United States GAO General Accounting Offke Washington, D.C. 20548 National Security and International Affairs Division B-282263 March 11,1999 The Honorable Floyd D. Spence Chairman, Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives Subject: NATO’s Onerationsand Continaencv Plans for Stabilizinu the Balkans Dear Mr. Chairman: This letter provides extracts from our recent report on NATO’s operationsand contingency plaus for stabilizing the Balkans. For purposesof this letter, the Balkans region is defined as Albania; Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croak, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro, hereafler referred to as the FRY).’ Figure 1 and attachment I provide maps of the Balkans region. The full report provides information on (1) current and projected security conditions in the Balkans region, particularly with regard to Bosnia and Serbia’s province of Kosovo, and (2) the potential impact of these conditions on (a) prospectsfor a drawdown of the North Atlantic Treaty Organ&&ion (NATO)-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, (b) NATO’s current operations around Kosovo, and (c) NATO and U.S. plans to deploy air and ground forces for resolving the ongoing conflict in Kosovo, in particular, ground operationsplanned for a ‘permissive environment”-one where all parties to the conflict agreeto the presenceand mission of NATO-led forces. To addressthese issues,we relied extensively on NATO and U.S. documentsconcerning the situation in the region. We also conducted interviews with the Department of Defense (DOD), State,and NATO officials to &xi@ our understandingof information contained in these documents. The full report from which these extmcts were derived provides summaryinformation on the status of NATO and U.S. planning as of February 26, 1999,three days a&r the latest round of Kosovo peacenegotiations had ended with the failure of the parties to agreeto a proposed interim peace settlement. Recent reports indicate that as of today, the parties are still unwilliug to sign this proposedpeaceagreement. As discussedin the full report, NATO and U.S. decisionson the force level, mission, and tasks of a peace enforcement operation for Kosovo will dependgreatly on the provisions of any cease-fireor peace agreementthat may be reachedin the future and on the parties’ willingness to implement them. ‘The former Yugoslavia consisted of six republics: (1) Bosnia and Henegoviq (2) Croatia, (3) Macedonia, (4) Montenegro, (5) Serbii and (6) Slovenk Following the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the republics of Serbia and Montene~o asserted the fomation of a joint independent state known as the Fehl Republic of Yugoslavia This entity has not ken formally recognized as a state by the United States. GAO/NSIAD-99-111R NATO Operations in the Balkans Figure 1: Map of the Balkans Region AUSTRIA -A% d@ HUNGARY Adriatic Sea ITALY \ GAOINSUD-99-11 IR NATO Operations in the Balkans Page 2 E282263 Overview of the Security Situation in the Balkans The situation in the Balkans remains one of ethnic turmoil and conflict, with the potential for the recent fighting in Kosovo to escalateand engulf relatively peaceful areas of the region. Bosnia Substantialprogress has beenmade in Bosnia sincethe signing of the 1995 Dayton Agreement, ’ but almost all of the results were achievedonly with intense international involvement and pressure,both political and military. This pressurewill continue to be necessarybecausethe parties to the conflict-- Bosnia’s Muslims, Croats,and Serbs,as well as Croatia and the FRY3-largely retain their wartime goals. Despite the progress madeto date, conditions in Bosnia have not improved to the point where SFOR can withdraw or substantially draw down. As we previously reported these conditions will likely not be met for sometime to come.4 Parties Largely Retain Wartime Gods The actions taken by the international community beginning in mid-1997 acceleratedthe pace of progress toward reaching the Dayton Agreement’s goals over the next year. With the military situation remaining stable,the international community used intensive political and military pressureto force advancements toward the goals of providing security for the people of Bosnia, creating a democratic environment, establishing multiethnic institutions at all levels of government, arresting those indicted for war crimes, returning people to their prewar homesacrossethnic lines, and rebuilding the infmstmcture and revitalizing the economy.5 Though the pace slowed somewhat during the second half of 1998, the international wmmmity has continuedto exert intensivepressureto force the parties to comply with the Dayton Agreement’s provisions. The intensive