oversight

Military Readiness: Readiness Reports Do Not Provide a Clear Assessment of Army Equipment

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1999-06-16.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                   United States General Accounting Office

GAO                Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee
                   on Military Readiness, Committee on
                   Armed Services, House of
                   Representatives

June 1999
                   MILITARY
                   READINESS

                   Readiness Reports Do
                   Not Provide a Clear
                   Assessment of Army
                   Equipment




GAO/NSIAD-99-119
United States General Accounting Office                                                   National Security and
Washington, D.C. 20548                    Leter
                                                                                   International Affairs Division



                                    B-282327                                                                  Letter

                                    June 16, 1999

                                    The Honorable Herbert H. Bateman
                                    Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Readiness
                                    Committee on Armed Services
                                    House of Representatives

                                    Dear Mr. Chairman:

                                    On the basis of your concerns about the combat readiness of U.S. military
                                    forces as the individual services deal with reductions in force size and the
                                    expanding demands of peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance
                                    operations, we reviewed the equipment readiness in active duty Army
                                    units. As requested, this report addresses whether active duty units
                                    (1) have the equipment required to conduct their wartime missions, (2) are
                                    keeping their equipment in good condition, and (3) can sustain the
                                    equipment in a two major theater war as required by the National Military
                                    Strategy.



Results in Brief                    While details are classified, a high percentage of active duty Army units
                                    have the major equipment items they need for their wartime mission.
                                    Moreover, Army information shows that units are maintaining the bulk of
                                    their equipment in a fully mission capable condition. Despite these positive
                                    indications of readiness, current readiness reporting systems are not
                                    comprehensive enough to reveal all readiness weaknesses. For example,
                                    they do not show operational limitations that have been caused by
                                    extensive shortages of support equipment essential to effective, sustained
                                    use of major equipment items. Units could deploy without this equipment
                                    and could perform their basic combat missions, but they would be limited
                                    in their capability, flexibility, or sustainability. Additionally, the Army has
                                    stated that its equipment is aging and becoming increasingly difficult to
                                    maintain and maintenance managers at units we visited told us that their
                                    mechanics are devoting increasing amounts of time to keep equipment
                                    operating. These problems are not reflected in readiness data, which show
                                    units are able to keep their equipment serviceable. We have reported that
                                    serviceability rates do not provide a good assessment of equipment
                                    condition because equipment that is old, unreliable, and difficult to
                                    maintain may still be reported serviceable. While maintenance problems
                                    may exist, the Army does not have data that clearly shows either what its
                                    equipment problems are or how units are affected.


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                     Two factors suggest that the Army could have difficulty sustaining
                     equipment in the event of two nearly simultaneous military operations.
                     First, there is a significant shortage of maintenance personnel with the
                     right skills and tenure. As a result, unit maintenance personnel are working
                     longer and harder to keep equipment in a fully mission capable condition.
                     Second, Army officials are concerned that shortages of war reserve repair
                     parts could seriously affect the operational availability of many of the
                     Army’s primary weapon systems. Army officials report they have started
                     efforts to fund critical shortages.

                     We are making recommendations intended to improve the reporting of
                     (1) auxiliary equipment shortages in Unit Status Reports and (2) equipment
                     condition in congressional readiness reports.



Background           The Army’s system for reporting the current status of Army units to the
                     National Command Authority, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
                     Headquarters, Department of the Army, is the Unit Status Reporting
                     System. Each month, or more frequently when changes occur, over
                     1,400 active duty Army units provide information on their status in four
                     measured resource areas: personnel, equipment on hand, equipment
                     serviceability, and training. A unit’s overall status is measured by a “C”
                     rating, which ranges from C-1 (best) to C-5 (worst). Units also provide
                     narrative remarks to support and clarify data. The Unit Status Report data
                     feed into the Department of Defense’s (DOD) system for reporting
                     readiness to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Status of Resources and Training
                     System (SORTS).

                     Equipment readiness is indicated in two Unit Status Report resource areas;
                     equipment on hand status and equipment serviceability status. Equipment
                     on hand indicates whether units have their principal weapon systems and
                     major equipment items compared to their wartime requirements. Principal
                     weapon systems and equipment are identified in a unit’s Table of
                     Organization and Equipment1 by an equipment readiness code of P or A.
                     Items coded P are central to an organization’s ability to perform its
                     doctrinal mission and are known as pacing items (e.g., tanks in a tank
                     battalion). The majority of units have two pacing items, and at most a unit
                     would have four pacing items. In total, the Army has categorized about


                     1A Table of Organization and Equipment prescribes the normal mission, organizational structure, and
                     personnel and equipment requirements for a tactical military unit.




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120 separate weapon systems and equipment items as pacing items. A unit’s
equipment inventory on-hand status is reflected in an S-level that ranges
from S-1 (best—having most or all its equipment) to S-4 (worst—missing
significant amounts of equipment).

Units also report how much auxiliary equipment they have compared to
their wartime requirement, but this information is not considered in
determining a unit’s equipment on-hand status. Auxiliary equipment is
essential to support principal weapon systems and provide mission
sustainment support.2 It includes items or systems required for
transporting, maintaining, supplying, servicing, protecting, enhancing, or
backing up principal weapon systems, such as unit maintenance
equipment; nuclear, biological, and chemical defense equipment; support
vehicles; mess equipment; and camouflage nets. Units identify the number
of auxiliary equipment items in their Table of Organization and Equipment
and determine a status rating for each item in accordance with Army
Regulation 220-1. For example, a unit reports a status rating of S-1 if it has
90 percent or more of its requirement for a specific auxiliary equipment
item; S-2 if it has 80-89 percent of its requirement; S-3 if it has 65-79 percent
of its requirement; and S-4 if it has less than 65 percent of its requirement.
The unit then identifies the number of equipment items at each S-level in
the Unit Status Report remarks. To illustrate, if a unit is required to have six
radios, six sets of night vision goggles, and six aircraft tool kits and has five
radios, five sets of night vision goggles, and four tool kits on-hand, it would
be S-2 for radios (5/6=83 percent), S-2 for night vision goggles
(5/6=83 percent), and S-3 for tool kits (4/6=67 percent). In its Unit Status
Report, the unit would report that two equipment items are at S-2 and one
equipment item is at S-3. It would not report the specific types or amounts
of equipment missing. However, the commander is expected to narratively
report any mission limitation that is caused by shortages of auxiliary
equipment in the remarks section of the Unit Status Report and reflect this
limitation in his mission accomplishment estimate. The mission
accomplishment estimate is the commander’s subjective assessment of the
unit’s ability to execute that portion of the wartime mission it would be
expected to perform if alerted or committed within 72 hours of the date of
the report.3



2
 The term auxiliary equipment as used in this report includes both auxiliary and auxiliary support
equipment.
3
See Army Regulation 220-1, Sept. 1, 1997, ch. 8.




