oversight

Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response Equipment and Sustainment Costs

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1999-06-09.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                   United States General Accounting Office

GAO                Report to Congressional Requesters




June 1999
                   COMBATING
                   TERRORISM

                   Analysis of Potential
                   Emergency Response
                   Equipment and
                   Sustainment Costs




GAO/NSIAD-99-151
United States General Accounting Office                                                                National Security and
Washington, D.C. 20548                                                                          International Affairs Division



                                    B-282618                                                                                       Letter

                                    June 9, 1999

                                    The Honorable Ike Skelton
                                    Ranking Minority Member
                                    Committee on Armed Services
                                    House of Representatives

                                    The Honorable Christopher Shays
                                    Chairman, Subcommittee on National
                                    Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations
                                    Committee on Government Reform
                                    House of Representatives

                                    Under the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness program,1 the
                                    Department of Defense (DOD) and others provide training, equipment, and
                                    advice to enhance the capability of civilian emergency response personnel
                                    to respond to a possible terrorist incident involving a chemical, biological,
                                    radiological, or nuclear device (CBRN). In 1998, we reported that some
                                    local jurisdictions were deciding on equipment purchases without the
                                    benefit of formal threat and risk assessments based on valid threat data.2
                                    In the absence of defined requirements, you asked us to determine the
                                    potential cost of equipping and maintaining the capability of cities to
                                    respond to a terrorist incident involving CBRN. Specifically, we
                                    (1) obtained the views of federal, state, and local officials on equipment
                                    they believed would provide various levels of capability to respond to a
                                    CBRN incident and (2) determined the potential procurement and
                                    sustainment costs of these items.

                                    To conduct our work, we developed a preliminary equipment list based on
                                    our prior work and discussions with DOD, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
                                    and local officials. We then surveyed 36 federal, state, and local officials


                                    1This program was authorized in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (title XIV
                                    of P.L. 104-201, Sept. 23, 1996) and is commonly referred to by its sponsors’ names, Senators Nunn,
                                    Lugar, and Domenici.

                                    2
                                     Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, Apr. 23, 1998);
                                    Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program
                                    Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998); Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-
                                    Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16, Oct. 2, 1998); and Combating
                                    Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency
                                    (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov. 12, 1998).




                                    Page 1                                                  GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism
                   B-282618




                   with hazardous materials (HAZMAT) expertise—24 of whom
                   responded—to determine the equipment they believed would provide
                   various levels of response capability. Based on the 24 responses, we
                   revised the equipment list. The list is for illustrative purposes, is not meant
                   to represent a minimum or maximum of equipment needs for local
                   jurisdictions, and may not reflect the actual equipment costs for a local
                   jurisdiction. Appendix I further describes our scope and methodology.



Results in Brief   We identified over 200 equipment items that federal, state, and local
                   officials believed would enhance their capability to respond to a CBRN
                   incident. These items ranged from standard items such as duct tape and
                   gloves to more sophisticated devices such as mobile command posts and
                   climate control systems. The officials we surveyed categorized the items to
                   represent different levels of capability—basic and modest, moderate, and
                   high in comparison to the basic level. A modest increase over basic
                   HAZMAT would include additional detection and decontamination
                   equipment. A moderate increase would include a greater array of detection
                   equipment than the modest level. The high level of increased equipment
                   capability would include additional and more expensive detection
                   equipment.

                   We estimated the potential cost of initially procuring and sustaining the
                   equipment items over a 10-year period using a notional city of 500,000. As
                   table 1 shows, these costs ranged from a total of about $4.6 million for
                   items considered to provide a basic capability to about $43 million for
                   items considered to provide a high capability.




                   Page 2                                     GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism
             B-282618




             Table 1: Possible Cost to Equip a Notional City of 500,000 to Respond to a CBRN
             Event
             Dollars in millions
             Equipment                        Initial    Sustainment cost                 Total
             level                  procurement cost        over 10 years                 cost
             Basic HAZMAT                         $1.3                $3.3                 $4.6
             Modest                               $5.2               $13.1                $18.3
             Moderate                             $8.3               $20.9                $29.2
             High                               $12.2                $30.7                $42.9

             This table represents a baseline and does not include some costs, such as
             those associated with equipment maintained as a stockpile, equipment
             training and certification, or some hospital and emergency medical
             response services.



