oversight

Food Security: Factors That Could Affect Progress Toward Meeting World Food Summit Goals

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1999-03-22.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                  United States General Accounting Office

GAO               Report to Congressional Requesters




March 1999
                  FOOD SECURITY
                  Factors That Could
                  Affect Progress Toward
                  Meeting World Food
                  Summit Goals




GAO/NSIAD-99-15
             United States
GAO          General Accounting Office
             Washington, D.C. 20548

             National Security and
             International Affairs Division

             B-280276

             March 22, 1999

             The Honorable Russell D. Feingold
             Ranking Minority Member
             Subcommittee on African Affairs
             Committee on Foreign Relations
             United States Senate

             The Honorable John Ashcroft
             United States Senate

             The Honorable Tony P. Hall
             House of Representatives

             In November 1996, a world summit was held in Rome, Italy, to address a
             global commitment to ensure that all people have access to sufficient food
             to meet their needs, referred to as “food security.” Participants set a new
             interim goal of reducing undernourishment by 50 percent by 2015.
             Previous world food conferences and international summits have fallen
             considerably short of their targets for reducing or eliminating food
             insecurity.1

             As you requested, we reviewed the outcome of the summit and identified
             key factors that could affect the progress of developing countries toward
             achieving the summit’s goal. Appendix XI describes our specific scope and
             methodology.


             The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO),2 the U.S. government, and
Background   others define food security to exist when all people at all times have
             physical and economic access to sufficient food to meet their dietary
             needs for a productive and healthy life. Food insecurity exists when the
             availability of nutritionally adequate and safe foods, or the ability to



             1
              Countries that attended the 1974 World Food Conference set a goal of eliminating hunger within
             10 years. The 1979 World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development agreed to eliminate
             severe undernutrition in the quickest possible time and certainly before the end of the century. The
             1992 International Conference on Nutrition pledged to make all efforts to eliminate famine and
             famine-related deaths and to substantially reduce starvation and widespread hunger before the year
             2000.
             2
              FAO is a specialized agency within the U.N. system. Founded in 1945, FAO has mandates to raise
             levels of nutrition and standards of living, to improve agricultural productivity, and to better the
             conditions of rural populations. It comprises 175 member nations plus the European Community
             (member organization).



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                   acquire acceptable foods in socially acceptable ways, is limited or
                   uncertain.

                   Although it is generally agreed that the problem of food insecurity is
                   widespread in the developing world, the total number of undernourished
                   people is unknown, and estimates vary widely. For example, estimates for
                   58 low-income, food-deficit countries range from 576 million people to
                   1.1 billion people. Appendix I provides further information about these
                   estimates.


                   The 1996 World Food Summit brought together officials from 185
Results in Brief   countries and the European Community to discuss the problem of food
                   insecurity and produced a plan3 to guide participants’ efforts in working
                   toward a common goal of reducing undernutrition. To reach this goal, they
                   approved an action plan, the focus of which is to assist developing
                   countries to become more self-reliant in meeting their food needs by
                   promoting broad-based economic, political, and social reforms at local,
                   national, regional, and international levels. The participants endorsed
                   various actions but did not enter into any binding commitments. They also
                   agreed to review and revise national plans, programs, and strategies,
                   where appropriate, so as to achieve food security consistent with the
                   summit action plan.

                   Summit participants agreed that achieving food security is largely an
                   economic development problem, and according to U.S. officials, a
                   willingness on the part of food-insecure countries to undertake
                   broad-based policy reforms is a key factor affecting whether such
                   countries will achieve the summit goal. Other important factors that could
                   affect progress toward achieving the summit goal are (1) the effects of
                   trade reform, (2) the prevalence of conflict and its effect on food security,
                   (3) the sufficiency of agricultural production, and (4) the availability of
                   food aid and financial resources. Also needed are actions to monitor
                   progress, such as the ability and willingness of the participant countries to
                   develop information systems on the status of food security and to
                   coordinate, monitor, and evaluate progress in implementing the summit’s
                   plan.

                   Given the complexity of the problems in each of these areas, summit
                   participants acknowledged that progress will be slow and difficult. FAO’s

                   3
                     Rome Declaration on World Food Security and World Food Summit Plan of Action, World Food
                   Summit (Rome: FAO, Nov. 13-17, 1996).



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                            Committee on World Food Security (CFS)4 requested that countries report
                            to the FAO Secretariat in 1998 on their progress in meeting the summit’s
                            goals, but many countries did not respond in a timely fashion. In addition,
                            some reports were more descriptive than analytical, and some reported
                            only on certain aspects of food security actions. Thus, the Secretariat was
                            unable to draw general substantive conclusions on progress made to
                            reduce food insecurity. The U.S. Agency for International Development
                            (USAID) said that the level of effort by both donor and developing countries
                            will probably fall short of achieving the summit’s goal of reducing chronic
                            global hunger by one-half.


                            The summit resulted in an action plan for reducing undernourishment.
Summit Outcomes             Included in the plan were a variety of measures for promoting economic,
                            political, and social reforms in developing countries.


Summit Produced a Plan of   To reach their goal, summit participants approved an action plan that
Action to Achieve Goal      included 7 broadly stated commitments, 27 objectives, and 181 specific
                            actions (see app. II). Among other things, the plan highlighted the need to
                            reduce poverty and resolve conflicts peacefully. While recognizing that
                            food aid may be a necessary interim approach, the plan encouraged
                            developing countries to become more self-reliant by increasing sustainable
                            agricultural production and their ability to engage in international trade,
                            and by developing or improving social welfare and public works programs
                            to help address the needs of food-insecure people. The plan further noted
                            that governments should work closely with others in their societies, such
                            as nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and the private sector.

                            Although the summit action plan is not binding,5 countries also agreed to
                            (1) review and revise as appropriate national plans, programs, and
                            strategies with a view to achieving food security; (2) establish or improve
                            national mechanisms to set priorities and develop and implement the
                            components of the summit action plan within designated time frames,
                            based on both national and local needs, and provide the necessary
                            resources; and (3) cooperate regionally and internationally in order to

                            4
                             Among other things, the CFS is responsible for monitoring implementation of the summit’s action
                            plan, reviewing worldwide demand and supply for foodstuffs, and recommending policy actions
                            necessary to remedy any difficulty in ensuring adequate cereal supplies. Its membership is open to any
                            country that is a member of FAO or the United Nations.
                            5
                             The plan is a statement of political intent whose implementation depends upon the goodwill of all the
                            countries and numerous international agencies that expressed support for it when the summit was
                            held. Each country’s national government will decide how to apply the summit’s objectives within its
                            borders.



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                          reach collective solutions to global issues of food insecurity. They also
                          agreed to monitor implementation of the summit plan, including
                          periodically reporting on their individual progress in meeting the plan’s
                          objectives.


Summit Called for         The summit placed considerable emphasis on the need for broad-based
Developing Countries to   political, economic, and social reforms to improve food security. For
Implement Broad-Based     example, summit countries called for the pursuit of democracy, poverty
                          eradication, land reform, gender equality, access to education and health
Reforms                   care for all, and development of well-targeted welfare and nutrition safety
                          nets. Other international conferences have suggested that major policy
                          reforms were needed in connection with food security issues. For
                          example, countries that attended the 1974 World Food Conference and the
                          1979 World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development said
                          they would undertake major economic, social, and political reforms.
                          According to some observers, the most important challenge of food
                          security today is how to bring about major socio-institutional change in
                          food-insecure countries, since previous efforts have met with limited
                          success. According to other observers, there is a growing acceptance on
                          the part of developing countries that policy reform must be addressed if
                          food security is to be achieved. However, reports on progress toward
                          implementing summit objectives that many countries provided to FAO in
                          early 1998 did not contain much information on the extent to which
                          countries have incorporated policy reforms into specific plans for
                          implementing summit objectives.

                          As defined by the summit and others, achieving improved world food
                          security by 2015 is largely an economic development problem; however,
                          the summit did not estimate the total resources needed by developing
                          countries to achieve the level of development necessary to cut in half their
                          undernutrition by 2015, much less assess their ability to finance the
                          process themselves. Many developed countries that attended the summit
                          agreed to try to strengthen their individual efforts toward fulfilling a
                          long-standing U.N. target to provide official development assistance
                          equivalent to 0.7 percent of the gross national product each year.
                          However, the countries did not make a firm commitment to this goal,6 and
                          the United States declined to endorse this target. Assistance from the




                          6
                           An agreement to hold the summit included an understanding that the conference would not seek
                          pledges from donor countries for increased levels of assistance.



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                    Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD)7
                    Development Assistance Committee members8 has been declining in
                    recent years—from about $66.5 billion in 1991 to $52.7 billion in 1997
                    (measured in 1996 dollars). Total official development assistance from
                    these countries in 1997 represented 0.22 percent of their combined gross
                    national product, compared to 0.32 percent during 1990-94.9

                    Many developed countries believe that the private sector is a key to
                    resolving the resources problem. Whether the private sector will choose to
                    become more involved in low-income, food-deficit countries may depend
                    on the extent to which developing countries embrace policy reform
                    measures. Private sector resources provided to the developing world have
                    grown dramatically during the 1990s, and by 1997 the private sector
                    accounted for about 75 percent of net resource flows to the developing
                    world, compared to about 34 percent in 1990. However, according to the
                    OECD, due to a number of factors, most of the poorest countries in the
                    developing world have not benefited much from the trend and will need to
                    rely principally on official development assistance for some time to come.
                    (See app. III for additional analysis on official and private sector resource
                    flows to the developing countries.)


                    Among factors that may affect whether the summit’s goal is realized are
Factors Affecting   trade reforms, conflicts, agricultural production, and safety net programs
Summit Goal         and food aid.


Trade Reform        Summit participants generally believed that developing countries should
                    increasingly rely on trade liberalization to promote greater food security,
                    and in support of this belief, the summit plan called for full




                    7
                     The OECD was established in 1961 to promote economic and social welfare in member countries and
                    to harmonize efforts on behalf of developing countries. OECD members include Australia, Austria,
                    Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
                    Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
                    the Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United
                    States.
                    8
                     The Committee, which includes most OECD countries, deals with development cooperation matters.
                    It seeks to expand the aggregate volume of resources made available to developing countries and to
                    improve the effectiveness of the aid.
                    9
                     U.S. official development assistance in 1997 was the lowest for all OECD countries, at less than
                    0.1 percent of gross national product. In terms of actual dollars, the United States was the fourth
                    largest provider of official development assistance in 1997. The United States has not agreed to the
                    OECD target on the grounds that the United States provides substantial resources for world security,
                    whereas the other countries provide relatively lesser amounts.
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implementation of the 1994 Uruguay Round Trade Agreements (URA).10 The
participants also recognized that trade liberalization may result in some
price volatility that could adversely affect the food security situation of
poor countries. To help offset these possible adverse effects, the
participants endorsed the full implementation of a Uruguay Round
decision on measures to mitigate possible negative effects.11

The summit participants generally acknowledged that the URAs have the
potential to strengthen global food security by encouraging more efficient
food production and a more market-oriented agricultural trading system.
Reforms that enable farmers in developing countries to grow and sell more
food can help promote increased rural development and improve food
security. Trade reforms that increase the competitiveness of developing
countries in nonagricultural sectors can also lead to increased income and,
in turn, a greater ability to pay for commercial food imports. However,
trade reforms may also adversely affect food security, especially during
the near-term transitional period, if such reforms result in an increase in
the cost of food or a reduced amount of food available to poor and
undernourished people. Reforms may also have adverse impacts if they
are accompanied by low levels of grain stocks and increased price
volatility in world grain markets.12

The summit plan acknowledged that world price and supply fluctuations
were of special concern to vulnerable groups in developing countries. As
part of the plan, food exporting countries said they would (1) act as
reliable sources of supplies to their trading partners and give due
consideration to the food security of importing countries, especially
low-income, food-deficit countries; (2) reduce subsidies on food exports in
conformity with the URA and in the context of an ongoing process of
agricultural reform; and (3) administer all export-related trade policies and
programs responsibly to avoid disruptions in world food agriculture and
export markets.

Also, to mitigate the possible adverse effects of trade reforms on food
security situations, the summit plan called for full implementation of a
Uruguay Round ministerial decision made in Marrakesh, Morocco, in 1994.
Under this decision, signatory nations to the URA agreed to ensure that

10
 The Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations were finalized in 1994 with a series of agreements
and ministerial decisions and declarations that were annexed to the Marrakesh Agreement, which
established the World Trade Organization (WTO).
11
 The Uruguay Round Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform
Program on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries.
12
  See also World Food Summit Technical Background Documents, vol. 3 (Rome, Italy: FAO, 1996).


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implementing the trade reforms would not adversely affect the availability
of sufficient food aid to assist in meeting the food needs of developing
countries, especially the poorest, net food-importing countries. To date,
however, agreement has not been reached about the criteria that should
be used in evaluating the food aid needs of the countries and whether
trade reforms have adversely affected the ability of the countries to obtain
adequate supplies of food.

While trade liberalization by developing countries was especially
encouraged by summit participants, some observers believe that
developed countries have been slow in removing their trade barriers and
that this may inhibit developing countries from achieving further trade
liberalization. For example, according to reports by the International Food
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)13 and the World Bank,14 member countries
of the OECD continue to maintain barriers to free trade that are adversely
affecting the means and willingness of developing nations to further
liberalize their own markets and to support additional trade liberalization.
According to the World Bank, without an open trading environment and
access to developed country markets, developing countries cannot benefit
fully from producing those goods for which they have a comparative
advantage. Without improved demand for developing countries’
agricultural products, for example, the agricultural growth needed to
generate employment and reduce poverty in rural areas will not be
achieved, the Bank report said. This is critical to food security. If
developing countries are to adopt an open-economy agriculture and food
policy, they must be assured of access to international markets over the
long term, particularly those of the developed nations, according to the
Bank.15 (For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see app. IV.)

Officials of the Department of State and the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA), however, said that the problem of developed countries’
trade barriers against developing countries is not as severe as portrayed by
IFPRI and the World Bank. State acknowledged that there are still some
significant barriers to trade but said most barriers are being progressively
removed because of the Uruguay Round. In addition, it said, the United
States has a number of preferential areas and regimes that favor
developing countries and allow most agricultural imports. State said the


13
 Per Pinstrup-Andersen, et al., The World Food Situation: Recent Developments, Emerging Issues, and
Long-Term Prospects (Washington, D.C.: IFPRI, Dec. 1997).
14
  Rural Development: From Vision to Action (Washington, D.C.: the World Bank, Oct. 1997).
15
  Rural Development: From Vision to Action.



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European Union has similar arrangements. USDA officials generally agreed
that it is important for developed countries to remove trade barriers but
said it is equally important for developing countries to eliminate domestic
policies and restrictions on trade that have adversely affected their own
economic growth.

The price volatility of world food commodities, particularly grains, and its
relationship to the level of food reserves, is a key issue related to trade
liberalization and a significant problem for food-insecure countries. Views
differ over the level of global grain reserves needed to safeguard world
food security, the future outlook for price volatility, and the desirability of
holding grain reserves. The summit observed that maintaining grain
reserves was one of several instruments that countries could use to
strengthen food security; however, the summit did not identify a minimum
level of global grain reserves needed to ensure food security nor did it
recommend any action by countries individually or in concert.16 Instead,
the summit participants agreed to monitor the availability and adequacy of
their individual reserve stocks, and FAO agreed to continue its practice of
monitoring and informing member nations of developments in world food
prices and stocks.

FAO, IFPRI,and the World Bank have observed that agricultural markets are
likely to be more volatile as the levels of world grain reserves are reduced,
an outcome expected as trade reforms are implemented. However, they
and other observers have also noted that as a result of trade market
reforms, agricultural producers may respond more quickly to rising prices
in times of tightening markets, the private sector may hold more reserves
than it did when governments were holding large reserves (though not in
an amount that would fully replace government stocks), and the increased
trade in grains among all nations will help offset a lower level of world
grain reserves. Some observers believe that most countries, including
food-insecure developing countries, are better off keeping only enough
reserves to tide them over until they can obtain increased supplies from
international markets,17 since it is costly to hold stocks for emergency
purposes on a regular basis and other methods might be available for
coping with volatile markets. Others support the view that ensuring world

16
  At the time of the summit, FAO was conducting a study to review whether a stocks-to-use ratio of 17
to 18 percent—previously set by an intergovernmental group on grains—was a reasonable standard for
judging the minimum safe level of global grain stocks in light of changes in national and global food
policies and improved transport and logistics infrastructure. In January 1997, FAO reported that the
standard was still reasonable.
17
 Luther G. Tweeten, “Food Security,” Promoting Third-World Development and Food Security, eds.
Luther G. Tweeten and Donald G. McClelland (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997).



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                             food security requires maintaining some minimum level of global grain
                             reserves18 and that developed countries have a special responsibility to
                             establish and hold reserves for this purpose. Some have also suggested
                             examination of the feasibility of establishing an international grain
                             reserve.19 The U.S. position is that governments should pursue at local and
                             national levels, as appropriate, adequate, cost-effective food reserve
                             policies and programs. The United States has opposed creation of
                             international food reserves because of the difficulties that would arise in
                             deciding how to finance, hold, and trigger the use of such reserves. (See
                             app. IV for additional analysis on grain reserves.)


Actions to Reduce Conflict   The summit countries concluded that conflict and terrorism contribute
                             significantly to food insecurity and declared a need to establish a durable,
                             peaceful environment in which conflicts are prevented or resolved
                             peacefully. According to FAO, many of the countries that had low food
                             security 30 years ago and failed to make progress or even experienced
                             further declines since then have suffered severe disruptions caused by war
                             and political disturbances. Our analysis of data on civil war, interstate war,
                             and genocide in 88 countries between 1960 and 1989 shows a relationship
                             between the incidence of these disturbances and food insecurity at the
                             national level. A sharp rise in international emergency food aid deliveries
                             during the early 1990s has been largely attributed to an increasing number
                             of armed conflicts in different parts of the world.20

                             Summit countries pledged that they would, in partnership with civil
                             society21 and in cooperation with the international community, encourage
                             and reinforce peace by developing conflict prevention mechanisms, by
                             settling disputes through peaceful means, and by promoting tolerance and
                             nonviolence. They also pledged to strengthen existing rules and
                             mechanisms in international and regional organizations, in accordance

                             18
                              Assessment of the World Food Security Situation (Rome, Italy: Committee on World Food Security,
                             Apr. 1998).
                             19
                              See Testimony of Leland H. Swenson, President National Farmers Union, Before the Senate
                             Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee, July 29, 1997; Hunger in a Global Economy (Silver
                             Spring, Md: Bread for the World Institute, 1997); and NGO Recommendations for U.S. Action Plan on
                             Food Security (Washington, D.C.: Coalition for Food Aid, Nov. 12, 1997).
                             20
                              Canadian International Development Agency, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Norway
                             Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Evaluation of the World Food Program Final Report (Bergen,
                             Norway: Chr. Michelesen Institute, Dec. 1993).
                             21
                              “Civil society” is a term used by U.N. and other international organizations to refer to the
                             nongovernmental side of society, including both organizations and its citizens more generally.
                             Distinctions are made between NGOs that are not-for-profit actors and the private (for-profit) sector.
                             However, the usage of these terms is not always exact. For example, officials and other interested
                             parties sometimes use NGOs to refer to both. See also appendix X.


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                          with the U.N. Charter, for preventing and resolving conflicts that cause or
                          exacerbate food insecurity and for settling disputes by peaceful means.
                          The FAO Secretariat analyzed progress reports submitted to FAO by member
                          countries in 1998 and cited several examples of country efforts to support
                          peaceful resolution of domestic and international conflicts. However, the
                          analysis did not provide any overall results on the extent to which
                          countries had made progress in ending already existing violent conflicts
                          and in peacefully resolving or preventing other conflicts. (See app. VI for
                          our analysis on the relationship between conflict and food security.)


Increasing Agricultural   One objective of the summit was to increase agricultural production and
Production                rural development in the developing world, especially in low-income,
                          food-deficit countries. FAO estimates show that achieving the required
                          production increases will require unusually high growth rates in the more
                          food-insecure countries and, in turn, greater investments, especially in the
                          worst-off countries.

                          World Bank officials have said that the Bank is committed to emphasizing
                          rural agricultural development in countries that receive its assistance. Its
                          plan calls for country assistance strategies that treat agriculture
                          comprehensively and include well-defined, coherent, rural strategy
                          components. Despite public statements by the World Bank, there are still
                          differences of opinion within the Bank and among its partners as to the
                          priority that should be given to the rural sector. These opinions range from
                          recognizing a positive role for agricultural growth in an overall
                          development strategy, to benign neglect, to a strong urban bias.

                          Achieving needed agricultural production increases will also require other
                          major changes in the rural and agricultural sector and in society more
                          generally. For example, according to the U.S. mission to FAO, the most
                          critical factor affecting progress toward achieving the summit goal is the
                          willingness of food-insecure countries to undertake the kind of economic
                          policies that encourage rather than discourage domestic production in the
                          agricultural sector and their willingness to open their borders to
                          international trade in agricultural products. There must be an “enabling
                          environment,” the mission said, that favors domestic investment and
                          production in the agricultural sector. Moreover, the mission said, these
                          policies are under the control of the food-insecure countries themselves
                          and can have a far greater impact on domestic food security than
                          international assistance.




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                          Another issue involving increased agricultural production concerns
                          promotion of modern farming methods, such as chemicals to protect
                          crops, fertilizers, and improved seeds. Agriculture production in
                          developing countries can be substantially improved if such methods are
                          adopted and properly implemented. However, some groups strongly
                          oppose the introduction of such methods because of concerns about the
                          environment.22 (See app. VII for additional information on this issue.)


Safety Net Programs and   The summit’s long-term focus is on creating conditions where people have
Food Aid                  the capability to produce or purchase the food they need, but summit
                          participants noted that food aid—both emergency and
                          nonemergency—could be used to help promote food security. The summit
                          plan called upon governments of all countries to develop within their
                          available resources well-targeted social welfare and nutrition safety nets
                          to meet the needs of their food-insecure people and to implement
                          cost-effective public works programs for the unemployed and
                          underemployed in regions of food insecurity.

                          With regard to emergency food aid, the summit plan stated the
                          international community should maintain an adequate capacity to provide
                          such assistance. Nevertheless, this goal has been difficult to implement
                          and, since the summit, some emergency food aid needs have not been met.
                          For example, according to the World Food Program, which distributes
                          about 70 percent of global emergency food aid, approximately 6 percent of
                          its declared emergency needs and 7 percent of its protracted relief
                          operations23 needs were not satisfied in 1997. Also, donors direct their
                          contributions to emergency appeals on a case-by-case basis, and some
                          emergencies are underfunded or not funded at all. In addition, according
                          to the World Food Program, lengthy delays between appeals and
                          contributions, as well as donors’ practice of attaching specific restrictions
                          to contributions, make it difficult for the World Food Program to ensure a
                          regular supply of food for its operations. In 1998, the program’s emergency
                          and protracted relief operations were underfunded by 18 percent of total
                          needs. Other problems affecting the delivery of emergency food aid
                          include government restrictions on countries to which the food aid can be
                          sent and civil strife and war within such countries. Notable recent


                          22
                           See, for example, Norman Borlaug, “Technological and Environmental Dimensions of Rural
                          Well-Being,” in Rural Well-Being: From Vision to Action, eds. Ismail Serageldin and David Steeds
                          (Washington, D.C.: the World Bank, 1997).
                          23
                           As discussed in appendix V, protracted relief operations food aid falls under the broad category of
                          emergency food aid.



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                         examples of countries that have not received sufficient assistance,
                         according to the World Food Program, include North Korea and Sudan,
                         where both situations involve complex political issues that go well beyond
                         the food shortage condition itself.24 (See app. V for additional information
                         on food aid.)


                         Summit participants agreed that an improved food security information
Actions Needed to        system, coordination of efforts, and monitoring and evaluation are actions
Monitor Progress         needed to make and assess progress toward achieving the summit’s goal.


Need to Develop a Food   Many countries participating in the summit acknowledged that they do not
Security Information     have adequate information on the status of their people’s food security.
System                   Consequently, participants agreed that it would be necessary to (1) collect
                         information on the nutritional status of all members of their communities
                         (especially the poor, women, children, and members of vulnerable and
                         disadvantaged groups) to enable monitoring of their situation;
                         (2) establish a process for developing targets and verifiable indicators of
                         food security where they do not exist; (3) encourage relevant U.N.
                         agencies to initiate consultations on how to craft a food insecurity and
                         vulnerability information and mapping system; and (4) draw on the results
                         of the system, once established, to report to CFS on their implementation of
                         the summit’s plan.