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Equipment serviceability indicates how well units are maintaining their on-
hand reportable equipment. On-hand reportable equipment consists of the
unit’s pacing items and any other equipment systems or individual items
controlled by materiel condition status reports. In total, about 570
equipment systems and items are controlled by materiel condition status
reports (comprising about 8 percent of the total equipment in the Army’s
inventory).4 The serviceability rate is a percentage based on the number of
days reportable equipment is available to the organization and fully able to
do its mission compared to the number of days it could have been
available. A rate is calculated for (1) each pacing item and (2) all pacing
items and reportable equipment in aggregate. A unit’s overall status is the
lower of the two serviceability rates. Pacing items again receive special
emphasis because of their major importance to a unit. The unit’s equipment
serviceability status is reflected in an R-level that ranges from R-1
(best--equipment other than aircraft are fully mission capable and available
to the unit 90 percent or more of the days in the period or aircraft are fully
mission capable 75 percent or more of the days in the period) to R-4
(worst--equipment other than aircraft are fully mission capable less than
60 percent of the days in the period, or aircraft are fully mission capable
less than 50 percent of the days in the period).5

In its fourth quarter, fiscal year 1998 Quarterly Readiness Report to the
Congress, DOD also reported on a number of other equipment condition
indicators. These indicators include (1) the percentage of equipment
reported out of service due to maintenance or supply problems (not
mission capable maintenance and not mission capable supply) for 16 major
Army systems, (2) average equipment age for 15 major Army systems, and
(3) depot maintenance requirements for 10 systems.




4
The Army’s reportable equipment items are identified in Army Regulation 700-138, app. B.
5
See Army Regulation 220-1, Sept. 1, 1997, para. 6.5.




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Most Active Duty Army        A review of Unit Status Report data for September 1998 showed that a large
                             percentage of active duty Army units had their principal weapon systems
Units Have Their Major       and major equipment items.6 Status levels for this equipment have
Equipment but Lack           increased notably over the past few years. However, many units do not
                             have all the auxiliary equipment needed to support their major equipment
Essential Support            and provide mission sustainment support. Army officials believe shortages
Equipment                    can be made up before deployment but acknowledge that in two nearly
                             simultaneous conflicts some later deploying units may have to deploy
                             without all of their authorized auxiliary equipment. Units without all
                             authorized auxiliary equipment would still be able to perform their basic
                             mission, but they may suffer limitations in their capability, flexibility, and
                             sustainability.


Units Have Their Principal   We reviewed the equipment on-hand status of 1,483 active duty units as
Weapon Systems and Major     reported in September 1998 and found that most units reported either an
                             S-1 or S-2 status for on-hand equipment. A unit reporting an S-1 status has
Equipment Items
                             the equipment needed to accomplish all missions for which it was designed
                             with no additional resources. S-2 units have the equipment needed to
                             undertake most of the full mission for which they were designed but may
                             experience isolated decreases in flexibility for mission accomplishment.
                             These units will require little, if any, assistance to compensate for
                             deficiencies. S-3 units will require significant equipment to compensate for
                             deficiencies but can undertake many portions, but not all, of the full
                             mission for which they were designed. S-4 units need significant additional
                             equipment to accomplish their assigned wartime mission.

                             Data for the past 7 years also show that equipment on-hand status levels
                             have increased notably in active duty units for this time period. Since 1992
                             the number of units reporting equipment on-hand status levels below S-2
                             has decreased significantly. This seems logical given the downsizing of the
                             force from 18 divisions to 10 divisions and the flow of excess equipment to
                             remaining units. Under the Army’s first to fight, first equipped strategy,
                             priority for equipment available from downsizing would generally go to
                             units scheduled to deploy early in a conflict.

                             We did not identify any aggregate Army data systems that would allow us to
                             corroborate the reliability of equipment on-hand data in unit status reports.


                             6
                             Precise numbers are classified.




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                              However, we reviewed and compared unit property records at three
                              brigade-sized commands in the continental United Status to the equipment
                              on-hand data in their Units’ Status Reports.7 We found that the property
                              book records generally supported the reported equipment on-hand status.


Units Do Not Have All Their   Our analysis of Unit Status Report data for September 1998 showed a large
Required Auxiliary            percentage of active duty units had significant shortages of auxiliary
                              equipment. Some of the significant auxiliary equipment shortages are
Equipment
                              identified in table 1. Applying the Army’s equipment on-hand criteria to
                              auxiliary equipment, over 62 percent of the units reporting auxiliary
                              equipment would have an S-3 or S-4 status.



                              Table 1: Examples of Auxiliary Equipment Shortages in U.S. Forces Command Units
                              Item                                 Units reporting shortages              Number of items short
                              Telephone cable                                                  335                              6,481
                              Night vision goggles                                             214                              8,835
                              Binoculars                                                       174                              1,129
                              Generator set                                                    148                                493
                              Global positioning system                                        136                              1,246
                              Chemical agent monitor                                           114                                521
                              Battery charger                                                   38                                112
                              Note: Shortage computations include substitute items.
                              Source: U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM), June 1999.


                              Officials from the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
                              said that the shortages exist for a number of reasons, including recent
                              increases in requirements for some items, slowed procurement funding,
                              and units’ use of operations and maintenance funds for higher priorities.
                              Many auxiliary equipment items, for example, must be purchased with
                              operations and maintenance funds. Officials said that units tend to delay
                              purchasing items they may not consider critical when their funding is
                              insufficient. This appeared to be the case at the three brigades we visited
                              where items that were purchased with operations and maintenance funds
                              comprised 28 to 53 percent of the missing auxiliary equipment. The high
                              percentage of missing items that must be purchased in this way does not
                              conclusively prove that inadequate funding is the cause. For example, some


                              7
                              The number of units visited was not sufficient to meet the requirements for a statistically valid sample.