Background   According to the U.S. intelligence community, conventional explosives and
             firearms are the weapons of choice for terrorists at least partly because
             chemical and biological weapons are more difficult to weaponize and the
             results are unpredictable. However, intelligence agencies state that
             terrorists’ use of chemical and biological materials may increase over the
             next decade. Despite differing views, Congress authorized and funded over
             $200 million in fiscal year 1999 for numerous training and equipment
             programs, including those offered by the Departments of Justice and
             Defense and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, to prepare local
             jurisdictions for a CBRN incident. Some jurisdictions are deciding on
             equipment purchases without the benefit of formal threat and risk
             assessments using valid threat data. As we have emphasized in our
             April 1998 report and testimony, a critical component of establishing and
             expanding programs to combat terrorism is an analytically sound threat
             and risk assessment using valid inputs from the intelligence community
             and other agencies. Such an assessment is widely recognized as an
             effective decision support tool for prioritizing security investments and
             would help local jurisdictions select equipment that would provide the
             greatest benefit whether purchased with federal, state, or local funds.




             Page 3                                      GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism
                      B-282618




                      While no valid set of equipment requirements has been defined or
                      established for equipping a local jurisdiction to respond to a CBRN terrorist
                      incident, the InterAgency Board3 for Equipment Standardization and
                      InterOperability recently developed a list of standardized equipment. The
                      list can be used by emergency personnel as a guideline when acquiring
                      CBRN response equipment and is intended to promote interoperability and
                      standardization among the response community at the local, state, and
                      federal levels. Use of the list, however, is voluntary, and state or local
                      jurisdictions decide the manufacturers, types, and quantities of the items to
                      be selected to meet their perceived operational needs.



No Defined            There is no assessment that would provide a basis for clearly defined and
                      prioritized equipment requirements based on threat and risk, and there is
Requirements and      little consensus among federal, state, and local officials on the types of
Little Consensus on   equipment needed for a city to prepare for a CBRN terrorist incident at
                      various levels. Based on our previous work, the Board’s list, and
Needed Equipment      discussions with agency officials, we identified about 200 equipment items
                      that might be used to respond to a CBRN incident. We then surveyed
                      36 federal, state, and local officials on the equipment they believed would
                      provide a basic HAZMAT equipment capability and various increments of
                      increased equipment capabilities to respond to industrial chemical spills
                      and/or CBRN terrorist events. Twenty-four of these officials responded.

                      The results of our survey identified additional protective, detection,
                      decontamination, and communications equipment to illustrate incremental
                      increases in equipment capability over basic HAZMAT. The modest
                      increase in equipment capability included more detection,
                      communications, and decontamination equipment, such as
                      decontamination showers. The moderate increase in equipment capability
                      included additional detection and decontamination items, such as gas
                      chromatograph/mass spectrometers. The high level in equipment capability
                      included more expensive detection equipment, such as perimeter sampling
                      systems and a Fox vehicle.




                      3
                        The Board is an advisory board to the National Domestic Preparedness Office at the Federal Bureau of
                      Investigation and consists of officials from local, state, and federal government organizations, including
                      the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, and the Director of Military Support,
                      Department of the Army. Its charter is to establish, maintain, and update a standard equipment list that
                      the interagency community could use to prepare for and respond to terrorism.




                      Page 4                                                    GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism
                    B-282618




                    All 24 survey respondents agreed that boundary marking tape was a basic
                    HAZMAT item. Respondents varied widely as to the level of capability
                    other equipment could provide. For example, six respondents designated a
                    chemical agent water test kit4 as basic HAZMAT equipment, four indicated
                    that it represented a modest increased capability above basic HAZMAT,
                    three indicated that it represented a moderate level of increased capability,
                    and seven indicated it represented a high level of increased capability.
                    Four respondents did not place the kit in any category. The thermal
                    imaging camera also received a varied response. For basic HAZMAT and
                    modest, moderate, and high levels of increased capability over basic
                    HAZMAT, the responses were eight, two, seven, and five, respectively.
                    Two respondents did not place this item in any category.



