Vehicles, 1990 Soviet
Union and 1997 Regional Conflict

Armored combat


                     0            20            40            60             80        100
                                         1997 as a percent of 1990

                         1990 Soviet Union
                         1997 Regional conflict

This decline reflects the changes in threats since the collapse of the Soviet
Union in 1991. In 1987, we reported that the Soviet inventory totaled
approximately 52,000 tanks, including about 29,000 in Europe.2 About
26,000 of the tanks in the inventory were produced after 1978 (including the
T64B, T72M1, and T80). The technical sophistication and the sheer
numbers of these armored vehicles were far greater than the armored
threat associated with any other war-fighting contingency, either then or
now. However, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact significantly reduced the
likelihood that the United States would have to face an opponent with such
technically sophisticated armored weapons. Consequently, the armored
threat as projected in the 1997 Outyear Threat Report is not nearly as
capable as that of the former Soviet Union in terms of quantity and quality.

In January 1998, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency reported
to Congress that threats had diminished substantially, that the United
States was unlikely to face a global military threat similar to the former
Soviet Union for at least two decades, and that ground forces throughout
the world were being reduced. Further, he said many developing nations

 Antitank Weapons: Current and Future Capabilities (GAO/PEMD-87-22, Sept. 17, 1987).

Page 4                                                 GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions

                        had outdated equipment that was either not operational or in serious
                        disrepair. Developed countries were in various stages of modernization,
                        but ground forces were a low priority.

                        The Defense Intelligence Agency’s 1997 Outyear Threat Report used two
                        regional conflict scenarios as the threat estimate for determining
                        requirements. Iraq and North Korea are currently the most likely opponents
                        the United States would face. The number of armored vehicles currently
                        maintained by Iraq and North Korea represents only a small fraction of the
                        Cold War threat. In addition, the Central Intelligence Agency Director
                        testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in January
                        1998 that the United Nations sanctions and arms embargo implemented
                        after the Persian Gulf War limit Iraq’s opportunity to procure additional
                        weapons and have had a devastating effect on its economy. Further, North
                        Korea’s overall military readiness continues to erode along with its
                        worsening economic situation.

Antiarmor Weapon        The overall size of the antiarmor weapon inventory has remained fairly
                        constant since 1990. At the same time, weapons have become more
Inventory Remains at    sophisticated, lethal, and effective. These more highly sophisticated
Cold War Levels While   weapons, some of which are capable of killing multiple targets, were
                        developed to defeat the anticipated future Soviet tank threat.
New and Improved
Weapons Are Added       The 1990 antiarmor master plan divided the inventory and procurement of
                        antiarmor weapons into five different categories: infantry/helicopter,
                        indirect fire support, fixed-wing, tank rounds, and mines. Figure 2
                        compares the number of all types of antiarmor weapons in 1990 and 1998
                        within these five categories. There are various types of antiarmor weapons
                        within each category. The various types of antiarmor weapons are
                        described in appendix I.

                        Page 5                                   GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions

Figure 2: Comparison of Antiarmor Munitions, 1990 and 1998
1998 as a percent of 1990

140                               128
           100              100          100             100            100          100   100
 80                                                              67.7




  0        Infantry         Indirect      Fixed-              Tank       Mines          Total
         /helicopters         fire         wing              rounds



                                         The 1998 inventory of infantry/helicopter antiarmor weapons is slightly
                                         smaller than in 1990, but it contains inventories of three additional
                                         weapons with improved capabilities—the Javelin, the Hellfire II missile,
                                         and the Longbow Hellfire missile. The 1998 inventory of indirect fire
                                         weapons increased from 1990 levels. The biggest contributors were the
                                         higher number of Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) rockets and the
                                         recently produced Sense and Destroy Armor (SADARM) submunition. The
                                         1998 inventory of fixed-wing antiarmor weapons also grew over the 1990
                                         level. It included two additional weapons capable of killing multiple
                                         armored targets—the Joint Stand-Off Weapon (JSOW) and the Sensor
                                         Fused Weapon. The 1998 inventory of tank rounds shrank significantly.
                                         However, the drop was in the number of tank rounds for the older M60 and
                                         M61 tanks. Rounds for the M-1 Abrams main battle tank currently in use

                                         Page 6                                    GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions

                      increased by 425 percent. These rounds are more lethal against modern
                      armored targets. The 1998 inventory of mines also shrank from 1990, but
                      quantities of two new mines that provide increased performance and
                      lethality were added. Detailed comparisons of the 1990 and 1998
                      inventories are in appendix II.