                         According to FAO and U.S. officials, improvement in data collection and
                         analysis is necessary if countries are to have reasonably accurate data to
                         design policies and programs to address the problem. However, not much
                         progress has been made in this regard over the past 20 years, and serious
                         challenges remain.

                         A major shortcoming is that agreement has not yet been reached on the
                         indicators to be used in establishing national food insecurity information

                         24
                           On June 11, 1998, the World Food Program reported that (1) it lacked sufficient funds and food for
                         Sudan; (2) it was starting to see the emergence of famine zones in parts of Sudan; and (3) while it
                         could firmly state that more food aid had to be rapidly delivered to affected areas, it would not be
                         possible unless it received a quick, massive injection of food and cash. On July 27, the program’s
                         Executive Director said: “We will need a great deal of help from the donor community if we are to
                         prevent an all-out famine in Sudan. I ask donors to search for any means to help us save these people.”
                         In September 1998, the program reported that its operations in the Democratic People’s Republic of
                         Korea had also suffered from resource gaps during the year and, as a result, the program had been
                         forced to limit its activities there. See “WFP Seeks to Expand Food Aid Operation in Sudan,” World
                         Food Program Press Release (Rome, Italy: June 11, 1998); “WFP Issues Urgent Appeal for Funds to
                         Expand Emergency Food Aid to Needy Sudanese,” World Food Program Press Release (Rome, Italy:
                         July 27, 1998); and 1998 Estimated Food Needs and Shortfalls, World Food Program (Rome, Italy:
                         September 1998).



                         Page 12                                                    GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
                       B-280276




                       systems. Following the 1996 summit, an international interagency working
                       group was created to discuss how to create such a system. As of
                       November 1998, the working group had not yet decided on or begun to
                       debate which indicators of food insecurity should be used, and the
                       working group is not scheduled to meet again before the mid-1999 CFS
                       meeting. FAO Secretariat officials told us that a proposal will be ready for
                       the 1999 CFS meeting. Thus far, only a few developed and not many more
                       developing countries have participated. (See app. VIII for additional
                       analysis of this issue.)


Coordination Is        The summit’s action plan incorporates several objectives and actions for
Considered Essential   improved coordination among all the relevant players. For example, it
                       calls upon FAO and other relevant U.N. agencies, international finance and
                       trade institutions, and other international and regional technical assistance
                       organizations to facilitate a coherent and coordinated follow-up to the
                       summit at the field level, through the U.N.’s resident coordinators,25 in full
                       consultation with governments, and in coordination with international
                       institutions. In addition, the plan calls on governments, cooperating among
                       themselves and with international institutions, to encourage relevant
                       agencies to coordinate within the U.N. system to develop a food-insecurity
                       monitoring system, and requested the U.N. Secretary General to ensure
                       appropriate interagency coordination. Since the summit, the United
                       Nations, FAO, the World Bank, and others have endorsed various actions
                       designed to promote better coordination.

                       In April 1997, the United States and others expressed concern to FAO about
                       problems related to FAO efforts to help developing countries create
                       strategies for improving their food security. Donor countries noted that
                       nongovernmental groups had not been involved in the preparation of the
                       strategies, even though the summit plan stressed the importance of their
                       active participation. In June 1997, the European Union expressed concern
                       about the uncoordinated nature of food aid, noting that responsibilities
                       were scattered among a number of international organizations and other
                       forums, each with different representatives and agendas. And in
                       October 1997, the World Bank reported that many agricultural projects
                       had failed due to inadequate coordination among the donors and


                       25
                        The principal officer of the U.N. Development Program in each developing country also serves as the
                       U.N. resident coordinator. The coordinator seeks to ensure effective integration of assistance provided
                       by the U.N. system of agencies and consistency of the U.N. system’s operational activities with the
                       plans, priorities, and strategies of the country. For further information, see International
                       Organizations: U.S. Participation in the United Nations Development Program (GAO/NSIAD-97-8,
                       Apr. 17, 1997).



                       Page 13                                                    GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
                      B-280276




                      multilateral financial institutions. (See app. IX for additional information
                      on the coordination issue.)


Need to Monitor and   The summit participants acknowledged the need to actively monitor the
Evaluate              implementation of the summit plan. To this end, governments of the
                      countries agreed to establish, through CFS, a timetable, procedures, and
                      standardized reporting formats for monitoring progress on the national,
                      subregional, and regional implementation of the plan. CFS was directed to
                      monitor the implementation of the plan, using reports from national
                      governments, the U.N. system of agencies, and other relevant international
                      institutions, and to provide regular reports on the results to the FAO
                      Council. As previously noted, as of November 1998, a monitoring and
                      evaluation system had not yet been developed to provide reasonably
                      accurate data on the number, location, and extent of undernourished
                      peoples. In addition, a system had not been created to assess
                      implementation of the various components of the summit’s action plan
                      (that is, 7 broad commitments, 27 major supporting objectives, and 181
                      supporting actions).26 Many of these involve multiple activities and
                      complex variables that are not easily defined or measured. In addition, CFS
                      has requested that the information provided allow for analysis of which
                      actions are or are not successful in promoting summit goals.

                      In April 1997, CFS decided that the first progress reports should cover
                      activities through the end of 1997 and be submitted to the FAO Secretariat
                      by January 31, 1998. Countries and relevant international agencies were to
                      report on actions taken toward achieving the specific objectives under
                      each of the seven statements of commitment. As of March 31, 1998, only 68
                      of 175 country reports had been received. The Secretariat analyzed the
                      information in the 68 reports and summarized the results in a report to the
                      CFS for its June 1998 session. The Secretariat reported it was unable to
                      draw general substantive conclusions because (1) all countries, to varying
                      degrees, were selective in providing the information they considered of
                      most relevance for their reporting; (2) varied emphasis was given to
                      reporting on past plans and programs, ongoing programs, and future plans
                      to improve food security; and (3) the reports did not always focus on the
                      issues involved. Furthermore, some countries chose to provide a report
                      that was more descriptive than analytical, and some countries reported
                      only on certain aspects of food security action, such as food stocks or
                      reserve policies.

                      26
                       CFS’ approach to monitoring and evaluation does not include a review or assessment of individual
                      country action plans for implementing summit statements of commitment. An FAO official said the
                      Secretariat does not have sufficient staff to evaluate the action plans of all members.



                      Page 14                                                  GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
                  B-280276




                  CFS had not stipulated or suggested any common standards for measuring
                  the baseline status and progress with respect to actions, objectives, or
                  commitments prior to the preparation of the progress reports. In the
                  absence of common standards, the Secretariat is likely to experience
                  difficulty in analyzing relationships and drawing conclusions about the
                  progress of more than 100 countries. In addition, CFS did not ask countries
                  and agencies to report on planned targets and milestones for achieving
                  actions, objectives, or commitments or on estimated costs to fulfill summit
                  commitments and plans for financing such expenditures.

                  The Secretariat provided the June 1998 CFS session with a proposal for
                  improving the analytical format for future progress reports. CFS did not
                  debate the essential points that should be covered in future reports and
                  instead directed the Secretariat to prepare another proposal for later
                  consideration. Given the complexity of the action plan and other
                  difficulties, CFS also decided that countries will not prepare the next
                  progress report until the year 2000 and will address only half of the plan’s
                  objectives. A progress report on the remaining objectives will be made in
                  2002. Thus, the second report will not be completed until 6 years after the
                  summit. A third set of progress reports is to be prepared in 2004 and 2006.

                  Under the summit plan, countries also agreed to encourage effective
                  participation of relevant civil society actors in the monitoring process,
                  including those at the CFS level.27 In April 1997, CFS decided to examine this
                  issue in detail in 1998. However, the issue was not included in the
                  provisional agenda for the June 1998 session. Detailed discussion of
                  proposals by Canada and the United States on the issue was postponed
                  until the next CFS session in 1999. The postponement occurred as a result
                  of opposition by many developing country governments to an increased
                  role for NGOs in CFS. (See app. X for additional analysis of this issue.)


                  The Department of State, USDA, FAO, and the World Food Program provided
Agency Comments   oral comments and USAID provided written comments on a draft of this
                  report. They generally agreed with the contents of the report. State
                  emphasized the important role that broad-based policy reforms play in
                  helping developing countries address food insecurity and suggested that
                  our report further highlight this factor. We agree with State on this matter,
                  and have reemphasized the need for developing countries to initiate
                  appropriate policy reforms as a prelude to addressing food security issues.

                  27
                   The U.N. Economic and Social Council has stressed the importance of involving civil society in the
                  U.N.’s follow-up to all major international conferences and summits more generally.



                  Page 15                                                   GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
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State and USDA officials also commented that in their opinion, the World
Bank and IFPRI overstated the effect of developed countries’ trade barriers
on the food insecurity of least-developed countries. We have modified the
report to reflect State’s and USDA’s views on this matter more fully. USAID
said that, although an unfortunate circumstance, it believes the level of
effort by donor and developing countries will probably fall short of
achieving the summit’s goal of reducing chronic global hunger by one-half.
While we cannot quantify the extent to which developing countries may
fall short, we tend to agree with USAID’s observation. USAID’s comments are
reprinted in appendix XII.

FAO officials said the report’s general tone of skepticism was justified
based on the past record and reiterated that reducing by one-half the
number of undernourished people by 2015 requires a change in priorities
by countries along the lines spelled out in the summit action plan. They
also said that work was underway to further investigate the extent to
which the target is feasible at the national level in those countries facing
political instability or with a high proportion of undernourished people.
FAO officials said that our discussion in appendix IX of coordination issues
concerning FAO’s Special Program for Food Security and a Telefood
promotion did not reflect FAO members’ support for these initiatives. We
provided additional information on the initiatives to reflect FAO’s views
(see app. IX). World Food Program officials said food aid for
nonemergency and developmental purposes is more effective than is
suggested by the discussion in our report. However, the officials did not
identify any studies or analysis to support the Program’s position that food
constitutes an efficient use of assistance resources. The World Food
Program said that it has acted on recommendations for improving its
operations, and we modified the report to reflect the World Food
Program’s views. However, it is important to note that a recent USAID study
on the use of food aid in contributing to sustainable development
concluded that while food aid may be effective, it is less efficient than
financial assistance, although the report pointed out that financial aid is
often not available. World Food Program officials acknowledged that
important issues remain unresolved concerning establishment of an
international database on food insecurity.

All of the above agencies and the Department of Health and Human
Services also provided technical comments that were incorporated into
the report where appropriate.




Page 16                                    GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
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We are sending copies of this report to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Senator
Robert C. Byrd, Senator Pete V. Domenici, Senator Jesse Helms, Senator
Frank R. Lautenberg, Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Senator Joseph I.
Lieberman, Senator Mitch McConnell, Senator Ted Stevens, and Senator
Fred Thompson, and to Representative Dan Burton, Representative Sonny
Callahan, Representative Sam Gejdenson, Representative Benjamin A.
Gilman, Representative John R. Kasich, Representative David Obey,
Representative Nancy Pelosi, Representative John M. Spratt,
Representative Henry A. Waxman, and Representative C. W. Bill Young.
We are also sending copies of this report to the Honorable Dan Glickman,
Secretary of Agriculture; the Honorable William M. Daley, Secretary of
Commerce; the Honorable William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense; the
Honorable Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services; the
Honorable Madeline K. Albright, Secretary of State; the Honorable Robert
E. Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury; the Honorable J. Brian Atwood,
Administrator, Agency for International Development; the Honorable
Carol M. Browner, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency; the
Honorable George J. Tenet, Director, Central Intelligence Agency; the
Honorable Jacob J. Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget; the
Honorable Samuel R. Berger, National Security Adviser to the President;
and the Honorable Charlene Barshefsky, U.S. Trade Representative.
Copies will also be made available to others upon request.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me
at (202) 512-4128. The major contributors to this report are listed in
appendix XIII.




Harold J. Johnson, Associate Director
International Relations and Trade Issues




Page 17                                    GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Contents



Letter                                                                                                1


Appendix I                                                                                           22
                         FAO’s Method for Estimating Undernourishment                                22
Current Status of        USDA Estimate of Undernutrition                                             29
Global Food Security     World Health Organization Undernourishment Estimates                        30


Appendix II                                                                                          31
World Food Summit’s
Commitments,
Objectives, and Select
Actions for Promoting
Food Security
Appendix III                                                                                         35
                         Private Sector Resource Flows to Developing Countries                       40
Resources for
Financing Food
Security
Appendix IV                                                                                          43
                         Effects of Trade Liberalization on Developing Countries’ Food               43
Trade, Food Prices,        Security
and Grain Reserves       Implementing the Uruguay Round                                              47
                         Trade Liberalization, Food Aid, and the Marrakesh Decision                  48
                         Trade, Price Volatility, and Global Grain Reserves                          50
                         Summit’s Action on Reserves                                                 53
                         Views About Future Stock Levels and Price Volatility                        53
                         Views on Actions to Increase Stocks and Hold Emergency                      55
                           Reserves
                         Possible Alternatives to Reserves for Coping With Price Volatility          57


Appendix V                                                                                           59
                         Trends in Food Aid                                                          59
Emergency and            Costs to Feed the Long-Term Undernourished                                  63
Nonemergency Food        Effectiveness of Food Aid for Nonemergency Purposes                         64
                         Provision of Emergency Food Aid Since the Summit                            66
Aid



                         Page 18                                    GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
                       Contents




Appendix VI                                                                                      70
Conflicts’
Contribution to Food
Insecurity
Appendix VII                                                                                     73
                       Production Increases Are Not Likely to Be Easy                            74
Increasing
Agricultural
Production in
Developing Countries
Appendix VIII                                                                                    80
Establishing an
Information System
for Assessing
Undernutrition and
Food Insecurity
Appendix IX                                                                                      84
                       Coordination Since the Summit                                             84
Coordination in
Implementing Summit
Goals
Appendix X                                                                                       90
                       Progress Reports                                                          90
Monitoring and         Participation of Civil Society                                            92
Evaluation of the
Action Plan
Appendix XI                                                                                      96
Objectives, Scope,
and Methodology



                       Page 19                                  GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
                        Contents




Appendix XII                                                                                      99
Comments From the
U.S. Agency for
International
Development
Appendix XIII                                                                                    101
Major Contributors to
This Report
Tables                  Table I.1: FAO Estimates of Chronically Undernourished People             26
                          in 93 Developing Countries, 1990-92
                        Table I.2: Distribution of Chronically Undernourished, 1990-92            27
                        Table I.3: Estimates of Incidence of Chronic Undernourishment             28
                          in Developing Countries by Regions of the World, 1969-71 to
                          1994-96
                        Table II.1: Commitments, Objectives, and Select Examples of               31
                          Actions in the World Food Summit’s Plan of Action
                        Table III.1: Relationship Between Income Levels of Developing             36
                          Countries and Food Security
                        Table III.2: Total Net Resource Flows from OECD Development               37
                          Assistance Committee Countries and Multilateral Agencies to Aid
                          Recipient Countries, 1990-97
                        Table III.3: ODA Performance of OECD DAC Countries, 1980-97               39
                        Table III.4: Creditworthiness Ratings and Level of Food Security          42
                          in Developing Countries
                        Table IV.1: Estimated Effects of the URAs’ Reforms on Income in           46
                          the Developing and Developed World
                        Table IV.2: World Carryover Cereal Stocks, 1971-72 to 1998-99             52
                        Table V.1: World Grains Food Aid Shipments and Their Use,                 61
                          1976-97
                        Table V.2: Share of Food Aid Reaching Low-Income, Food-Deficit            63
                          Countries, 1976-96
                        Table V.3: 1998 World Food Program Emergency and Protracted               67
                          Relief Assistance
                        Table VI.1: Relationship Between Incidence of Conflict and Level          71
                          of Food Security in Developing Countries, 1960-89




                        Page 20                                  GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Contents




Table VII.1: FAO Analysis of Daily Per Capita Calorie Levels,            74
  Grain Production Growth Rates, and Millions of Undernourished
  to 2010 for 93 Developing Countries




Abbreviations

ACC        Administrative Coordination Committee of the United
                 Nations
CFS        Committee on World Food Security
DAC        Development Assistance Committee
DES        daily energy supply
ERS        Economic Research Service
FAO        Food and Agriculture Organization
IFPRI      International Food Policy Research Institute
NGO        nongovernmental organization
ODA        official development assistance
ODF        official development finance
OECD       Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
UR         Uruguay Round
URA        Uruguay Round Trade Agreements
USAID      U.S. Agency for International Development
USDA       U.S. Department of Agriculture
WTO        World Trade Organization


Page 21                                 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix I

Current Status of Global Food Security


                   Although the problem of food insecurity is widespread in the developing
                   world, the total number of undernourished people is unknown, and
                   estimates vary widely. An accurate assessment of the number of people
                   with inadequate access to food would require data from national sample
                   surveys designed to measure both the food consumption and the food
                   requirements of individuals. Such studies may include a dietary survey and
                   a clinical survey that involves anthropometric, or body, measurements,1
                   and biochemical analyses. According to the Food and Agriculture
                   Organization (FAO), clinical and anthropometric examinations are the most
                   practical and sound means of determining the nutritional status of any
                   particular group of individuals in most developing countries in Africa,
                   Asia, and Latin America because the countries lack vital statistics,
                   accurate figures on agricultural production, and laboratories where
                   biochemical tests can be performed. However, clinical examinations have
                   often been given a low priority by developing countries, and studies of
                   anthropometric measurements have been undertaken very infrequently.
                   National dietary intake surveys are costly and time-consuming and have
                   also been undertaken in very few countries. As a result, there are no
                   internationally comparable, comprehensive survey data for tracking
                   changes in undernutrition for individuals and population groups within
                   countries, according to FAO.2


                   For many years FAO has employed a method to estimate the prevalence of
FAO’s Method for   chronic undernourishment at the country level that is subject to a number
Estimating         of weaknesses. Nevertheless, FAO estimates are frequently cited in the
Undernourishment   absence of better estimates. FAO uses (1) food balance sheets that estimate
                   the amount of food available to each country over a 3-year period and
                   (2) estimates of each country’s total population to calculate the average
                   available per capita daily supply of calories during that period. FAO then
                   estimates the minimum average per capita dietary requirements for the
                   country’s population, allowing for only light physical activity. Then, in
                   combination with an estimate of inequality in the distribution of food
                   among households in the country, it derives the percentage distribution of
                   the population by per capita calorie consumption classes. On the basis of
                   this distribution and a cutoff point for food inadequacy based on the
                   estimate of the minimum average per capita dietary energy requirements,


                   1
                    Measurements of the body, such as height and weight, are made and compared to population norms.
                   For example, chronic undernourishment in children may result in stunting (low height for age),
                   underweight (low weight for age), and wasting (low weight for height).
                   2
                    See Michael C. Latham, Human Nutrition in the Developing World (Rome, Italy: FAO, 1997) and The
                   Sixth World Food Survey (Rome, Italy: FAO, 1996).



                   Page 22                                                 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix I
Current Status of Global Food Security




the proportion of undernourished is estimated. This is then multiplied by
an estimate of the size of the population to obtain the absolute number of
undernourished .

According to FAO, a minimum level of energy requirements is one that
allows for only light physical activity. Depending on the country, FAO says,
the minimum level of energy requirements for the average person ranges
from 1,720 to 1,960 calories per day. Depending on data availability, FAO’s
assessment of equitable food distribution for a country is based on survey
data on household food energy intake, food expenditure, total income or
expenditure, and/or the weighted average of estimates for neighboring
countries.

FAO’s method has a number of weaknesses, and the validity of its estimates
has not been established. For example, FAO’s food supply figures are based
on 3-year averages, and population estimates are for the midpoint of the
reference period used. As a result, FAO’s estimates of the prevalence of
undernutrition do not reflect the short-term, seasonal variations in food
production or availability in countries. In addition, FAO’s method relies on
total calories available from food supplies and ignores dietary deficiencies
that can occur due to the lack of adequate amounts of protein and
essential micronutrients (for example, vitamins essential in minute
amounts for growth and well-being). FAO’s method for measuring
inequality in food distribution or access is ideally based on food
consumption data from household surveys, but the number of developing
countries for which such data are available is limited, and the surveys may
not be national in scope or may have been done infrequently. FAO uses
these data to estimate parameters for countries for which data are not
available.

FAO acknowledges that the quality and reliability of data relating to food
production, trade, and population vary from country to country and that
for many developing countries the data are either inaccurate or
incomplete. According to one critic of FAO’s method, FAO’s estimates are
unreliable indicators of the scope of the undernutrition problem and
erroneously find chronic undernutrition to be most prevalent in Africa.
The main reasons for the latter finding are systematic bias in methods
used by African countries to estimate food production and, to a lesser
extent, certain minor food items that are not completely covered in FAO’s
food balance sheets. The author concludes that anthropometric
measurements, based as they are on measurements of individuals, would




Page 23                                     GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix I
Current Status of Global Food Security




be a more promising method for future estimates of undernourishment
than estimates based on FAO’s aggregate approach.3

FAO’s method does not provide information on the effects of chronic
undernourishment (for example, the prevalence of growth retardation and
specific nutritional deficiencies), does not specify where the chronically
undernourished live within a country, and does not identify the principal
causes of their undernutrition. According to FAO and other experts, such
information is needed to develop effective policies and programs for
reducing undernourishment. In addition, FAO does not provide estimates
for developed countries and does not provide estimates of chronic
undernutrition of less than 1 percent.

Overall, according to FAO, its estimates of food availability and/or the
prevalence of undernutrition for many countries are subject to errors of
unknown magnitude and direction. Nonetheless, FAO believes that its
estimates permit one to know generally in which countries undernutrition
is most acute. According to FAO, the consensus of a group of experts that it
consulted in March 1997 was that (1) despite the deficiencies of its
method, FAO had no current substitute for assessing chronic
undernutrition than its food balance sheets based on per capita food
availability and distribution; (2) FAO’s approach tends to underestimate
consistently per capita food availability in African countries because of its
inadequate coverage of noncereal crops; (3) attention needs to be given
not just to indications of severe malnutrition but also to mild and
moderate malnutrition; and (4) more subregional information is needed on
malnutrition and on local levels of food stocks and trade, wages and
market conditions, and household perceptions of medium-term food
insecurity. It was also argued that about 67 percent of child deaths are
associated with nonclinically malnourished children.

In analyses for the World Food Summit, FAO estimated that about
840 million people in 93 developing countries were chronically
undernourished during 1990-92.4 These countries represented about
98.5 percent of the population in all developing countries. According to the
FAO estimates, a relatively small number of countries account for most of
the chronically undernourished in the 93 countries (see table I.1). For
example, during 1990-92, China and India were estimated to have about


3
Peter Svedberg, “841 Million Undernourished? On the Tyranny of Deriving a Number,” Seminar Paper
No. 656 (Stockholm, Sweden: Institute for International Economic Studies, Oct. 1998).
4
 FAO reported a revised number in 1998 but not on an individual country basis. See table I.3 and the
accompanying discussion.



Page 24                                                    GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix I
Current Status of Global Food Security




189 million and 185 million chronically undernourished, respectively;
collectively, they had nearly 45 percent of the total for all 93 countries.
Five countries—Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Nigeria, and
Pakistan—accounted for between 20 million and 43 million chronically
undernourished each. The next 13 countries represented between about
6 million and 17 million of the chronically undernourished. Altogether, the
20 countries accounted for about 679 million, or nearly 81 percent, of the
undernourished in the 93 countries.




Page 25                                    GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
                                       Appendix I
                                       Current Status of Global Food Security




Table I.1: FAO Estimates of
Chronically Undernourished People in                                                                Number of
93 Developing Countries, 1990-92                                                              undernourished
                                                                                            as percent of total
                                                                                Number of            number of
                                                                           undernourished     undernourished               Cumulative
                                       Country                                   (millions)   for all countries               percent
                                       China                                         188.9                   22.5                   22.5
                                       India                                         184.5                   22.0                   44.5
                                       Nigeria                                         42.9                   5.1                   49.6
                                       Bangladesh                                      39.4                   4.7                   54.3
                                       Ethiopia                                        33.2                   4.0                   58.3
                                       Indonesia                                       22.1                   2.6                   60.9
                                       Pakistan                                        20.5                   2.4                   63.4
                                       Vietnam                                         17.2                   2.1                   65.4
                                       Zaire                                           14.9                   1.8                   67.2
                                       Thailand                                        14.4                   1.7                   68.9
                                       Philippines                                     13.1                   1.6                   70.5
                                       Afghanistan                                     12.9                   1.5                   72.0
                                       Kenya                                           11.3                   1.3                   73.4
                                       Peru                                            10.7                   1.3                   74.6
                                       Tanzania                                        10.3                   1.2                   75.9
                                       Sudan                                            9.7                   1.2                   77.0
                                       Brazil                                           9.7                   1.2                   78.2
                                       Mozambique                                       9.6                   1.1                   79.3
                                       Mexico                                           7.2                   0.9                   80.2
                                       Somalia                                          6.4                   0.8                   80.9
                                       Subtotal                                      678.9                   80.9                   80.9
                                       Second 20 countriesa                            91.0                  10.8                   91.8
                                       Third 20 countries                              49.8                   5.9                   97.7
                                       Fourth 20 countries                             16.6                   2.0                   99.7
                                       Last 13 countries                                2.4                   0.3                 100.0
                                       Total                                         838.7                 100.0                  100.0
                                       Note: Countries are ranked in descending order based on the number of undernourished.
                                       a
                                        Aggregate number of undernourished people for the next 20 countries with the largest number of
                                       undernourished people.