Procurement and     No one has created a validated list of equipment to provide a sound basis
                    for determining costs to initially equip and sustain various levels of
Sustainment Costs   equipment capability for a local jurisdiction to deal with a CBRN incident.
                    However, using the weighted results of our survey to establish which
                    equipment would go into which category, we estimated the potential costs
                    to initially equip a notional city of 500,000 people.5 The notional city has
                    1,337 first responders, 112 of which are technically trained.6 As shown in
                    figure 1, the estimated costs range from $1.3 million (basic HAZMAT) to
                    $12.2 million (high level of increased equipment capability).




                    4
                        A chemical agent water test kit evaluates any chemical warfare agent contamination in a water source.

                    5Because of the widely varying opinions on which equipment belonged in which category, we
                    reconciled the results through weighting. Based on how a respondent rated each item in our survey, we
                    assigned a score to that response and then divided the total by the number of responses.

                    6
                      The numbers of first responders, the size of response teams, and our equipment list were derived from
                    assumptions discussed in our scope and methodology and are for estimating purposes only. We do not
                    intend to imply our concurrence with the appropriateness of such resources for responding to a CBRN
                    incident, and our cost estimate is not to be considered a recommendation for how a city should be
                    structured or equipped.




                    Page 5                                                    GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism
B-282618




Figure 1: Estimated Procurement Costs
Dollars in Millions

15

                                                  12.2




10
                                     8.3




                           5.2

  5



           1.3



  0
      Basic Level        Modest   Moderate   High Level
                          Level    Level

                 Basic   Modest   Moderate High
Source: Our analysis.


Each local jurisdiction has its own perceived HAZMAT needs and opinions
on what types of equipment it would need to respond to a CBRN incident.
Depending on the types of equipment, the number of items, the
manufacturer, and discounts for quantity purchases, the actual costs to
equip a city to respond to a CBRN incident could vary greatly. For
example, a level A protective suit can cost between $600 and $2,000.

As shown in figure 2, the estimated cumulative costs to sustain the
equipment (in current year dollars) over a 10-year period range from
$3.3 million for basic HAZMAT equipment to $30.7 million for a high level
increased capability.




Page 6                                             GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism
B-282618




Figure 2: Estimated 10-Year Sustainment Costs

Dollars in Millions

35
                                           30.7


30


25
                                  20.9


20


15                      13.1




10

         3.3
 5


 0
     Basic Level Modest        Moderate High Level
                 Level          Level

      Basic     Modest         Moderate   High
Source: Our analysis.


Sustainment costs, however, can also vary because some items have an
indefinite shelf life (e.g. traffic cones and hard hats) while others have a
limited shelf life. For example, level A protective suits have a shelf life of
up to 5 years, while chlorine bleach, which is used for decontamination,
has a shelf life of 6 months. In addition, the environment and/or the
frequency that items are used can affect their useful life. For example,
according to Los Angeles County Operational Terrorism Working Group
officials, from mid-December 1998 to mid-April 1999, first responders from
the Los Angeles County operational area addressed approximately
60 chemical and biological threats that were hoaxes. When responding to
these hoaxes, first responders routinely wore hooded chemical resistant
clothing or other appropriate clothing. Some hooded chemical resistant
clothing can be worn only one time. As such, the county has had to replace



Page 7                                            GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism
B-282618




approximately 200 of these items within the past 4 months. Furthermore,
technical equipment has to be calibrated periodically to ensure that it
functions properly, and some equipment becomes obsolete and is replaced
by improved models. All of these factors can affect sustainment costs for
items and equipment used to deal with a possible CBRN terrorist incident.
The cost factor we used to estimate our sustainment costs included most of
these issues, factoring in various assumptions about shelf life and usage.

If an average inflation rate of 2.1 percent is included, the cumulative
estimated sustainment costs range from $3.6 million for basic HAZMAT
equipment to $34.2 million for the highest level of equipment capability
(see fig. 3).



Figure 3: Estimated 10-Year Sustainment Costs
Then-year Dollars in Millions

40
                                            34.2
35


30

25                                23.2



20
                        14.5
15

10

          3.6
  5

  0
      Basic Level Modest        Moderate High Level
                   Level         Level

         Basic      Modest       Moderate    High
Source: Our analysis.