                      U.S. antiarmor weapons proved very capable during Operation Desert
                      Storm. The United States and its allies destroyed or forced abandonment of
                      2,633 tanks during the air and ground assault against Iraqi ground forces.
                      According to a 1992 House Committee on Armed Services report,
                      technology gave U.S. forces the edge, and the equipment performed above
                      the most optimistic expectations.3

DOD Continues to      In 1998, the services had 35 different types of weapons in inventory capable
                      of performing today’s antiarmor mission and had spent a total of
Invest in Antiarmor   $20.2 billion (in then-year dollars) to acquire these weapons.4 They had also
Weapon Capability     spent a total of $3.6 billion through fiscal year 1998 to procure
                      10 additional antiarmor weapons and estimated they would spend another
                      $7.4 billion to complete procurement of these new weapons. The
                      procurement funding requests for the 10 antiarmor weapons in production
                      are in appendix III.

                      In addition, the services are currently developing nine new weapons with
                      varying levels of antiarmor capability for a total estimated development
                      cost of almost $3.5 billion, $2.6 billion of which has already been spent.
                      Some of the weapons such as the Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition and the
                      Line-of-Sight Antitank (LOSAT) are primary antitank weapons. Others such
                      as the Multipurpose Individual Munition (MPIM) engage a variety of
                      targets, including buildings, bunkers, and light armor. The guided MLRS
                      can engage personnel, light armor, or heavy armor, depending on the
                      payload selected. At this time, only three of the weapons are approaching a
                      procurement decision. Their estimated future procurement funding is
                      about $4.7 billion. Table 1 shows the development and projected
                      procurement costs for the nine weapons.

                       Defense for a New Era, Lessons of the Persian Gulf War, House Committee on Armed Services (1992).
                       Inventory quantities and costs are defined as what was on contract through fiscal year 1998, not
                      necessarily what was on–hand at the end of the fiscal year. For some older Army munitions, inventory
                      was based on on-hand data because original procurement data was unavailable.

                      Page 7                                                  GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions

Table 1: Antiarmor Development Weapons

Then-year dollars in millions
                                                         Total Development      Estimated
                                                  development        cost to procurement
                                                         cost     complete           cost
Brilliant antiarmor submunitiona                        $1,020               $ 34          $1,864
Improved brilliant antiarmor submunitiona                  334               206 Undetermined
Line-of-sight antitank                                     387               220 Undetermined
Multipurpose individual munition                               61             42 Undetermined
Improved sense and destroy armor                           988                36 Undetermined
Guided multiple launch rocket system                           96             78 Undetermined
Tank round M829E3                                          255               193 Undetermined
Joint stand-off weapon BLU-108                             245                47            2,369
Predator                                                   139                25              492
Total                                                   $3,525              $881           $4,725
 Does not include the cost to develop and procure the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) needed
to deliver the submunition to the target area.
Source: President’s Fiscal Year 1999 Budget.

In addition, the Army has spent almost $178 million to develop the
Enhanced Fiber Optics Guided Missile antiarmor weapon. The future of
this weapon is uncertain. No funding was requested in the President’s
Fiscal Year 2000 Budget, and procurement funds for fiscal years 1998 and
1999 were rescinded and eliminated. Table 2 shows the projected yearly
procurement funding requests through fiscal year 2003 for the 10 weapons
in production and the 3 nearing production.

Table 2: Antiarmor Procurement Funding Requests

Then-year dollars in millions
                                          Fiscal year
Weapons               1998       1999          2000    2001         2002    2003    To complete
In production         $784       $964     $1,154      $1,087    $1,121      $814           $1,975
Nearing                            122          267     478         448      480            2,930
Total                 $784     $1,086     $1,421      $1,565    $1,569     $1,294          $4,905
Source: President’s Fiscal Year 1999 Budget.