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items may not have been available through the supply system. Equipment
managers at the Army’s Tank and Automotive Command also said that
reductions in procurement funding particularly affect auxiliary equipment
because funding priority generally goes to principal weapon systems and
major equipment.

The Army’s Unit Status Report regulation states that a unit commander that
lacks equipment, including auxiliary equipment, that he deems combat
essential should address the shortages in the narrative remarks section of
the report and consider the effect of these shortages, among other factors,
in formulating the mission accomplishment estimate.8 However, our review
of the September 1998 Unit Status Reports found that commanders rarely
identified impacts related to auxiliary equipment shortages even in cases
where our analysis showed significant amounts of equipment were missing.
For example, 74 units that we identified as S-4 for auxiliary equipment also
reported an overall unit status of C-1 (the unit could perform its full
wartime mission). As mentioned previously, units do not identify the
specific auxiliary equipment they are missing so we could not question the
commanders’ subjective assessment.

Shortages of some auxiliary equipment are likely to have little effect on unit
operations. For example, sign painting kits and wristwatches are auxiliary
equipment that would not likely affect mission accomplishment. Other
auxiliary equipment may be needed only in certain operating environments.
For example, winterization kits for UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters may not
be needed in Southwest Asia, and electrical distribution equipment may not
be needed by units moving into large, preestablished bases. Other auxiliary
equipment, such as battery chargers, generators, and mine detectors,
however, may limit a unit’s capability, flexibility, or sustainability.

FORSCOM officials generally discount the effect of auxiliary equipment
shortages on mission accomplishment. They report that units with
auxiliary equipment shortages would still be able to perform their basic
warfighting mission. Additionally, they said they carefully review unit
equipment before deployments and make up any equipment shortages
deemed necessary for the mission. For example, during Operations Desert
Shield/Desert Storm, to rectify shortages, FORSCOM officials said that they
extensively transferred equipment between units and bought equipment
such as generators, cellular phones, facsimiles, secure telephones, and


8
    See AR 220-1, Sept. 1, 1997, paras. 5-13c(2), 8-1, and 8-3.




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                          other electronic devices from the commercial market prior to deployment.
                          Although FORSCOM plans to continue this general approach in rectifying
                          shortages, no definitive plans exist specifying how this will take place.
                          Given the magnitude of the shortages, transferring equipment between
                          units may be problematic.

                          The Army’s description of auxiliary equipment as either essential to
                          support principal weapon systems or provide unit sustainment support
                          seems to be contradicted by the large amounts of equipment missing and
                          the absence of any reported effect by Army units.9 It is understandable that
                          units can and do function without all required equipment items. However,
                          at some point the synergy built into a unit begins to be reduced when large
                          amounts of equipment are missing. Shortages of maintenance equipment,
                          in particular, create questions about a unit’s ability to sustain its primary
                          weapon systems at a wartime pace of operations. Given the number of
                          units with shortages, one would expect to see some acknowledgment of a
                          capability, flexibility, or sustainment limitation in at least some units. The
                          absence of any recognized effect demonstrates either that the equipment is
                          not essential or that commanders are not appropriately considering
                          potential limitations to their units. Additionally, in February 1993, we
                          reported on the impact of equipment shortages during the Gulf War
                          mobilization.10 During that conflict the Army transferred equipment
                          between units to rectify shortages but found that filling shortages became
                          more difficult as the operation progressed and more units were mobilized.
                          As equipment became scarcer, some equipment shortages could not be
                          filled, and as a result, some units were deployed without all of their
                          equipment. Our report stated a number of instances in which units were
                          hampered in their ability to perform their required mission by the
                          equipment shortages.



Army Data Do Not          Despite the Unit Status Reports for September 1998 that showed that
                          equipment serviceability rates were high, the Army reported in its
Provide a Clear Picture   Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress for the fourth quarter of fiscal
of Equipment              year 1998 its concern that its equipment is aging and becoming increasingly
                          difficult to maintain. Maintenance managers at units we visited also said
Condition                 that their mechanics are working harder to keep equipment operating.

                          9
                          See AR 220-1, Sept. 1, 1997, App. B.
                          10Reserve
                                  Forces: Aspects of the Army’s Equipping Strategy Hamper Reserve Readiness
                          (GAO/NSIAD-93-11, Feb. 18, 1993).




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                           However, these problems are not reflected in high equipment readiness
                           rates. We have previously reported that serviceability rates do not provide a
                           good assessment of equipment condition because equipment that is old,
                           unreliable, and difficult to maintain may be reported serviceable.11
                           However, we could not determine the extent to which Army units are
                           affected by equipment problems because the Army does not have data that
                           identifies either its unreliable equipment or how units are affected.


Serviceability Data Show   In addition to showing quantities on hand, the Unit Status Reports measure
Units Are Maintaining      equipment readiness by how well units maintain their on-hand reportable
                           equipment. The Army’s goal is that 90 percent or more of ground equipment
Equipment
                           be in a fully mission capable status, which means the equipment can
                           perform all of its combat missions without endangering the lives of crew or
                           operators.12 Aircraft units have a goal of 75 percent or higher fully mission
                           capable. Unit Status Report data for September 1998 showed that the
                           majority of the 1,483 active duty Army units reporting were achieving the
                           Army’s goals.13 According to commanders at the units we visited, meeting
                           the Army’s serviceability goals is a command priority and the condition of
                           pacing items and other reportable equipment is closely monitored at all
                           command levels.

                           Historical Unit Status Report data also show that units have generally
                           maintained their major equipment at the fully mission capable goals over
                           time. For example, table 2 shows the quarterly mission capable rates for
                           16 major Army equipment items that were being maintained at 90- and
                           75-percent rates from October 1994 through August 1998. Mission capable
                           rates for some equipment occasionally fell below the goals. However, we
                           see no pattern that would suggest an increasing problem.