Page 8                                             GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism
                  B-282618




Agency Comments   In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred and noted
                  the difficulties of developing procurement and sustainment costs for
                  equipment needed to enhance the response capability of cities to respond
                  to a terrorist incident involving CBRN. DOD also noted that our report
                  provided a good base for decision-making entities to work from. DOD’s
                  comments are included as appendix V. DOD provided technical comments,
                  which we have addressed in our report where appropriate.


                  As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of
                  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until
                  30 days after its issue date. At that time, we will send copies to the
                  appropriate congressional committees; the Honorable Jacob J. Lew,
                  Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Honorable Louis J. Freeh,
                  Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Honorable William S. Cohen,
                  Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army;
                  other federal agencies discussed in this report; and other interested parties.

                  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me
                  at (202) 512–5140. The major contributors to this report were Carol R.
                  Schuster, Davi M. D’Agostino, James F. Reid, and Lisa M.Quinn.




                  Mark E. Gebicke
                  Director, National Security
                   Preparedness Issues




                  Page 9                                    GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism
Contents



Letter                                                                                          1


Appendix I                                                                                     12
Scope and
Methodology

Appendix II                                                                                    14
Equipment List Sorted   Basic HAZMAT Equipment Capability                                      14
                        Modest Increase in Equipment Capability                                16
by Equipment            Moderate Increase in Equipment Capability                              18
Capability Level        High Level of Equipment Capability List                                19


Appendix III                                                                                   20
Survey Respondents      Local Jurisdictions                                                    20
                        Federal Agencies                                                       21
                        Associations                                                           21
                        Contractor                                                             21


Appendix IV                                                                                    22
Additional Offices      Local Jurisdictions                                                    22
                        Federal Agencies                                                       22
Consulted for Our
Review

Appendix V                                                                                     23
Comments From the
Department of Defense

Appendix VI                                                                                    27
Terrorism Related GAO
Products




                        Page 10                               GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism
          Contents




Tables    Table 1: Possible Cost to Equip a Notional City of 500,000 to
            Respond to a CBRN Event                                                  3


Figures   Figure 1: Estimated Procurement Costs                                      6
          Figure 2: Estimated 10-Year Sustainment Costs                              7
          Figure 3: Estimated 10-Year Sustainment Costs                              8




          Abbreviations

          CBRN   chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear device
          DOD    Department of Defense
          HAZMAT hazardous materials



          Page 11                                  GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology                                                                                                AppIex
                                                                                                                          ndi




             To estimate the procurement costs for equipment that might be required by
             a city responding to a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear device
             (CBRN) incident, we first developed a preliminary equipment list based on
             our previous work and input from the Army’s Director of Military Support
             and its Technical Escort Unit, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and
             Virginia’s Fairfax County Hazardous Materials Unit. This list formed the
             basis for our survey of city, state, and federal officials with expertise in the
             field of hazardous materials (HAZMAT ) and/or CBRN response equipment.
             The survey requested an evaluation of equipment that represented the four
             levels of capability, defined on page 2, that we constructed to analyze and
             illustrate potential costs. On the basis of our analysis of the survey
             responses, we compiled a master equipment list that reflected the different
             levels of capability. Because of the varying opinions on which equipment
             belonged in which category, we reconciled the results through weighting.1
             Appendix III contains a list of survey respondents and appendix IV contains
             a list of additional offices that we consulted for our review.

             We then determined the amount and types of items and equipment that
             could be used by choosing a notional city and identifying the number of
             first responders. We chose a population size of 500,000 for a notional city,
             which is slightly above the median size of the 100 most populous U.S. cities.
             Cleveland, Ohio, and New Orleans, Louisiana, are within about 5,000
             people of the notional city population size; therefore, we included them in
             our analysis to obtain the number and types of first responders—including
             their levels of training—assigned to their respective jurisdictions. From
             this information, we derived an average number of first responders for the
             notional city. We then consulted with local and federal officials, such as the
             Hazardous Materials Coordinators for the cities of Chicago, New York, and
             Baltimore and the Army’s Director of Military Support, to identify the
             amount of equipment, at each level of capability, that could be used by first
             responders. Our master equipment list, notional city size, and numbers of
             first responders are for illustrative purposes only and are not meant to
             imply that we agree with the appropriateness of such equipment or with
             how a city should be structured.