international pressureon the political leadersof the Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbswas necessarybecausetheir strategicgoals remain largely unchanged and the underlying political diikences have not beenresolved. The delays in implementing the Dayton Agreement’s civil provisions-including the slow pace of developing multiethnic institutions and the obstruction of people attempting to return to their prewar homesacrossethnic lines-is a continuing manifestation of the attitudes of Bosnian Serbsand Croats toward a unified Bosnia. The majority of these two groups, as well as their political leaders, continue to want to establishstatesseparatefrom Bosnia. According to polling data of the U.S. Information Agency, only 19 percentof Bosnian Serbsand 45 percent of Bosnian Croats support the goal of Bosnia remaining a single state. In contrast, 99 percent of Bosniaks support this goal. ‘For purposesof this repor& the 1995 Gcnaal Framework @eemeat for Peace in Bosnia aud Hmegovina and its supporting anuexes are r&red to as the “Dayton Agreement.” %e wu in Boka WLSfought among Bosoia’s three major etbnkkeligious gmups-Bosnkks (MusIims), Serbs (Eastern Orthodox Christians), end Croats (Roman Whoks). the lat&rtwo being supported by Serbia and Croatia, respectively. Before the war, Bosnia’s population was 4.4 million people-44 percent Muslim, 3 1 pacent Serb, 17 percent Croat, and 8 percent other ethnic groups. The Dayton Agreement was signed in December 1995 by representatives of Bosnia’s three major ethnic 8mups, Croatia,, and the FRY. ' bS!da Peace cbratior~: PaCe Of hu~crnMtiap: Davton Accelerated as h&national h01vcm~ In--d (GAO/NSIAD.98q38, June 5, 1998) and Bosnia Peace CWmtion: Mission. Structure. and Transition Stratew ofNATO’s Stabilization Force, (GAO/NSIAD-99-19, Oa. 8, 1998). ‘See Bosnia Peace Owration: Pace of Imchmentine Davton Accelerated as International Involvement Inmeased for a full description of progress toward these goals and Bosnia Peace Owmtion: Mission. Stmcture. and Transition 8tratew of NATO’s Stabilization Force for information WI SFOR’s contribution to implementing the military and civilian provisions of the Dayron Agreement. GAOINSIAD-99-I 11R NATO Opendons in the Balhs Page 3 B-282263 At the sametune, Croatia and Serbia--the dominant republic in the FRY-continue to use their influence to obstruct Dayton implementationas they pursue their strategic goals of a “Greater Croatia” and “Greater Serbia” respectively. The international community will attempt to achieve a breakthrough in minority returns during 1999, with the Office of the High Representative6hoping that as many as 120,000 people will return home across ethnic lines this year. However, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees(UNHCR) has estimatedthat about 50,000 of these “minority returns” will take place in 1999, a number more in keeping with the incremental progressachievedthus far. 7 In developing this estimate, UNHCR assumed,among other things, that (1) the international community will main&t a concerted, forceful, and long-term commitment to Dayton implementation; and (2) SFOR will maintain a credible security umbrella in Bosnia and will actively supportthe implementation of the civil aspectsof Dayton.* Potential for an SFOR Drawdown As long as a credible SFOR remainsin theater ready and able to intervene actively should circumstances warraut, according to international officials in Bosnia, the probability that the respective ethnic groups will resort to military action is low. These officials said, however, that SFOR needsto continue to deter hostilities through constantmonitoring and maintaining a deterrent presence. SFOR also needsto actively maintain a safeand secureenvironment, particularly with regard to returns of people to their pre- war homes acrossethnic lines. SFOR officials told us that the increasedemphasisof the international wmmunity on minority returns will in turn increasethe number of “hotspots” of potential violence. In November 1998, international officials in Bosnia estimatedthat without an SFOR presenceat or about its current force levels,the war would break out again within a short period of tune. In mid-December 1998,NATO concluded that political and security conditions in Bosnia would not allow a changein SFOR’s mission or a substantial drawdown in SFOR force levels.? Instead,NATO decidedto make administrativeadjustmentsof up to 10 percent in SFOR force levels by April 1999. This could lower the number of SFORtroops to about 30,000. As currently envisioned, NATO will reduce the number of SFOR’s combat support and combat service support personnel but will not reducethe number of combat battalions located in Bosnia. As part of this