                           11Military Readiness: DOD Needs to Develop a More Comprehensive Measurement System
                           (GAO/NSIAD-95-29, Oct. 27, 1994).
                           12   See AR 220-1, Sept. 1, 1997, Glossary, Section II, Terms; and AR 700-138, Sept. 16, 1997, para. 1-6.
                           13Precise   numbers are classified.




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Table 2: Mission Capable Rates for 16 Major Equipment Items
                                   Oct.      Mar.          Oct.        Mar.          Oct.        Mar.          Oct.        Mar.     Aug.
Equipment item                    1994       1995         1995         1996         1996         1997         1997         1998     1998
Aircraft systems: Availability goal 75 percent
CH-47D Chinook cargo
helicopter                          75            78        74            75           76             73         77            73     75
AH-64 Apache attack
helicopter                          78            82        83            80           82             84         86            83     81
OH-58D Kiowa Warrior
helicopter                          83            76        79            84           82             85         87            87     87
UH-60 Blackhawk
helicopter                          78            73        78            78           81             81         82            85     79
Ground systems: Availability goal 90 percent
M1A1 Abrams tank                   N/A           N/A       N/A            93           92             92         92            93     90
M1A2 Abrams tank                   N/A           N/A          0           28           84             95         84            90     92
M2 Bradley Fighting
Vehicle                             91            94        94            95           95             95         94            95     92
M3 Armored Cavalry scout
vehicle                             91            93        93            94           92             91         93            91     94
M109 Self-propelled
howitzer                            95            95        95            96           96             96         97            96     97
M198 Towed howitzer                 95            95        90            93           94             94         91            94     93
HEMTT [Heavy expanded
mobility tactical truck]            89            89        90            88           89             89         90            89     88
HMMWV [High mobility
multipurpose wheeled
vehicle]                            94            94        95            94           95             94         95            94     93
MLRS [Multiple launch
rocket system]                      94            93        94            94           95             96         95            94     95
TOW2 HMMW [High
mobility multipurpose
wheeled vehicle]                    97            97        97            98           96             96         97            96     98
Patriot missile system              97            97        96            95           96             92         94            95     92
Avenger ground to air
missile system                     N/A            99        98            99           96             98         98            97     98
                                                                                                 th
                                            Source: Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress, 4 quarter, fiscal year 1998.




Serviceability Data Do Not                  Although overall serviceability rates are high as shown in table 2,
Provide a Good Assessment                   serviceability data do not provide a complete assessment of equipment
                                            condition. Our 1994 report on the ability of DOD’s readiness reporting
of Equipment Condition
                                            system to provide a comprehensive assessment of overall readiness stated
                                            that C-ratings represent a snapshot of readiness in time but by design do
                                            not address long-term readiness or signal impending changes in the status

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                              of resources and for equipment, this continues to be the case. Specifically,
                              equipment that is old, unreliable, and difficult to maintain may be reported
                              serviceable. For example, Army officials told us that the Armored Vehicle
                              Launched Bridge and the Armored Combat Earthmover are examples of
                              systems that are complex, difficult to maintain, and/or aging in the Army
                              inventory. The Army is in the process of replacing the Armored Vehicle
                              Launched Bridge with the Wolverine Heavy Assault Bridge. Despite these
                              problems, serviceability rates for these systems generally are in the 86- to
                              92-percent range. While the Army’s goal is for units to maintain ground
                              equipment above 90-percent availability, slight decreases below this goal do
                              not by themselves indicate problems. For example, as shown in table 2, the
                              M1A2 Abrams tank’s rates were below the goal during four quarters, even
                              though the Abrams is among the Army’s newest and most modern
                              weapons. Maintenance managers told us that they can maintain high
                              serviceability rates, even for problem equipment, through intense
                              investments of time. However, the effort required to keep equipment
                              serviceable is not reflected in readiness reports.


Other Army Equipment          Our review of other Army equipment condition indicators, including the
Condition Indicators Do Not   expanded equipment condition indicators recently provided in DOD’s
                              Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress, revealed that the indicators
Support Reliability or
                              do not effectively identify and highlight the Army’s equipment problems. To
Maintenance Problems          the contrary, most of the indicators show few equipment problems.

                              The Army maintains that its equipment is becoming increasingly difficult to
                              maintain. If units are experiencing problems with unreliable equipment, the
                              problems should be reflected in increasing amounts of equipment reported
                              as “not mission capable-maintenance.” “Not mission capable-maintenance”
                              is reported when equipment cannot perform its mission because of
                              maintenance underway or needed. Units report equipment out of service
                              for maintenance through the Unit Level Logistics System, and the Army
                              aggregates and stores this data at the Army Materiel Command’s Logistics
                              Support Activity (LOGSA).

                              As shown in table 3, Army data from October 1994 through August 1998 for
                              16 key Army systems show no increase in the percent of equipment not
                              mission capable and no downward trends that would indicate worsening
                              conditions. Officials at the units we visited explained that the data might
                              not be a good indicator of reliability problems because available personnel
                              work not only their regular schedules but also evenings and weekends to
                              keep maintenance backlogs low. However, the Army does not collect
                              workload data for individual equipment systems that would illustrate
                              increasing workloads.

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Table 3: Percent of Equipment Not Mission Capable Maintenance
                                Oct.     Mar.          Oct.        Mar.          Oct.        Mar.          Oct.        Mar.     Aug.
Equipment item                 1994      1995         1995         1996         1996         1997         1997         1998     1998
CH-47D Chinook cargo
helicopter                       22        19           23            21           21             24         20            23     23
AH-64D Apache attack
helicopter                       17        14           14            13           14             13         12            13     16
OH-58D Kiowa warrior
helicopter                       11        15           13            14           16             12         11            11     11
UH-60D Blackhawk
helicopter                       16        22           18            18           15             15         15            12     19
M1A1 Abrams tank                N/A       N/A          N/A             1            2              3          1            2       4
M1A2 Abrams tank                N/A       N/A           50            70            8             3           8            5       4
M2 Bradley Fghting Vehicle        3          1            1            1            1              1          1            1       3
M3 Armored Cavalry scout
vehicle                           3          2            2            1            1              1          1            4       2
M109 Self-propelled
howitzer                          2          1            1            2            1             1           1            1       0
M198 Towed howitzer               2          3            7            2            3              3          2            4       5
HEMTT                             4          3            3            4            3             4           3            5       6
HMMWV                             2          2            2            2            2              2          1            3       4
MLRS                              3          4            2            3            3             2           2            3       3
TOW2 HMMWV                        1          1            1            1            2             1           2            2       1
Patriot missile system            3          2            2            4            2              2          2            3       3
Avenger ground to air
missile system                  N/A          0            1            1            2             0           1            1       0
                                                                                             th
                                        Source: Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress, 4 quarter, fiscal year 1998.