Page 8                                                  GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions

                      Procurement funding for antiarmor weapons fell steadily between 1986 and
                      1996. According to the Institute for Defense Analysis, antiarmor funding fell
                      from $2.5 billion in 1986 to $770 million in 1996.5 However, future funding
                      demands for the 10 weapons in production and the 3 in development show
                      a reverse in this trend. Fiscal year 1999 was the first year to exceed
                      $1 billion in antiarmor funding since fiscal year 1994. Funding for these
                      weapons is expected to increase each year through fiscal year 2002.

Conclusions           DOD has maintained the overall size of its antiarmor weapon inventory at
                      the same level as in 1990 while significantly increasing its effectiveness.
                      The lethality and accuracy of the weapons in the current inventory are
                      superior to those available in 1990. At the same time, however, the threat of
                      a massive heavily armored attack by potential enemies has greatly
                      diminished, and war-fighting strategies have been modified to reflect global
                      changes in threats and priorities. Nevertheless, DOD plans to increase its
                      procurement of antiarmor weapons. Plans to acquire large quantities of
                      new and improved antiarmor weapons do not appear consistent with the
                      reduced size of the armored threat and the existing large and capable
                      inventory of antiarmor weapons.

Agency Comments and   In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred. DOD
                      offered comments that were generally directed at explaining and justifying
Our Evaluation        the findings of this report. For example, DOD noted that the report did not
                      discuss or account for the fact that many of the antiarmor weapons
                      quantities are leftover stockpile levels from the Cold War and the
                      technology in those weapons did not provide the levels of precision,
                      lethality, and survivability available today.

                      As discussed in our report, we plan to assess DOD’s forthcoming antiarmor
                      master plan. The plan is expected to provide an updated assessment of the
                      current armored threat, current antiarmor capabilities, and antiarmor
                      weapons requirements. We plan to assess the plan’s findings and
                      conclusions, its underlying data and analyses, and its key assumptions.

                        Trends and Funding for Acquisition of Antiarmor Munitions, 1986-2001, Institute for Defense Analysis
                      (Jan. 1997).

                      Page 9                                                   GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions

Scope and     To determine the change in threat from 1990 to 1997, we compared the
              threat contained in the 1990 antiarmor master plan with the threat
Methodology   contained in the Defense Intelligence Agency’s 1997 Outyear Threat Report.
              We discussed threat information with representatives from the Defense
              Intelligence Agency, Bolling Air Force Base, Maryland; the U.S. Central
              Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida; and the Commander of U.S.
              Forces Korea.

              To determine the change in number and types of antiarmor weapons
              between 1990 and 1998, we compared the inventory contained in the 1990
              antiarmor master plan with data the individual services provided on their
              1998 antiarmor inventory. We discussed antiarmor weapon inventories with
              representatives from the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and
              Plans, Washington, D.C.; the Army’s Concepts Analysis Agency, Bethesda,
              Maryland; the Air Force’s Director for Operational Requirements, Crystal
              City, Virginia; the Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland;
              and the Marine Corps’ Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia.

              We identified past and future funding trends by obtaining data from the
              1997 Institute for Defense Analysis report on Trends and Funding for
              Acquisition of Antiarmor Munitions, 1986-2001 and from fiscal year 1999
              and 2000 budgetary documents.

              We conducted our review from June 1998 to May 1999 in accordance with
              generally accepted government auditing standards.

              We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable William S. Cohen,
              Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army;
              the Honorable F. Whitten Peters, Acting Secretary of the Air Force; the
              Honorable Richard Danzig, Secretary of the Navy; General James L. Jones,
              Commandant of the Marine Corps; Jacob J. Lew, Director, Office of
              Management and Budget; and other interested parties. We will also make
              copies available to others upon request.

              Page 10                                  GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or William Graveline at (256) 650-1400,
if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. The major
contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.

Sincerely yours,

James F. Wiggins
Associate Director
Defense Acquisitions Issues

Page 11                                   GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions

Letter                                                                                            1

Appendix I                                                                                       14
U.S. Antiarmor

Appendix II                                                                                      19
Comparison of
Antiarmor Weapons in
Inventory, 1990-98

Appendix III                                                                                     21
Current Production
Weapon Funding

Appendix IV                                                                                      22
Comments From the
Department of Defense

Appendix V                                                                                       25
Major Contributors to
This Report

Tables                  Table 1: Antiarmor Development Weapons                                    8
                        Table 2: Antiarmor Procurement Funding Requests                           8

