oversight

Chemical and Biological Defense: Coordination of Nonmedical Chemical and Biological R&D Programs

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1999-08-16.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                   United States General Accounting Office

GAO                Report to Congressional Requesters




August 1999
                   CHEMICAL AND
                   BIOLOGICAL
                   DEFENSE

                   Coordination of
                   Nonmedical Chemical
                   and Biological R&D
                   Programs




GAO/NSIAD-99-160
United States General Accounting Office                                                               National Security and
Washington, D.C. 20548                                                                         International Affairs Division



                                    B-282700                                                                                    Letter

                                    August 16, 1999

                                    The Honorable Robert C. Byrd
                                    Ranking Minority Member
                                    Committee on Appropriations
                                    United States Senate

                                    The Honorable Carl Levin
                                    Ranking Minority Member
                                    Committee on Armed Services
                                    United States Senate

                                    Since the Persian Gulf War, Members of Congress have raised concerns
                                    regarding the adequacy of technology used by the Department of Defense
                                    (DOD) to detect, identify, prepare for, and protect troops against chemical
                                    and biological (CB) weapons.1 In 1993, the National Defense Authorization
                                    Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (P.L. 103-160) directed the Secretary of Defense to
                                    take actions designed to improve the Department’s CB defense capabilities,
                                    including coordination and integration of all CB defense programs into
                                    what is now the CB Defense Program. More recently, concerns that
                                    terrorists might move beyond using conventional weapons to CB devices
                                    led Congress to authorize the federal government to improve domestic
                                    capabilities to respond to such incidents. With the initiation of these
                                    domestic preparedness programs in fiscal year 1997, federal research and
                                    development (R&D) efforts to develop nonmedical CB defense technology
                                    expanded considerably, and they continue to grow.2 According to the White
                                    House, the President’s fiscal year 2000 budget request includes over
                                    $10 billion to combat terrorism. Almost $1.4 billion is for programs
                                    specifically aimed at terrorist threats from chemical, biological,
                                    radiological, or nuclear weapons, an amount that exceeds the funding of
                                    less than $1 billion for military programs to counter CB threats.



                                    1
                                      See Chemical and Biological Defense: Emphasis Remains Insufficient to Resolve Continuing Problems
                                    (GAO/NSIAD-96-103, Mar. 29 1996) and Chemical Weapons: DOD Does Not Have a Strategy to Address
                                    Low-Level Exposures (GAO/NSIAD-98-228, Sept. 23, 1998).
                                    2
                                     Nonmedical technologies refer to technologies for detecting, identifying, protecting against, or
                                    decontaminating personnel and equipment of CB agents. By contrast, examples of medical R&D include
                                    the development of prophylactics such as vaccines, medical diagnostics for determining exposure to
                                    chemical or biological agents, and therapeutic drugs or procedures for countering the effects of
                                    exposure.




                                    Page 1                                     GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense
                   B-282700




                   In response to your request, we examined the coordination of federal R&D
                   efforts to develop nonmedical technology related to CB defense.
                   Specifically, we (1) identified federal programs that conduct nonmedical
                   CB defense-related R&D and (2) described the existing mechanisms for
                   coordinating these programs. A companion report, Chemical and Biological
                   Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation Should Follow Results Act
                   Framework (GAO/NSIAD-99-159, Aug. 16, 1999), examines the extent of
                   DOD’s application of the Government Performance and Results Act’s
                   outcome-oriented principles to the CB Defense Program.



Results in Brief   Four federal programs that currently fund R&D of nonmedical CB defense
                   technologies are:

                   • Department of Defense’s Chemical and Biological Defense Program,
                   • Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s Biological Warfare
                     Defense Program,
                   • Department of Energy’s Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation
                     Program, and
                   • Counterterror Technical Support Program conducted by the Technical
                     Support Working Group.

                   All these programs pursue R&D ranging from applied research to prototype
                   development. Two of these programs, the Chemical and Biological Defense
                   Program and Biological Warfare Defense Program, develop technologies
                   primarily for military warfighting applications. The other two programs
                   develop CB defense technologies primarily to assist civilians responding to
                   terrorist incidents.