                                       Source: Our analysis of FAO data.



                                       As table I.2 shows, great variation also characterizes the extent to which
                                       chronic undernutrition is a problem within countries. According to FAO



                                       Page 26                                                 GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
                                         Appendix I
                                         Current Status of Global Food Security




                                         figures, a majority of the countries were estimated to have chronically
                                         undernourished people at a rate ranging between 11 and 40 percent in
                                         1990-92, and 19 had rates ranging between 41 and 73 percent.

Table I.2: Distribution of Chronically
Undernourished, 1990-92                                                                                 Total number of
                                                                                                             chronically
                                         Percent of country’s population             Number of          undernourished
                                         chronically undernourished                   countries                (millions)
                                         1 - 10                                              18                       40
                                         11 - 20                                             17                      255
                                         21 - 30                                             24                      267
                                         31 - 40                                             15                      146
                                         41 - 50                                              9                       50
                                         51 - 60                                              3                        9
                                         61 - 70                                              5                       53
                                         71 - 73                                              2                       19
                                         Total                                               93                      839
                                         Source: Our analysis of FAO data.



                                         Table I.3 provides estimates of the number of undernourished people in
                                         developing country regions of the world between 1969-71 and 1994-96.
                                         (The figures include FAO revised estimates for the periods prior to 1994-96.5
                                         As a result, the total for 1990-92 is slightly lower than that shown in
                                         tables I.1 and I.2.) FAO’s estimates indicate that the developing world as a
                                         whole made considerable progress in reducing the level of chronic
                                         undernourishment between 1969-71 and 1990-92, from an estimated
                                         37 percent of the total population to 20 percent. However, the absolute
                                         number of undernourished was reduced by only 14.3 percent during the
                                         period—from 959 million to about 822 million—because the total
                                         population of the developing world increased by nearly 1.5 billion people
                                         during that time. Also, a large number of states did so poorly that their
                                         chronically undernourished people increased both absolutely and as a
                                         percentage of their total population. Between 1990-92 and 1994-96, the
                                         proportion of undernourished people in the developing world declined
                                         another 1 percent, but the number of undernourished increased by about
                                         6 million people.




                                         5
                                          See footnote in table I.3.



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                                       Appendix I
                                       Current Status of Global Food Security




Table I.3: Estimates of Incidence of
Chronic Undernourishment in                                                                     Total        Undernourished
Developing Countries by Regions of                                    Year (3-year        population Percentage of        Persons
the World, 1969-71 to 1994-96          Region                           averages)          (millions) total population   (millions)
                                       Sub-Saharan Africa                  1969-71                 268                   40             108
                                                                           1979-81                 352                   41             145
                                                                           1990-92                 484                   40             196
                                                                           1994-96                 543                   39             211
                                       Near East and North
                                       Africa                              1969-71                 182                   28                  51
                                                                           1979-81                 239                   12                  29
                                                                           1990-92                 325                   11                  34
                                                                           1994-96                 360                   12                  42
                                       East and Southeast Asia             1969-71               1,166                   43             506
                                                                           1979-81               1,418                   29             413
                                                                           1990-92               1,688                   17             289
                                                                           1994-96               1,773                   15             258
                                       South Asia                          1969-71                 711                   33             238
                                                                           1979-81                 892                   34             302
                                                                           1990-92               1,137                   21             237
                                                                           1994-96               1,223                   21             254
                                       Latin America and the
                                       Caribbean                           1969-71                 279                   20                  55
                                                                           1979-81                 354                   14                  48
                                                                           1990-92                 440                   15                  64
                                                                           1994-96                 470                   13                  63
                                       Totals                              1969-71               2,609                   37             959
                                                                           1979-81               3,259                   29             938
                                                                           1990-92               4,078                   20             822a
                                                                           1994-96               4,374                   19             828
                                       a
                                        In May 1998, FAO provided revised estimates of the number and percentage of undernourished
                                       people by regions of the world for 1969-71, 1979-81, and 1990-92 and for the first time provided
                                       estimates for 1994-96. According to FAO, the revised numbers reflect the reestimation of
                                       historical population figures by the U.N. Population Division. (As examples of the changes, FAO
                                       previously estimated the number of undernourished people for all developing regions at
                                       917 million in 1969-71, 905 million in 1979-81, and 839 million in 1990-92.) However, FAO did not
                                       release data on a country-by-country basis for either its revised or new estimates. As a result,
                                       other tables in this report that are based on individual country data use FAO’s previous estimates.

                                       Source: FAO.



                                       Although the percentage of chronically undernourished people in the
                                       developing world was considerably reduced between 1969-71 and 1994-96,



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                   Appendix I
                   Current Status of Global Food Security




                   sub-Saharan Africa’s reduction was very small. According to FAO’s
                   estimates, in 1994-96 the proportion of sub-Saharan Africa’s population
                   that was undernourished greatly exceeded that of the other regions of the
                   world. However, in absolute numbers, the most undernourished persons
                   were still found in East and Southeast Asia and in South Asia.


                   A 1997 U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Economic Research Service
USDA Estimate of   (ERS) study employed an alternative indirect method for estimating the
Undernutrition     amount of undernutrition at the country level that is similar to FAO’s
                   method in some respects.6 Like FAO, ERS estimates food availability within
                   a country. It also adopts a minimum daily caloric intake standard
                   necessary to sustain life with minimum food-gathering activities. However,
                   the standard is higher than that used by FAO (for light physical
                   activity)—ranging between about 2,000 and 2,200 calories per day,
                   depending on the country. According to ERS, its standard is comparable to
                   the activity level for a refugee; it does not allow for play, work, or any
                   activity other than food gathering. ERS estimates how inequality affects the
                   distribution of available food supplies based on consumption or income
                   distribution data for five different groups of the population. Like FAO’s
                   estimate, ERS’ estimate is highly dependent on the availability and quality
                   of national-level data.

                   In 1997, ERS used its method to estimate the number of undernourished in
                   58 of the 93 developing countries regularly reported on by FAO. ERS
                   estimated that during 1990-92, about 1.038 billion people could not meet
                   their nutritional requirements—nearly 200 million more than FAO’s
                   estimate of 839 million people for 93 countries. FAO’s data for the same 58
                   countries indicates 574 million chronically undernourished, about
                   45 percent less than USDA’s estimate. One reason for the much larger
                   estimates resulting from the USDA approach are the higher standards used
                   for minimum energy requirements that were previously noted .7




                   6
                    Food Security Assessment, USDA/ERS (Washington, D.C.: USDA, November 1997).
                   7
                    In estimating per capita food supply availability, ERS limited its analysis to grains and root crops.
                   These two food commodity groups account for as much as 80 percent of all calories consumed in the
                   countries. ERS adjusted its minimum caloric requirements to reflect the total share of grains and root
                   crops in the diet of each country.



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                   Appendix I
                   Current Status of Global Food Security




                   Another important source of data on the status of food security in the
World Health       developing world is the World Health Organization’s global database on
Organization       growth in children under age 5. Since 1986, the World Health Organization
Undernourishment   has sought to assemble and systematize the results of representative
                   anthropometric surveys conducted in different parts of the world. The
Estimates          data indicate that about 2 out of 5 children in the developing world are
                   stunted (low height for age), 1 out of 3 underweight (low weight for age),
                   and 1 out of 11 wasted (low weight for height). In absolute numbers, the
                   estimates for 1990 are 230 million stunted children, 193 million
                   underweight, and 50 million wasted under the age of 5.8 According to the
                   U.N. Children’s Fund, more than 6 million children in developing countries
                   die each year from causes either directly or indirectly tied to malnutrition.




                   8
                    The results were based on nationally representative surveys conducted in 79 developing countries
                   between 1980 and 1992. The World Health Organization estimated the number of underweight, stunted,
                   and wasted children for 1990 by applying prevalence estimates to the population of under 5 year olds
                   in 1990.



                   Page 30                                                  GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix II

World Food Summit’s Commitments,
Objectives, and Select Actions for
Promoting Food Security
                                           The 185 countries that attended the World Food Summit pledged their
                                           actions and support to implement a plan of action for reducing food
                                           insecurity. The plan includes 7 major commitments, 27 subordinate
                                           objectives, and 181 specific actions. The commitments, subordinate
                                           objectives, and 24 of the specific actions relating to a variety of objectives
                                           are summarized in table II.1.1


Table II.1: Commitments, Objectives, and Select Examples of Actions in the World Food Summit’s Plan of Action
Commitment, objective,
and action                  Summary
1                           Ensure an enabling political, social, and economic environment designed to create the best conditions
                            for the eradication of poverty and for durable peace, based on full and equal participation of men and
                            women.
1.1                         Prevent and resolve conflicts peacefully and create a stable political environment through respect for all
                            human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy, a transparent and effective legal system,
                            transparent and accountable governance and administration in all public and private national and
                            international institutions, and effective and equal participation of all people in decisions and actions that
                            affect their food security.
1.2                         Ensure stable economic conditions and implement development strategies that encourage the full
                            potential of private and public initiatives for sustainable, equitable, economic, and social development
                            that also integrate population and environmental concerns.
1.2 (b)                     Establish legal and other mechanisms that advance land reform and promote the sustainable use of
                            natural resources.
1.3                         Ensure gender equality and empowerment of women.
1.3 (b)                     Promote women’s full and equal participation in the economy.
1.4                         Encourage national solidarity and provide equal opportunities for all in social, economic, and political
                            life, particularly vulnerable and disadvantaged people.
1.4 (a)                     Support investment in human resource development, such as health, education, and other skills
                            essential to sustainable development.
2                           Implement policies aimed at eradicating poverty and inequality and improving physical and economic
                            access by all.
2.1                         Pursue poverty eradication and food sustainability for all as a policy priority and promote employment
                            and equal access to resources, such as land, water, and credit, to maximize incomes of the poor.
2.1 (f)                     Promote farmers’ access to genetic resources for agriculture.
2.2                         Enable the food insecure to meet their food and nutritional requirements and seek to assist those unable
                            to do so.
2.2 (a)                     Develop national information and mapping systems to identify localized areas of food insecurity and
                            vulnerability.
2.2 (b)                     Implement cost-effective public works programs for the underemployed.
2.2 (c)                     Develop targeted welfare and nutrition safety nets.
                                                                                                                                       (continued)

                                           1
                                            Commitments are denoted by a whole number, objectives by a decimal number, and actions by a
                                           decimal number and a letter. We selected 24 actions to further illustrate the depth and specificity of
                                           the summit’s plan. Including all of the actions would have considerably expanded the length of the
                                           table.



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                                        Appendix II
                                        World Food Summit’s Commitments,
                                        Objectives, and Select Actions for
                                        Promoting Food Security




Commitment, objective,
and action               Summary
2.3                      Ensure that food supplies are safe, physically and economically accessible, appropriate, and adequate
                         to meet the needs of the food insecure.
2.4                      Promote access to education and health care for all.
3                        Pursue participatory and sustainable food, agriculture, fisheries, forestry, and rural development policies
                         and practices, in areas with low as well as high potential, that are essential for adequate and reliable
                         food supplies at the household, national, regional, and global levels and combat pests, drought, and
                         desertification.
3.1                      Pursue, through participatory means, sustainable, intensified, and diversified food production, and
                         increased productivity and efficiency and reduced losses, taking into account the need to sustain
                         resources.
3.2                      Combat environmental threats to food security, in particular droughts and desertification, pests, and
                         erosion of biological diversity, and restore the natural resource base, including watersheds, to achieve
                         greater production.
3.3                      Promote sound policies and programs on the transfer and use of technologies, skills development, and
                         training for food security needs.
3.4                      Strengthen and broaden research and scientific cooperation on agriculture, fisheries, and forestry to
                         support policy and international, national, and local actions to increase productive potential and
                         maintain the natural resource base in agriculture, fisheries, and forestry and in support of efforts to
                         eradicate poverty and promote food security.
3.5                      Formulate and implement integrated rural development strategies, in high and low potential areas, that
                         promote employment, skills, infrastructure, institutions, and services in support of food security.
3.5 (b)                  Strengthen local government institutions in rural areas and provide them with adequate resources,
                         decision-making authority, and mechanisms for grassroots participation.
3.5 (h)                  Promote the development of rural banking, credit, and savings schemes, including equal access to
                         credit for men and women, microcredit for the poor, and adequate insurance mechanisms.
4                        Strive to ensure that food, trade, and overall trade policies are conducive to fostering food security for all
                         through a fair and market-oriented world trade system.
4.1                      Use the opportunities arising from the international trade framework established in recent global and
                         regional trade negotiations.
4.1 (a)                  Establish well-functioning internal marketing and transportation systems to facilitate local, national, and
                         international trade.
4.2                      Meet essential food import needs in all countries, considering world price and supply fluctuations and
                         taking into account food consumption levels of vulnerable groups in developing countries.
4.2 (b)                  Food-exporting countries should act as reliable sources of supplies to their trading partners and give
                         due consideration to the food security of importing countries.
4.2 (c)                  Reduce subsidies on food exports in conformity with the Uruguay Round Agreements.
4.3                      Support the continuation of the reform process in conformity with the Uruguay Round Agreements.
5                        Endeavor to prevent and be prepared for natural disasters and man-made emergencies and meet
                         transitory and emergency food requirements in ways that encourage recovery, rehabilitation, and
                         development of a capacity to satisfy future needs.
5.1                      Reduce demands for emergency food assistance through efforts to prevent and resolve man-made
                         emergencies, particularly international, national, and local conflicts.
5.2                      Establish as quickly as possible prevention and preparedness strategies for low-income, food-deficit
                         countries and areas vulnerable to emergencies.
                                                                                                                           (continued)



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                                        Appendix II
                                        World Food Summit’s Commitments,
                                        Objectives, and Select Actions for
                                        Promoting Food Security




Commitment, objective,
and action               Summary
5.3                      Improve or develop efficient and effective emergency response mechanisms at international, regional,
                         national, and local levels.
5.4                      Strengthen links between relief operations and development programs to facilitate the transition from
                         relief to development.
6                        Promote optimal allocation and use of public and private investments to foster human resources,
                         sustainable food and agricultural systems, and rural development.
6.1                      Create the policy framework and conditions that encourage optimal public and private investments in
                         the equitable and sustainable development of food systems, rural development, and human resources
                         necessary to contribute to food security.
6.2                      Endeavor to mobilize and optimize the use of technical and financial resources from all sources,
                         including debt relief, to raise investment in sustainable food production in developing countries.
6.2 (a)                  Raise sufficient and stable funding from private, public, domestic, and international sources to achieve
                         and sustain food security.
6.2 (e)                  Strengthen efforts towards the fulfillment of the agreed official development assistance target of 0.7
                         percent of the gross national product.
6.2 (f)                  Focus official development assistance (ODA) toward countries that have a real need for it, especially
                         low-income countries.
6.2 (g)                  Explore ways of mobilizing public and private financial resources for food security through the
                         appropriate reduction of excessive military expenditures.
7                        Implement, monitor, and follow up the summit plan of action at all levels in cooperation with the
                         international community.
7.1                      Adopt actions within each country’s national framework to enhance food security and enable
                         implementation of the commitments of the World Food Summit plan of action.
7.1 (a)                  Review and revise, as appropriate, national plans, programs, and strategies to achieve food security
                         consistent with summit commitments.
7.1 (b)                  Establish or improve national mechanisms to set priorities and develop, implement, and monitor the
                         components of action for food security within designated time frames.
7.1 (c)                  In collaboration with civil society, formulate and launch national food-for-all campaigns to mobilize all
                         stakeholders and their resources in support of the summit plan of action.
7.1 (d)                  Actively encourage a greater role for, and alliance with, civil society.
7.2                      Improve subregional, regional, and international cooperation and mobilize and optimize the use of
                         available resources to support national efforts for the earliest achievement of sustainable food security.
7.2 (d)                  Continue the coordinated follow-up by the U.N. system to the major U.N. conferences and summits
                         since 1990; reduce duplication and fill in gaps in coverage, making concrete proposals for
                         strengthening and improving coordination with governments.
7.2 (i)                  Relevant international organizations are invited, on request, to assist countries in reviewing and
                         formulating national plans of action, including targets, goals, and timetables for achieving food security.
7.3                      Actively monitor the implementation of the summit plan of action.
7.3 (a)                  Establish, through FAO’s Committee on Food Security, a timetable, procedures, and standardized
                         reporting formats, on the national and regional implementation of the summit plan of action.
7.3 (e)                  Monitor, through the Committee on Food Security, implementation of the summit action.plan.
7.4                      Clarify the right to adequate food and the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger, as
                         stated in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and other relevant
                         international and regional instruments.
                                                                                                                          (continued)


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                                        Appendix II
                                        World Food Summit’s Commitments,
                                        Objectives, and Select Actions for
                                        Promoting Food Security




Commitment, objective,
and action               Summary
7.5                      Share responsibilities for achieving food security for all so that implementation of the summit plan of
                         action takes place at the lowest possible level at which its purpose is best achieved.

                                        Source: Rome Declaration on World Food Security and World Food Summit Plan of Action (Rome,
                                        Italy: FAO, Nov. 13, 1996).




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Appendix III

Resources for Financing Food Security


               As defined by the countries at the summit, achieving improved world food
               security by 2015 is largely a development problem, the primary
               responsibility for attaining food security rests with individual countries,
               ODA1 could be of critical importance to countries and sectors left aside by
               other external sources of finance, and developing country governments
               should adopt policies that promote foreign and direct investment and
               effective use of ODA.

               There is a growing body of evidence that foreign financial aid works well
               in a good policy environment. For example, according to a recent World
               Bank report,2 financial assistance leads to faster growth, poverty
               reduction, and gains in social indicators with sound economic
               management. With sound country management, the report said, 1 percent
               of gross domestic product in assistance translates into a 1 percent decline
               in poverty and a similar decline in infant mortality. The report concluded
               that improvements in economic institutions and policies in the developing
               world are the key to a quantum leap in poverty reduction and that effective
               financial aid complements private investment . Conversely, financial aid
               has much less impact in a weak policy environment.

               The report’s conclusions are consistent with the approach espoused by the
               summit. For example, according to the summit countries, a sound policy
               environment in which food-related investment can fulfill its potential is
               essential. More specifically, summit participants said governments should
               provide an economic and legal framework that promotes efficient markets
               that encourage private sector mobilization of savings, investment, and
               capital formation. In addition, the participants said that the international
               community has a role to play in supporting the adoption of appropriate
               national policies and, where necessary and appropriate, in providing
               technical and financial assistance to assist developing countries in
               fostering food security .

               Table III.1 shows, as could be expected, that a majority of the more
               food-insecure countries are low-income countries and many of them are
               also least developed. Of 93 developing countries reported on in the table,


               1
                ODA includes grants or loans to developing countries at concessional financial terms (if a loan, having
               a grant element of at least 25 percent), with the promotion of economic development and welfare as
               the main objective. Technical cooperation is included in aid. Grants, loans, and credits for military
               purposes are excluded. Official development finance includes (1) bilateral ODA, (2) grants and
               concessional and nonconcessional development lending by multilateral financial institutions, and
               (3) other official financing that is considered developmental (including refinancing loans) but the grant
               element is too low to qualify as ODA.
               2
                David Dollar and Lant Pritchett, Assessing Aid (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).



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                                              Appendix III
                                              Resources for Financing Food Security




                                              72 had inadequate food supplies in 1990-92. Forty-six of the countries were
                                              low income (that is, they had a gross national product per capita of less
                                              than $766), and 34 of the 46 countries were designated as “least
                                              developed,” meaning they were the poorest countries in the world.
                                              Together, the 46 countries accounted for more than 700 million of the
                                              chronically undernourished people in developing countries in 1990-92.


Table III.1: Relationship Between Income Levels of Developing Countries and Food Security
                                                           Income levelb (number of countries)
                                                           Least
Average daily calories                            developed, low           Other low       Lower middle         Upper middle
per capitaa                                              income              income             income               income                    Total
            c
Inadequate                  Less than 2,100                    16                    3                    3                    0                     22
                            2,100 to 2,400                     15                    8                    9                    1                     33
                            2,400 to 2,700                       3                   1                    8                    5                     17
                            Subtotal                           34                   12                   20                    6                     72
Adequatec                   Greater than
                            2,700                                0                   2                   11                    8                     21
Total number of
countries                                                      34                   14                   31                  14                      93
Number of chronically
undernourished people (in
millions)                                                     212                  508                   90                  29                     839
                                              Notes: Data on average per capita calories and number of chronically undernourished people are
                                              for 1990-92. Data on income levels are for 1995.
                                              a
                                              Average is based on available food supply at the country level.
                                              b
                                               The U.N. General Assembly designates countries as “least developed” on the basis of several
                                              criteria; they are the poorest countries in the world. Other country designations are, according to
                                              the World Bank classification of 1995, gross national product per capita: low income—less than
                                              $766; lower middle income—between $766 and $3,035; upper middle income—between $3,036
                                              and $9,385; high-income—above $9,385.
                                              c
                                               We designated countries as having inadequate or adequate daily per capita energy supplies
                                              based on an FAO analysis of the relationship between average per capita daily energy supplies
                                              and chronic undernutrition. According to FAO, for countries having an average daily per capita
                                              undernutrition threshold ranging between 1,750 calories and 1,900 calories and a moderate level
                                              of unequal food distribution, between 21 percent and 33 percent of the population will be below
                                              the undernutrition threshold if the average per capita daily energy supply is 2,100 calories. If the
                                              average per capita daily energy supply is 2,400 calories, 7 to 13 percent of the population will be
                                              undernourished. At 2,700 calories, 2 to 4 percent of the population will be undernourished. If food
                                              is distributed more equitably, the percentage of the population that is undernourished decreases,
                                              and vice versa.

                                              Source: Our analysis of FAO and U.N. data.




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                                         Appendix III
                                         Resources for Financing Food Security




                                         Table III.2 shows that between 1990 and 1997, Organization for Economic
                                         Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee
                                         countries’ allocation of ODA averaged $60.9 billion (1996 prices and
                                         exchange rates). However, ODA has been steadily declining, from a high of
                                         $66.5 billion in 1991 to $52.7 billion in 1997.


Table III.2: Total Net Resource Flows From OECD Development Assistance Committee Countries and Multilateral Agencies
to Aid Recipient Countries, 1990-97
Dollars in billions (1996 prices and exchange rates)
Net resource flows                      1990           1991        1992       1993       1994        1995        1996      1997a       Mean
Official development finance            $91.7          $98.2       $85.7     $93.5       $92.3      $87.1       $78.1       $75.4       $87.8
  ODAb                                   60.6           66.5        63.8       62.5       64.5        58.4       57.9        52.7        60.9
  Other ODF                              31.0           31.7        21.9       31.0       27.8        28.8       20.2        22.6        26.9
Total export credits                     11.4               0.7      1.1       –3.3         6.7        5.5         4.0       –4.7         2.7
Private flows                            52.4           58.8        84.2       91.4      135.5      164.2       286.3       222.0       136.8
Total                                  $155.4        $157.7       $171.0    $181.5     $234.5      $256.9      $368.4     $292.6       $227.3
Percent of total
Official development finance                  59             62      50          52         39          34         21          26         39
        b
  ODA                                         39             42      37          34         28          23         16          18         27
  Other ODF                                   20             20      13          17         12          11           5          8         12
Total export credits                           7             0        1          –2           3          2           1         –2          1
Private flows                                 34             37      49          50         58          64         78          76         60
Total                                        100            100     100        100         100        100         100         100        100
                                         Note: Official development finance—ODF.
                                         a
                                             Provisional.
                                         b
                                             Excluding forgiveness of nonofficial development assistance debt for the years 1990-92.

                                         Source: GAO calculation using OECD data.



                                         For many years, OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has
                                         supported a target of providing ODA equivalent to 0.7 percent of the gross
                                         national product.3 This goal was reaffirmed by most DAC countries at the
                                         World Food Summit. As table III.3 shows, since the early 1980s ODA as a
                                         percent of the gross national product has declined for most DAC countries,
                                         including the five largest providers (France, Germany, Japan, the United




                                         3
                                          The target was established by the United Nations in 1970 as an appropriate level for ODA.