efficiency reduction, DOD plans to decreasethe U.S. contribution to SFOR by 10 percent to about 6,200 troops. According to information from the Joint crhe Dayton Agreement created the position of the High Representative. It gave the High Representative, an intemational oKciaI, many responsibilities, including monitoring the implemeutation ofthe agreement, coordinating civilian organizations, mai!Wi&8 close contact with the parties, and givingthe final interpretation intheater on civilian implementation ofthe agreement. ‘According to UNHCR data, the number of people rehming home auoss ethnic lines has been increasing each year since the signing ofthe Dayton Agreement The number went kom an estimated 9,500 in 1996, to 39,000 in 1997, to over 41,000 in 1998, for a total of 89,500. Despite this trend, UNHCR estimamd that as ofthe end of 1998, about 370,000 refugees and 860,000 displaced persons (about 1.23 million people total) had not yet found a “dumble solution” to their displacematf defined as hum&tari an/refugee status, other resident status, resettlement, and repatdion Ifthese people returned to their pre-war homes, most of them would be returning to areas now controlled by another ethnic group. c ‘According to a senior State Department offkiai, as put of tbis increased emphasis, the international community will begin to pressure the Republika Srpska government to accept the retums of non-Serbs to Republika Srpska, something tbat did not occur in 1998 despite the pledges of the moderate Republika Srpska Prime Minister, Milorad Dodik. In February 1998, the Prime Minister set a goal of retuming 70,000 non-Serbs to their pre-war homes in Republika &p&a. Organized visits of Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks to their pre-war commum‘ties, however, sperked violent incidents in westem Republika Srpska during the spring of 1998. According to UNHCR data, only 6,000 non-Serbs retumed to Republika Srpska, excluding the Brcko area, during the year. In comparison, about 32,700 minority returns occurred in the Federation, including about 10,370 Serbs, and about 2,600 non-Serbs returned to the Brcko area. ‘SFOR consists of about 33,200 troops located in Bosnia and Croatia (as of November 1998). The United States remains the largest force provider to SFOR snd Ameticans continue to hold the key NATO military positions that control the operation k of Janwry 1999, the United States was providing about 6,830 troops to SFOR-6,730 in Bosnia and 100 troops iu Croatia An additional 2,200 U.S. military pemormel in Croatia, Hungary, and Italy wae directly suppoiting SFOR operations but were not a part of SFOR Attachment III provides more information on current peace operations of NATO and the United Nations in the Balkans. GAO/NSIAD3FlllR NATO Operations in the Balkans Page 4 B-282263 StaE, the U.S. military will reduce its contribution to SFOR’s operational reserve-a U.S. aviation task force that also supports the U.S. military sector-as well as in headquartersand support units. NATO is currently studying various options for more substantiallyreducing SFOR’s presencein Bosnia. The United Statesproposed two options for consideration: (1) a gradual reduction option in which the size of SFOR would decreasein light of progress in Dayton implementation,and (2) a substantial reduction option in which the post-1999 force would be structuredbasedupon SFOR’s key military tasks. This study is to be submitted by NATO military headquartersto NATO’s international military staff during March 1999. U.S. SFOR officials told us in November 1998 that the U.S. military employs 55 percent of its ground combat forces in Bosnia on “presencepatrols” and 40 percent on duties associatedwith force protection. SFOR’s presencepatrols, according to U.S. and other SFOR officials, serveboth military and civilian purposes. SFOR headquartersin Sarajevois in the processof collecting data on how SFOR overall is using its ground combat forces. SFOR intends to use the data as the basis of (1) SFOR’s next 6-month assessmentdue in May 1999 and (2) future decisions on rempving SFOR combat battalions from Bosnia. These data are expectedto be availableby the end of March 1999.,. Kosovo In mid-October 1998, FRY PresidentSlobodan Milosevic agreedto a cease-fireunder pressurefrom NATO, and Kosovar Albanian insurgents agreedto exerciseself-restraint. The cease-fire,however, constituted only a pausein the military struggle over the future of Kosovo. The Serbsand the Kosovar Albanians retain mutually exclusivegoals and are preparedand willing to renew the conflict in order to attain their objectives. These and other aspectsof the security environmentin and around Kosovo will affect the mission, composition, and required force