             1
               Because of the widely varying opinions on which equipment belonged in which category, we
             reconciled the results through weighting. Based on how a respondent rated each item in our survey, we
             assigned a score to that response and then divided the total by the number of responses.




             Page 12                                                GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism
Appendix I
Scope and Methodology




We are aware that many items on our equipment list are being used in local
jurisdictions for fire fighting and HAZMAT operations; however, for the
purposes of identifying procurement costs, we assumed the notional city
would have no preexisting HAZMAT capabilities. We consulted with
federal government officials to derive procurement costs. As mentioned
previously, our procurement costs are for operational equipment, do not
reflect additional equipment that might be maintained as a stockpile, and
may not reflect the actual prices a local jurisdiction might pay. Differences
might occur based on the equipment manufacturer, quantity discounts, or
the use of alternative equipment to serve the same function.

To calculate the equipment sustainment costs, we applied a factor of
25 percent of the initial procurement cost (in current-year and then-year
dollars) to each item for every year of our analysis. This factor was derived
from discussions with local and federal officials, and it represents an
average sustainment factor. A heavy vehicle would actually require a
higher relative sustainment cost than an article of clothing. The average
sustainment factor accounts for (1) general wear and tear, instrument
calibration, and general maintenance costs of the equipment and
(2) replacement costs for small-scale incidents and hoaxes. For example, a
small-scale incident would be in a localized area and would not include
mass casualties. Replacement costs due to a large-scale incident, such as
the Oklahoma City bombing, were not considered. We did not include
training and certification costs in our sustainment estimates.




Page 13                                   GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism
Appendix II

Equipment List Sorted by Equipment
Capability Level                                                                                  ApIpex
                                                                                                       ndi




Basic HAZMAT           Level A fully encapsulated chemical resistant suit ensemble
                       Hooded chemical resistant clothing
Equipment Capability   Chemical resistant gloves (Butyl)
                       Chemical resistant gloves (Nitrile)
                       Inner gloves
                       Hard-hat with face shield
                       Safety glasses
                       Duct tape
                       Chemical resistant boots, steel or fiberglass toe and shank
                       Outer booties
                       Safety boots or shoes
                       Two-way local communications, push to talk
                       Personal alarm system to alert for downed personnel
                       HAZMAT gear bag
                       Surgical masks
                       Appropriate air monitoring instruments
                       Boundary marking tape: yellow-caution/red-danger
                       Restricted access and caution warning signs
                       Combination meter
                       Combustible gas indicator
                       pH paper and water finding test paper
                       Radiation monitoring equipment
                       Leak detectors (soap solution, ammonium hydroxide, etc.)
                       pH meter or pen
                       Water finding paste
                       Gauging stick
                       Squirt bottle
                       Distilled water
                       Ammonia for chlorine detection
                       Drum thieves
                       Grab sampling tubes
                       Glass or plastic pipettes with aspiration bulb
                       Tweezers, plastic
                       Flags, wire stakes
                       Wind socks
                       Contaminated material disposal containers
                       Traffic cones
                       Brushes, long handle
                       Garden hose with nozzles
                       Polyethylene sheeting
                       Containment basins, vehicle and personnel sized



                       Page 14                                 GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism
Appendix II
Equipment List Sorted by Equipment
Capability Level




5-gallon buckets
55-gallon plastic bags
Disinfectant, detergent, bleach, and sodium bicarbonate
Hand-operated diaphragm pumps with hoses
Small garden sprayers
Backless stools
Folding tables, folding (6 foot)
Trauma-type first aid kit
Emergency eye wash
Timer or stopwatch
Safety harness with 150 foot dry line retrieval ropes, 9.5mm-10.5mm.
Locking carabiners
20-lb. ABC fire extinguisher
Hand lights, explosive proof
Portable lights
Air compressors and generators, 8kw, 15kw, and 50kw
Electric cord reels
Copper grounding rods, ¾ x 4 feet (minimum length)
Grounding cables, point-type clamps on both ends, 1/8 stainless steel
  (uninsulated) 50-foot minimum
Traffic safety vests
Megaphone/ public address system
Overpacks: 35, 55, and 85 gallon poly-drums
Miscellaneous non-sparking tool kit, to include bun and spanner wrenches
Small, medium, and large equipment bags
Handheld illumination
Cellular telephone (satellite capability is optimal)
Facsimile, copier, computer printer, and scanner (combined or individual
  machines)
Binoculars
Camera, self-developing
Computers (laptop, desktop, or docking station) with common data and
  word processing software for stand-alone, local, and wide area networks
Office supply kit (notepads, pencils, etc)
Personal Protective Equipment Selection Guide
CHRIS Manual, 1993 edition
Merck Index, 12th edition
Emergency Action Guides, Association of American Railroads
Emergency Handling of Hazardous Materials in Surface Transportation