                                        We also analyzed data in the Army Cost and Economic Analysis Center’s
                                        Operating and Support Management Information System (OSMIS) for
                                        indications of equipment reliability problems. The OSMIS database is the
                                        Army’s source of historical operating and support cost information for
                                        more than 350 systems that are in tactical units—Active, Guard, and
                                        Reserve. Generally, increasing operating and support costs should be an
                                        indicator of growing reliability problems. However, our analysis of
                                        operating and support cost data shows few problems with increasing
                                        operating and support costs. For example, we compared fiscal year 1992
                                        repair parts costs (consumables and net reparables) per hour flown or mile
                                        driven for 20 active duty aviation, tactical wheeled vehicle, artillery and
                                        missile, and combat systems (tanks and infantry fighting vehicles) to the
                                        fiscal year 1996 repair parts costs. We found that costs decreased for



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15 systems (75 percent), increased for 4 systems (20 percent), and
remained stable for 1 system (5 percent). A comparison of fiscal year 1993
and 1996 repair parts costs for the same 20 systems similarly showed that
14 systems (70 percent) had lower repair parts costs while 6 (30 percent)
had higher. We also compared annual repair parts costs for another 9
systems where usage data were not available, such as communications and
engineering equipment, and artillery systems. Without usage data, annual
repair parts costs are a less precise measure of reliability but generally
show how much the equipment is being repaired. Repair parts costs
decreased between fiscal year 1992 and 1996 for seven systems and
increased for two. A comparison of fiscal year 1993 and 1996 repair parts
costs for the same nine systems showed that five systems had lower repair
parts costs while four had higher.

Army officials told us that OSMIS data might not support possible
reliability problems because there is not a direct correlation between
equipment operation and repair parts usage. However, they agree that if
equipment is being repaired more frequently, it should be indicated by the
data. They speculated that repairs might be down because some equipment
is being used less.

Our analysis of historical data from October 1994 through August 1998 for
the Army’s top 16 systems shows some variance in equipment out of service
while awaiting repair parts, but overall the data does not indicate
increasing problems in repair parts availability.




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Table 4: Percent of Equipment Not Mission Capable Supply
                                Oct.      Mar.          Oct.        Mar.          Oct.        Mar.          Oct.        Mar.     Aug.
Equipment item                 1994       1995         1995         1996         1996         1997         1997         1998     1998
CH-47D Chinook cargo
helicopter                        3           3            3            4            3             3           3            4       2
AH-64D Apache attack
helicopter                        5           4            3            7            4             3           2            4       3
OH-58D Kiowa Warrior
helicopter                        6           9            8            2            2             3           2            2       2
UH-60D Blackhawk
helicopter                        6           5            4            4            4             4           3            3       2
M1A1 Abrams tank                N/A        N/A          N/A             6            6             5           7            5       6
M1A2 Abrams tank                N/A        N/A           50             2            8             2           8            5       4
M2 Bradley Fighting
Vehicle                           6           5            5            4            4             4           5            4       5
M3 Armored Cavalry scout
vehicle                           6           5            5            5            7             8           6            5       4
M109 Self-propelled
howitzer                          3           4            4            2            3             3           2            3       3
M198 Towed howitzer               3           2            3            5            3             3           7            2       2
HEMTT                             7           8            7            8            8             7           7            6       6
HMMWV                             4           4            3            4            3             4           4            3       3
MLRS                              3           3            4            3            2             2           3            3       2
TOW2 HMMWV                        2           2            2            1            2             3           1            2       1
Patriot missile system            0           1            2            1            2             6           4            2       5
Avenger ground to air
missile system                  N/A           1            1            0            2             2           1            2       2
                                                                                              th
                                         Source: Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress, 4 quarter, fiscal year 1998.


                                         Maintenance officers at two units we visited told us that they had not
                                         experienced problems with the availability of repair parts. However, at the
                                         7th Transportation Group maintenance officers reported difficulties
                                         obtaining parts for some older ships in their fleet. The 7th Transportation
                                         Group has several boat companies that transport cargo, troops, and
                                         vehicles between ship and shore, or from one port to another port.
                                         Additionally, although units were reducing the number of repair parts in
                                         their inventories, unit supply managers’ told us they were not having any
                                         more difficulty obtaining spare parts than in the past. Nonetheless, units
                                         visited reported that they occasionally obtained parts by removing them
                                         from other equipment items rather than waiting for the supply system to
                                         provide them. A FORSCOM official, however, told us that he believes that
                                         the practice of “controlled substitution” has not increased notably.


                                         Page 14                                                   GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness
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We also analyzed equipment age because keeping equipment past its useful
life may lead to unacceptable operating and support costs and a decrease in
wartime operational effectiveness. As shown in table 5, the equipment ages
for 15 major systems reported in the expanded Quarterly Readiness Report
to the Congress shows that most major systems are within their estimated
service life.



Table 5: Average Age of the Army’s Top 15 Systems
                                                                      Estimated        Average
Equipment item                                                       service life          age
M1A1 Abrams tank                                                               20                9.3
M1A2 Abrams tank                                                               20                1.5
M2/M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle                                                 20           11.2
M109 Self-propelled howitzer                                                  N/A                 6
M198 Towed howitzer                                                           N/A                12
MLRS                                                                          N/A                9.2
Patriot missile system                                                        N/A           10.5
Avenger ground-to-air missile system                                          N/A                8.7
HEMTT                                                                   20 years            11.5
HMMWV                                                                   14 years                 8.1
TOW2 HMMWV                                                              14 years            11.8
AH-64 Apache attack helicopter                                                 20           11.2
OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopter                                                20                8.2
CH-47D Chinook cargo helicopter                                                20           10.8
UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter                                                     20           11.6
Sources: Estimated service life data were obtained from FORSCOM and Army Materiel Command
officials. Average age data were obtained from the Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress,
4th quarter, fiscal year 1998. N/A indicates data were not available.