levels of any NATO-led force that may be deployed in an effort to resolve the conflict. The relationship betweenthe security environmentand proposed NATO- led operations is discussedin detail in our full report on NATO’s operation and contingency plans for stabilizing the Balkans. Security Situation and Status of Peace Negotiations Since the October agreement,there has been a continuous deterioration of the cease-fire. Numerous violent incidents occurred during late December 1998 and January 1999 asthe Kosovar Albanian insurgents took advantageof the cease-fireand initial reductionsin Serb security forces and as Serb special forces were reintroduced into the province. The on-the-groundpresenceof the unarmed Kosovo Verification Mission, led by the Organization for Security and Cooperationin Europe, has not and likely will not be able to deter Serb forces or the insurgents from using violence to gain advantage. According to a recent statementof the Director of Central Intelligence, the year-long conflict between Kosovar Albanian insurgents and Serb forces will likely continue to escalatewithout the presenceof an external force, such as a NATO-led peace enforcementoperation. An escalationof the conflict would likely further destabilize or harm international efforts to stabiliaethe region, particularly the neighboring countries of Bosnia; Macedonia, a country with a large minority population of ethnic Albanians; and Albania, where the government doesnot control the country’s northern areasthat support Kosovar Albanian insurgents. According to reports of the United Nations SecretaryGeneral, Kosovar Albanian insurgents are militarily active on both sides of the Kosovo-Albania border. Attachment I provides a map showing the distribution of the ethnic Albanian population in and around Kosovo. GAO/NSIAD-99-1llR NATO Operations in the Balkans Page 5 B-282263 NATO’s current operations around Kosovo are part of a larger international effort to verify whether Serb and Kosovar Albanian forces are complying with the cease-fireand other measurescalled for by the UN. Security Council in late September 1998.” By late January 1999, it appearedthat cease-fire violations committed by both parties during late December1998 and January 1999 would escalateinto a full-scale resumption of the conflict before a peacesettlementcould be reached. In responseto this situation, as well as to recent Serb atrocities against Kosovar Albanians, the international community attempted to mediate an interim peace settlementbetweenboth parties during early February 1999 under the renewed threat of NATO airshikes againstthe Serbs. This round of negotiations ended with no peace agreement being reachedbut with the expectationthat negotiations would continue on March 15,1999. As of March 11, however, reports indicated that the parties were unwilling to sign the proposed interim peace agreement. NATO Contingency Plans for Resolving the Conflict NATO and the United Stateshave considereda number of air and ground options for resolving the Kosovo conflict. The United Statesand NATO have publicly threatenedto launch airstrikes against the Serbs as a meansof foi%ng them to agreeto an interim peace settlement. It is unclear, however, what the current intent is with regardsto NATO’s planneduse of airstrikes, as executive branch officials have recently made conflicting statementson this issue. On February 19,1999, the President said that NATO allies standunited in their determinationto use force if Serbia failed to accept the interim peace agreement. Shortly after recent negotiations in France ended with neither party agreeing to the proposed settlement,DOD said in commentsto our full report that there is no longer a willingness to use air and/or ground forces in Kosovo to get an agreement. DOD and U.S. European Command officials told us in late 1998 that the United Statesdid not intend to deploy U.S. ground troops to Kosovo. The executivebranch at that time, however, had not ruled out the possibility of sending U.S. troops there as part of a NATO-led force to enforce a cease-fire or a peace agreementwith the parties’ consent,that is, within a permissive environment. As the security situation deteriorated during late 1998 and early 1999,NATO allies respondedto the changed situation by deciding to execute,under certain conditions, an option for a ground force that would enforce a peace agreement. During February 1999,the President said that the United Stateshas an important interest” in resolving the Kosovo conflict that warrants the deployment of U.S. ground troops to help bring peace to Kosovo, but U.S. forces would be deployed only if a permissiveenvironment existed.. At that time, the United States would have provided about 