                                         Page 37                                                    GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix III
Resources for Financing Food Security




Kingdom, and the United States).4 Only four countries met the ODA target
in 1997 (Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and Sweden), and they
represent a small amount of the ODA provided by the DAC countries. For the
DAC countries in total, ODA represented 0.34 percent of their combined
gross national product during 1980-84 and only 0.22 percent in 1997. Most
countries’ ODA in 1997 ranged between only 0.22 percent and 0.36 percent
of their gross national product. The United States was the lowest,
contributing only 0.08 percent of its gross national product, or about
one-ninth of the DAC target.




4
 The OECD’s figures on ODA for the United States do not fully agree with U.S. figures, since OECD
data are reported on a calendar year basis while U.S. figures are reported for fiscal years. In addition,
the OECD’s definition for ODA differs somewhat from the definition the United States uses in its
reports.



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                                        Appendix III
                                        Resources for Financing Food Security




Table III.3: ODA Performance of OECD DAC Countries, 1980-97
                                                                                               1997 ODA in dollars (billions)
                            ODA as a percent of gross national product                                 Target amount              Shortfallb
                            1980/84      1985/89         1990/94          1995/97                       of 0.7 percent           relative to
Country                     average      average         average          average            Actual            of GNPa          target goal
Australia                      0.48          0.42             0.36             0.31           $1.08               $2.65               $1.57
Austria                        0.29          0.23             0.30             0.28            0.53                 1.44                0.91
Belgium                        0.56          0.46             0.39             0.34            0.76                 1.72                0.96
Canada                         0.45          0.47             0.45             0.35            2.15                 4.19                2.04
Denmark                        0.76          0.89             1.00             0.99            1.64                 1.18              –0.46
Finland                        0.29          0.54             0.57             0.33            0.38                 0.81                0.43
France                         0.53          0.59             0.62             0.50            6.35                 9.80                3.45
Germany                        0.46          0.41             0.38             0.31            5.91               14.58                 8.67
Ireland                        0.20          0.21             0.19             0.30            0.19                 0.42                0.23
Italy                          0.20          0.37             0.31             0.15            1.23                 8.02                6.79
Japan                          0.31          0.31             0.30             0.23            9.36               29.72               20.36
Luxembourg                     0.20          0.18             0.31             0.43            0.09                 0.12                0.03
Netherlands                    1.01          0.97             0.85             0.81            2.95                 2.56              –0.39
New Zealand                    0.28          0.26             0.25             0.23            0.14                 0.41                0.26
Norway                         0.97          1.09             1.10             0.86            1.31                 1.06              –0.24
Portugal                       0.03          0.16             0.31             0.24            0.25                 0.71                0.46
Spain                          0.09          0.10             0.25             0.23            1.23                 3.72                2.49
Sweden                         0.85          0.89             0.96             0.79            1.67                 1.53              –0.14
Switzerland                    0.27          0.31             0.36             0.33            0.84                 1.85                1.01
United Kingdom                 0.37          0.31             0.30             0.27            3.37                 9.16                5.78
United Statesc                 0.24          0.20             0.18             0.10            6.17               56.42               50.25
Total DAC                      0.34          0.33             0.32             0.25          $47.58            $152.06              $104.48
                                        a
                                         Actual and shortfall numbers may not exactly total to the target amount due to rounding.
                                        b
                                         A negative number means the country’s ODA exceeded the 0.7 percent of gross national
                                        product (GNP) target.
                                        c
                                         The United States has never approved the ODA target. According to U.S. government officials,
                                        the government has no plans to try to meet the target.

                                        Source: Our analysis of OECD data.



                                        Apart from ODA, the United States devotes substantial resources to
                                        promoting global peace through its participation in a variety of strategic
                                        alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and maintenance
                                        of the world’s most sophisticated defense forces. U.S. expenditures on ODA




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                       Appendix III
                       Resources for Financing Food Security




                       and defense combined in 1995 represented 3.9 percent of the U.S. gross
                       national product—a higher percentage than that for any other DAC country.
                       (The average for all other DAC countries was 2.4 percent, with a range from
                       1.1 percent for Luxembourg to 3.6 percent for France.)

                       According to the OECD, reasons for the decline include the end of the Cold
                       War, which removed a traditional and well-understood security rationale
                       for development assistance, preoccupation with domestic issues and
                       budgetary pressures in some donor countries, and fiscal restraint policies
                       that have included disproportionate cuts in development assistance
                       budgets. In June 1998, the OECD reported that fiscal restraint programs had
                       succeeded in reducing OECD public deficits from 4.3 percent of combined
                       gross domestic product in 1993 to 1.3 percent in 1997. The OECD said that
                       the continuing decline in ODA ran counter to the widespread improvements
                       in the economic and budgetary situations of the DAC member countries and
                       to their clearly stated policy goals for increasing ODA.

                       According to a June 1998 report by FAO (based on information provided by
                       only some of the DAC countries), Ireland plans to increase its ODA to
                       0.45 percent of its gross national product by 2002 (compared to
                       0.31 percent in 1997); Switzerland plans to increase its ODA to 0.45 percent
                       of its gross national product (from 0.32 percent in 1997 ), but the year for
                       reaching this level was not cited; and Norway seeks to raise its assistance
                       to 1 percent of gross national product by the year 2000 (compared to
                       0.86 percent in 1995).


                       As table III.2 shows, private sector resource flows applied to the
Private Sector         developing world have grown dramatically during the 1990s, from
Resource Flows to      $52.4 billion in 1990 to about $286 billion in 1996 (1996 prices and
Developing Countries   exchange rates), although private flows declined in 1997 to an estimated
                       $222 billion. Although the flow of private resources has increased
                       considerably, the vast majority of the world’s poorest countries continue
                       to rely heavily on official development financing.5 According to the OECD
                       and the World Bank, with some exceptions, these countries are as yet
                       unable to tap significant, sustainable amounts of private capital; without
                       official assistance, these countries’ progress toward financial
                       independence will be slow and difficult.


                       5
                        In 1995, the world’s poorest countries attracted almost no foreign direct investment or loans from
                       international banks. They have very limited access to foreign portfolio debt or equity finance. Many
                       lack the financial market structures to handle such financing, a gap that also impairs their ability to
                       mobilize domestic financial resources.



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Resources for Financing Food Security




One measure of the difficulty of attracting private investment to the most
food-insecure countries and peoples is shown in table III.4. The table
relates creditworthiness ratings of the risk of investing in 92 developing
countries to the level of their food security. The ratings are from
Euromoney, a leading international publication, that assigns ratings as a
weighted average of indicators of economic performance, political risk,
debt, credit, and access to bank finance, short-term trade finance, and
capital. Ratings can range between a possible low of 0 points (poorest
rating) to a possible high of 100 points (most favorable rating). As shown
in the table, we grouped countries into four category ranges—0 to 25, 26 to
50, 51 to 75, and 76 to 100 points. The large majority of countries with
inadequate average daily calories per capita had a creditworthiness rating
of less than 51 points.6 Only 2 of the 71 countries with inadequate food
availability received a creditworthiness rating of more than 75 points. As
the table also shows, 358 million chronically undernourished people lived
in countries that received a creditworthiness rating of less than 51 points,
and another 459 million undernourished people lived in countries that
received ratings between 51 and 75 points.




6
For the rating period shown in the table, Afghanistan received the lowest score, 3.9 points, and South
Korea the highest rating, 84.3 points.



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                                             Resources for Financing Food Security




Table III.4: Creditworthiness Ratings and Level of Food Security in Developing Countries
Number of countries

Average daily                                                              Investor ratings
calories per capitaa                             0-25 points         26-50 points          51-75 points        76-100 points                  Total
             b
Inadequate              Less than 2,100                      8                   13                     0                     0                     21
                        2,100 to 2,400                       4                   24                     4                     1                     33
                        2,400 to 2,700                       1                   11                     4                     1                     17
                        Subtotal                            13                   48                     8                     2                     71
         b
Adequate                Greater than 2,700                   3                     7                    9                     2                     21
Total number of
countries                                                   16                   55                    17                     4                     92c
Number of chronically
undernourished
people (in millions)                                        75                  283                  459                    19                  836c
                                             Notes: Data on average per capita calories are for 1990-92. Data on investor ratings are based on
                                             Euromoney country risk ratings for 1996.
                                             a
                                             Average based on available food supply at the country level.
                                             b
                                              We designated countries as having inadequate or adequate daily per capita energy supplies
                                             based on an FAO analysis of the relationship between average per capita daily energy supplies
                                             and chronic undernutrition. According to FAO, for countries having an average daily per capita
                                             undernutrition threshold ranging between 1,750 calories and 1,900 calories and a moderate level
                                             of unequal food distribution, between 21 percent and 33 percent of the population will be below
                                             the undernutrition threshold if the average per capita daily energy supply is 2,100 calories. If the
                                             average per capita daily energy supply is 2,400 calories, 7 to 13 percent of the population will be
                                             undernourished. At 2,700 calories, 2 to 4 percent of the population will be undernourished. If food
                                             is distributed more equitably, the percentage of the population that is undernourished decreases,
                                             and vice versa.
                                             c
                                              Burundi, with an estimated chronically undernourished population of 2.9 million, was not
                                             included in the analysis, since it did not have a credit rating from Euromoney.

                                             Source: Our analysis of FAO food security data and Euromoney creditworthiness data.




                                             Page 42                                                    GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix IV

Trade, Food Prices, and Grain Reserves


                        The World Food Summit identified trade as a key element for improving
                        world food security and urged countries to meet the challenges of and
                        seize opportunities arising from the 1994 Uruguay Round Trade
                        Agreements (URA). According to the summit plan of action, the progressive
                        implementation of the URA as a whole will generate increasing
                        opportunities for trade expansion and economic growth to the benefit of
                        all participants. The summit action plan encouraged developing countries
                        to establish well-functioning internal marketing and transportation
                        systems to facilitate better links within and between domestic, regional,
                        and world markets and to further diversify their trade. The ability of
                        developing countries to do so depends partly on steps taken by developed
                        countries to further open their domestic markets. Food-insecure countries
                        have concerns about possible adverse effects of trade reforms on their
                        food security and about price volatility in global food markets, particularly
                        in staple commodities such as grains.


                        Trade liberalization can positively affect food security in several ways. It
Effects of Trade        allows food consumption to exceed food production in those countries
Liberalization on       where conditions for expanding output are limited. Food trade has an
Developing Countries’   important role to play in stabilizing domestic supplies and prices; without
                        trade, domestic production fluctuations would have to be borne by
Food Security           adjustments in consumption and/or stocks. Trade allows consumption
                        fluctuations to be reduced and relieves countries of part of the burden of
                        stockholding. Over time, more liberal trade policies can contribute to
                        economic growth and broaden the range and variety of foods available
                        domestically.1

                        However, during the negotiations leading up to the URAs and since then,
                        concerns have been raised about possible adverse impacts of trade
                        liberalization on developing countries’ food security, especially
                        low-income, food-deficit countries. These concerns relate to impacts on
                        food prices, the ability of the developing countries to access developed
                        countries’ markets, food aid levels, and global grain reserves. For example,
                        FAO said that future levels of food aid might be adversely affected, since
                        historically food aid volumes had been closely linked to the level of
                        surplus stocks, and future surplus stocks could be low. FAO also expressed
                        concern that if grain stocks fell to low levels, trade liberalization measures
                        might be less effective in stabilizing world cereal market prices.



                        1
                         See, for example, Technical background documents 12-15, World Food Summit (Rome, Italy: FAO,
                        1996).



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In 1995, FAO estimated that the effects of the URAs would likely cause a
sizable increase in the food import bills of developing countries. For the
low-income, food-deficit countries as a whole, FAO projected the food
import bill would be 14 percent higher in the year 2000 (about $3.6 billion)
as a result of the URAs.2 However, a World Bank study, issued at about the
same time, estimated very modest price increases for most major traded
commodities and concluded the changes would have a very minor impact
on the welfare of the developing countries.3 Some more recent studies
have also indicated that the impact of the URAs on international food and
agricultural prices will be very limited.4 The authors of one study
estimated that grains and livestock product prices will increase by only
about 2 to 5 percent by 2005 and concluded that the small increases are
not expected to offset a long-term declining trend in food prices.5

Table IV.1 reports the results of two models6 that estimated the income
effects resulting from reforms in the agricultural sector alone and
economywide.7 Despite the delicate nature of modeling complex trade
agreements, both models projected positive economy-wide benefits (from
0.29 percent to 0.38 percent of the base gross domestic product for
developing countries as a whole). For agricultural reform alone, one
model projected negative benefits and the other positive benefits for
developing countries as a whole. Both models projected that Africa and
the Near East would experience negative benefits from agricultural reform
alone. The study that cited the results concluded that further work was
needed to reconcile differences between the various assessments before
firm policy recommendations could be made. Elsewhere, FAO commented
that studies modeling the impact of the URAs typically cover only the parts
of the agreement that are more amenable for quantification. In FAO’s view,


2
 According to FAO analyses released at the time of the summit, low-income, food-deficit countries
continued to worry about their losses in trade preferences as a result of the URAs, greater constraints
in taking advantage of new trade opportunities, and the possibility of higher import bills.
3
 I. Goldin, O. Knudsen, and D. van der Mensbrugghe, Trade Liberalization: Global Economic
Implications (Washington, D.C.: OECD and the World Bank, 1995).
4
 The World Food Situation.
5
 See Kym Anderson, et al., “Asia—Pacific Food Markets and Trade in 2005: A Global, Economy-wide
Perspective,” The Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, No. 41:1 (1997).
6
 See J. Francois, B. McDonald, and H. Nordstrom, “Assessing the Uruguay Round,” The Uruguay
Round and the Developing Economies, eds. W. Martin and L. Winters, World Bank Discussion Paper
No. 307 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1995). See also G. Harrison, T. Rutherford, and D. Tarr,
“Quantifying the Uruguay Round,” The Uruguay Round and the Developing Economies.
7
 The analysis included reforms in the agricultural sector, market access reforms in manufactured and
industrial products, and the phasing out of a multifiber arrangement.



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estimates of the URA trade and income gains from the increase in market
access for goods underestimate the full benefits of the agreement on world
trade and income.




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                                          Trade, Food Prices, and Grain Reserves




Table IV.1: Estimated Effects of the URAs’ Reforms on Income in the Developing and Developed World
Dollars in millions
                                      Estimated effects on 1992 gross domestic product if UR reforms had been in effect
                                                                                                  FMN model base scenarioa
                                                                           a
                                           MRT model base scenario                                                   Economy-wide
                                                                         Economy-wide                                    reform as
                                                                             reform as                                   percent of
                                                                        percent of base                                 base gross
Regions and select countries       Agricultural        Economy-         gross domestic       Agricultural Economy-        domestic
and trade groups                        reform       wide reformb              product            reform wide reform       product
Developing countries                     $9.21            $17.65                   0.38           $-0.21      $10.29                0.29
Africa                                   –0.29              –0.42                –0.24            –0.40          1.81               0.24
East Asia                                 8.04              12.30                  0.86            0.17          7.19               0.50
South Asia                                0.10               3.29                  0.99           –0.22          1.23               0.37
                                                                                                          c            c                  c
Near East                                –0.45              –0.39                –0.07
Latin America                             2.07               3.30                  0.27            0.24          0.06               0.01
Developed countries                     $49.10            $75.21                   0.41           $4.33       $26.86                0.14
Australia and New Zealand                 1.11               1.52                  0.45            0.59          0.29               0.09
Japan                                    15.23              16.69                  0.47           –0.50          1.26               0.04
Canada                                    0.24               1.16                  0.22            0.74          0.72               0.13
United States                             1.66              12.84                  0.22            0.10        10.07                0.17
European Union –12                       28.54              38.85                  0.58            4.79        14.56                0.22
                               d
European Free Trade Association           2.41               4.15                  0.35           –0.64          0.27               0.03
Eastern Europe and former Soviet
Union                                    –0.25              –0.42                –0.05            –0.75        –0.31              –0.04
                                                 e                  e                    e
Rest of world                                                                                      0.52          2.49               0.98
Total                                    $58.3              $92.9                  0.41%           $4.6        $39.6                0.17%
                                                                                                               (Table notes on next page)




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                   Trade, Food Prices, and Grain Reserves




                   Legend
                   UR = Uruguay Round

                   Note: Income effects were estimated relative to 1992 baseline conditions.
                   a
                    The Multi-Regional Trade (MRT) model by G. Harrison, T. Rutherford, and D. Tarr and the
                   Francois, McDonald, and Nordstrom (FMN) model by J. Francois, B. McDonald, and
                   H. Nordstrom.
                   b
                    Full reforms simulated agricultural sector reforms plus reforms in nonagricultural sectors and the
                   phasing out of the multifiber arrangement.
                   c
                       In FMN, the Near East region is covered under Africa.
                   d
                    Members include Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. Austria, Finland, and Sweden
                   left the association in January 1995.
                   e
                       Not applicable.

                   Source: Ramesh Sharma, Panos Konandreas, and Jim Greenfield, “An Overview of Assessments
                   of the Impact of the Uruguay Round on Agricultural Prices and Incomes,” Food Policy, vol. 21,
                   No. 4/5 (1996).




                   According to some observers, the most important thing that developed
Implementing the   countries can do to help food-insecure countries is to open their own
Uruguay Round      markets to developing country exports. Market access is important not
                   only in primary commodities but also in clothing, textiles, footwear,
                   processed foods, and other products into which developing countries may
                   diversify as development progresses.8 Yet, according to the International
                   Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the World Bank, the way
                   developed countries are implementing the URAs is adversely affecting the
                   ability of developing countries to improve their food security and may
                   jeopardize their support for further trade liberalization. U.S. government
                   officials state, however, that because of the URAs, most of the relatively
                   few remaining barriers are being progressively eliminated. A State
                   Department official further noted that the United States and the European
                   Union have a number of preferential arrangements that favor developing
                   countries and allow most agricultural imports.

                   One study, by IFPRI, concluded that a large number of developing countries
                   have liberalized foreign trade in food and agricultural commodities in
                   response to structural adjustment programs and the recent URAs, but OECD
                   countries have not matched their actions. While specific quantities of
                   certain commodities from developing countries still receive preferential
                   treatment, OECD countries have been reluctant to open their domestic
                   markets to developing countries’ exports of high-value commodities such

                   8
                    Tweeten, “Food Security.”



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                            Trade, Food Prices, and Grain Reserves




                            as beef, sugar, and dairy products. In IFPRI’s view, this reduces benefits to
                            developing countries and may make continued market liberalization
                            unviable for them. IFPRI recommended that the next round of World Trade
                            Organization (WTO) negotiations emphasize the opening of OECD domestic
                            markets to commodities from developing countries.

                            According to a World Bank report, without an open trading environment
                            and access to OECD country markets, developing countries cannot fully
                            benefit from the goods they produce that give them a comparative
                            advantage. Without improved demand for developing countries’
                            agricultural products, the agricultural growth needed to generate
                            employment and reduce poverty in rural areas will not occur. Under the
                            Uruguay Round (UR) Agreement on Agriculture, countries generally agreed
                            to eliminate import restrictions, including quotas. However, according to
                            the World Bank, the elimination of agricultural import restrictions through
                            tariffication resulted in tariff levels that in many cases were set much
                            higher than previously existing tariff levels. If developing countries are to
                            adopt an open-economy agricultural and food policy, they must be assured
                            of stable, long-term access to international markets—including those of
                            the OECD, the Bank said. Yet during 1995-96, when international grain
                            prices were soaring, the European Union restricted cereal exports from
                            member countries (by imposing a tax on exports) to protect their
                            domestic customers. An export tax was also applied during a few weeks in
                            1997.


                            The 1994 URAs included a ministerial decision reached by trade ministers
Trade Liberalization,       in Marrakesh, Morocco, that recognized that implementation of the UR
Food Aid, and the           agricultural trade reforms might adversely affect the least-developed and
Marrakesh Decision          net food-importing countries. The concern was that as a result of the
                            reforms, these countries might not have available to them adequate
                            supplies of basic foodstuffs from external sources on reasonable terms
                            and conditions and might face short-term difficulties in financing normal
                            levels of commercial imports. To obviate this situation, the decision
                            included, among others, agreements to

                        •   review the level of food aid established periodically by the Committee on
                            Food Aid under the Food Aid Convention of 1986 and to initiate
                            negotiations in an “appropriate forum” to establish food aid commitments
                            sufficient to meet the legitimate food aid needs of the developing countries
                            during the reform program;




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    Trade, Food Prices, and Grain Reserves




•   adopt guidelines to ensure that an increasing proportion of basic
    foodstuffs is provided to least-developed countries and net food-importing
    countries in fully grant form and/or on appropriate concessional terms in
    line with the 1986 Food Aid Convention; and
•   have the WTO’s Committee on Agriculture monitor, as appropriate,
    follow-up actions.

    The decision specifically targeted developing countries whose food aid
    needs may be adversely affected as a result of the UR agricultural trade
    reforms.9 It did not establish or propose criteria for assessing whether
    trade reforms had adversely affected the availability of and terms and
    conditions for accessing basic foodstuffs. (Methodologically, it could be
    difficult to separate the effects of the URAs’ reforms from other factors
    affecting the ability to access food from external sources.) Nor did the
    decision establish what criteria would be used in determining the
    “legitimate needs” of different developing countries. For example, would
    “legitimate needs” be based on a country’s current overall food aid needs,
    the amount of food aid it received prior to completion of the URAs, the
    amount of food aid adversely affected by the agreements, or something
    else? In addition, the decision did not establish any timetable for resolving
    these issues. Finally, the decision did not clearly identify what would be
    the appropriate forum for establishing a level of sufficient food aid
    commitments.

    In March 1996, the WTO’s Committee on Agriculture established a list of
    eligible countries covered by the decision with an understanding that
    being listed did not confer automatic benefits.10 During country
    negotiations over the content of the proposed World Food Summit action
    plan in the fall of 1996, there was considerable debate about the
    ministerial decision. Developing countries attributed recent high world
    grain prices to UR agricultural reforms and wanted the plan to commit
    countries to prompt and full implementation of the decision. U.S.
    negotiators disagreed. They recognized that the high market prices for
    grain had adversely affected the least-developed and net food-importing
    countries but said that the reforms were just beginning to be implemented
    and it was thus too early for the reforms to have had any measurable
    adverse effects.


    9
     Appendix V provides additional information on food aid apart from the issue of trade reforms.
    10
      The list included the least-developed countries as recognized by the U.N. Economic and Social
    Council, as well as 15 developing country WTO members that asked to be listed and submitted relevant
    statistical data regarding their status as net-importers of basic foodstuffs. The committee reviews the
    list annually .



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                           Trade, Food Prices, and Grain Reserves




                           The summit plan that was finally approved by all countries, in
                           November 1996, states that the ministerial decision should be fully
                           implemented. To date, however, decisions still have not been made about
                           criteria that should be used for judging and quantifying the legitimate food
                           aid needs of developing countries. In addition, no decisions have been
                           made about an appropriate forum or criteria for assessing whether the
                           Uruguay Round trade reforms have adversely affected the availability of
                           and terms and conditions for accessing basic foodstuffs. Consequently, no
                           findings have been made as to whether adverse impacts have already
                           occurred.

                           In December 1996, the WTO ministerial meeting in Singapore agreed that
                           the London-based Food Aid Committee, in renegotiating the Food Aid
                           Convention (scheduled to expire in June 1998), should develop
                           recommendations for establishing a level of food aid commitments,
                           covering as wide a range of donors and donatable foodstuffs as possible,
                           sufficient to meet the legitimate needs of developing countries during
                           implementation of the Uruguay Round reform program.11 In January 1997,
                           Food Aid Committee members indicated they would do so, with an
                           understanding that the committee would direct its recommendations to
                           the WTO and reflect its recommendations in the provisions of a new food
                           aid convention. Agreement on a new convention has not yet been reached.
                           The existing agreement was re-extended and is scheduled to expire in
                           June 1999. According to a U.S. official, if ongoing efforts to negotiate a
                           new agreement are successful, the document should go some distance in
                           assuring food-deficit, low-income countries that the Uruguay Round trade
                           liberalization will not drastically reduce food aid. According to the official,
                           the United States, Australia, Canada, and Japan are pressing hard for
                           conclusion of the negotiations . In January 1998, the FAO Secretariat
                           advised the WTO Committee on Agriculture that there was little it could do
                           in its analyses to isolate the effect of the Uruguay Round from other
                           factors influencing commodity prices.