Page 15                                 GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism
                       Appendix II
                       Equipment List Sorted by Equipment
                       Capability Level




                       Association of American Railroads, 1996 edition
                       Farm Chemicals Handbook, Meister Publishing, 1997 edition
                       First Responder’s Guide to Agriculture Chemicals Accidents,
                        Foden-Weddell, 1993 edition
                       NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards, 1995 edition
                       GATX Tank Car Manual, GATX 6th edition
                       Hawley’s Condensed Chemical Dictionary, Sax & Lewis, 13th edition
                       Handbook of Toxic and Hazardous Chemicals and Carcinogens, Sittig,
                        3rd edition
                       TLVs and BELs Guidebook, ACGIH, 1996 edition
                       Quick Selection Guide to Chemical Protective Clothing, Forsberg,
                        3rd edition
                       Household Chemicals and Emergency First Aid, Foden-Weddell, 1993
                       Gardner’s Chemical Synonyms and Trade Names, Ash, 10th edition




Modest Increase in     Personal cooling system; vest or full suit
                       Bio-pack rebreather (2-, 3-, or 4-hour supply, preferred)
Equipment Capability   Self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA)
                       Chemical/biological resistant coveralls
                       Spare ice packs for cooling systems
                       Extraction gear
                       Level A pressure test kit
                       Full Face air purifying respirators with appropriate cartridges
                       Emergency escape breathing apparatus (EEBA)
                       Paper/disposable chemical/biological overgarments, including gloves and
                        booties
                       Hazard categorizing (HazCat) kit
                       Air and liquid detector tube system
                       Colormetric tube kit with additional tubes
                       Photoionization detector (PID)
                       Flame ionization detector (FID)
                       Pesticide screening kit
                       PCB test kits
                       Petroleum finding paste
                       Chemical spill classifier kit
                       Waste water classifier kit
                       Heat sensor, infrared
                       Surface thermometer




                       Page 16                                GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism
Appendix II
Equipment List Sorted by Equipment
Capability Level




Plastic or brass scoops and trowels
Sample jars: 8 oz. wide mouth, with Teflon lids, 16 oz. wide mouth with
  Teflon lids
Thermal imaging camera
Meteorological stations (temperature, wind, and humidity)
Decontamination shower for individual and mass application
Decontamination system supplies (secondary)
Water bladder, decontamination shower waste collection
Spill containment pillows and devices
Contaminated water run-off and collection pools
Water pumps, hoses, couplers, and nozzles (electric and manual)
Emergency decontamination shelter
Air inflatable tents
Sodium hypochlorite powder (15 lb. buckets)
85 gallon poly over pak drums
Disposable personal property bags
Paper hospital gowns
Colored/nonviewable cadaver bags (Center for Disease Control standard)
HEPA (high-efficiency particulate air) vacuum for dry decontamination
Ambu bag, chemical filtered
Green line/red line battery activated marking system
Class D fire extinguisher
Ohm meter, intrinsically safe
Ground resistance tester
Explosive-proof exhaust fans
Stretcher, litter decontamination mass casualty and field cart
General purpose freezer/refrigerator
Head area lighting system
Portable area illumination
Water trailers/source (potable and nonpotable)
Heat stress monitor
Hazardous material shipping containers
Vehicle support
Chlorine A (cylinder), B (1-ton cylinder), and C kit (railcar) w/appropriate
  tools
Portable air cylinder carts
Modular back packs
Duty gear and modular load bearing systems/operational vests
Medical/casualty bags
Optics: day and limited visibility




Page 17                                   GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism
                       Appendix II
                       Equipment List Sorted by Equipment
                       Capability Level