4,000 troops to a NATO-led force of 28,000 (about 14 percent of the total) if the parties reacheda strong peaceagreement,detied by the Presidentas an agreementthat provides for (1) an immediate cease-fire, (2) a rapid withdrawal of most Serb security forces, and (3) the demilitarization of the Kosovar Albanian insurgents. The executivebranch did not rule out the possibility of providing U.S. ground troops to a NATO-led force that would enforce a cease-fireagreementin a permissive environment. “%.N. Security Council Resolution 1199 (Sept. X3,1998). While the FRY agreed to a cease-fire in October 1998. the Kosovar Albauian insurgents agreed only to exercise “self-restnint” “The national security strategy defines three types of U.S. intere=&+vital, iqnuut, and humanitarian-that guide decisions about whether aud when to use U.S. military forces. Important interests do not affect the nation’s survival as do vital interem but they do significantly affect the national well-being end the cheracter of the world in which Americans live. Where imporrant interests are at stake, according to the strategy, military forces should be used only ifthey advance U.S. interests, are likely to accomplish their objectives, aud if other means are inadequate to accomplish U.S. goals. GAOMUD-99-111R NATO Operations in the Balkans Page 6 B-282263 As of February 26,1999, basedon the expectationthat an interim peace agreementwould be reachedin the near term, NATO and U.S. planning efforts were concentratedon deploying this force that would monitor, ensure,and, if necessary,enforce a peaceagreementin Kosovo only. Jfthis force were to deploy by mid-1999, the number of NATO-led troops in the Balkans would grow to about 63,000 and U.S. commitmentsin the region would increaseto about 11,400 troops, most of which would come from the U.S. Army. (SeeattachmentII for information on how U.S. Army resourcesare currently engaged worldwide.) However, the conflict will likely escalateover the next few months in the absenceof a viable peace agreementbacked by an external force, such as a NATO-led peace enforcement operation. Ifthe security situation significantly deterioratesbefore the FRY and Kosovar Albanian insurgents reach such an agreement,then NATO allies could decideto plan for and deploy a different force that is better suited for the changedsecurity environmentand the status of peacenegotiations. Specifically, NATO could choose to deploy a force that would enforcea cease-firein Kosovo only or in Kosovo and Albania. This force would provide a secureenvironmentin Kosovo while the parties continue to negotiate a viable peace agreement. The expectedsecurity environment and the associatedmission and tasks of such a force would likely require a much larger number of troops than the force of 28,000 currently under consideration. Further, security conditions around Kosovo may require the deployment of NATO-led troops to help stabilize Albania and Macedonia. This letter was preparedunder the direction of Harold J. Johnson,Associate Director, International Relations and Trade Issues,who may be contacted on (202) 5 12-4128 if you or your staff have any questions about this letter or our full report on these matters. Other major contributors to the report include B. Patrick Hickey, Judith McCloskey, E. JeanetteVelis, and Jody Woods . Attachments (3) GAO/NSIAD-99-1llR NATO Operations in the Balkans Page 7 ATTACHMEm I MAPS OF BOSNIA AM3 THE KOSOVO AREA This attachmentprovides maps showing the distribution of Bosnia’s three major ethnic groups (seefig, I. 1) and the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo and Macedonia (seefig. 1.2), as well as the areasof operation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) (see fig. 1.3). Figure Ll: Map of Bosnia Croatia - L?- Croatia Bosnia and Hetzeaovina -4 drb* py WY E M”IlJnallonal - -“&Q#,#‘:.::: ,’ - (N) = Multinationa! KF’o” (North) .-- . . .. .. .~.- ,e-~.-__.\ I GAO/NSAD-99-111R NATO Opemtions in the Jhlkans Page 8 B282263 ATTACHMENT I Figure I.2: Distribution of Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia I Sarajevo Montenegro I Adriatic Sea c *lirana Albania i 50 25 Greece 10 ‘5 I 1 lJnclassilied GAOLNSIAD-99-1llR NATO Operatims in the Bakaus Page9 B282263 ATTACHhEm I Figure L3: Kosovo Liberation Army Areas of Operation (as of October 1998) : ^.,:. ..:. :, ‘f..’