                           As countries rely more on trade to meet their food needs, they become
Trade, Price Volatility,   more vulnerable to possible volatility in world food prices. Price volatility
and Global Grain           of basic food commodities, especially grains, can be a significant problem
Reserves                   for food-insecure countries. Many poor people spend more than half their

                           11
                             Members also agreed to encourage relevant institutions to consider establishing or enhancing
                           facilities for developing countries experiencing URA-related difficulties in financing normal
                           commercial imports. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund reported that they were in
                           a position to meet requests with existing facilities. The Fund reported that in 1997, one purchase was
                           made through its Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility.



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income on food.12 FAO and others have suggested that sufficient grain
stocks be held to help contain excessive price increases during times of
acute food shortages and thus provide support to the most vulnerable
countries. However, views differ over the level of global reserves needed
to safeguard world food security, the future outlook for price volatility,
and the desirability of governments’ holding grain reserves.

In response to the world grain crisis of the early 1970s, the 1974 World
Food Conference endorsed several principles regarding grain
stock-holding policies: (1) governments should adopt policies that take
into account the policies of other countries and would result in
maintaining a minimum safe level of basic grain stocks for the world as a
whole; (2) governments should take actions to ensure that grain stocks are
replenished as soon as feasible when they drop below minimum levels to
meet food shortages; and (3) in periods of acute food shortages, nations
holding stocks exceeding minimum safe levels to meet domestic needs and
emergencies should make such supplies available for export at reasonable
prices. Subsequently, the Intergovernmental Group on Grains established
a stocks-to-consumption ratio of 17 to 18 percent as an indicator of a
minimum safe global food security situation.

As table IV.2 shows, the world grain stocks-to-use ratio reached and
exceeded the minimum level in 1976-77 and remained at or above that
level for the next 18 years. In the year before the November 1996 World
Food Summit, the ratio fell to 14 percent, the lowest level in the previous
25 years. During 1995-96, world grain prices rose significantly. The price of
wheat increased from $151 per ton in April 1995 and reached a peak of
$258 in May 1996, a rise of 71 percent. Corn prices rose continuously from
$113 in May 1995 to a record $204 in May 1996, an increase of 81 percent.
The world price increases were accompanied by high grain prices in many
developing countries. In some cases, the latter prices exceeded the world
price increases because of simultaneous depreciation of developing
countries’ currencies. According to the World Bank, the price increases
were a result of a poor U.S. grain harvest in 1995, combined with unusually
low world grain stockpiles. Another factor was China’s entry into world
grain markets, with a purchase of 5 million tons in 1995 (after exporting
nearly 11 million tons of grain in 1993-94).




12
  According to Tweeten, poor people typically spend 60 to 80 percent of their income on food.



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Table IV.2: World Carryover Cereal
Stocks, 1971-72 to 1998-99           Tons in millions
                                                                                          Government Total carryover
                                                                                             carryover     stocks as a
                                                          Private Government                 stocks as      percent of
                                                        carryover   carryover           percent of total   world grain
                                     Year                  stocks      stocks     Total         stocks   consumption
                                                                a             a                        a
                                     1971-72                                       217                                18.1
                                                                a             a                        a
                                     1972-73                                       175                                14.2
                                                                a             a                        a
                                     1973-74                                       189                                15.4
                                                                a             a                        a
                                     1974-75                                       176                                14.4
                                                                a             a                        a
                                     1975-76                                       194                                15.1
                                                                a             a                        a
                                     1976-77                                       256                                19.1
                                                                a             a                        a
                                     1977-78                                       251                                17.7
                                                                a             a                        a
                                     1978-79                                       287                                20.0
                                     1979-80                 115          161      276              58                18.9
                                     1980-81                 117          137      254              54                17.4
                                     1981-82                 122          179      301              59                19.9
                                     1982-83                  91          255      346              74                22.3
                                     1983-84                 101          186      286              65                17.9
                                     1984-85                 118          221      338              65                21.2
                                     1985-86                 194          232      426              54                25.8
                                     1986-87                 160          296      457              65                27.4
                                     1987-88                 162          240      401              60                24.3
                                     1988-89                 117          194      311              63                18.3
                                     1989-90                 127          181      308              59                17.9
                                     1990-91                 155          196      351              56                20.3
                                     1991-92                 145          191      336              57                19.3
                                     1992-93                 179          201      380              53                21.8
                                     1993-94                 143          195      338              58                19.3
                                     1994-95                 148          166      314              53                17.8
                                                                a             a                        a
                                     1995-96                                       261                                14.0
                                                                a             a                        a
                                     1996-97                                       297                                15.4
                                                                a             a       b                a
                                     1997-98                                       322                                16.9b
                                                                a             a          c             a
                                     1998-99                                       328                                17.2c

                                                                                                 (Table notes on next page)




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                     Trade, Food Prices, and Grain Reserves




                     Note: Stocks include wheat, rice, and coarse grains. Data are based on an aggregate of
                     carryover levels at the end of national crop years.
                     a
                     Not available.
                     b
                      Estimate by FAO in June 1998. In April 1998, FAO estimated total stocks at 302 million tons and
                     the stocks-to-use ratio at 15.9 percent.
                     c
                     Forecast by FAO in June 1998.

                     Source: FAO.



                     Although the high grain prices of 1996 have abated, estimates of the
                     stocks-to-use ratio remained at a low level through early 1998. As recently
                     as April 1998, FAO estimated the ratio would be 15.9 percent for 1997-98.
                     However, FAO revised its figures in June 1998, estimating that the ratio
                     might reach 16.9 percent for 1997-98 and cross the 17-percent threshold in
                     1998-99. These revisions reflected the expectation of a record grain crop in
                     1998 and lower feed demand in China, the United States, and some
                     countries affected by the Asian financial crisis.


                     World Food Summit participants said that reserves was one factor, in
Summit’s Action on   combination with a number of others, that could be used to strengthen
Reserves             food security. According to the summit action plan, it is up to national
                     governments, in partnership with all actors of civil society, to pursue at
                     local and national levels, as appropriate, adequate and cost-effective
                     emergency food security reserve policies and programs. Summit countries
                     agreed that governments should monitor the availability and nutritional
                     adequacy of their food supplies and reserve stocks, particularly areas at
                     high risk of food insecurity, nutritionally vulnerable groups, and areas
                     where seasonal variations have important nutritional implications. In
                     addition, international organizations and particularly FAO were asked to
                     continue to monitor closely and inform member nations of developments
                     in world food prices and stocks. The summit did not identify a minimum
                     level of global grain reserves needed to ensure food security nor
                     recommend any action by countries individually or in concert to achieve
                     or maintain such a level.


                     In 1996, FAO invited a group of experts to Rome to consider a number of
Views About Future   developments that directly or indirectly influence price stability. These
Stock Levels and     included, among others, production variability, the URAs, and the role of
Price Volatility     cereal stocks. The group agreed that there was little evidence to reach




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conclusions on whether production variability at the global level would
increase or decrease in the future. Price instability caused by shifts in
production between countries that may occur because of the URAs was
expected to be slight. The group concurred that ongoing market
liberalization initiatives, including those under the URAs, regional trading
arrangements, and other unilateral initiatives, should as a whole
contribute to stability in international markets by inducing greater
adjustments to demand/supply shocks in domestic markets. However,
changes under the URAs were not considered to be drastic enough for
instability to decrease significantly, as many countries, especially some
larger trading countries, still retained instruments and institutions (such as
policies similar to variable levies and state trading) that had impeded price
transmission in the past.

The group agreed that a lack of transparency and consistency in
government stock-holding and trade policies had been a source of
instability in the past and that less involvement of governments in stock
management and a more transparent trade policy should contribute to
stability in the future. At the same time, there was considerable doubt
whether private stocks would increase to the extent required to offset the
shocks that previously were countered by the public sector stocks.13 The
group concluded that increased funds in international commodity markets
were expected to influence only within-year price volatility and were
unlikely to affect annual price levels in the longer run. In addition, there
were uncertainties regarding how fast China and countries of the former
Soviet Union would be fully integrated into the world agricultural trading
system.

Overall, the experts agreed that compared to the situation in the past,
future world commodity markets would likely retain lower levels of
overall stocks but should be less prone to instability due to faster and
more broad-based adjustments to production/demand shocks. However,
the path to a new market environment was seen as uncertain. The group
generally believed that price instability would be greater during the
transitional period than after the system had fully adjusted.

According to an FAO study prepared for the summit, global stocks are
likely to remain relatively low compared with the previous decade, and the


13
  An FAO simulation of the impact of a 5-percent production shortfall of grains in 1999 indicated the
URAs would have almost no effect in stabilizing grain market prices in the year 2000. One reason is
that global stocks were not expected to be large in the year 2000, at just around 17 percent of
consumption, compared with what was often over 20 percent in the 1980s and early 1990s.



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                          Trade, Food Prices, and Grain Reserves




                          chance of price spikes occurring is probably greater than in the past.14
                          According to a World Bank study, grain stocks are not likely to return to
                          the high levels of the 1980s, given the current focus on reducing
                          government involvement in agriculture, and with smaller grain stocks,
                          prices could be more volatile than in the past.15 According to IFPRI, policy
                          changes in North America and Europe could result in a permanent
                          lowering of grain stocks and thus increase future price fluctuations
                          because of a lack of stocks to buffer price variations. IFPRI noted that the
                          moderating or cushioning impact on world price instability that once was
                          exercised by varying world grain stocks has been reduced by the
                          substantial decline in grain stocks in recent years. As a result, IFPRI said,
                          international price instability, if fully transmitted to domestic markets,
                          especially to low-income, food-deficit countries, may raise domestic price
                          instability in these countries.16


                          Views differ over whether governments should take action to hold and/or
Views on Actions to       increase grain reserves. Among the views expressed against increasing or
Increase Stocks and       maintaining large government-held reserves are the following:
Hold Emergency
                      •   Reserves are expensive to accumulate, store, manage, and release.17 An
Reserves                  annual cost of 25 percent to 40 percent of the value of the reserves is not
                          unusual. Developing countries cannot afford such costs; it is cheaper for
                          them to deal with periodic price increases. They should hold only enough
                          stocks to tide them over until replacement supplies can be obtained from
                          international markets.
                      •   It is much cheaper for most countries to rely on trade, using financial
                          reserves or international loans to make up shortfalls.
                      •   If reserves are to be held, it is more efficient and cheaper to hold reserves
                          in money than in physical stock.
                      •   Governments, including the U.S. government, have not been good at
                          managing stocks.

                          14
                            Technical Background Documents 12-15.
                          15
                            Rural Development: From Vision to Action.
                          16
                            In a more recent study, IFPRI noted that it is not certain that surplus stocks will continue at a low
                          level. It noted a European Commission study that projected a gradual rebuilding of large European
                          Union grain stocks between 2001 and 2006. The projected increases could be even greater if the
                          European Union is enlarged to include East European countries and these countries are permitted to
                          obtain the benefits of existing common agricultural policies. See The World Food Situation.
                          17
                            According to the June 1996 experts’ group that advised FAO, the previous use of stocks as an
                          instrument for price stability often suffered from several problems, including poor management
                          practices and lack of clear-cut operational rules. However, in cases where such stocks were managed
                          correctly, they played an important role in stabilizing domestic markets. The group considered that
                          maintaining moderate levels of food stocks at the national level, with clear food security objectives for
                          their use, was a desirable option for countries to pursue and consistent with the URA.
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    Trade, Food Prices, and Grain Reserves




•   Stocks are not the only measures available for coping with price volatility.
•   As a result of market and trade liberalization measures, markets can
    respond more quickly to shocks, which will lead to much briefer price
    cycles than those in the past. Free trade permits stocks to be shifted,
    thereby reducing the need to maintain large amounts of domestic stocks.
•   World food supplies have been adequate since the Second World War.
    Good and bad weather conditions for growing crops tend to balance out
    across countries. In addition, some crops and food products can be
    substituted for others, depending on the weather.
•   The problem is not one of supply but of buying power, including when
    prices rise to high levels. Other measures are needed, such as policy
    reforms, that increase economic development and enable people to buy
    the food they need.

    Among views advanced for governments’ taking action to increase and
    maintain emergency reserve levels (some of the views pertain specifically
    to the United States; others apply to countries more generally) are the
    following:

•   It is good government policy to store grain during prosperous years in
    order to survive lean years.
•   Private companies will not hold many reserve stocks, since it is expensive
    to do so and governments may limit price increases in times of short
    supply, thus affecting companies’ ability to recoup the added cost of
    holding emergency reserves.
•   Even if governments do not excel at managing reserves, the social costs of
    their not doing so may be greater.
•   The use of emergency food reserves to respond quickly to periodic food
    shortages in developing countries is the most unobtrusive way for
    governments to intervene in the market.
•   Responsible trade requires that wealthier countries establish and maintain
    essential grain reserves as a supply safety net (available to other countries
    when the need arises) and thus to encourage and compensate poorer
    countries for relying on increased trade liberalization.
•   If a tight U.S. grains supply situation occurs and export customers
    perceive that a unilateral U.S. export embargo is plausible, they will
    intensify their food self-sufficiency goals and seek grain commitments
    from other exporters.




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                        Trade, Food Prices, and Grain Reserves




                        A 1996 FAO study18 identified several possible alternatives for mitigating
Possible Alternatives   price volatility problems, including national and international measures.
to Reserves for         However, it is not clear to what extent developing countries, particularly
Coping With Price       low-income, food-deficit countries, are capable of establishing such
                        measures or the costs and benefits of such measures relative to one
Volatility              another and to grain reserves.

                        The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture limits the use of quotas and
                        variable levies, two measures traditionally employed to deal with price
                        instability. According to the FAO study, a country may adopt a sliding scale
                        of tariffs related inversely to the level of import prices and keep the
                        maximum rate of duty at a level no higher than its agreed rate of duty in
                        the WTO. If the agreed rate of tariffs is fairly high, which is commonly the
                        case, developing countries may offset variations in import prices by
                        reducing tariffs when prices rise and raising them when prices fall. In
                        addition, at times of sharply rising world prices or sharply rising demand
                        from a neighboring country, it may be possible for a country to limit
                        exports, provided it has taken other countries’ food security into account.
                        (See URA on Agriculture, Article 12.)

                        Commodity exchanges, futures contracts, and options could be used to
                        reduce uncertainty associated with price and income instability. However,
                        not all countries could make use of existing exchanges because of lack of
                        knowledge, lack of economies of scale, and/or higher transaction costs. To
                        ease such constraints, the experts suggested establishing
                        nongovernmental institutions to allow a large number of small entities to
                        pool their risks.

                        Countries with sufficient food reserves or cash to purchase food could
                        seek to mitigate the effect of price spikes by providing food aid to meet the
                        unmet food needs of urban and rural poor. Food aid from international
                        donors could be used to help mitigate the consequences of high increases
                        in the price of imported food. However, with reduced surpluses and
                        budgetary constraints in donor countries, it is not clear how much
                        additional aid would be available when needed.

                        The International Monetary Fund’s Compensatory and Contingency
                        Financing Facility can be used by members to obtain credit if they are
                        experiencing balance of payment difficulties arising from shortfalls in
                        export receipts (that is, foreign exchange) or increases in the costs of
                        grain imports—provided these are temporary and largely attributable to

                        18
                          Report of a Meeting of Experts on Agricultural Price Instability (Rome, Italy: FAO, 1996).



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conditions outside the control of the countries. However, partly because
of the conditions and interest costs associated with drawings from the
facility and the availability of alternative facilities that are more favorable,
countries have not used the facility very frequently over the past 15 years.
(The International Monetary Fund believes that price spikes have not been
sufficiently frequent since the facility’s inception to warrant its use.) The
European Union also has a financing mechanism for certain countries, but
the financing is limited to covering shortfalls in export earnings (high food
import bills are not covered), and the mechanism lacks the funding and
concessional terms (below-market interest rates) necessary for wider use
by poorer countries.

Finally, according to the FAO report, an international insurance scheme
could be devised for financing food imports by low-income, food-deficit
countries during periods of price instability. Beneficiary countries could
finance the system with premium payments. Ideally, such a scheme would
operate without conditions. However, according to the FAO study, in
practice only a few countries could afford to pay the premiums by
themselves. Thus, for countries requiring assistance from developed
countries, setting conditions for the use of withdrawals from the insurance
facility might be necessary.

Following the large increase in grains prices during 1995-96, FAO surveyed
the governments of 47 developing countries to determine whether their
domestic retail and wholesale prices of grains rose and, if so, how they
responded. FAO found that domestic market prices increased considerably
in most countries but usually not as much as the world price. (In some
countries, prices did not increase or they even fell because of favorable
domestic harvests.) Many countries mitigated the price effects by
annulling or reducing import duties. Some countries mitigated price
effects by further subsidizing already regulated prices of grain products.




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Appendix V

Emergency and Nonemergency Food Aid


                     At the World Food Summit, countries said they would try to prevent and
                     be prepared for natural disasters and man-made emergencies that create
                     food insecurity and to meet transitory and emergency food requirements
                     in ways that encourage recovery, rehabilitation, development, and a
                     capacity to satisfy future needs. The summit’s action plan said that food
                     assistance can also be provided to help ease the plight of the long-term
                     undernourished, but concluded that food aid is not a long-term solution to
                     the underlying causes of food insecurity.1 The plan called upon countries’
                     governments to implement cost-effective public works programs for the
                     unemployed and underemployed in regions of food insecurity and to
                     develop within their available resources well-targeted social welfare and
                     nutrition safety net programs to meet the needs of their food insecure. The
                     summit did not recommend an increase in development assistance for the
                     specific purpose of helping countries to establish or improve such
                     programs. However, donor countries generally agreed to strengthen their
                     individual efforts toward providing official development assistance
                     equivalent to 0.7 percent of gross national product each year.2


                     Over the past several decades, food aid has helped meet some of the
Trends in Food Aid   emergency and nonemergency food needs of many food-insecure
                     countries. In recent years, food aid has declined significantly. As table V.1
                     shows, world grain aid shipments increased from 6.8 million tons in
                     1975-76 to a peak of 15.2 million tons in 1992-93. Shipments in 1997 were
                     5.9 million tons, about 40 percent of the peak value and about 60 percent
                     of the former World Food Conference target. FAO estimates that shipments
                     in 1997-98 were at about the same level as in 1996-97 (that is, at about
                     5.3 million tons). According to FAO, grain shipments in 1996-97 were at the
                     lowest level since the start of food aid programs in the 1950s. Table V.1
                     also shows a substantial decline in the proportion of food aid provided for
                     program purposes and a steady increase in the proportion of food aid



                     1
                      The summit’s position on food aid differed significantly from that adopted by the 1974 World Food
                     Conference. That conference established a target for donor countries to provide at least 10 million
                     tons of food aid annually to developing countries in the form of grain (or the cash equivalent) suitable
                     for human consumption. Under the Food Aid Convention of 1986, signatory nations agreed to
                     contribute a minimum amount of grains each year toward achieving the World Food Conference
                     target. Members said that they would provide, in aggregate, at least 7.5 million tons of grains aid
                     annually—the highest minimum amount ever approved by the convention. Periodically, members meet
                     to review their commitments and decide whether to extend the agreement. In 1995, the convention’s
                     commitment was substantially reduced, to 5.4 million tons. The convention is scheduled for renewal in
                     June 1999.
                     2
                     The United States, in an interpretative statement for the record, noted that it has not agreed to an
                     ODA target.



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Emergency and Nonemergency Food Aid




allocated for emergency purposes.3 In absolute terms, in 1997 project food
aid equaled about 54 percent of its peak level (1986-87), emergency food
aid was about 55 percent of its peak level (1992), and program aid was
about 17 percent of its peak level (1993). Program and project aid
combined peaked in 1993 at 11.3 million tons. The combined total for 1997
was 3.5 million tons or 31 percent of the peak-year total.




3
 Program and project food aid are nonemergency aid, are generally provided to achieve a
developmental purpose, and could be considered a substitute for financial aid. Program food aid does
not target specific beneficiary groups. It is mainly provided on a bilateral basis to support recipient
governments’ budgets (for stabilization, adjustment, and economic reform) or reduce balance of
payments deficits. Project food aid is provided to selected beneficiary groups to support specific
development objectives. Emergency food aid is targeted to victims of natural or man-made disasters.
Emergency and project food aid are always provided to recipient countries on a grant basis, while
program food aid is also provided under concessional terms.



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                                   Emergency and Nonemergency Food Aid




Table V.1: World Grains Food Aid
Shipments and Their Use, 1976-97                                                                      Type of aid (percent)

                                                                        All donors             Nonemergency
                                   Yeara                              (million tons)         Program            Project         Emergency
                                   1975-76                                         6.8               71               19                      10
                                   1976-77                                         9.0               77               17                       6
                                   1977-78                                         9.2               71               19                      10
                                   1978-79                                         9.5               72               18                      10
                                   1979-80                                         8.9               70               20                      10
                                   1980-81                                         8.9               60               26                      14
                                   1981-82                                         9.1               52               27                      21
                                   1982-83                                         9.2               62               26                      12
                                   1983-84                                         9.8               57               28                      15
                                   1984-85                                       12.5                53               21                      25
                                   1985-86                                       10.9                46               24                      30
                                   1986-87                                       12.6                55               29                      17
                                   1987-88                                       13.5                54               27                      19
                                   1988-89                                       10.2                54               25                      21
                                   1989-90                                       11.3                58               21                      20
                                   1990-91                                       12.4                56               21                      23
                                   1991-92                                       13.1                52               19                      29
                                   1992-93                                       15.2                57               15                      28
                                   1993                                          15.1                60               15                      25
                                   1994                                          10.7                44               22                      34
                                   1995                                            8.4               42               24                      34
                                   1996                                            6.2               41               24                      35
                                   1997b                                           5.9               25               34                      41
                                   a
                                       The first series of data reported is for overlapping years; the second series is calendar year data.
                                   b
                                       Provisional.

                                   Sources: Our analysis of World Food Program data.



                                   According to a recent FAO forecast,4 cereal food aid shipments are
                                   expected to increase substantially in 1998-99, after 4 years of decline, and
                                   reach 9 million tons. FAO attributed the increase to a greater availability of
                                   grain supplies in donor countries and higher food aid needs, particularly in
                                   Asia. According to FAO, food aid availabilities have been growing in recent
                                   months, triggered by relatively low international grain prices and
                                   accumulating grain stocks, mostly in the European Union and the United

                                   4
                                    FAO, “Food Aid,” Food Outlook (November 1998).



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Emergency and Nonemergency Food Aid




States. (The United States announced in July 1998 that it would increase
its wheat donations by up to 2.5 million tons, most of which has been
allocated.) On the demand side, financial and economic turmoil has
affected the economies of many food import-dependent countries, raising
the need for food aid. Although grain prices have declined, countries
experiencing severe food emergencies will not necessarily be able to
increase commercial cereal imports, FAO said. And, the slower growth of
the world economy, combined with falling cash crop prices and export
earnings, could force some developing countries to sharply cut back on
their imports of essential foods.

Table V.2 shows how food aid trends have affected the low-income,
food-deficit countries (for total food aid, not just grains). Food aid
received in 1995-96 was at the lowest level since 1975-76 and represented
about 50-55 percent of previous peak-year deliveries. During the 1990s,
food aid provided to low-income, food-deficit countries has averaged
about 78 percent of food aid deliveries to all developing countries; by way
of comparison, between 1983-84 and 1986-87, low-income, food-deficit
countries averaged more than 92 percent of deliveries. In 1995-96, the
proportion of these countries’ food imports covered by food aid fell to
8 percent, the lowest level in more than 20 years.




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                                        Emergency and Nonemergency Food Aid




Table V.2: Share of Food Aid Reaching
Low-Income, Food-Deficit Countries,                                                                                   Food aid as percent
1976-96                                                                Food aid to                                        of low-income,
                                                                      low-income,                                             food-deficit
                                                             food-deficit countries       Food aid as percent             countries’ food
                                        Year                         (million tons)         of global food aid                    imports
                                        1975-76                                     5.3                         78                         20
                                        1976-77                                     7.1                         79                         27
                                        1977-78                                     7.1                         77                         23
                                        1978-79                                     7.7                         81                         19
                                        1979-80                                     7.6                         85                         18
                                        1980-81                                     7.3                         82                         15
                                        1981-82                                     7.7                         85                         15
                                        1982-83                                     8.2                         89                         15
                                        1983-84                                     9.3                         95                         18
                                        1984-85                                   11.5                          92                         23
                                        1985-86                                   10.2                          94                         22
                                        1986-87                                   11.4                          90                         24
                                        1987-88                                   12.0                          89                         21
                                        1988-89                                     8.7                         85                         15
                                        1989-90                                     8.2                         73                         14
                                        1990-91                                     9.7                         78                         18
                                        1991-92                                   11.0                          84                         15
                                        1992-93                                   11.1                          73                         16
                                        1993-94                                     8.2                         65                         12
                                                  a
                                        1994-95                                     7.4                         88                         10
                                        1995-96a                                    6.0                         79                           8
                                        a
                                        Estimate.