Figures                 Figure 1: Comparison of Enemy Tanks and Armored Combat
                          Vehicles, 1990 Soviet Union and 1997 Regional Conflict                  4
                        Figure 2: Comparison of Antiarmor Munitions, 1990 and 1998                6

                        Page 12                                GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions


ATACMS     Army Tactical Missile System
BAT        Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition
CEM        Combined Effects Munition
DOD        Department of Defense
HEAA       High Explosive Antiarmor
JSOW       Joint Stand-Off Weapon
LOSAT      Line-of-Sight Antitank
MLRS       Multiple Launch Rocket System
MOPMS      Modular Pack Mine System
MPIM       Multipurpose Individual Munition
SADARM     Sense and Destroy Armor
SFW        Sensor Fused Weapon
SLAP       Saboted Light Armor Penetrator
SMAW       Shoulder-launched Multipurpose Assault Weapon
TOW        Tube-launched, Optically Tracked, Wire Command–link Guided
WAM        Wide Area Munition
WCMD       Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser

Page 13                                GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix I

U.S. Antiarmor Weapons                                                                                      Appenx


Dragon                     The Dragon completed production in 1980. It is a shoulder-fired,
                           lightweight, short-range antitank guided missile that only needs one soldier
                           to fire. The missile uses semiautomatic command line-of-sight guidance
                           with an infrared tracker. The Dragon has limited antiarmor capability due
                           to its 1,000-meter range and lack of fire-and-forget technology (allowing
                           personnel to fire the weapon and take cover rather than remaining exposed
                           while guiding the weapon to its target).

Hellfire                   The Hellfire air-to-ground missile is the primary antitank armament of the
                           Army’s Apache, Kiowa Warrior, and special operations helicopters; the
                           Marine Corps’ Super Cobra helicopter; and the Navy’s Sea Hawk helicopter.
                           The Hellfire uses semi-active laser terminal guidance. Beginning in 1990,
                           the missile was reconfigured with an interim warhead to improve lethality
                           against near-term threat reactive armor. Hellfire II includes improvements
                           to defeat all known electro-optical countermeasures and advanced reactive

High Explosive Antiarmor   The High Explosive Antiarmor (HEAA) rocket is an antitank weapon
                           designed to defeat targets at ranges up to 500 meters. It is effective against
                           current tanks without additional armor. The rocket is launched from the
                           shoulder-launched multipurpose assault weapon (SMAW). When the HEAA
                           completed development in 1988, it transformed the SMAW into a
                           multipurpose weapon suitable for close-in antiarmor urban fighting.

Javelin                    The Javelin is a portable antitank weapon used by the Army and the Marine
                           Corps. The weapon weighs 48.5 pounds and has a maximum range of
                           2,500 meters. It provides high lethality against conventional and reactive
                           armor and will replace the Dragon. The weapon has a high kill rate against
                           all known armored threats at extended ranges under day/night, adverse
                           weather, and battlefield obscurants. Its key feature is fire-and-forget
                           technology. The Javelin is hardened against countermeasures and does not
                           require extensive training for effective employment.

                           Page 14                                    GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions
                           Appendix I
                           U.S. Antiarmor Weapons

Line-of-Sight Antitank     The Line-of-Sight Antitank (LOSAT) weapon consists of a kinetic energy
                           missile and launcher mounted on a High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled
                           Vehicle (HMMWV). LOSAT is being developed as a mobile, direct fire,
                           antitank weapon that provides lethality at long ranges.

Longbow Hellfire           The Longbow Hellfire air-to-ground missile is designed to defeat individual
                           armored targets and enhance the survivability of the Longbow Apache
                           Helicopter. Longbow uses radio frequency guidance. It can be used both
                           day and night, in adverse weather, and with battlefield obscurants.
                           Longbow Hellfire complements the semi-active Laser Hellfire II with
                           fire-and-forget capability, maximizing the ability of the Apache.

Predator Multipurpose      Predator is designed to be a lightweight shoulder-fired weapon capable of
Individual Munition        defeating reactive armor. The weapon is designed with a modular warhead.
                           The Marine Corps uses a warhead that can defeat tanks with reactive
                           armor. The Army has modified the Predator with an alternative warhead,
                           the Multipurpose Individual Munition (MPIM). The MPIM provides infantry
                           with a fire-and-forget weapon capable of defeating enemy forces in
                           buildings, bunkers, and lightly armored vehicles.