. ecani a a L l UrOS8VaC Kacanik l A- Unciassmea GAON3AD-99-111R NATO Opemtions in the Balkans Page 10 E282263 ATTACHMENTII EMPLOYMENT OF U.S. ARMY RESOURCES The U.S. Army has 10 active divisions, sized to meet the requirements of the National Military Strategy. All 10 divisions would be needed in the event of two major theater wars occuning at about the sametime. While not engagedin major theater wars, these divisions can be used in smaller-scaleoperationslike the one in Bosnia. A number of the divisions are actively engagedin various parts of the world today, as shown in table II. 1. Table 11.1:U.S. Army Divisions and Their Current Commitments, as of February II,1999 Retraining following Bosnia mission to be camp Division 25” infantry Division United States Normal home station training. (Light) 82”’ Airborne United States On Call as rapid reSDOnSeforce. Division lOPAir assault United States Normal home station training. Division As can be seenfrom the table, as of mid-February 1999, all but three of the &my’s divisions are either committed to certain parts of the world or are preparing for or recovering from operations. l One division is committed to Bosnia; another division is scheduledto deploy later this year. l Two other divisions, the ones basedin Europe, had been providing the bulk of the forces for Bosnia until last summer,when they were given an operational pause scheduleto last until 2001. This reflected au Amry decision to relieve U.S. &my Europe of the high operating and personneltempo it has experiencedsince the Bosnia mission began and to allow it to focus on its wartime mission. l A fifth division is based in Korea to guard against a North Korean invasion of South Korea. l A sixth division is committed to Southwest Asia and has been deploying a battalion on a quarterly basis for the past severalyears to train with Kuwaiti armed forces. This division also has a brigade on alert to deploy to Kuwait in the event of any increasedtensions with Jraq. l A seventhdivision is on continuous alert to respondto any other crisesthat may occur anywhere in the world. GAO/NSIAD8FlllR NATO Operations in the Balkans Page11 B-282263 ATTACHMENT II l Theremainin g three divisions are engagedin normal peacetimetraining to meet wartime requirements. One of these is also the test division in the Army’s advancedwarfighting experiment and is in the process of receiving new equipment. Any requirement to deploy all or a major part of another division would increasethe risk of being able to respondto major theater war within establishedJoint StaEtimeIines should one occur during a Kosovo deployment becausethe pool of readily available divisions would shrink. The Army also has 8 National Guard Divisions and 15 enhancedreadinessbrigadesthat could be called into service to provide forces for smaller-scalecontingencies. One of these divisions is scheduledto lead the Bosnia mission in 2000. To avoid straining active divisions, the Presidentcould exercisehis statutory authority to call-up reserve forces. He could utilize his Presidential SelectedReserveCall-up Authority, which allows him to involuntarily call to duty up to 200,000 reservistsat any one time with no one reservist able to serve more than 270 days. Jf the time necessaryto first tram and then deploy a unit for a 6-month tour of duty exceedsthe 270day period, which has beenthe casefor active units involved in Bosnia, the President could then use his statutory authority to order a partial mobilization of the atmed forces. Under this authority he can call to involuntary duty up to 1 million reservistsfor up to 2 years. To use this authority, he must declare a national emergency. GAO/NSlAD-99-I 11R NATO Opedons in the Balhs Page 12 B-282263 ATTACHMENT III CURRENT NATO AND U.N PEACE OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS REGION The following attachmentprovides information on current military operationsled by NATO and the United Nations intended to bring peaceand stability to the Balkans. Table III. 1 provides summary information on these operations. Table III.2 provides information on force contributors to SFOR Table III.3 shows the mission of and force contributions to U.N. operationsin Macedonia. As shown in Table III. 1, NATO commandsalmost all troops assignedto international peace operations in the Balloms. As of November 1998, at least 35,000 military personnel were deployed under NATO command or control in three operationsin the region, while just over 1,000military personnel were deployed in one U.N. operation. Theseoperations both support and are dependentupon larger international civilian efforts to bring peaceand stability to the region. Table 111.1:NATO and UN.