                       Multi-channel (UHF/VHF) encrypted, push to talk radios with chargers and
                         two extra batteries and accessories and trickle chargers with field
                         programming capability
                       Micro-tape recorders with audio in/out feature
                       Camera, 35mm with flash, telephoto lens
                       Camera, digital
                       Camera, video, VHS
                       Light amplification lenses
                       Standardized NBC/commercial chemical hazard software and response
                         system
                       Portable repeater
                       Two-way pagers (secure preferred)
                       Miscellaneous adapter cables and connectors
                       Bull horns and portable sound system.
                       Matheson Gas Data Book , Matheson, 6th edition
                       Effects of Exposure to Toxic Gases; First Aid and Medical Treatment,
                         Matheson, 3rd edition
                       Hazardous Material Injuries, Stutz, 3rd edition
                       Emergency Care for Hazardous Materials Exposure, Bronstein, 2nd edition
                       Clinical Toxicology of Commercial Products, Williams & Wilkens, 5th
                         edition
                       Joint Information Center (JIC) Manual
                       Gloves Plus (computer program)
                       Medical Management of Bio Casualty Book
                       Medical Management of Chemical Casualty Book




Moderate Increase in   Escape mask
                       Tents, standard or air inflatable with climate control and chemical/
Equipment Capability     biological liners
                       M-8 detection paper for chemical agent (weapons grade) detection
                       M-9 detection paper (roll) for chemical agent (weapons grade) detection
                       M-256 detection kit for chemical agent (weapons grade) detection
                       M-18 series, chemical agent detector kit for surface and vapor chemical
                         agent
                       Point chemical agent detector and alarm
                       Stand-off chemical detector, FTIR
                       Hand-held chemical agent monitor with training set
                       Chemical agent water test kit, M-272




                       Page 18                                 GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism
                       Appendix II
                       Equipment List Sorted by Equipment
                       Capability Level




                       Container, sample transfer/small infectious substance
                       Gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer (GC/MS)
                       JPO-BD immunoassay tickets
                       Sampling kit with aerosol collector
                       Aerosol samplers
                       M-295 equipment decontamination kit for chemical warfare agents
                       M-291 skin decontamination kit
                       Cryogenic shipment containers
                       Liquid nitrogen for cryogenic shipment containers
                       Decontamination trailer, multi-water source, and prime mover
                       High pressure hot water system
                       Ultraviolet lighting
                       Tents for contaminant containment|
                       Vaporized hydrogen peroxide solution
                       2PAM chloride autoinjector
                       Atropine 2mg/ml, 25ml vial
                       Atropine autoinjector
                       CANA (Diazepam) autoinjector
                       Commercial vehicles with run-flat tires: vans, sport utility vehicles and
                         trucks for personal transportation and equipment
                       Mobile command post or chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
                         incident response operations center
                       Portable area climate control system
                       Forward vehicle and equipment maintenance packages
                       Solar battery chargers
                       Vehicle-mounted communication systems for long-range, encrypted, voice,
                         video, and data transmission capable of cross-band repeat
                       Bi-direction amplifiers
                       Secure telecomputer encryption




High Level of          Automated perimeter sampling system (portal shield)
                       Portal shield sampling kits
Equipment Capability   Fox vehicle
List




                       Page 19                                 GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism
Appendix III

Survey Respondents                                                                            AIpIex
                                                                                                   ndi




Local Jurisdictions   Battalion Chief
                      Downers Grove Fire Department
                      Downers Grove, Ill.

                      Department of Emergency Services
                      Richmond, Va.

                      District Chief
                      Montgomery County Fire and Rescue Service
                      Rockville, Md.

                      Emergency Operations Bureau
                      Los Angeles, Calif.

                      Fire Station 39
                      Van Nuys, Calif.

                      HAZMAT Coordinator
                      Chicago, Ill.

                      HAZMAT Coordinator
                      Baltimore County Fire Department
                      Towson, Md.

                      Oahu Civil Defense Agency
                      Honolulu, Hawaii

                      Office of Emergency Management
                      Denver, Colo.

                      Office of Emergency Management
                      New York, N.Y.

                      Office of Emergency Management
                      Philadelphia, Pa.

                      Office of Emergency Management
                      Seattle, Wash.

                      Office of Emergency Preparedness
                      New Orleans, La.