Saboted Light Armor        Saboted Light Armor Penetrator (SLAP) is a 50-caliber ammunition
Penetrator                 effective against light armor with a maximum effective range of
                           approximately 1,500 meters. It is a reduced caliber munition wrapped in
                           plastic. The lighter weight allows the velocity to be significantly and safely
                           increased in an unmodified machine gun.

Tube-launched, Optically   The Tube-launched, Optically Tracked, Wire Command-link Guided (TOW)
Tracked, Wire              missile is an antitank weapon designed to fulfill the heavy assault
                           requirement for close combat maneuver forces. The TOW can be fired from
Command-link Guided
                           a ground tripod or from specifically adapted vehicles such as Bradleys and
                           HMMWVs or from Cobra helicopters. The weapon includes a thermal sight
                           for operations at night, in reduced visibility, and in countermeasures.
                           Several upgraded variants of the missile are in inventory, including ones
                           that can counter reactive armor. However, the TOW is not a fire-and-forget

                           Page 15                                    GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions
                         Appendix I
                         U.S. Antiarmor Weapons

Indirect Fire Weapons

Brilliant Antiarmor      The Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition (BAT) is a guided submunition that
Submunition              searches and destroys moving armored targets using acoustic and infrared
                         seekers. The Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) Block II can carry
                         the BAT to ranges beyond 100 kilometers. The preplanned product
                         improvement (P3I) BAT uses millimeter wave, infrared, and acoustic
                         seekers to also attack cold stationary or dug-in targets like
                         Surface-to-Surface Missile Transporter-Erector Launchers and Heavy
                         Multiple Rocket Launchers. The ATACMS Block IIA missile will carry the
                         P3I BAT to ranges of 300 kilometers.

Copperhead               The Copperhead is a laser-guided projectile fired from standard
                         155-millimeter howitzers. Its production was completed in the 1980s. The
                         projectile's semi-active laser seeker searches for a target illuminated by a
                         forward ground- or aircraft-based observer using a laser. The minimum
                         range of the Copperhead is 3 kilometers and its maximum range is
                         15.5 kilometers. The warhead can penetrate every tank now in service. The
                         Copperhead has been modified with a time-delay fuse, which permits the
                         warhead to penetrate reactive armor without detonating it.

Multiple Launch Rocket   The Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) has been in production since
System                   the 1980s. The MLRS basic rocket is a free-flight unguided tactical rocket
                         with a warhead containing 644 Dual Purpose Improved Conventional
                         Munition (DPICM) submunitions. The DPICM can penetrate light armor.
                         The Extended Range MLRS (ER-MLRS) began production in fiscal year
                         1996. The new rocket added enhanced capability through improvements in
                         range, accuracy, effectiveness, and maneuver force safety. The extended
                         range rocket has a range of 45 kilometers and contains 518 DPICM
                         submunitions. Starting in fiscal year 2002, the guided MLRS will integrate a
                         guidance control package into the ER-MLRS resulting in reduced mission
                         time and increased survivability.

                         Page 16                                   GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions
                            Appendix I
                            U.S. Antiarmor Weapons

Sense and Destroy Armor     The Sense and Destroy Armor (SADARM) is a fire-and-forget sensor-fused
                            submunition delivered by 155-millimeter artillery projectiles or by the
                            MLRS. It is designed to detect and destroy light armored vehicles, primarily
                            self-propelled artillery. Once dispensed over the target area, it detects
                            individual targets using millimeter wave and infrared sensors and fires an
                            explosively formed penetrator through the top of the target. The
                            155-millimeter projectile carries two SADARMs per round and has a range
                            of 22.5 kilometers. The MLRS carries six SADARMS per rocket and has a
                            range of 30 kilometers. According to the Department of Defense (DOD), the
                            Army’s MLRS-delivered SADARM program is currently not funded.

Fixed-Wing Weapons

Combined Effects Munition   The Combined Effects Munition (CEM) is a multipurpose cluster bomb for
                            ground support and is used against light armor, personnel, and artillery. The
                            CEM weighs approximately 950 pounds and dispenses 202 bomb units. The
                            CEM entered production in 1985. Because of its inaccuracy when dropped
                            from higher altitudes, the Air Force is fitting CEM with a wind corrected
                            munitions dispenser (WCMD) kit. The kit will provide inertial navigation to
                            correct for the effects of the wind.