                   The current formal and informal program coordination mechanisms may
                   not ensure that potential overlaps, gaps, and opportunities for
                   collaboration are addressed. Coordinating mechanisms lack information
                   on prioritized user needs, validated CB defense equipment requirements,
                   and how programs relate R&D projects to these needs. In particular,
                   domestic preparedness needs are specified with significantly less detail




                   Page 2                          GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense
             B-282700




             than military needs.3 Furthermore, two programs—those in the Defense
             Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Department of Energy—do
             not formally utilize user requirements in planning their R&D goals. More
             detailed information about user needs, validated CB defense equipment
             requirements, and how user needs relate to R&D projects may allow
             coordination mechanisms to better assess whether overlaps, gaps, and
             opportunities for collaboration exist.

             Agency officials are aware of the deficiencies in the existing coordination
             mechanisms and some have initiated additional informal contacts in
             response. Informal coordination between the Department of Defense and
             the Department of Energy has been particularly active.

             We are making no recommendations at this time.



Background   In the last decade, concerns about the possible use of CB weapons led both
             Congress and the executive agencies to implement new or expanded
             programs to address these threats. In 1993, Congress established DOD’s CB
             Defense Program in an effort to coordinate and integrate across the
             military all CB defense programs from R&D through procurement.4 DOD
             initiated a stand alone R&D program in biological defense within the
             Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in fiscal year 1997,
             and in October 1998 it established the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to
             administer the CB Defense Program as well as to address other emerging
             military threats. Following the use of a chemical agent by terrorists in
             Japan, civilian-oriented programs emerged through Congress’s passage of




             3
               In Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response Equipment and Sustainment Costs
             (GAO/NSIAD-99-151, June 9, 1999), we found that there is no assessment that would provide a basis for
             clearly defined and prioritized equipment requirements based on threat and risk, and there is little
             consensus among federal, state and local officials on the types of equipment needed for civilians to
             prepare for a CB terrorist incident. Moreover, in 1998 we reported that some local jurisdictions were
             deciding on equipment purchases without the benefit of formal threat and risk assessments based on
             valid threat data. See Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues
             (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, Apr. 23, 1998); Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help
             Prioritize Target Program Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998); Combating Terrorism:
             Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16,
             Oct. 2, 1998); and Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program
             Focus and Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov. 12, 1998).
             4
                 P.L. 103-160, sec. 1701, Nov. 3, 1993.




             Page 3                                       GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense
                        B-282700




                        the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996.5 This act
                        initiated a set of domestic preparedness programs, including R&D
                        programs, for improving domestic capabilities to respond to terrorism
                        involving chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons.



Four Federal Programs   Four federal programs that currently fund nonmedical R&D addressing CB
                        threats are:
Fund Nonmedical R&D
Addressing CB Threats   •      DOD’s CB Defense Program,
                        •      DARPA’s Biological Warfare Defense Program,
                        •      Department of Energy’s (DOE) CB Nonproliferation Program, and
                        •      Counterterror Technical Support Program conducted by the Technical
                               Support Working Group (TSWG).

                        The objective of DOD’s CB Defense Program is to enable U.S. forces to
                        survive, fight, and win in chemically and biologically contaminated
                        environments. DARPA’s program funds R&D projects supporting
                        revolutionary approaches to biological warfare defense, emphasizing
                        high-risk, high-potential technologies. DOE’s program funds R&D to
                        develop advanced technologies to enable the United States to more
                        effectively prepare and respond to the use of CB weapons. Finally, TSWG is
                        an interagency working group whose mission is to facilitate interagency
                        R&D for combating terrorism primarily through rapid research,
                        development, and prototyping.6 The TSWG’s subgroup on Chemical,
                        Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures oversees, among
                        other activities, the development of techniques to detect, protect from, and
                        mitigate CB weapons.

                        These programs conduct R&D in similar areas as well as in support of
                        similar user communities. In all four programs, R&D activities include
                        applied research and initial prototype development; two programs, DOD’s
                        CB Defense Program and DOE’s CB Nonproliferation Program, also engage




                        5
                         This act was contained in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (title XIV of P.L.
                        104-201, Sept. 23, 1996) and is commonly referred to by its sponsors’ names: Senators Nunn, Lugar, and
                        Domenici.
                        6
                            TSWG is funded primarily through the Counterterror Technical Support Program within DOD.




                        Page 4                                       GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense
B-282700




in basic research.7 The R&D funded by DOD’s and DARPA’s programs
support the development of technologies principally for military
warfighting applications. The end users of such technologies may be a
single military service, such as the Army, or multiple services. The R&D
conducted by DOE’s program and by the TSWG’s Subgroup on Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures support the
development of technologies for civilian end users, which include federal,
state, and local emergency response personnel.