                                        Source: Our analysis of World Food Program data.




                                        In 1996, FAO estimated that it would take an additional 30 million tons of
Costs to Feed the                       grain and over 20 million tons (grain equivalent) of other foods simply to
Long-Term                               bring 800 million chronically undernourished people up to “minimum
Undernourished                          nutritional standards” (assuming perfect targeting of food assistance and
                                        local absorptive capacity).5 FAO estimated the value of the additional
                                        required food at about $13 per person per year (in 1994 dollars), or about
                                        $10.4 billion. According to FAO, the world produces enough food to meet

                                        5
                                          According to Evaluation of the World Food Program Final Report, a trebling of food aid from the 1993
                                        level of 15 million tons could, if distribution problems were solvable, enable 700 million-800 million
                                        chronically undernourished people to reach minimum dietary standards.



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                        Emergency and Nonemergency Food Aid




                        the needs of all people,6 but hundreds of millions remain chronically
                        undernourished because they are too poor to afford all the food they need.
                        In addition, others are undernourished because they are otherwise unable
                        to provide for themselves (for example, because of humanitarian crises),
                        because not enough food assistance has been provided, or because the
                        assistance has not been sufficiently effective.

                        The provision of food aid costing $10.4 billion would require a large
                        commitment compared to recent expenditures on foreign assistance more
                        generally. For example, during 1996 and 1997, net disbursements of ODA by
                        the Development Assistance Committee members of the OECD averaged
                        about $55 billion (1996 prices and exchange rates).


                        Several studies have questioned whether food aid is an efficient means of
Effectiveness of Food   satisfying nonemergency, chronic food shortage needs. A joint 1991 study
Aid for Nonemergency    by the World Bank and the World Food Program on food aid for Africa7
Purposes                reported that food aid may in some cases be a second-best solution and
                        there are problems in its implementation. The study concluded, however,
                        that it is unlikely that an equal amount of financial aid would be available
                        if the food aid is not provided. The study included a number of specific
                        recommendations for improving the effectiveness of food aid and
                        concluded that food aid contributes substantially to growth, long-term
                        food security, and the reduction of poverty and that its use should
                        continue.

                        A 1993 evaluation of the World Food Program found that while emergency
                        food aid was quite effective, food aid for development had a number of
                        weaknesses.8 There was little evidence that country strategies seriously
                        addressed the use of food aid to support national priorities. At the project
                        level, many weaknesses were found: the targeting of food aid on the
                        poorest areas and the poorest people was often unsatisfactory, the
                        technical content of projects often left much to be desired, and the
                        phasing out of projects was often not planned. The study made several
                        recommendations to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the food
                        aid development program.


                        6
                         FAO estimated world cereals production in 1996 at 1,873 million tons (including rice in milled terms).
                        The 30-million tons of grain needed for 800 million chronically undernourished people represented less
                        than 2 percent of the grains production.
                        7
                          Food Aid in Africa: An Agenda for the 1990s (Washington, D.C. and Rome, Italy: The World Bank and
                        the World Food Program, Aug. 1991).
                        8
                         Evaluation of the World Food Program.



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    Emergency and Nonemergency Food Aid




    In addition, a 1996 study prepared for European Union member states
    evaluated food aid commodities that were provided directly to a recipient
    government or its agent for sale on local markets.9 Such aid was intended
    to provide some combination of balance of payments support (by
    replacing commercial imports) and budgetary support (through
    governments’ use of counterpart funds generated from the sale of the
    commodities). This study noted the following:

•   The impacts of the food aid on food security were marginally positive, but
    transaction costs were very high, suggesting the need for radical changes
    to improve effectiveness and efficiency.
•   Minor, short-term negative impacts on local food production were
    common. Food aid was still being used, though to a decreasing extent, to
    support subsidized food sales, which in some countries favored
    food-insecure and poor households and, in others, urban middle-class and
    public sector groups. The little available evidence suggested that the food
    aid had modest positive impacts on the nutritional status of vulnerable
    groups.
•   The European Commission and the member states should consider
    (1) either phasing out such assistance, especially in the case of donors
    with smaller programs or (2) making radical changes in policies and
    procedures to increase effectiveness and reduce transaction costs to
    acceptable levels.

    A group of experts meeting at FAO in June 1996 opposed food aid as a
    regular instrument to deal with market instability because of its market
    displacement and disincentive effects. A 1997 report prepared for the
    Australian government recommended that Australia considerably reduce
    its food aid commitment to the Food Aid Convention and in the future use
    food aid primarily for emergency relief. 10

    In October 1998, USAID reported on the results of a 2-year study that it
    conducted to assess the role of U.S. food aid in contributing to sustainable
    development during the past 40 years. It examined 6 case studies.11 The
    U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) concluded that U.S.

    9
    Edward Clay, Sanjay Dhiri, and Charlotte Benson, Joint Evaluation of European Union Program Food
    Aid: Synthesis Report (London: Overseas Development Institute, Oct. 1996).
    10
        Report of the Committee of Review, The Australian Overseas Aid Program (1997).
    11
      The case studies included five countries (Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, Honduras, and Indonesia)
    and the Sahel region of Africa. (The Sahel consists of 9 countries: Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, the
    Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal.) The examination included field work in
    the 5 countries and a desk study of the 9 countries in the Sahel. See: Donald G. McClelland, U.S. Food
    Aid and Sustainable Development (Washington, D.C.: USAID, Oct. 1998).



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                     Appendix V
                     Emergency and Nonemergency Food Aid




                     food aid had at times been successfully used to leverage or support a
                     sound economic policy environment and thus promote sustainable
                     development. At other times, however, U.S. food aid had hampered
                     sustainable development by permitting governments to postpone needed
                     economic policy adjustments and, at still other times, had no discernible
                     effect on a country’s economic policy environment. USAID found that
                     providing large quantities of food aid for sale on the open market at the
                     wrong time has at times been a disincentive to domestic food production.
                     However, targeting food aid to those who lack purchasing power and are
                     unable to buy food has at other times increased food consumption and
                     incomes without adversely affecting domestic food production. In
                     addition, USAID concluded that it is normally more efficient to transfer
                     resources as financial aid rather than as food aid, but in practice this is a
                     moot point because generally the choice is between U.S. food aid or no
                     aid.12


                     According to the World Food Program, which distributes about 70 percent
Provision of         of global emergency food aid,13 some of its emergency relief projects tend
Emergency Food Aid   to be underfunded or not funded at all because donors direct their
Since the Summit     contributions to the program’s emergency appeals on a case-by-case basis.
                     In addition, the program has problems in ensuring a regular supply of food
                     to its operations more generally because of lengthy delays between its
                     appeals and donor contributions and donors’ practice of attaching specific
                     restrictions to their contributions.

                     In 1997, about 6 percent of the program’s declared emergency needs were
                     unmet and 7 percent of its protracted relief operations needs were not
                     satisfied. Table V.3 shows the program’s resource shortfall for emergency
                     food aid, including emergency operations and protracted relief
                     operations,14 for 1998. As the table shows, 33 operations were
                     underfunded and 18 percent of total 1998 needs were not covered.




                     12
                       For additional results, see U.S. Food Aid and Sustainable Development.
                     13
                       The program distributes more than 95 percent of global multilateral food aid and about 40 percent of
                     all food aid.
                     14
                       An emergency operation provides emergency food aid for victims of sudden disasters or abnormal
                     droughts and initial assistance for the first 12 months to refugees and displaced persons. Protracted
                     relief operations provide food aid to refugees and displaced persons beyond an initial 12-month period
                     when, for reasons beyond the control of the host government, it has not been possible to achieve any
                     form of durable solution to enable the people to achieve self-sufficiency in their locations of temporary
                     residence.



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                                              Appendix V
                                              Emergency and Nonemergency Food Aid




Table V.3: 1998 World Food Program Emergency and Protracted Relief Assistance
                                                                 Number of             Net 1998 needsa                      Resource
                                                               people to be                                Dollars           shortfall
Recipient           Project title                                 assisted          Metric tons          (millions)         (percentb
Asia and Commonwealth of Independent States
Afghanistan         Afghan relief rehabilitation                  1,140,000             17,497                $8.0                  0
Albania             Assistance to destitute victims                  24,000              1,000                 0.4                100
Albania             Assistance to victims of Kosovo crisis           42,000              1,991                 0.7                  0
Armenia             Vulnerable groups, refugees, others             220,000             17,643                 9.1                 47
Azerbiajan          Internally displaced persons                    215,000              7,227                 3.7                 16
Bangladesh          Assistance to Myanmar refugees                   21,000              4,415                 1.9                  0
Bangladesh          Assistance to flood victims                  19,121,500            333,313                84.2                 36
Cambodia            Rehabilitation program                        1,710,000             28,000                15.8                  0
China               Assistance to flood victims                   5,786,900            239,721                65.7                 25
Former Yugoslavia   Refugees, returnees, internally
                    displaced persons, war victims                  650,000             82,371                46.0                 49
Georgia             Displaced persons and vulnerable
                    groups                                          200,000              7,541                 3.3                 18
Indonesia           Displaced persons and vulnerable
                    groups                                        4,600,000            354,000               138.4                  9
Iran                Food assistance for Afghan refugees              88,000             13,790                 4.4                  0
Korea, Democratic   Vulnerable groups
Peoples Republic                                                  6,700,000            602,000               346.0                  0
Kosovo Crisis       Food assistance to refugees,
                    returnees, internally displaced persons         420,000             37,800                19.4                 34
Laos                Flood victims                                   210,000             12,999                 6.4                 23
Nepal               Bhutanese refugees                               93,500             18,859                 7.7                  0
Nepal               Victims of crop losses                           10,500                685                 0.1                  0
Pakistan            Afghan refugees                                  28,000              4,119                 1.9                100
Sri Lanka           Displaced persons                                50,000              8,667                 3.2                  1
Tajikistan          Vulnerable groups                               500,000             24,761                 8.8                 36
Thailand            Assistance to Cambodian refugees                 90,000             12,349                 1.6                 10
Vietnam             Assistance to drought victims                    35,000                420                 0.2                  0
Subtotal                                                         41,955,400          1,831,168               776.9                 16
Latin America and Caribbean
Central America     Victims of Hurricane Mitch                    1,125,000             60,000                30.1                 60
Cuba                Drought victims                                 615,195             19,853                40.6                 70
Dominican Republic Hurricane Georges                                225,000              3,662                 2.1                  0
Ecuador             Victims of “El Niño”                            112,060                  0                   0                  0
Guatemala           Victims of Hurricane Mitch                       40,000                283                 0.2                  0
                                                                                                                           (continued)



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                                               Appendix V
                                               Emergency and Nonemergency Food Aid




                                                                  Number of             Net 1998 needsa                      Resource
                                                                people to be                                Dollars           shortfall
Recipient            Project title                                 assisted          Metric tons          (millions)         (percentb
Honduras             Victims of Hurricane Mitch                      101,000                450                 0.2                  0
Nicaragua            Central America regional “El Niño”              323,000             18,764                 9.0                 14
Nicaragua            Crop failure caused by drought (“El
                     Niño”)                                           65,500                399                 0.2                  0
Nicaragua            Victims of Hurricane Mitch                       63,000                401                 0.2                  0
St. Kitts-Nevis      Hurricane Georges                                 3,000                 35                 0.2                  0
Subtotal                                                           2,672,755            103,847                82.8                 51
Middle East and North Africa
Algeria              Assistance to Western Sahara refugees            80,000             10,909                 5.1                  0
Yemen, Rep. of       Food assistance for Somali refugees              10,000              2,339                 1.2                  1
Iraq                 Assistance to the destitute/vulnerable          943,000             61,896                35.0                 91
Subtotal                                                           1,033,000             75,144                41.3                 75
Sub-Saharan Africa
Angola               Displaced & war affected                        539,500             46,848                30.7                  0
Cameroon             Locust infestation                               60,000                540                 0.2                  0
Cameroon             Locust infestation and crop losses              210,000              5,518                 1.5                 31
Chad                 Sudanese refugees                                12,500                845                 0.8                  0
Chad                 Crop failure                                    122,000                473                 0.2                  0
Democratic           Flood victims in Kisingani
Republic Congo                                                        13,000                168                 0.2                  0
Democratic           Angolan refugees
Republic Congo                                                        46,000              4,825                 3.4                100
Djibouti             Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti refugees             22,000              1,134                 0.6                  0
Ethiopia             Somalia, Sudanese, Djibouti, Kenya
                     refugees                                        336,000             30,093                15.6                  0
Ethiopia             Assistance to returnees                          96,000             15,804                 6.4                  0
Ethiopia             Victims of Meher crop failure                   800,000             60,000                23.7                  0
Guinea               Sierra Leone refugees                           200,000             17,645                 9.4                 13
Guinea Bissau        War victims                                     330,000             28,370                17.5                 30
Guinea Bissau        Assistance to displaced/conflict
                     affected                                         25,000                392                 0.2                  0
Kenya                Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudanese refugees            178,000             41,700                26.9                  0
Kenya                Floods                                          587,400             31,823                18.5                 48
Lesotho              Feeding for schools affected by unrest           30,727                245                 0.2                  0
Liberia              Internally displaced persons &
                     returning Sierra Leone refugees               1,717,000             62,312                41.5                  0
Madagascar           Mitigation of locust invasion                    32,527                674                 0.2                  0
Malawi               Targeted safety net                             185,000              6,550                 2.7                  0
Mali                 Malian returnees/affected persons               112,500             10,025                 7.8                  0
                                                                                                                            (continued)


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                                          Appendix V
                                          Emergency and Nonemergency Food Aid




                                                                 Number of                Net 1998 needsa                         Resource
                                                               people to be                                   Dollars              shortfall
Recipient        Project title                                    assisted           Metric tons            (millions)            (percentb
Mauritania       Assistance to drought-affected
                 populations                                           95,000                 705                  0.2                     0
Mozambique       Food Assistance to flood victims                      70,000               4,297                  1.5                     8
Namibia          Drought victims                                       25,000                 926                  0.6                    100
Rwanda/Burundi   Victims of conflict                               1,399,817              104,927                64.5                     15
Senegal Reg.     Early drought response                            1,500,000                6,072                  3.3                    100
Sierra Leone     Internally displaced persons &
                 returning Sierra Leone refugees                       97,840              46,019                33.6                      0
Somalia          Flood victims                                       657,500                9,847                13.0                      0
Somalia          Rehabilitation and reconstruction                   829,340               16,885                13.0                     19
Sudan            Eritrean & Ethiopian refugees                       138,000               30,000                13.7                      0
Sudan            War and drought victims                           2,600,000              115,426               125.1                     12
Sudan            Floods                                              113,000                4,577                  2.0                    100
Tanzania         Drought victims                                   1,400,000                5,253                  1.9                     0
Uganda           Sudanese, Zaire, Rwanda refugees                    165,000               52,000                29.3                      0
Uganda           Displaced.persons in North Uganda                   347,000               28,622                17.4                     40
Uganda           Drought victims                                     126,000                4,077                  1.6                     0
Zambia           Angola, Zaire refugees                                25,200               1,302                  2.2                     0
Zambia           Flood victims in Luapula Province                     22,200                 306                  0.2                     0
Zambia           Drought victims                                     692,035               25,000                  8.2                    60
Subtotal                                                          15,958,086              822,225               539.6                     13
Total                                                             61,619,241             2,832,384           $1,440.6                     18%

                                          Note: Numbers may not total due to rounding.
                                          a
                                           Food needs for the entire year, as reported in January 1999, excluding carryover stocks from
                                          1997.
                                          b
                                           Tons needed minus contributions as a percent of needs.

                                          Source: World Food Program.




                                          Page 69                                                    GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix VI

Conflicts’ Contribution to Food Insecurity


               The countries attending the World Food Summit acknowledged a clear
               relationship between conflict and food insecurity and agreed that an
               environment in which conflicts are prevented or resolved peacefully is
               essential to improving food security. They also noted that conflicts can
               cause or exacerbate food insecurity.

               Table VI.1 presents the results of an analysis in which we examined the
               relationship between four different types of conflict (genocide, civil war,
               interstate war, and revolution) and the level of food security in 88
               developing countries. In general, the table shows an association between
               countries experiencing conflict and food inadequacy. For example,
               countries with low levels of average daily calories per capita generally
               experienced more involvement in conflict proportionately than did
               countries with higher levels of average daily calories per capita. In terms
               of types of conflict, for each of the 3 decades shown, all countries that
               experienced genocide had an inadequate level of food security. For 2 out
               of the 3 decades (that is, the 1960s and the 1980s), countries that
               experienced civil war were more likely to have experienced food
               inadequacy.1 Similarly, for 2 out of the 3 decades (the 1960s and the
               1970s), countries that experienced interstate war on their own territory
               were more likely to have been food insecure. In the case of revolution, the
               relationship is more in the other direction; for 2 out of the 3 decades,
               food-secure countries were more likely to have experienced revolution
               than food-inadequate countries.




               1
                The percentages reported in the table for countries with adequate average daily calories per capita
               (that is, greater then 2,700 calories) should be interpreted cautiously, given the relatively small number
               of countries in this category. For example, during the 1960s, only 3 countries were classified as food
               secure; 5 countries during the 1970s; and 15 countries during the 1980s.



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                                           Appendix VI
                                           Conflicts’ Contribution to Food Insecurity




Table VI.1: Relationship Between Incidence of Conflict and Level of Food Security in Developing Countries, 1960-89
                                                           Number of countries involved in Proportion of countries in conflict
                                                                       conflict                for each food security levelb
                                                              1960    1970      1980               1960    1970     1980
                       Average daily calories per capitaa       to       to       to                 to      to       to
Type of conflict                                              1969     1979     1989    Total      1969    1979     1989         Total
                                      c
Genocide                    Inadequate    Less than 2,100         5        4        3     12         13%      13%      14%          13%
                                           2,100 to 2,400         3        5        5     13          8       16       14           12
                                           2,400 to 2,700         1        1        0      2         13        5        0            4
                                                 Subtotal         9       10        8     27         11       12       11           11
                                             Greater than
                             Adequate              2,700          0        0        0      0          0        0        0            0
                                      c
Civil war                   Inadequate    Less than 2,100       10         8        9     27         26       27       41           30
                                           2,100 to 2,400         5       12       13     30         13       38       37           28
                                           2,400 to 2,700         0        1        7      8          0        5       44           18
                                                 Subtotal       15        21       29     65         18       25       40           27
                                             Greater than
                             Adequate              2,700          0        2        3      5          0       40       20           22
Interstate war on
country’s territory         Inadequatec   Less than 2,100         4        3        1      8         11       10        5            9
                                           2,100 to 2,400         2        0        2      4          5        0        6            4
                                           2,400 to 2,700         1        1        0      2         13        5        0            4
                                                 Subtotal         7        4        3     14          8        5        4            6
                                             Greater than
                             Adequate              2,700          0        0        2      2          0        0       13            9
Revolution                  Inadequatec   Less than 2,100         1        9        6     16          3       30       27           18
                                           2,100 to 2,400         9        7        6     22         23       22       17           21
                                           2,400 to 2,700         0        5        1      6          0       24        6           13
                                                 Subtotal       10        21       13     44         12       25       18           18
                                             Greater than
                             Adequate              2,700          1        1        4      6         33       20       27           26

                                                                                                             (Table notes on next page)




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Appendix VI
Conflicts’ Contribution to Food Insecurity




Note: The unit of analysis is countries grouped together by a specific level of food security, time
period, and type of conflict. For each group, countries were classified by whether they were or
were not involved in at least one conflict during the time period. Conflict data were reported by
decade. Data on conflict and food security were obtained for 88 of 93 developing countries that
were analyzed elsewhere in this report. Data were not available for Cuba, Iran, Iraq, North Korea,
and Saudi Arabia.
a
 Average is based on available food supply at the country level. Averages were calculated from
annual data for the decades shown.
b
 We calculated the proportion of countries in conflict as the ratio of the number of countries that
were involved in an indicated type of conflict to the total number of countries belonging to the
group of countries for an indicated food security level and time period. For example, for the
decade 1960-69, there were 38 countries whose average daily calories per capita were less than
2,100. Of these, 5 countries experienced genocide, 10 experienced civil war, 4 experienced
interstate war, and 1 experienced revolution. For these groups, the rate of incidence of genocide
was 13 percent (5 out of 38), the rate of incidence of civil war was 26 percent (10 out of 38), the
rate of incidence of interstate war on a country’s territory was 11 percent (4 out of 38), the rate of
incidence of revolution was 3 percent (1 out of 38).
c
 We designated countries as having inadequate or adequate daily calories per capita based on
an FAO analysis of the relationship between average daily calories per capita and chronic
undernutrition. According to FAO, for countries having an average daily per capita undernutrition
threshold ranging between 1,750 calories and 1,900 calories and a moderate level of unequal
food distribution, between 21 percent and 33 percent of the population will be below the
undernutrition threshold if the average per capita daily energy supply is 2,100 calories. If the
average per capita daily energy supply is 2,400 calories, 7 percent to 13 percent of the
population will be undernourished. At 2,700 calories, 2 to 4 percent of the population will be
undernourished. If food is distributed more equitably, the percentage of the population that is
undernourished decreases and vice versa. See also the discussion in appendix II.

Source: Our analysis of country data on per capita calories as reported by FAO and on conflict
data as reported by William Easterly and Ross Levine in “Africa’s Growth Tragedy,” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics Vol. CXII, No. 4 (Nov. 1997).




Page 72                                                     GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix VII

Increasing Agricultural Production in
Developing Countries

               The summit’s policy declaration and action plan stress the importance of
               promoting sustainable agricultural development in developing countries.
               In an analysis prepared for the summit, FAO concluded that it was
               technically possible for the more food-insecure developing countries to
               increase their agricultural production by substantial amounts and in so
               doing to contribute significantly to the summit’s goal of halving the
               number of their undernourished people by 2015.1 According to a U.S.
               official, the FAO analysis was an important basis underlying the agreement
               of summit countries to try to halve undernutrition by 2015. At issue is
               whether the developing countries will be able to achieve the kind of
               production increases indicated by the FAO study.

               Table VII.1 shows the key results of the FAO analysis. FAO differentiated
               between three levels of food-insecure countries: (1) countries with an
               estimated average per capita daily energy supply (DES) of less than
               1,900 calories, (2) countries with an estimated average per capita DES of
               2,300 calories, and (3) countries with an estimated average per capita DES
               of more than 2,700 calories. As the table shows, the proposed goal for 17
               group 1 countries is to raise their DES to at least 2,300 and if possible
               2,500 calories by 2010. The normative goal for 38 group 2 countries is to
               raise their DES to at least 2,500 calories and, if possible, to 2,700 calories by
               2010. The normative goal for 38 group 3 countries is to maintain DES above
               2,700 calories and to achieve a more equitable distribution of food supplies
               among their citizenry.




               1
                According to the World Bank, no developing country has had a sustained impact on reducing poverty
               without continuing positive economic growth, and for most developing countries, agricultural growth
               has been essential to economic growth. Most of the developing countries that grew rapidly during the
               1980s had experienced rapid agricultural growth in the preceding years. Such growth stimulates
               economic growth in nonagricultural sectors, which results in increased employment and reduced
               poverty. Fostering rural growth also helps the urban poor.



               Page 73                                                  GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
                                          Appendix VII
                                          Increasing Agricultural Production in
                                          Developing Countries




Table VII.1: FAO Analysis of Daily Per Capita Calorie Levels, Grain Production Growth Rates, and Millions of
Undernourished to 2010 for 93 Developing Countries
                                                         Grains production growth rate         Number of undernourished
                              Average per capita               (percent per year)                       (millions)
                                daily calories                               1990/92-2010                                        2010
                                                2010                    FAO 1995                                       FAO 1995
              Number of                       summit                        study         Summit                           study          Summit
Country group countries       1990-92           goala      1970-1992    estimatea           goal          1990-92      estimatea            goal
1                                               2,300-
                       17       1,860            2,500           1.7            3.2             3.8            160             188             95
2                                               2,500-
                       38       2,300            2,700           3.0            2.3             2.5            384             359             210
3                                            More
                       38       2,780    than2,700               3.2            2.0             2.0            295             133             133
                                                       b
Total                  93       2,520                            3.0            2.1             2.3            840             680             438
                                          a
                                           World Agriculture: Towards 2010, ed. Nikos Alexandratos (New York: FAO and John Wiley &
                                          Sons, 1995). The study sought to assess the future as it is likely to be in 2010 rather than as it
                                          ought to be from a normative or goal perspective.
                                          b
                                              Not available.

                                          Source: Technical background documents 12-15.