Joint Stand-Off Weapon      The Joint Stand-Off Weapon (JSOW) is a Navy-led joint program with the
                            Air Force. JSOW is an air-to-ground weapon capable of attacking a variety
                            of targets from outside enemy point defenses during day/night and adverse
                            weather conditions. There are currently three configurations of the JSOW:
                            JSOW baseline for soft and area targets, JSOW BLU-108 for massed land
                            combat vehicles, and JSOW Unitary for harder/point targets and increased
                            kill effectiveness.

Maverick                    The Maverick is a rocket propelled, air-to-surface, precision guided tactical
                            missile with fire-and-forget capability designed for use against tanks and a
                            variety of hardened targets. The pilot has to visually acquire a target. When
                            the missile is engaged, a video picture instantly appears on the cockpit
                            display. The pilot then lines up the target with the gunsight. When the
                            missile is released, it finds the target automatically.

                            Page 17                                    GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions
                      Appendix I
                      U.S. Antiarmor Weapons

Rockeye               The Rockeye is an air-launched dispenser weapon. It is one of the older,
                      best known, and most widely used dispensers. The bomblet is designed
                      primarily as an antiarmor weapon for use against tanks, armored carriers,
                      and gun emplacements. The Rockeye II carries 247 dual-purpose antiarmor
                      bomblets and has a nose-mounted fuse to control the opening of the
                      dispenser at predetermined altitudes.

Sensor Fused Weapon   The Sensor Fused Weapon (SFW) is a cluster weapon designed for use
                      against land combat vehicles. It consists of a tactical weapon dispenser
                      containing 10 submunitions. Each submunition contains four warheads.
                      The warheads are released in a horizontal trajectory and are activated
                      through a small infrared sensor contained in the warhead. This weapon
                      provides multiple kills per pass capability. The Air Force is fitting SFW with
                      the WCMD kit, which will provide inertial navigation to correct for the
                      effects of the wind.

Tank Rounds           The 120-millimeter tank round is fired from the M1A1 and M1A2 tanks.
                      There are four basic cartridge types: (1) Kinetic Energy; (2) Armor
                      Piercing, Fin Stabilized, and Discarding Sabot-Tracer; (3) Chemical Energy
                      High Explosive; and (4) training rounds for each of the tactical cartridges.
                      The Armaments Enhancement Initiative program provides upgrades to the
                      120-millimeter round capability to defeat Soviet-built armored vehicles of
                      the 1990s and later.

Antiarmor Mines       Antiarmor mines in inventory include several non-self-destructing and
                      self-destructing mines. The inventory includes the M15, M19, and M21
                      non-self-destructing mine and a family of mixed munitions that includes the
                      Modular Pack Mine System (MOPMS), Volcano, and Gator. MOPMS
                      contains 21 individual antitank and antipersonnel mines. It is used as a
                      protective minefield, for obstacle enhancement, or to close gaps in other
                      larger minefields. Volcano contains six antitank mines and is designed for
                      quick emplacement. The Gator system has a total of 94 mines (72 antitank
                      and 22 antipersonnel) and was developed to place mine fields on the
                      ground using high-speed tactical aircraft. DOD has one mine in production,
                      the Wide Area Munition (WAM). The WAM is a first-generation smart
                      weapon. It recognizes armor and autonomously aims and launches its
                      submunition against the target. It offers increased performance and
                      lethality over current mines in inventory.

                      Page 18                                    GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II

Comparison of Antiarmor Weapons in
Inventory, 1990-98                                                                                                AppenIx

              The 1990 antiarmor master plan contained a total of 34 antiarmor weapons
              in inventory or procurement. Comparisons of the weapons by category
              shows that more sophisticated lethal weapons have been added since

              In the infantry/helicopter weapon category, the 1998 inventory stood at
              97 percent of the 1990 inventory. The 1990 inventory contained five
              weapons: the Dragon, the Light Assault Weapon, the Lightweight
              Multipurpose Weapon (AT-4), the TOW missile, and the Hellfire. The 1998
              inventory included these five weapons and three additional ones with
              improved capabilities: the shoulder-fired Javelin, the Hellfire II missile, and
              the Longbow Hellfire missile.