                      Page 20                              GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism
                   Appendix III
                   Survey Respondents




                   Office of Public Safety
                   Columbus, Ohio

                   Terrorism Coordinator
                   Los Angeles County Fire Department
                   Los Angeles, Calif.



Federal Agencies   Commander
                   Soldier and Biological Chemical Command
                   Department of Army

                   Technical Escort Unit
                   Soldier and Biological Chemical Command
                   Department of Army

                   Office of Emergency Response
                   Department of Energy

                   Office of the Emergency Coordinator
                   Environmental Protection Agency



Associations       International Association of Fire Chiefs1

                   International Association of Fire Fighters

                   National Fire Protection Association

                   National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

                   National Volunteer Fire Council



Contractor         MKI Systems




                   1
                     The HAZMAT Coordinator for Chicago, Illinois, and the International Association of Fire Chiefs
                   submitted a joint response.




                   Page 21                                                 GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism
Appendix IV

Additional Offices Consulted for Our Review                                                    ApV
                                                                                                 Ienxdi




Local Jurisdictions   Department of Public Safety
                      Cleveland, Ohio

                      HAZMAT Coordinator
                      City of Baltimore
                      Baltimore, Md.

                      HAZMAT Unit
                      Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department
                      Fairfax, Va.



Federal Agencies      Director of Military Support
                      Department of the Army

                      Hazardous Materials Response Unit
                      Federal Bureau of Investigation

                      The National Domestic Preparedness Office
                      Federal Bureau of Investigation

                      Office of National Security Affairs
                      Federal Emergency Management Agency




                      Page 22                               GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism
Appendix V

Comments From the Department of Defense                        ApV
                                                                 enx
                                                                   di




             Page 23        GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism
Appendix V
Comments From the Department of Defense




Page 24                                   GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism
Appendix V
Comments From the Department of Defense




Page 25                                   GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism
Appendix V
Comments From the Department of Defense




Page 26                                   GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism
Appendix VI

Terrorism Related GAO Products                                                                    ApV
                                                                                                    enxdiI




                      Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear
                      (GAO/NSIAD-99-110, May 21, 1999)

                      Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorist
                      Operations (GAO/NSIAD-99-135, May 13, 1999)

                      Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public
                      Health Initiatives (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112, Mar. 16, 1999).

                      Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat
                      Terrorism (GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107, Mar. 11, 1999).

                      Combating Terrorism: FBI’s Use of Federal Funds for Counterterrorism-
                      Related Activities (Fiscal years 1995-98) (GAO/GGD-99-7, Nov. 20, 1998).

                      Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness
                      Program Focus and Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov. 12, 1998).

                      Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic
                      Preparedness Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16, Oct. 2, 1998).

                      Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues
                      (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, Apr. 23, 1998).

                      Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize
                      and Target Program Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998).

                      Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires
                      Better Management and Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, Dec. 1, 1997).

                      Combating Terrorism: Efforts to Protect U.S. Forces in Turkey and the
                      Middle East (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-44, Oct. 28, 1997).

                      Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Implement National
                      Policy and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997).

                      Combating Terrorism: Status of DOD Efforts to Protect Its Forces Overseas
                      (GAO/NSIAD-97-207, July 21, 1997).

                      Aviation Security: FAA’s Procurement of Explosives Detection Devices
                      (GAO/RCED-97-111R, May 1, 1997).




              eL
               rtet   Page 27                                 GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism
                   Appendix VI
                   Terrorism Related GAO Products




                   Aviation Security: Commercially Available Advanced Explosives Detection
                   Devices (GAO/RCED-97-119R, Apr. 24, 1997).

                   Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Responsibilities for Developing
                   Explosives and Narcotics Detection Technologies (GAO/NSIAD-97-95,
                   Apr. 15, 1997).

                   Aviation Security: Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed
                   (GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-151, Sept. 11, 1996).

                   Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Technologies for Detecting Explosives
                   and Narcotics (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-252, Sept. 4, 1996).

                   Aviation Security: Immediate Action Needed to Improve Security
                   (GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237, Aug. 1, 1996).

                   Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Threats and Roles of Explosives and
                   Narcotics Detection Technology (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR,
                   Mar. 27, 1996).




(701149)   eL
            rtet   Page 28                                GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism
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