                                          According to FAO’s analysis, if the normative goals were achieved,
                                          additional production would deliver 60 percent of the developing
                                          countries’ additional needed food for consumption. The balance would
                                          have to be covered by net imports, which would increase from the
                                          24 million tons in 1990-92 to 70 million tons in 2010 (instead of the
                                          50 million tons projected by a 1995 FAO study). FAO estimated that the
                                          additional export supply was within the bounds of possibility for the main
                                          grain exporting countries.


                                          Achieving the production increases previously discussed is not likely to be
Production Increases                      easy because it requires unusually high growth rates in the more
Are Not Likely to Be                      food-insecure countries and, in turn, higher amounts of investments,
Easy                                      especially in the worst-off countries. In addition, it requires numerous
                                          major changes in these countries, particularly in the rural and agricultural
                                          sector.

                                          According to FAO, aggregate production must increase rapidly in countries
                                          with too-low daily caloric levels and must also contribute to development
                                          and generate incomes for the poor. As table VII.1 shows, the group 1




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Appendix VII
Increasing Agricultural Production in
Developing Countries




countries would have to more than double their aggregate agricultural
production growth rate during 1970-92, from 1.7 percent to 3.8 percent per
year. FAO considered 3.2 percent the most likely production increase. For
several group 1 countries, production increases of 4 to 6 percent annually
are implied, according to FAO. For group 2 countries, the goal is to slow an
expected decline in the agricultural production growth rate per year
relative to the 3 percent rate during 1970-92. FAO estimated the most likely
production increase for these countries at 2.3 percent but said the rate
would need to be at least 2.5 percent to achieve the summit goal of halving
the number of food insecure by 2010.

FAO based its normative targets on fairly optimistic assumptions about
expanding domestic production and access to imports, including food aid.2
In fact, FAO said, extraordinary measures would have to be taken to realize
the normative goals. FAO offered the following rationale to justify the
targets. Previously, some of the countries had already achieved average
per capita daily caloric levels above the proposed minimum of
2,300 calories. For most of the countries, daily caloric levels were at the
minimum or near the minimum recorded for them during the previous
30 years. There was a marked correlation between these low levels and the
prevalence of unsettled political conditions, which suggested that progress
could be made during a recovery period if more peaceful conditions
prevailed. Finally, FAO said, the historical record showed that periods of
10-20 years of fairly fast growth in production and consumption had not
been uncommon—mostly during periods of recovery (usually from
troughs associated with war, drought, or bad policies). Thus, if conditions
were created for the onset of a period of recovery, policies and efforts to
achieve the required high growth rates could bear fruit.

According to one expert, most low-income developing countries and
countries of the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe have
large, unexploited gaps in agricultural yields.3 He estimated that yields can
be increased by 50-100 percent in most countries of South and Southeast
Asia, Latin America, the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and by
100-200 percent in most of sub-Saharan Africa. According to the expert, it
is technically possible for the world population to meet growing food
demands during the next few decades, but it is becoming increasingly
difficult because of groups that are opposed to technology, whether it be
developed from biotechnology or more conventional methods of

2
 FAO did not break down its estimates in terms of what proportion of the increased exports would be
covered by commercial imports and food aid.
3
 See Norman Borlaug, “Technological and Environmental Dimensions of Rural Well-Being.”



Page 75                                                  GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
                        Appendix VII
                        Increasing Agricultural Production in
                        Developing Countries




                        agricultural science.4 The expert has expressed particular concern about
                        the effect of these groups on the ability of small-scale farmers in
                        developing countries to obtain access to the improved seeds, fertilizers,
                        and crop protection chemicals that have allowed affluent nations plentiful
                        and inexpensive foodstuffs.


Additional Amount of    Under its scenario of the most likely increase in agricultural production in
Needed Investment Not   developing countries by 2010, FAO roughly estimated, in a presummit
Clear                   analysis, that gross investment in primary agricultural production5 in the
                        developing countries would require an increase from $77 billion annually
                        in the early 1990s to $86 billion annually during 1997-2010 (constant 1993
                        dollars). FAO estimated that another $6 billion of investment would be
                        needed to halve the number of undernourished people in countries with
                        low daily per capita caloric levels. While the $6 billion increase
                        represented only a 7-percent rise, FAO noted that all of the additional
                        investment would be required in the lagging countries. Thus, group 1
                        countries (table VII.1) would require a 30-percent annual increase in
                        investment, and group 2 countries a 17-percent increase. However,
                        according to FAO, the low-income, food-deficit countries will mostly
                        continue to have very low domestic savings and access to international
                        credit. As a result, both private and public sectors will have difficulty, at
                        least in the short and medium term, in raising the investment funds needed
                        to respond to new production opportunities, even when they have a
                        comparative economic advantage, and there will be a continuing need for
                        external assistance on grant or concessionary lending terms.

                        FAO’s presummit analysis did not address, for countries with low daily per
                        capita caloric levels, added investment needs for (1) post-production
                        agriculture and improved rural infrastructure (excluding irrigation),
                        (2) public services to agriculture, and (3) social support in rural areas.
                        Consequently, the analysis may understate the amount of additional
                        investment required in those countries to attain the normative production


                        4
                         Borlaug notes that sophisticated molecular genetics and biotechnology hold great promise for
                        increasing agricultural yields but doubts they will transform agricultural production in low-income,
                        food-deficit countries in the next 2 decades, since these technologies will be confined primarily to
                        more affluent nations. Instead, he believes that more widespread and better application of
                        conventional technology can accomplish the task. He cites experiences over the past 10 years in eight
                        sub-Saharan countries, indicating that great strides can be made in improving the nutritional and
                        economic well-being of their desperately poor populations if Africa maintains political stability and
                        develops effective marketing and seed and fertilizer supply systems.
                        5
                         The estimate did not include agricultural investment needed for the post-food production stage or
                        public investment needed to improve rural infrastructure (excluding irrigation), public services to
                        agriculture, and social support in rural areas.



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                         Appendix VII
                         Increasing Agricultural Production in
                         Developing Countries




                         goals.6 In addition, there is no indication that bilateral or multilateral
                         donors will increase their assistance by the amounts indicated by the FAO
                         study. In fact, ODA for primary agriculture steadily declined from a peak of
                         $18.9 billion in 1986 (1990 constant prices) to $9.8 billion in 1994.
                         According to FAO, external assistance is almost the only source of public
                         investment in agriculture for many of the poorer developing countries.7


Desired State of Rural   According to an October 1997 World Bank report,8 several major regions
Development May Be       of the world and many countries that receive the Bank’s assistance are
Difficult to Achieve     agricultural underperformers. These regions and countries have
                         institutions and agricultural policies that discriminate against the rural
                         sector, underinvest in technology development, maintain inappropriate
                         agrarian structures, use arable land for low-productivity ranching,
                         undervalue natural resources and therefore waste them, seriously
                         underinvest in the health and education of their rural populations,
                         discriminate against private sector initiatives in food marketing, and fail to
                         maintain existing or invest in new rural infrastructure. Unless these
                         policies, institutions, and public expenditure patterns are corrected, the
                         Bank said, they will not have abundant food supplies.

                         In the Bank’s view, rural areas have not been developed for three reasons.
                         First, countries are not politically committed to the broad vision of rural




                         6
                          FAO estimated that gross fixed investment in the post-production food chain in the developing
                         countries would need to increase from $33.5 billion annually in the early 1990s to $43 billion in the
                         projection period—to achieve the agricultural output reflected in FAO’s 1995 study, World Agriculture:
                         Toward 2010. Similarly, investment in the public sector and infrastructure (excluding irrigation) was
                         required to increase from $25 billion to $37 billion. FAO did not estimate additional amounts needed to
                         reach the normative production goals for 2010 shown in table VII.1. Regarding public sector
                         investment in the developing countries, FAO projected a needed increase in domestic public
                         investment, from $19 billion per year during the early 1990s to $26 billion per year in the projected
                         period; in multilateral investment, from $6.5 billion per year during the early 1990s to more than
                         $9.5 billion per year during the projection period; and in bilateral ODA, from $3.5 billion during the
                         early 1990s to more than $5.5 billion during the projection period. FAO did not estimate additional
                         amounts needed in these categories to reach the normative production goals.
                         7
                          About 67 percent of such assistance is on concessional terms.
                         8
                          Rural Development: From Vision to Action.


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Increasing Agricultural Production in
Developing Countries




development.9 Second, for many reasons, international interest in
agricultural and rural matters has waned over the past decade.10 Third, the
Bank has in the past been poorly committed to rural development, and its
performance on rural development projects has been weak. For example,
according to a Bank official, a 1993 review found that Bank expenditures
on agriculture and rural development had declined from $6 billion to about
$3 billion and that less than half of the Bank’s projects in the area were
successful. Following the review, the Bank conducted additional analyses
and developed a vision statement for its future work in the area. In
September 1996, the Bank’s President announced that rural development
would be one of six key Bank objectives.

To tackle the issue of weak commitment at the country level, the Bank is
focusing on improving its strategies for country assistance. According to
the Bank, the strategies define the key issues for development, analyze the
current and future prospects for dealing with the issues, and provide the
overall context within which Bank operations are undertaken. The Bank
believes that the strategies are crucial to renewing the commitment by
countries and the Bank to rural growth.11 The Bank plans to build a
comprehensive rural development strategy into each of its overall country
assistance strategies. According to the Bank, no approach to rural




9
 Partner countries of the Bank have frequently given a low priority to agricultural growth and rural
development because they view agriculture as a declining sector. Many developing countries have
focused resources on the urban and industrial sectors, often at the expense of the rural sector. They
have failed to recognize the critical importance of productivity improvements and growth in the rural
sector in the long transition from an agrarian to an urban-industrial society. Falling real food prices
over the last 2 decades led to complacency toward the agricultural sector (some of the decline resulted
from protectionist agricultural policies pursued in OECD countries). The rural poor have little political
power, and urban elites pursue policies that disadvantage the agricultural sector. In many countries,
public institutions have dominated the agricultural sector by controlling input and output markets,
land markets, and access to finance. They have often been highly inefficient and unresponsive to
changes in market conditions and provided privileges and rents to a favored few. Resources have been
concentrated in the hands of a few. Designing and implementing effective community-based systems
for managing common property resources is difficult and only just starting in many countries.
10
  Reasons include a decline in real grain prices, leading to complacency, and a reduction of 50 percent
in external assistance for agriculture since 1986. During the 1980s, development assistance
increasingly diverted finance to projects in environmental protection and natural resource
management. Poverty alleviation programs were increasingly disconnected from agricultural
production.
11
  The Bank also recently adopted a sector investment approach to development assistance that differs
from its traditional project approach. (According to the Bank, the project approach has had limited
impact in increasing rural incomes and reducing rural poverty.) The new approach covers the entire
sector or subsector, is prepared by the country’s local stakeholders, is implemented within the
country’s institutional framework (no new project management units are created), is supported by all
of the active donors in the sector, uses common implementation arrangements for all financiers to the
extent possible, and tailors long-term technical assistance to meet demand. Since the sector
investment approach is still new, its success is not yet proved, according to the Bank.


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Increasing Agricultural Production in
Developing Countries




development will work for all countries, and developing and implementing
rural strategies will be complex for most countries.12

The Bank believes that if country assistance strategies include
well-defined, coherent rural strategies and treat agriculture
comprehensively, the chances for a sustained and effective rural sector
program will be substantially improved. Even so, in October 1997, a Bank
report acknowledged that there were still wide differences of opinion
within the Bank and among its partners as to the priority that should be
given the rural sector.




12
  According to the Bank, it is crucial to improve the formulation of rural strategies by improving the
analytical base; identifying the necessary changes in policies, institutions, and expenditure allocations;
clearly stating priorities; determining an appropriate balance between lending and nonlending services;
developing partnership relationships with appropriate government ministries; and involving members
of civil society at all levels. It requires input not only from agricultural experts but also from experts in
education, population, health, nutrition, infrastructure, the environment, and economics at a minimum.



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Appendix VIII

Establishing an Information System for
Assessing Undernutrition and Food
Insecurity
                    Summit countries agreed to set out a process for developing targets and
                    verifiable indicators of national and global food security where they do not
                    exist, to establish a food insecurity and vulnerability information and
                    mapping system, and to report to the Committee on World Food Security
                    on the results produced by the system. On March 24-25, 1997, FAO
                    convened a group of experts to discuss ways and means of implementing
                    such a system. This group recommended a series of initial steps to take
                    prior to the CFS meeting in June 1998. Subsequently, an interagency
                    working group was established to promote development of the
                    information and mapping system. (Membership included 21 international
                    agencies and organizations, including bilateral donor agencies.) The
                    working group met in December 1997 and April 1998. The FAO Secretariat
                    helps staff the work of the group between meetings.

                    According to FAO, among some of the key tasks identified for establishing
                    the information and mapping system are the following:

                •   Designate country focal points for all the information and mapping system
                    matters.
                •   Develop an awareness and advocacy strategy for end-users of the system;
                    where key national policymakers are not fully aware of the need for strong
                    food insecurity and vulnerability information systems, secure their
                    commitment to provide adequate and continuing support for the
                    establishment and maintenance of such systems.
                •   Inventory available as well as planned data collection systems at both the
                    international and national levels, and evaluate the quality and coverage of
                    their data; at the national level, identify and prioritize the information
                    needs of key food security decisionmakers and determine to what extent
                    needs are already met; define a priority set of information required by
                    national decisionmakers and a set of verifiable objectives; set out a
                    scheduled program of initiatives and activities to meet those objectives.
                •   Define the conceptual framework and scope of the information and
                    mapping system, including the indicators to be used at both national and
                    international levels for identifying (down to at least the household level)
                    people who are food insecure or at risk of becoming food insecure, the
                    degree of their undernutrition or vulnerability, and the key factors or
                    causes for their food insecurity or vulnerability.
                •   When agreement on system indicators is reached, complete and issue
                    guidelines for the establishment of the system at the national level.
                •   Inventory national systems to determine to what extent the information
                    and mapping system indicator needs are already met; identify significant
                    gaps and weaknesses; assess the cost and time required to implement the



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    Establishing an Information System for
    Assessing Undernutrition and Food
    Insecurity




    information and mapping system and to what extent, if any, countries
    require technical or financial assistance; and set out a scheduled program
    of initiatives and activities for establishing an effective system.
•   Identify and prepare a computerized system for compiling and analyzing
    multisectoral data and an information system for mapping, posting, and
    disseminating information accessible to all users.
•   Ensure the exchange of information among international agencies and
    organizations on all aspects related to food insecurity and vulnerability
    information and mapping. Do the same at the national level.

    By the time of the June 1998 CFS meeting, none of these tasks was
    complete. Two reports, based on the interagency working group’s work,
    were provided to CFS for its June 1998 meeting. The first was a proposed
    plan for continuing and future work on the information and mapping
    system. The plan included a long list of tasks, but the items were not
    prioritized, and no schedule for completing them was suggested. The
    second was a report providing background information and principles that
    could be followed in establishing national information and mapping
    systems. The report could be useful to officials interested in how to go
    about developing an awareness and advocacy strategy for end-users of the
    system within their countries, including securing the support of national
    decisionmakers.

    The interagency working group and FAO Secretariat had been taking an
    inventory of available information for use in the information and mapping
    system at the international level. However, no report on the results was
    available for the June 1998 CFS. The Secretariat, interagency working
    group, and member countries had not yet begun to debate what indicators
    should be used for the system. At the June 1998 CFS meeting, a number of
    countries stressed the need for a decision on what indicators to use so that
    member countries could take steps toward measuring progress in
    achieving the overall summit goal.

    A March 1997 technical advisory group and the CFS have stressed the need
    to involve FAO countries in the design of the information and mapping
    system. However, the interagency working group has not asked member
    countries to identify and prioritize their information needs, determine the
    extent to which those needs have already been met, and share the results
    with the interagency working group. Only a few developing countries sent
    representatives to the first interagency working group meeting. Fourteen
    developing countries were invited to the second meeting, and 12 countries
    sent representatives. The interagency working group met for the third time



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Establishing an Information System for
Assessing Undernutrition and Food
Insecurity




in November 1998. No developing countries sent representatives to the
meeting. There was some discussion of indicators that might be used at
the national and international levels for a food insecurity and vulnerability
mapping system and of existing international data systems from which
some indicators could be drawn. However, no proposals were offered and
no attempt was made to reach agreement on a common set of indicators
for use at the national or international level. The group is not scheduled to
meet again before the next CFS meeting, which will be held in June 1999.

Since agreement had not been reached on the information and mapping
system indicators, detailed technical guidance to countries on how to
develop information on the indicators and establish the system at the
national level also had not been developed. Similarly, member countries
had not been able to identify whether their existing systems meet their
needs or assess the time, financial resources, and technical assistance
required to establish national systems.

The interagency working group and the Secretariat have made progress in
identifying a computer system for compiling and analyzing data and an
information system for mapping, posting, and identifying the information.
However, the work is not yet complete.

A cooperative process is underway among U.N. and other international
agencies. For example, FAO and the International Fund for Agricultural
Development hosted the first and second meetings of the interagency
working group, respectively, and the World Bank hosted the third meeting.
Agreements have been reached for sharing information among some of the
agencies, for example, between FAO and the World Food Program.
However, FAO officials told us that problems have arisen in the exchange
of information and that the World Food Program and the World Health
Organization had not yet made important data sets available.

As of mid-December 1998, only about 60 countries had identified focal
points.

In commenting on a draft of this report, FAO officials said considerable
progress has been made in addressing the key tasks for establishing an
information and mapping system, and implementation of many of the tasks
requires a longer period of time. In addition, FAO said, many developing
countries have difficulty in mobilizing the required resources. According
to FAO, only about 15 countries are currently engaged in establishing
national food insecurity and vulnerability mapping systems, with or



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Establishing an Information System for
Assessing Undernutrition and Food
Insecurity




without international assistance. FAO said that the interagency group is
working on a technical compendium, to be issued in mid-1999, which will
provide more detailed technical guidance to prospective users on
technical issues related to the selection of indicators, the cut-off points,
the analysis of data, and so forth.

World Food Program officials noted that their program is actively involved
in the interagency working group that is promoting development of a food
insecurity and vulnerability information mapping system, cited several
specific areas of cooperation that involve the agency and FAO, and said the
program recently made available a data base on China that includes data
at the provincial and county level. At the same time, program officials said
that the November 1998 meeting of the interagency working group did not
resolve the issue of mechanisms to be used in the development of an
international food insecurity and vulnerability mapping system data base
as well as the possible technical composition of the data base. Several
different systems (FAO, World Bank, and the World Health Organization)
offer possible alternatives, the officials said. They said the meeting
discussed the issue of availability of data sets and data-sharing, and all
participants are aware that many complications relate to data copyrights
issues. Such issues will need to be resolved at the political level, officials
said, before free data-sharing becomes a practical reality.




Page 83                                     GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix IX

Coordination in Implementing Summit
Goals

                     The summit action plan stressed a need to improve coordination among
                     governments, international agencies, and civil society. Numerous
                     organizations are involved in food security issues, including FAO, the World
                     Health Organization, the U.N. Development Program, the World Bank, the
                     International Monetary Fund, the WTO, regional development banks, key
                     donor countries, for-profit private sector companies, and NGOs. Since the
                     summit, international groups have taken steps to promote better
                     coordination, but problems still exist.


                     In February 1997, FAO and the International Fund for Agricultural
Coordination Since   Development proposed that the U.N. resident coordinator in each country
the Summit           facilitate inter-U.N. coordination and that FAO headquarters establish and
                     manage a network among the U.N. and non-U.N. agencies. The
                     Administrative Coordination Committee of the United Nations (ACC)1
                     endorsed this proposal in April 1997 and authorized FAO to consult with
                     other U.N. agencies on detailed arrangements to establish the network and
                     a detailed work plan. The United States succeeded in placing the issue of
                     food security coordination on the agendas of the 1997 Group of Seven
                     developed countries’2 economic summit in Denver, Colorado, and the 1997
                     U.S.-European Union Summit.

                     Despite these actions, coordination problems continued. For example, at a
                     June 1997 meeting of the Food Aid Forum, the European Union and 11
                     other countries attending the meeting expressed concern about the
                     uncoordinated nature of food aid in contributing to food security goals.3
                     The European Union and 11 of the other countries attending the meeting
                     said global food aid policy components were scattered among a number of
                     international organizations and other forums, each with different
                     representatives and agendas, and that they lacked effective coordination.
                     In addition, they said that systemic coordination of food aid at the regional
                     and national levels was needed. To improve coordination and the
                     effectiveness of food aid, the European Union is drafting a proposed code
                     of conduct for food aid. The code of conduct is to include a statement of



                     1
                      The Administrative Coordination Committee, composed of the U.N. Secretary-General and heads of
                     specialized U.N. agencies, is responsible for ensuring full coordination between all branches of the
                     U.N. system.
                     2
                     The Group of Seven consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the
                     United States.
                     3
                     The Forum consists of 15 countries (including several European nations, the United States, Japan,
                     Australia, and Canada), the World Bank, the Club du Sahel, and the European Union.



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                           Appendix IX
                           Coordination in Implementing Summit
                           Goals




                           responsibility for both food aid donors and recipients and stress the need
                           to ensure optimal use of food aid resources.

                           Another coordination problem concerned rural agricultural development.
                           In October 1997, the World Bank reported that in virtually all of the
                           countries it works with, many donors and multilateral financial
                           institutions are promoting often disjointed projects. According to the
                           Bank, these projects are launched when the policy environment is not
                           favorable and a coherent rural strategy is lacking. Consequently, many of
                           the projects fail to achieve their development objectives and undermine
                           local commitment and domestic institutional capacity. Other examples of
                           coordination problems concern FAO’s Special Program on Food Security, a
                           telefood promotion to raise money, efforts to assist developing countries
                           develop food security action plans for implementing summit
                           commitments, FAO coordination with NGOs, and FAO coordination with
                           other U.N. agencies.


Special Program for Food   The intent of FAO’s Special Program for Food Security, an initiative of FAO’s
Security                   Director-General, is to provide technical assistance to help low-income,
                           food-deficit countries increase their agricultural production. The program
                           began in 1995 with a pilot phase involving 18 countries. At a spring 1997
                           meeting of the CFS, many developed countries expressed concern about
                           the program. For example, the European Union representative said FAO
                           was not sufficiently emphasizing the need for policy reform, donor
                           coordination, and rural development, as called for by the summit, and was
                           not developing the program in a sufficiently participatory manner to allow
                           recipient countries to take ownership of the program. The United States
                           and other countries also complained about a lack of information on the
                           costs and results of the program and expressed concern that the program
                           was using FAO resources needed for summit implementation and FAO’s
                           traditional normative work. According to a U.S. official, the United States
                           was concerned that FAO was using the special program to become a
                           development agency rather than an agency that sets standards for
                           countries to follow. The official also said that the FAO Director-General had
                           not been responsive to donor concerns about the program.

                           In commenting on a draft of this report, FAO officials said that we did not
                           adequately reflect the views of developing countries that are the main
                           beneficiaries of the program, nor did we recognize that the special
                           program was an initiative of the Director-General that was approved by
                           the FAO membership. Moreover, FAO said that the special program is now



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                     Coordination in Implementing Summit
                     Goals




                     part of its regular Program of Work and Budget. USDA officials advised us
                     that our discussion of the April 1997 events was correct, but that since
                     then, the FAO Director-General had been responsive to concerns expressed
                     about the program. For example, FAO has provided factual data on the
                     program’s activities, and that while early discussions about the program
                     had emphasized supporting large capital projects that were questionable,
                     the focus of the program has since shifted to encourage many small
                     projects.


Telefood Promotion   In 1997, the FAO Director-General announced plans to put on a 48-hour
                     global television program to mobilize public opinion and financial
                     resources to pay for the Special Program and other food security activities.
                     Participating countries were to organize national broadcasts, to be held on
                     October 18 and 19, 1997, centered on World Food Day, an annual event
                     designed to raise awareness about food security problems. According to
                     the Director-General, the telecast was an important way to raise money for
                     FAO’s Special Program in light of declining aid levels from donor countries.
                     The main purpose originally was to raise public awareness of food
                     problems and, only as a secondary suggestion from member countries, to
                     mobilize resources for micro-projects providing direct support to small
                     farmers.

                     In general, donor countries did not initially support the telefood initiative
                     when it was discussed at the April 1997 CFS meeting. Some key donor
                     countries, such as the United States, Australia, and Canada, announced
                     they would not participate in the telecast, because the proposal (1) had
                     not been reviewed or approved by FAO members; (2) lacked participation
                     by civil society in each country; (3) was designed to help fund the Special
                     Program, which was viewed as not fully reflecting World Food Summit
                     commitments; and (4) would impinge upon national NGO fundraising
                     activities centered on World Food Day. In November 1997 FAO indicated
                     the operation was successful, and invited FAO members to take all
                     measures they deem appropriate to promote Telefood in the future.
                     According to FAO, 58 countries participated in awareness-raising activities
                     in the 1997 Telefood, including 5 developed countries (France, Greece,
                     Italy, Japan, and Turkey). Twenty of the countries also engaged in
                     fundraising, including one developed country (Japan). For the 1998
                     Telefood, 45 countries participated in awareness activities and 35 of these
                     countries also engaged in fund-raising. Five developed countries
                     participated , including in both sets of activities (Italy, Japan, Portugal,
                     Spain, and Turkey).