              In the infantry/helicopter category, the inventory quantities of
              shoulder-fired weapons were 95 percent of 1990 levels. The 1998 inventory
              included the Javelin, which provides fire-and-forget technology and
              enhanced lethality over the Dragon. The 1998 inventory of TOW missiles
              was about 81 percent of the 1990 inventory. Although the number of TOW
              missiles has declined, the 1998 inventory contained more modern variants,
              which provide more lethality and longer range. The 1998 inventory of
              helicopter air-to-ground missiles was well above its 1990 level and included
              over 20,000 Hellfire II and Longbow Hellfire missiles, which provide
              improved lethality and survivability over the basic Hellfire missile.

              The 1998 inventory for the indirect fire support weapons category was
              128 percent of the 1990 inventory. This category is composed of artillery
              shells and rockets. The biggest contributors to the larger 1998 inventory
              were the increased numbers of the MLRS rocket and the inclusion of some
              recently produced SADARM submunitions. The SADARM was developed to
              improve the ability of the artillery projectile to accurately locate targets.

              The 1998 inventory in the fixed-wing category of antiarmor weapons was
              119 percent of the 1990 inventory. The fixed-wing 1990 inventory contained
              the Maverick air-to-ground missile and the Rockeye and CEM cluster
              weapons. In the 1998 inventory, the Maverick was 104 percent, the Rockeye
              107 percent, and the CEM 164 percent of the 1990 inventory. The 1998
              inventory included two additional antiarmor area weapons capable of

               We did not include four weapons (25-millimeter and 30-millimeter munitions) in the comparison
              because their quantities were extremely large compared with the other weapons in the same categories.

              Page 19                                                 GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II
Comparison of Antiarmor Weapons in
Inventory, 1990-98

killing multiple armored targets: the JSOW air-to-ground missile and the

In the tank rounds category, the 1998 inventory stood at 68 percent of the
1990 inventory. This category contained 105-millimeter and 120-millimeter
tank rounds. While the 1998 inventory of tank rounds was significantly
smaller than the total 1990 inventory, most of the rounds in 1990 were
105-millimeter M60 or M61 tank rounds. However, the main battle tank
currently in use is the M-1 Abrams, which uses the 120-millimeter round
shell. A comparison of the 120-millimeter inventory shows that the 1998
inventory was 425 percent of the 1990 inventory. The 120-millimeter tank
rounds have increased lethality against modern armored weapons. Some of
the newer kinetic energy rounds were designed to defeat the newer
Soviet-built tanks.

In the mines inventory category, the 1998 inventory was 80 percent of the
1990 inventory. The 1998 inventory contained two newer mines, the
Volcano and the WAM. Both provide increased performance and lethality
over the mines contained in the 1990 inventory.

Page 20                                   GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix III

Current Production Weapon Funding
Requests                                                                                                                          AppeInIx

Then-year dollars in millions
                                                Total quantity to be                      Cost through fiscal Cost fiscal year 1999
Weapon                      Service                       procured           Total cost            year 1998         to completion
WCMD on CEM                 Air Force                          30,000             $500                  $112                  $388
WCMD on Gator               Air Force                           5,000               82                    19                    63
Javelin                     Army                               24,403            3,012                   945                 2,067
Javelin                     Marine Corps                        2,553              287                    96                   191
Longbow Hellfire            Army                               12,905            2,092                   704                 1,388
MLRS-extended range         Army                                6,102              245                   109                   136
SADARM                      Army                               50,000            1,978                   235                 1,743
SFW                         Air Force                           5,000            2,066                   912                 1,154
Tank round M829A2           Army                             144,000               614                   470                   144
WAM                         Army                                3,165              214                    40                   174
Total                                                                          $11,090                $3,642                $7,448
                                           Source: Service budgetary data.

                                           Page 21                                            GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix IV

Comments From the Department of Defense                         AppenV

              Page 22       GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix IV
Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 23                                   GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix IV
Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 24                                   GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix V

Major Contributors to This Report                                             AppenV

National Security and   William Gillies
                        Roy Karadbil
International Affairs
Division, Washington,

Atlanta Field Office    Laura Durland
                        Beverly Breen

(707356)     Lert       Page 25           GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions
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