The funding for nonmedical R&D in the DARPA and DOE programs has
been increasing, and combined are projected to be greater than nonmedical
R&D funding for DOD’s CB Defense Program for fiscal years 2000-2001.
The funding levels of basic research, applied research, and prototype
development for these programs are shown in figure 1 for fiscal years
1996-2001.




7
 Basic research involves the investigation of fundamental scientific knowledge, such as the basic
physical properties of CB agents. Applied research refers to scientific investigation directed toward a
technical goal, such as developing and evaluating the feasibility of proposed detection technologies.
Applied research generally tests such technologies within a controlled laboratory environment.
Prototype development involves developing a piece of equipment in order to show the practical utility
and feasibility of a technology. In general, the initial prototype must be able to perform in an
environment similar to that in which it will ultimately be used, though it may not be able to withstand
all the stresses of operational use. Two other types of R&D activities, conducted primarily by DOD, are
Demonstration/Validation and Engineering and Manufacturing Development. These two activities are
part of DOD’s acquisition cycle, and include the testing and evaluation of technologies.




Page 5                                      GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense
                         B-282700




                         Figure 1: Actual and Projected Funding for Nonmedical Basic Research, Applied
                         Research, and Prototype Development Addressing Chemical and Biological Threatsa
                         200       Dollars in millions

                         180

                         160

                         140

                         120

                         100

                             80

                             60

                             40

                             20

                              0
                                    1996                 1997     1998          1999          2000       2001

                                   Fiscal Year



                                            DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Programb
                                            DARPA Biological Warfare Defense Programb
                                            DOE Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program
                                           TSWG Counterterror Technical Support Programc
                         a
                             All funding amounts are in then-year dollars.
                         b
                          DOD and DARPA budgets include only nonmedical R&D in the DOD budget activities of basic
                         research, applied research, and advanced technology development. The fiscal year 1997 DOD CB
                         Defense Program budget excludes DARPA funds, which were consolidated into the CB Defense
                         Program for fiscal year 1997 only.
                         c
                          Our figures for TSWG’s budget only include funding originating in DOD for the Chemical, Biological,
                         Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures Subgroup. Funding for fiscal years 2000-2001 is
                         estimated assuming the same annual percentage change as total TSWG funding from DOD.
                         Sources: DOD, DARPA, and DOE.




Current Mechanisms       These four programs need to coordinate their R&D efforts because they
                         pursue many of the same capabilities and may contract with many of the
May Not Ensure           same laboratories to perform R&D work. The current formal and informal
Effective Coordination   mechanisms to coordinate among these programs may not ensure that
                         potential overlaps, gaps, and opportunities for collaboration are addressed.
of R&D Programs          In particular, participation in some current coordination mechanisms is



                         Page 6                                          GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense
                          B-282700




                          inconsistent, and information on user needs, validated CB defense
                          equipment requirements, and on how programs relate R&D projects to
                          those needs is incomplete.


Programs Pursue Similar   As emphasized in a recent National Academy of Sciences study,8
Capabilities and May      overlapping R&D activities among different agencies, while common and
                          valuable, would be enhanced by effective coordination to reduce potential
Employ Many of the Same
                          inefficient duplication of effort, prevent important questions from being
Laboratories              overlooked, and enhance opportunities for collaboration. The National
                          Academy of Sciences study advocated a formal process to coordinate areas
                          of research that are supported by multiple agencies.

                          In the case of R&D to address CB threats, every R&D area is addressed by
                          at least two of the four programs we examined. For example, all four
                          programs address the capability for biological agent detection and
                          identification, and three of the four programs address the capability for
                          chemical detection and identification. Furthermore, programs sometimes
                          develop similar technologies in pursuing these capabilities, such as mass
                          spectroscopy for identifying biological agents. A summary of the R&D
                          areas pursued by each program is presented in figure 2.




                          8
                            Evaluating Federal Research Programs: Research and the Government Performance and Results Act,
                          National Research Council, National Academy Press, 1999.