Another indicator of aging equipment is the Army’s equipment
recapitalization program that extends the service life of equipment through
depot rebuild or technology insertion. Extending the service life of
equipment is sometimes necessary when production and fielding rates for
new equipment are insufficient to prevent fleet aging from becoming a
chronic problem. Some of the recapitalization programs we identified that
address problems with aging equipment include engineer support
equipment, construction equipment, Paladin M109 Howitzer, UH-60A
Blackhawk helicopter, UH-1 Iroquois utility helicopter, HEMTT, HMMWV,
 2 1/2-ton truck, 5-ton truck, line-haul tractors, engineer tractors, and
materiel handling equipment.


Page 15                                                 GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness
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                       Army officials acknowledge that serviceability rates and other condition
                       indicators currently reported provide a limited picture of equipment
                       condition. However, identifying predictive condition indicators for the
                       large variety of equipment in the Army is complex. They said that Army
                       commands independently monitor numerous additional information
                       sources to supplement data reported in Unit Status Reports. These sources
                       include reports from Logistics Assistance Offices at all installations and
                       item managers at the commodity commands. This information is generally
                       not reported to higher commands. They report that this information is
                       sufficient to provide assurance on current readiness issues but
                       acknowledge its weakness for identifying longer term equipment condition
                       problems.



The Army May           The Army may have difficulty sustaining its equipment in the event of two
                       nearly simultaneous military operations, the most demanding scenario,
Experience Problems    because of significant shortages of maintenance personnel and war reserve
Sustaining Its         repair parts stocks. The war reserve repair parts stocks are intended to
                       support Army units during wartime until logistics supply lines can be
Equipment              established from the United States. The amount of repair parts that should
                       be stocked is based on the Army’s most demanding scenario, two nearly
                       simultaneous theater wars, and considers repair part utilization rates for
                       major equipment items, on-hand general issue stocks, on-hand war reserve
                       stocks, and the amounts industry can provide.


Units Are Short Some   Unit commanders we visited reported the availability of maintenance
Maintenance Skills     personnel with the right skills and tenure was the units’ most significant
                       equipment readiness problem. Army-wide shortages of personnel, frequent
                       deployments to peacekeeping missions, and the assignment of personnel to
                       tasks outside their military specialty were the primary reasons cited. These
                       shortages create risks in the Army’s ability to sustain its equipment in the
                       event of two nearly simultaneous theater wars.




                       Page 16                                     GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness
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The units we visited had 97 to 99 percent of their authorized enlisted
personnel at the time of our visits. However, high unit manning rates do not
fully reflect the extent of maintenance personnel shortages in the units or
the impact of these shortages on the units’ ability to accomplish critical
wartime tasks. Further, high manning rates do not capture the rank
(enlisted versus noncommissioned officers), skill, and experience
imbalances that affect their maintenance operations. FORSCOM data
shown in table 6 show that these imbalances are prevalent.




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                                             B-282327




Table 6: Personnel authorized and assigned by grade for a sample of occupations
                                                                                                      Senior noncommissioned
                                                                 Enlisted Noncommissioned officers                      officers
                                                        (E-1 through E-4)         (E-5 through E6)            (E-7 through E-9)
Military occupational specialty                           (auth/assigned)          (auth/assigned)              (auth/assigned)
44B Metal worker                                                361/386                     112/93
                                                                  107%                        83%                 Not applicable
44E Machinist                                                    105/96                     104/87                          3/2
                                                                   91%                        84%                          67%
45B Small arms/artillery repairman                              213/206                      47/37
                                                                   97%                        79%                 Not applicable
45D Self-propelled field artillery turret                         49/80                      62/21
mechanic                                                          163%                        34%                 Not applicable
45E Abrams tank turret mechanic                                 264/330                      85/68
                                                                  125%                        80%                 Not applicable
45K Armament repairman                                          297/227                   192/158                         67/61
                                                                   76%                       83%                           91%
45T Bradley Fighting Vehicle system turret                      142/262                     113/58
mechanic                                                          185%                        51%                 Not applicable
52C Utilities equipment repairman                               533/474                   229/226
                                                                   89%                       99%                  Not applicable
52D Power generation equipment                                1389/1208                   505/471
repairman                                                          87%                       93%                  Not applicable
62B Construction equipment repairman                            651/635                   398/351                         81/98
                                                                   98%                       88%                          121%
63B Light wheel vehicle repairman                             3234/2844                 1867/1748                       593/521
                                                                   88%                       94%                           88%
63D Self-propelled field artillery system                       224/177                   145/149                         50/47
mechanic                                                           79%                      103%                           94%
63E M1 Abrams tank system mechanic                              390/580                   381/251                       136/140
                                                                  149%                       66%                          103%
63G Fuel/electrical system repairman                            191/198                     45/48
                                                                  104%                      107%                  Not applicable
63H Tracked vehicle repairman                                   666/764                   643/475                       474/464
                                                                  115%                       74%                           98%
63S Heavy wheel vehicle mechanic                              1189/1003                   398/369
                                                                   84%                       93%                  Not applicable
63T Bradley Fighting Vehicle system                            980/1161                   616/439                       127/134
mechanic                                                          119%                       71%                          106%
63W Wheel Vehicle repairman                                   1582/1488                   361/364
                                                                   94%                      101%                  Not applicable
63Y Track vehicle mechanic                                      269/277                   127/105
                                                                  103%                       83%                  Not applicable
                                             Source: FORSCOM, February 1999.




                                             Page 18                                         GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness
                            B-282327




                            Commanders of units visited reported similar personnel shortages. Some of
                            the significant shortages reported follow.