-led Peace Operations in the Stilkans Region, as of November 1998 Name Area of Force Levels U.S. Operations Contribution -NATO 1 SFOR Bosnia 33,200’ 6,828 N.A = Not available. vhis number includes 2,268 SFOR personnel based in Croatia. bThis figure includes non-SFOR personnel assigned to the U.S. national support element in Croatia. About 1,980 U.S. troops were also directly supporting SFOR in Hungary (654) and Italy (1,324). vhis operation is based in Macedonia and is on-call for deployment to Kosovo to extract unarmed monitors of the Kosovo Verification Mission run by the OSCE. dThis operation includes forces based in Macedonia, specifically, ground forces assigned to the Kosovo Verification Coordination Center and some air assets. vhe number of NATO and non-NATO military personnel associated with this air operation is not available. ‘The United Nations also has deployed a group of 28 military observers to monitor the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula in southern Croatia. The FRY is disputing Croatia’s claim to this peninsula because it controls the entrance to a sea inlet in Montenegro. gOn February 25, 1999, China vetoed the U.N. Security Council resolution that would have extended UNPREDEP’s mandate beyond the February 28, 1999, end date. GAOMX4D-99-I 1IR NATO Operations in the Balkans Page13 B-282263 ATTACHMENT III Table III.2 provides information on troop contributions to SFOR by NATO and non-NATO participants. Table 111.2:SFOR Force Contributors, By Country (as of November 1998) NATO Countries ) Contribution Belgium 561 Canada 1,040 France 3,167 Germany 2,535 Greece 294 Iceland Italy 2,15f: Luxemhntrm 74 NethWlIQIIu3 I I,& I I Natwav I 750 I Portugal 300 Spain 1,710 Turkev 1.554 I United Klnadom I 4.752 I1 United States 6,828 Subtotal 27.550 Non-NATO Austria 208 Czech Republic 568 Eavnt ’ I 124 Estonia I 43 Finland 377 1 Hungary 238 Latvia 41 Lithuania 41 Morocco 630 Poland 484 Romania 21A Russia 1,342 Sweden 449 Ukraine 395 Other cnuntriesD A47 Subtotal 5,301 Multinational Specialized Unit’ 352 Total 33,203 -he withdrawal of Egyptian troops was completed by November 30,1998. bNine other countries contributed troops to SFOR: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, Ireland, Jordan, New Zealand, South Africa, and Slovakia. ‘Data was not available to break out this number by country. Italy is the largest contributor to this unit followed by Argentina. By February 1999, countries had contributed about 500 of the 800 troops required for this unit. Page 14 GAO/NSlAD-99-11 IR NATO Operations in the Babm B-282263 ATTACHMENT III The United Nations had deployed one military observer force consisting of about 1,050 military personnelin Macedonia, as of January 1999 (seetable IIJ.3). On February 25,1999, however, China vetoedthe resolution calling for the extension of UNPREDEP’s mandate past its February 28 end date, thereby ending the mission. The mission of this force was to deter and report on possible developmentsthat could undermine confidence and stability in Macedonia or threaten its territory. UNPREDEP’s tasks included deterring threats or clashes,monitoring events,and patrolling Macedonia’s border areasand reporting to the Security Council any developmentsthat could pose a threat to Macedonia.” In July 1998, UNPREDEP assumedthe task of monitoring and reporting on (1) flows of illicit arms to the FRY, including Kosovo; (2) the arming and training of terrorists on Macedonian territory; or (3) any other activities prohibited since March 1998by the UN. Security Coun~il.‘~ At the sametime, at the requestof the governmentof Macedonia,the U.N. Security Council extendedUNPREDEP’s mandate until February 28,1999. Jt also authorizedan increasein the operation’s force level from 750 troops to 1,050 troops. The U.S. contribution to the operation increasedfrom its previous level of 350 military personnelto 362. Table 111.3:U.N. Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia (as of January 1999) ‘asks Force Contributions Under UNSCR 795: Total Troops: 1,050 Deter threats and prevent Nordic Battalion: 650 clashes. (Finland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden) thrkten its territory. Monitor border areas. Report any developments Task Force Able Sentryz 350 that could pose a threat to (United States): Macedonia. Under UNSCR 1166: Engineer platoon: 50 (Indonesia) Monitor and report on illicit arms flows to the FRY. 35 military observers and 26 Monitor and report on civilian police monitors to report arming and training of on developments within terrorists and other Macedonia and provide training activities prohibited by assistance. UNSCR 1160. Legend FRY = Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) UNPREDEP = United Nations Preventive Deployment Force UNSCR = United Nations Security Council Resolution Source: United Nations. (Code 711416) ‘3J.N. secudy f2owlcil Rcsohltion 795 (Dccembcr 11,1992). *)v.N. 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NATO's Operations and Contingency Plans for Stabilizing the Balkans
Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1999-03-11.
Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)