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                          Appendix IX
                          Coordination in Implementing Summit
                          Goals




                          In commenting on this report, FAO officials acknowledged that concerns
                          had been expressed about supporting events that might be seen as
                          competing with the activities of nongovernmental organizations (NGO) but
                          said that most Telefood supporters came from civil society. USDA officials
                          said that the United States was critical of Telefood in spring 1997 but
                          expressed support for the program later in the year. They said that the
                          United States now recognizes that Telefood may be a significant activity
                          for other countries and that it can help in raising consciousness about
                          food insecurity.


Country Strategy Papers   Shortly before the summit was held, the FAO Director-General ordered that
                          food security strategy papers be drafted for each member country,
                          including developed countries. (According to FAO officials, papers for the
                          developed countries would simply describe the food security situation in
                          each country and not include recommendations.) The Director-General did
                          so without advising or securing the approval of at least some member
                          countries, including the United States. The strategies for the developing
                          countries reportedly included recommendations for improving food
                          security that focused on the agricultural sector. FAO officials told us that
                          each paper cost approximately $2,000 to produce and was drafted over a
                          2-week period. Sixty strategy papers, prepared before the summit was
                          held, were reviewed jointly by FAO, the associated member country
                          governments, and the World Bank. By April 1997, about 90 papers had
                          been drafted, and parliaments in about 20 countries had approved the
                          documents as national action plans for implementing World Food Summit
                          commitments, according to FAO officials.

                          At the April 1997 CFS session, donor countries expressed concern that civil
                          societies of the countries had not been involved in preparation of the
                          strategies, even though the summit action plan stressed the need for civil
                          society to participate in planning, promoting, and implementing measures
                          for improving food security. Donors were also concerned that the
                          presummit strategies would not reflect the full range of commitments and
                          actions agreed upon by summit participants. Also of concern was the short
                          amount of time allotted for drafting the papers. Several FAO officials
                          indicated that 2 weeks was not sufficient time to prepare sound country
                          strategy papers. They noted that prior FAO preparation of country
                          strategies typically took about 6 months. FAO officials also acknowledged
                          that FAO lacked expertise in several key areas related to food security,
                          such as macroeconomic and political policy reform, that were emphasized
                          by the summit. In general, the donors were also displeased about FAO’s



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                        Appendix IX
                        Coordination in Implementing Summit
                        Goals




                        funding of country briefs for the developed countries. Countries had
                        written position papers on their individual approaches to food security
                        during preparations for the summit. Representatives from several
                        developed countries noted that neither FAO nor FAO contractors had
                        contacted their governments to obtain key data and information on the
                        status of country efforts to develop country action plans. The European
                        Union representative instructed FAO to stop preparing briefs on the
                        European Union’s member states unless one of its countries specifically
                        requested that FAO do so.

                        FAO staff told us that the country strategies had been well received by the
                        developing countries, were not meant to substitute for action plans
                        developed by the civil society of each country, and were only a starting
                        point to stimulate discussion and debate. However, donor country
                        governments and other key groups were not invited to critique the drafts.
                        Moreover, completed strategy papers and briefs have not been made
                        available to other FAO members. According to FAO, as of June 1998, FAO had
                        provided assistance to 150 countries in preparing strategy briefs.


FAO Coordination With   The summit action plan said coordination and cooperation within the U.N.
Other U.N. Agencies     system, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund,
                        are vital to the summit follow-up. Governments agreed to cooperate
                        among themselves and with international agencies to encourage relevant
                        agencies within the U.N. system to initiate consultations on the further
                        elaboration and definition of a food insecurity and vulnerability
                        information and mapping system. As part of an already existing effort by
                        U.N. agencies to coordinate follow-up with major U.N. conferences and
                        summits since 1990, these governments also agreed to seek to reduce
                        duplications and fill gaps in coverage, defining the tasks of each
                        organization within its mandate, making concrete proposals for their
                        strengthening, for improved coordination with governments, and for
                        avoiding duplication of work among relevant organizations.

                        The summit plan also requested that the ACC ensure appropriate
                        interagency coordination and, when considering who should chair any
                        mechanisms for interagency follow-up to the summit, recognize the major
                        role of FAO in the field of food security. In April 1997, the ACC approved a
                        proposal to establish a network on rural development and food security as
                        the mechanism for providing interagency follow-up to the summit. At the
                        country level, the network consists of thematic groups established under
                        the U.N. Resident Coordinator System. According to FAO, these groups



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Coordination in Implementing Summit
Goals




typically include U.N. agencies, national institutions, bilateral donors, and
civil society representatives. At the headquarters level, the network
includes 20 U.N. organizations that participate in and support the
country-level groups. The network is jointly coordinated and backstopped
by FAO and the International Fund for Agricultural Development, in close
cooperation with the World Food Program.

Despite these efforts, FAO, other U.N. agency officials, and U.S. officials
advised us that coordination problems continue. For example, an FAO
official said that in May 1998, the U.N. Economic and Social Council4 met
to review a set of indicators for measuring follow-up to the various U.N.
conferences and summits. According to the official, FAO had not been
involved in the exercise to create the indicators, and the proposed
indicators did not adequately represent food security issues. As discussed
in appendix VIII, FAO officials told us that although the World Food
Program and World Health Organization have been cooperating in
establishing an information and mapping system, FAO was still waiting to
receive previously promised data from the organizations. According to
both FAO and U.N. Children’s Fund officials, their two agencies have had
problems coordinating with each other.

In commenting on a draft of our report, FAO officials noted that
coordination problems exist even at the national level among ministries
and agencies, and said that such problems cannot be absent in the U.N.
system of agencies. However, FAO said great efforts had been made,
particularly in the framework of the Administrative Committee on
Coordination, to improve the cooperation and synergy among the different
institutions. According to officials, the network on rural development and
food security is growing rapidly and proceeding satisfactorily.




4
 The Council is responsible for overseeing and coordinating the economic and social work of the
United Nations, including that of U.N. specialized agencies. (As previously noted, FAO is one of the
specialized agencies.) The ACC reports to the Council on coordination issues. The Council is seeking
to strengthen its interaction with the specialized agencies. According to the Council, the need to
establish institutional ties between the specialized agencies, and between them and the Council, is a
major issue. Since the specialized agencies have their own governing structures and mandate, the
Council believes it also needs to improve its interaction with the specialized agencies’ governing
bodies.



Page 89                                                    GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix X

Monitoring and Evaluation of the Action
Plan

                   The summit directed FAO’s Committee on Food Security to monitor and
                   evaluate progress toward national, subregional, regional, and international
                   implementation of the action plan, using reports from national
                   governments, the U.N. system of agencies, and other relevant international
                   institutions. Governments are to provide regular reports on progress made
                   to the FAO Council and the U.N. Economic and Social Council. The summit
                   also directed that NGOs and other interested parties should play an active
                   role in this process, at the national level and within CFS itself. Since the
                   summit, countries have provided their first progress report to CFS and the
                   FAO Secretariat, and planning has begun for a revised format for future
                   reports. NGOs have made some progress in increasing their involvement in
                   food security efforts, but not as much as they would like.


                   In April 1997, CFS decided that the first report would cover progress
Progress Reports   through the end of 1997 and the reporting procedure would be provisional.
                   Reports would be prepared by national governments, U.N. agencies, and
                   other relevant international institutions and were to be received by the FAO
                   Secretariat by January 31, 1998. Countries agreed to report on actions
                   taken toward achieving the specific objectives under each of the seven
                   statements of commitment (following the format of the summit plan of
                   action) and include information on the actors and, if available, results,
                   including quantitative assessments, under each of the objectives. CFS
                   allowed each country to decide whether to report on the specific actions
                   included in the summit’s action plan. CFS emphasized that the information
                   should include some analysis on how national policies and actions were
                   geared toward, and effective in, achieving the food security objective of
                   reducing the number of undernourished. A more detailed reporting format,
                   proposed to CFS by the Secretariat, was not approved.

                   CFS did not set any other requirements concerning the information to be
                   provided. A proposal by some delegates that countries provide baseline
                   information on actions taken to implement each of the seven
                   commitments was noted but not endorsed as a requirement. Countries
                   were not asked to provide baseline information on the number of their
                   undernourished, the extent of undernourishment, or the principal causes
                   of undernourishment. Nor were they asked to provide baseline
                   information regarding actions already underway or planned or information
                   on targets and milestone dates for implementing actions. They were not
                   asked to provide information on actual or planned expenditures for
                   implementing actions.




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Monitoring and Evaluation of the Action
Plan




Although CFS did not ask for baseline or target information, in a July 1997
letter to countries, FAO’s Director-General said that the first report after the
World Food Summit was of the utmost importance and would be of
critical value in setting baselines and the orientations that governments
intend to pursue. He also said it was expected that governments’ reports
would cover the contributions of all relevant partners at the national level,
including governmental institutions, as well as nongovernmental and
private sector actors. In addition, he asked for a one-page summary of the
major food security issues that each country was facing and the priority
targets being addressed through implementation of the plan.

By the January 31, 1998, due date, only 5 countries had provided progress
reports to the Secretariat; as late as March 31, 1998, only 68 of 175 country
reports had been received.1 The Secretariat analyzed and summarized the
results in a report for the CFS’ June meeting but drew no overall
substantive conclusions because (1) information on policies and programs
predominantly covered continuing actions already taking place at the time
of the summit, (2) the Secretariat’s analysis of country actions was limited
to 68 reports, (3) the countries only provided selective information rather
than focusing on all the issues involved, (4) some countries provided
descriptive rather than analytical information, and (5) some countries
reported only on certain aspects of food security action such as food
stocks or food reserve policies. The Secretariat said future reports need to
be oriented more toward providing a precise analysis of selected
situations, actions conducted over time to address them, results obtained,
and reasons for such results.

To date, CFS’ approach to monitoring and evaluation of country
performance has focused on encouraging countries to report on actions
taken and the impact of the actions on food security. Under this approach,
the FAO Secretariat seeks to summarize the results across all countries. CFS
has not considered directly assessing the quality of a country’s overall
action plan—including strategy, programs, resources, targets, and
milestones for achieving the summit commitments, objectives, and
actions.2 Secretariat officials told us that they lack sufficient staff to
evaluate action plans for all CFS members.

1
According to FAO, the total number of reports that eventually reached the Secretariat was 101 from
member countries, 33 from international organizations, and 3 from NGOs .
2
 As part of the summit’s action plan, countries agreed to review and revise, as appropriate, their
national plans, programs, and strategies to promote achievement of the summit’s commitments. They
also agreed to establish or improve national mechanisms to set priorities, develop, implement, and
monitor their food security actions within designated time frames, based on national and local needs,
and to provide the necessary resources for their planning.



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                         Appendix X
                         Monitoring and Evaluation of the Action
                         Plan




                         The Secretariat prepared a report for the June 1998 CFS session that
                         included a proposed standard format for reporting future progress in
                         implementing the plan. The proposal was considerably more structured
                         than that which CFS asked members to use for the provisional report
                         provided in 1998. The proposal included suggestions regarding essential
                         substantive points to be addressed in future reports. Prior to convening on
                         June 2, CFS held a 1-day working group meeting on June 1 to examine the
                         Secretariat’s proposals and report on them to CFS. However, the working
                         group did not debate and CFS did not reach any decisions on the essential
                         points to be included in future progress reports . CFS directed the
                         Secretariat to collaborate with member states and other concerned
                         partners in the continuing preparation of a set of indicators for measuring
                         progress in implementing the plan and said the work should be completed
                         sufficiently in advance to be used by CFS in preparing for its session in the
                         year 2000. CFS also directed the Secretariat to further develop an analytical
                         framework for preparing future reports and assessing progress in
                         implementing the summit action plan.


                         The summit action plan directed that civil society be involved in CFS’
Participation of Civil   monitoring and that governments, in partnership with civil society, report
Society                  to CFS on national implementation of the plan. The plan’s directive is
                         consistent with a growing interest in involving civil society to help
                         promote the objectives and work of international agencies during the past
                         decade in response to various transformations within and across
                         countries. For example, the globalization of the economy has reduced the
                         ability of individual governments to control the direction of development.
                         Structural adjustment reforms have led to a redefinition of the role of the
                         state in many countries, reducing its function as a doer and provider and
                         leaving it to the private sector and citizen initiatives to take on
                         responsibilities for services it no longer provides. The demise of
                         authoritarian regimes in many countries has created opportunities for
                         groups and collective initiatives of many kinds to spring up and make their
                         voices heard.

                         Increasing the role of civil society in CFS is not easily accomplished since
                         FAO was created as an intergovernmental forum and operates by consensus
                         of all the members. Unless the members of CFS agree to allow for NGO
                         participation, this cannot occur. According to several U.N. officials with
                         whom we spoke, developing countries are generally opposed to greater
                         involvement by NGOs in U.N. agencies, including FAO.




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Monitoring and Evaluation of the Action
Plan




According to FAO and other participants, if CFS member countries agree
that civil society should have a greater role, a variety of practical questions
must be addressed. For example, how can FAO deal effectively and
equitably with the large number of civil society organizations that would
like to be heard, the variety and number of conflicting views and interests
that they express, the disparities in their legitimacy and
representativeness, and the difficulties many NGOs in developing countries
have in gaining access to information and policy forums? In addition, given
limited resources, where should priorities lie in promoting policy dialogue,
and how can links between national and global levels be promoted? Some
NGOs believe that some of these issues could be addressed if NGOs were
allowed to hold separate meetings for developing consensus positions and
selecting a few NGOs to represent them in CFS meetings.

At the April 1997 CFS session, several delegates suggested that ways be
considered for strengthening or widening the participation of civil society
organizations in the work and deliberations of CFS. CFS asked the
Secretariat to take interim measures to broaden NGO participation at the
1998 session of CFS and agreed to examine the issue in greater detail at that
time. In responding to the April 1997 CFS session, the Secretariat took
several positive actions prior to June 1998. It increased the number of NGOs
invited to the June 1998 CFS meeting, made documents available on the FAO
website about 1 month prior to the meeting, and provided FAO countries
with a copy of a proposal by a group of NGOs for enhanced civil society
participation. The proposal identified a number of specific actions that
could be taken to increase NGO opportunities for participation before and
around CFS meetings. NGOs expressed particular disappointment about not
being allowed to make prepared statements in CFS meetings until after
government delegates have spoken and said if they were to make the effort
of participation, they needed to be assured of a say in decision-making and
to know that NGO positions could at least be reflected in CFS reports.3

In addition to the actions by the Secretariat, the FAO Director-General
invited seven NGOs to a 2-day meeting at the end of January 1998 to provide
advice on redefining FAO’s role during the next decade. NGO representatives
were asked to address what role FAO should play in fostering an enabling

3
 Other NGO suggestions for increased involvement were to (1) allow NGOs to collaborate with the
Secretariat in the drafting of CFS papers, (2) allow civil society representatives to meet separately just
prior to CFS meetings, (3) allow NGO discussions with the CFS Bureau (a small executive committee)
the day before the start of CFS meetings to identify NGO concerns, (4) include two NGO
representatives in committees that draft CFS reports, (5) encourage governments to invite NGOs to
nominate one or two representatives to join their national delegations, (6) increase the use of FAO
trust funds to facilitate participation of developing country NGOs in CFS meetings, and (7) ensure
NGO gender- and geographically balanced representation.



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Appendix X
Monitoring and Evaluation of the Action
Plan




environment for civil society organizations and building dialogue with
governments and how civil society’s views could be better taken into
account given the intergovernmental nature of FAO. The seven NGOs
provided their views in an information paper that was made available for
the CFS June meeting. In addition, the Secretariat drafted its own paper on
how the NGOs’ role could be enhanced in CFS and invited the CFS Bureau to
approve the paper for use at the June 1998 meeting.

Notwithstanding the positive steps taken by the Secretariat and CFS’
April 1997 decision, CFS did not seriously consider the issue in 1998. For
example, the CFS Bureau, a small executive committee, did not approve the
Secretariat’s paper for use at the June 1998 CFS session, and the issue was
not included in the provisional agenda for the meeting.

At the opening of the session, Canada, with support from the United
States, proposed that the provisional agenda be amended to include a
discussion of the role of civil society. However, rather than permitting
debate on the proposal, the CFS Chairman announced that he had decided
to seek to satisfy NGOs’ interests by holding informal discussions with
them. Subsequently, the Chairman advised the NGOs4 that he and the CFS
Bureau would meet with representatives of five NGOs. During the morning
of the second day of the CFS meeting, the United States again proposed
that civil society participation be added to the agenda and asked that it be
addressed without further delay. The Chairman agreed to add the item to
the agenda but postponed discussion until the end of the third day’s
meeting. During the abbreviated discussion, various ideas for broadening
civil society participation were noted. However, some delegates, including
China, stressed that CFS is an intergovernmental forum and that any
measures taken to broaden participation would need to respect that
principle.

At the conclusion of the June session, CFS countries agreed to make the
issue of increased civil society participation in its activities a main agenda
item for the 1999 meeting. It asked the Secretariat to prepare and circulate
a discussion paper at least 6 months prior to the next meeting to allow
ample time for consultations between governments and national civil
society organizations. The Secretariat was also asked to analyze the pros
and cons of proposals, including their legal, procedural, and financial
implications.


4
 About 20 NGOs attended the CFS session. An FAO official advised us that although it had broadened
the list of NGOs invited to the meeting, many NGOs did not send representatives—probably because
there was no assurance that they would be allowed to participate meaningfully in the session.



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Monitoring and Evaluation of the Action
Plan




According to a statement presented on behalf of NGOs that attended the
June 1998 CFS session, the involvement of civil society organizations in
preparing national reports on progress in implementing the summit’s
action plan was varied. In some cases, NGOs had written inputs; in other
cases, NGOs gave their views orally in meetings with government officials;
and in numerous other cases, civil society was not invited to participate in
the drafting of the national report.




Page 95                                    GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix XI

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology


                  At the request of Senator Russell D. Feingold, Ranking Minority Member of
                  the Subcommittee on African Affairs, Senator John Ashcroft, and
                  Congressman Tony P. Hall, we reviewed the outcome of the 1996 World
                  Food Summit and key factors that could affect progress toward achieving
                  the summit’s goal. Our overall objective was to comment on key issues
                  and challenges related to developing countries’ achieving the summit’s
                  goal of reducing undernourishment by half by 2015. Our overall approach
                  was to analyze and synthesize information from a wide variety of primary
                  and secondary sources. To address the current status of global food
                  security, the summit’s approach to reducing food insecurity, and the
                  summit’s possible contribution to reducing hunger and undernutrition, we
                  did the following:

              •   reviewed documents and studies by the FAO, the U.N. Children’s Fund, the
                  World Health Organization, the World Bank, and the World Food Program;
                  the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; the
                  Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research; IFPRI; USDA,
                  USAID, the Department of State, and the Department of Health and Human
                  Services; and various academics, NGOs, and private sector entities
                  concerned with past and possible future efforts to reduce poverty and
                  undernutrition;
              •   discussed issues concerning the extent and causes of undernutrition with
                  national and international experts in food security, including experts at
                  FAO, the World Food Program, the World Bank, IFPRI, USDA, USAID, the
                  Department of State, various NGOs, and universities and international food
                  companies;
              •   observed presummit negotiations over the text to be included in the World
                  Food Summit’s policy declaration and plan of action, the World Food
                  Summit, and subsequent FAO follow-up meetings to the summit (the latter
                  include the April 1997 CFS meeting, the November 1997 FAO Conference
                  meeting, and the June 1998 CFS meeting;
              •   attended various other conferences and seminars where food security and
                  related issues were discussed; and
              •   developed a database on country-level estimates of undernutrition and
                  various economic, political, and social variables possibly associated with
                  food insecurity.

                  We relied heavily on secondary sources of information, including data on
                  estimated past and future projections of the number of chronically
                  undernourished people in developing countries, world cereal stocks, and
                  world food aid deliveries. We used country and regional data on the effects
                  of the URA, conflicts, agricultural production, income levels, official and



                  Page 96                                   GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
    Appendix XI
    Objectives, Scope, and Methodology




    private sector resource flows, and investors’ ratings of the risk associated
    with investing in countries. We did not validate the reliability of these data.

    To address the current status of global food security, more specifically, we

•   reviewed methodological issues associated with efforts to accurately
    identify and measure the extent of undernutrition;
•   reviewed FAO, USDA, and World Health Organization estimates of the
    number of undernourished people or children in up to 93 developing
    countries that collectively account for about 98 percent of the population
    in the developing world;
•   used FAO estimates of the number of undernourished people in 93
    developing countries to calculate and describe (1) the distribution of the
    total number of undernourished people across countries and (2) the
    variation across countries in the proportion of population that is
    undernourished; and
•   compared FAO and USDA estimates of the number of undernourished people
    in 58 low-income, food-deficit countries to show to what extent the
    estimates differ.

    To describe the summit’s policy declaration and action plan for reducing
    food insecurity, we reviewed both and prepared a table summarizing the 7
    major commitments, 27 supporting objectives, and 24 of the 181
    supporting actions. The latter were selected to further illustrate the depth
    and specificity of the summit’s plan.

    To provide perspective on the summit’s goal of halving the number of
    undernourished people by 2015, we reviewed and compared FAO and USDA
    estimates on the number of undernourished people in developing
    countries. In addition, we analyzed a variety of key issues associated with
    the summit’s proposed commitments, objectives, and actions for halving
    undernutrition by no later than 2015. These issues concern the ability and
    willingness of countries to reasonably measure the prevalence of
    undernourishment and the possible effects of trade liberalization, grain
    reserves, food aid, conflict, increased agricultural production, policy
    reforms, resources, coordination, and monitoring and evaluation of
    progress in reducing food insecurity.

    We related FAO country-level data on the number of undernourished
    people to FAO estimates of the capability of the same countries to reduce
    undernourishment by redistribution of available food supplies. We
    reviewed and analyzed summary FAO data on past and projected cereals



    Page 97                                      GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
    Appendix XI
    Objectives, Scope, and Methodology




    production growth rates relative to food insecurity levels and the
    aggregate number of undernourished people of the countries.

    To assess the impact of trade liberalization on food security, we reviewed
    various analyses of the subject, including two detailed estimates of the
    projected income impacts of the URAs on major regions of the world and
    several major trading countries. To provide perspective on trends and
    issues associated with grain reserves and food aid, we analyzed data on
    (1) world private and government grain reserves and the ratio of total
    grain reserves to world cereal consumption; (2) world and U.S. cereals
    shipments of food aid in terms of total quantities and the proportion
    provided as program, project, and emergency aid; and (3) total food aid
    deliveries to low-income, food-deficit countries and as a percent of total
    global food aid deliveries. We also

•   analyzed country-level data on average per capita caloric levels and
    related this measure of food security to other country-level variables,
    including (1) the incidence of civil war, war, revolution and genocide
    during 1960-89; (2) the level of income; and (3) creditworthiness ratings of
    the risk associated with investing in these countries;
•   related country-level data on the number of undernourished people to
    (1) income levels of developing countries, (2) total official and private
    resources provided to these countries, and (3) creditworthiness ratings of
    the risk associated with investing in the countries; and
•   analyzed data on the role of official development assistance and private
    sector investment in developing countries during 1990-97.

    To comment on the issues of (1) improving coordination among
    governments, international agencies, and civil society and (2) monitoring
    and evaluating their progress in implementing the summit action plan, we
    considered information that became available to us in some of our
    previously discussed actions. For example, we relied heavily on the FAO
    Secretariat’s assessment of individual developing and developed country
    progress reports that were provided to the Secretariat during early 1998.
    We did not undertake a comprehensive study of actions taken by
    governments, international agencies, and civil society to improve
    coordination and monitor and evaluate progress toward achieving summit
    commitments.

    We conducted our review from February 1997 to September 1998 in
    accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.




    Page 98                                    GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix XII

Comments From the U.S. Agency for
International Development




               Page 99       GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix XII
Comments From the U.S. Agency for
International Development




Page 100                            GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
Appendix XIII

Major Contributors to This Report


                        Phillip J. Thomas
National Security and   Wayne H. Ferris
International Affairs   Gezahegne Bekele
Division, Washington,   Edward George
D.C.




(711350)                Page 101            GAO/NSIAD-99-15 Global Food Security
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