                            • At the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division, only 2 of 8 Bradley
                              Fighting Vehicle turret mechanics (25 percent), and 5 of 10 Abrams tank
                              systems mechanics (50 percent) were assigned. The brigade also had
                              only 28 of 44 motor transport operators (64 percent) assigned.
                            • At the 7th Transportation Group, only 10 of 15 light wheel vehicle
                              supervisors (67 percent) were assigned. The group also had only 20 of
                              30 authorized motor transport operators (67 percent).
                            • At the 18th Aviation Brigade, 17 of 25 authorized light wheel vehicle
                              mechanics (68 percent) were assigned. A CH-47 Chinook helicopter
                              company within the brigade had 37 helicopter repairman assigned of
                              38 authorized but, according to unit officials, 8 repairman could not
                              work because of medical problems. The company also had all three
                              authorized aircraft powertrain repairmen, but we were told that all three
                              were fresh from school and lacked experience.

                            Army officials told us of several other issues that compound their
                            personnel shortage problems. First, over the past few years the amount of
                            training provided in Army schools had been reduced and units are expected
                            to provide more of the skills-oriented training. Additionally, many
                            occupational specialties have been combined and individual soldiers are
                            responsible for knowing how to repair more types of equipment than
                            previously. These changes have significantly increased the supervisory and
                            training workload for unit noncommissioned officers. Second, the burden
                            of peacekeeping operations, along with the assignment of personnel to
                            tasks outside their military specialties, has also added to noncommissioned
                            officers’ workloads. For example, the 7th Transportation Group provided
                            one battalion per month to the post for base support activities. Army
                            officers told us that reductions in base operating support funding left them
                            with no choice but to use soldiers for these tasks. The result, however, has
                            been that the maintenance workload tends to focus on a few key
                            individuals who must work long and hard to maintain unit equipment
                            readiness status. Readiness reporting does not capture this increase in
                            work tempo.


Prepositioned War Reserve   Sustaining Army equipment in two nearly simultaneous major theater wars
Repair Parts May Limit      may also present risks due to shortages of war reserve repair parts.
                            According to a contractor study, the operational availability of many of the
Equipment Sustainability
                            Army’s major weapon systems will decrease significantly by the 60th day of
                            an overlapping two-theater war because of a repair part shortage. For


                            Page 19                                     GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness
B-282327




example, the operational availability of the AH-64 Apache is forecast to fall
to 44 percent by day 60 of a conflict and the operational availability of the
OH-58D Kiowa is forecast to fall to 52 percent. Conflicts requiring fewer
forces than assumed in the study would result in higher operational
availabilities. Army officials report they have started efforts to fund critical
shortages. Table 7 shows the Army’s estimated equipment availability in a
two-war scenario.



Table 7: Availability of Selected Equipment in a Two-War Scenario; 30 Days between
Wars
Numbers in percent
Availability of selected
equipment                              Two major theater wars (30 day periods)
                                       30             60           90          120          150
Abrams tank                            89             83           61            49          46
AH-64 Apache                           56             44           37            31          26
Avenger                                84             82           64            46          39
Bradley Fighting Vehicle               76             79           53            44          41
CH-47 Chinook                          70             64           57            50          45
Heavy equipment
transporter                            75             54           41            33          29
HMMWV                                  82             83           61            60          58
HEMTT                                  84             80           77            58          51
Howitzer                               69             52           31            26          24
M113                                   86             84           66            50          44
MLRS                                   87             75           40            26          20
Mobile subscriber
equipment                              72             34           35            33          32
OH-58D, Kiowa                          65             52           35            25          22
Palletized load system                 81             71           45            36          34
SinCgars                               89             71           65            52          46
UH-60 Blackhawk
helicopter                             65             62           57            53          52
Source: Army War Reserve Secondary Items, Final Report – Phase II, Coopers & Lybrand, June 1998.




Page 20                                                GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness
                  B-282327




Conclusions       The Army’s current equipment readiness indicators provide valuable
                  information, but they do not provide a comprehensive assessment of
                  equipment. In particular, the equipment on-hand indicator does not
                  effectively characterize unit conditions as they relate to capability,
                  flexibility, and sustainment. Shortages of some auxiliary equipment may
                  have little impact on units, while others, such as camouflage nets, night
                  vision goggles, and communications equipment, give Army forces a combat
                  edge over their possible foes. Current guidance does not emphasize the
                  need to assess how auxiliary equipment shortages may affect their wartime
                  operations. Over 60 percent of reporting units had significant shortages of
                  auxiliary equipment that would likely continue in the early stages of a
                  deployment.

                  The Army’s equipment condition indicators similarly do not support or
                  refute the Army’s position that its equipment is aging and becoming
                  increasingly difficult to maintain. Army units’ equipment serviceability
                  status remains high and stable, and other indicators recently provided by
                  the Army in its Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress similarly show
                  few equipment problems. The amount of time that equipment is not
                  mission capable because of maintenance or supply problems remains low
                  and stable, seemingly refuting assertions that equipment is becoming less
                  reliable or is plagued by supply problems. Further, age data on major
                  systems indicate that most equipment is within its estimated service life.
                  This disparity illustrates the limitation of the Army’s equipment condition
                  assessment.

                  Finding the right set of equipment condition indicators is complex. Given
                  the large variety of equipment items in the Army’s inventory, no one
                  common set of indicators is likely to provide a comprehensive assessment
                  of equipment condition for all items. Further, expanding the number of
                  equipment items that the Army provides information on threatens to be
                  burdensome with no assurance that problem systems will be reflected. The
                  best alternative may be a report that specifically identifies equipment
                  problems, details the readiness impact, and proposes solutions. This would
                  enable the Army to succinctly focus on its equipment problems so they can
                  be addressed by Army, DOD, and the Congress and provide assurance that
                  it knows the true status of its equipment.



Recommendations   We recommend that the Secretary of the Army direct the Deputy Chief of
                  Staff for Plans and Operations to reemphasize to Army commanders the



                  Page 21                                     GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness
                      B-282327




                      requirement to identify the operational impact of essential auxiliary
                      equipment shortages in the narrative remarks section of the Unit Status
                      Report and to properly consider shortages of auxiliary equipment when
                      formulating their mission accomplishment estimates. The Deputy Chief of
                      Staff for Plans and Operations should instruct commanders to focus more
                      broadly on unit capability, flexibility, and sustainability issues in
                      formulating their overall unit status and mission accomplishment estimate.

                      To improve equipment condition reporting, we recommend that the
                      Secretary of the Army direct the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics to
                      submit a periodic report to the Congress that highlights the Army’s top
                      equipment problems. This report should address more than just the 16
                      reportable SORTS systems and should identify major equipment readiness
                      concerns and planned corrective actions.



Agency Comments and   DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report and they are
                      included in their entirety in appendix II. DOD concurred with our
Our Evaluation        recommendation that the Secretary of the Army should reemphasize to
                      Army commanders the requirement to identify the operational impact of
                      auxiliary equipment shortages. DOD also concurred with our
                      recommendation that the Army periodically report to the Congress on their
                      top equipment problems. We used the term periodically to give the Army
                      the discretion to report as often as it believed necessary to keep the
                      Congress informed. However, it was our intention that a report be
                      submitted at least annually. Additionally, in its response to this
                      recommendation DOD stated that it believes a report is an appropriate
                      process to highlight auxiliary equipment problems. We did not intend this
                      report to be limited to auxiliary equipment problems.



Scope and             To determine if units have the equipment necessary to conduct their
                      wartime missions, we obtained summary-level information on the Army’s
Methodology           equipment on-hand posture as of September 1998 from DOD’s SORTS. We
                      also obtained equipment on-hand data for three brigade sized units and
                      visited those units to determine if the SORTS data accurately reflected
                      actual unit conditions by reviewing and comparing unit property book
                      records to the reported SORTS data. These units were the 7th
                      Transportation Group, Fort Eustis, Virginia; 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry
                      Division, Fort Lewis, Washington; and, 18th Aviation Brigade, Fort Bragg,
                      North Carolina. We also used SORTS data to calculate the equipment on-



                      Page 22                                    GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness
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hand status for lower priority equipment for all reporting active duty units
as of September 1998. We then discussed our findings with Army officials in
the Offices of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Deputy Chief of Staff
for Operations and Plans, and FORSCOM.

To determine the condition of the Army’s equipment, we analyzed summary
equipment serviceability data for all reporting active duty Army units as of
September 1998 and equipment serviceability data for three brigade-sized
units from SORTS. These units were the same units discussed above. We
then visited those units to inspect the equipment and maintenance records
to determine if the SORTS data accurately reflected actual field conditions.
At the units we met with unit commanders, maintenance supervisors, and
maintainers to discuss problems they may have in supporting the
equipment. We also met with personnel responsible for maintaining the
units’ inventories of repair parts. At Fort Eustis, we met with the
Directorate for Logistics, who was responsible for providing the
7th Transportation Group’s direct support maintenance. At Fort Lewis, we
met with I Corps officials, and at Fort Bragg we met with 1st Corps Support
Command officials responsible for supporting their respective brigades’
equipment to discuss equipment conditions and support problems.

To gather information on Army-wide equipment conditions, we met with
officials from LOGSA at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, who provided data on
readiness trends for reportable equipment and age data for Army
equipment. Officials from the U.S. Army Cost and Economic Analysis
Center, Falls Church, Virginia, discussed how they track operating and
support costs for Army equipment with us and provided us data for
350 Army systems. Officials from the Army Materiel Support Analysis
Activity, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland, discussed their ongoing
effort to gather mean utilization between failure data for Army equipment.
We also met with officials from the U.S. Army’s Tank and Automotive
Command, Warren, Michigan, to discuss information they possess on
equipment condition. After analyzing the data, we discussed our
conclusions with officials from the Offices of the Army Deputy Chief of
Staff for Logistics, Army Deputy Chief of Staff or Operations and Plans,
DOD Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and
FORSCOM.

Our information on equipment sustainment was derived from interviews
with unit commanders at the three bases visited as well as data on specific
maintenance skill shortages in the respective units. We followed up on the
data with FORSCOM officials. We obtained our information on repair parts



Page 23                                      GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness
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war reserves from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics and
the U.S. Army Materiel Support Analysis Activity. We conducted our review
from June 1998 to February 1999 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to other interested committees. We are
also sending copies of this report to the Honorable William Cohen,
Secretary of Defense and the Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the
Army. Copies will also be made available to others upon request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-5140 should you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are
listed in appendix II.

Sincerely yours,




Mark E. Gebicke
Director, National Security and Preparedness




Page 24                                     GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness
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Page 25    GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness
Contents



Letter                                                                                               1


Appendix I                                                                                          28
DOD Comments

Appendix II                                                                                         30
Major Contributors to
This Report

Tables                  Table1: Examples of Auxiliary Equipment
                        Shortages in U.S. Forces Command Units
                                                                                                     6

                        Table 2: Mission Capable Rates for                                          10
                        16 Major Equipment Items
                        Table 3: Percent of Equipment Not                                           12
                        Mission Capable Maintenance
                        Table 4: Percent of Equipment Not                                           14
                        Mission Capable Supply
                        Table 5: Median Age of the Army’s Top 15 Systems                            15
                        Table 6: Personnel Authorized and Assigned by                               18
                        Grade for a Sample of Occupations

                        Table 7: Availability of Selected Equipment in a                            20
                        Two-War Scenario




                        Abbreviations

                        DOD     Department of Defense
                        FORSCOM U.S. Forces Command
                        LOGSA   Logistics Support Activity
                        OSMIS   Operating and Support Management Information System
                        SORTS   Status of Resources and Training System
                        SORTS   Status of Resources and Training System



                        Page 26                                     GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness
Page 27   GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness
Appendix I

Comments From the Department of Defense                        ApIpenxdi




             Page 28         GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness
        Appendix I
        Comments From the Department of Defense




eL
 rtet   Page 29                                   GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness
                        Appendix II
                        Major Contributors to This Report




Major Contributors to This Report                                                                   ApIpIexndi




National Security and   Carol R. Schuster, Associate Director
                        William C. Meredith, Assistant Director
International Affairs   Glenn D. Furbish, Evaluator in Charge
Division, Washington,
D.C.

Norfolk Field Office    Lawrence E. Dixon, Senior Evaluator
                        Linda H. Koetter, Senior Evaluator
                        James E. Lewis, Senior Evaluator




(703238)     eL
              rtet      Page 30                                   GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness
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