                          Page 7                                    GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense
B-282700




Figure 2: CB-related Subject Areas Covered by R&D Programs
R&D area                    DOD's Chemical    DARPA's            DOE's Chemical    TSWG's
                            and Biological    Biological Warfare and Biological    Counterterror
                            Defense Program   Defense Program Nonproliferation     Technical Support
                                                                 Program           Program
Biological detection and
identification                     X                 X                  X                   X

Chemical detection and
identification                     X                                    X                   X

Individual protection
                                   X                                                        X

Collective protection
                                   X                                                        X

Decontamination,
restoration, and                   X                                    X                   X
mitigation
Modeling and simulation
                                   X                                    X                   X

Other applied research
(e.g., threat assessment,          X                                    X
aerosol technology)
Other basic research
(e.g., aerosol science,            X                                    X
genomic sequencing)

Note: An X indicates that the program covers the specified R&D subject area, by either funding or
soliciting for (e.g., through a broad agency announcement) R&D projects in that area. A blank indicates
that the program does not cover the specified R&D subject area.
Sources: DOD, DARPA, DOE, and TSWG.


In addition, programs may contract with the same groups of laboratories to
perform R&D. Laboratories in DOD, industry, and academia may perform
R&D work for three of the four programs, and DOE laboratories may
perform work for any of the programs. A summary of the relationships
among the agencies, programs, and potential R&D performers is presented
in figure 3.




Page 8                                        GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense
                                        B-282700




Figure 3: Summary of Organizational Relationships Among Agencies, Programs, and Potential R&D Performers for Nonmedical
R&D Addressing CB Threats

 Agencies                       Department of                 Department of               TSWG
                                  Defense                        Energy               (interagency)




                                             DARPA


 Programs                                   Biological                                Counterterror
                           CB                                    CB Non-
                                             Warfare                                   Technical
                         Defense                               proliferation
                                             Defense                                    Support
                         Program                                 Program
                                             Program                                    Program



 Potential              DOD labs            DOD labs                                    DOD labs
 Performers of
                       Industry labs       Industry labs                               Industry labs
 R&D
                        DOE labs            DOE labs            DOE labs                DOE labs
                      Academic labs       Academic labs                               Academic labs


                                        Sources: DOD, DARPA, DOE, and TSWG.




Participation in                        Both formal and informal mechanisms are used to coordinate R&D among
Coordination Mechanisms                 these four programs. One formal coordinating body involved with both
                                        military and domestic preparedness programs is the Counterproliferation
Is Inconsistent
                                        Program Review Committee. This Committee, which consists of
                                        representatives from DOD, DOE, and the intelligence community, is
                                        responsible for annually reviewing and making recommendations to
                                        Congress regarding programs related to military as well as terrorist threats
                                        from non-conventional weapons, including CB threats. In addition, the
                                        National Security Council has established a coordinating group for
                                        Weapons of Mass Destruction Preparedness, under which there is a
                                        subgroup for R&D. Other formal coordinating bodies, such as the
                                        Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technical Working Group and the




                                        Page 9                                 GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense
                            B-282700




                            National Security Council-sponsored TSWG, oversee narrower ranges of
                            activities related to CB threats.9

                            Many officials cited the importance of informal coordination mechanisms,
                            such as informal briefings, scientific conferences, and participation in each
                            other’s planning and review meetings.10 Participation in some informal
                            coordination mechanisms, however, is incomplete. For example, although
                            DOE’s program is aimed at domestic preparedness needs, planning and
                            review of DOE projects have not involved potential users from the
                            domestic preparedness community. And, moreover, no valid requirements
                            have been defined for this community. In the case of DOD’s CB Defense
                            Program, although DOE is invited to participate in the R&D planning and
                            review meetings, they have not consistently attended. DARPA officials cite
                            insufficient staff to attend all potential planning and review meetings. Thus,
                            informal coordination mechanisms have not ensured input from end users
                            and agencies involved in addressing threats from CB weapons.


Current Coordination        The current coordination mechanisms utilize only limited information on
Mechanisms Lack Complete    civilian user needs, validated CB defense equipment requirements, and how
                            programs relate R&D projects to user needs. Information on user needs
Information on User Needs
                            and defined requirements may allow coordination mechanisms to compare
and Requirements            the specific goals and objectives of R&D projects to better assess whether
                            overlaps, gaps, and opportunities for collaboration exist.

                            DOD’s CB Defense Program coordinates and consolidates information on
                            the warfighting capabilities that military users require. These requirements
                            initially take the form of broad needs, such as “individual protection” or
                            “contamination avoidance.” From these broad needs, users develop
                            detailed system and coordinated performance requirements based on
                            analyses of threats and military missions. With information on user needs,
                            equipment requirements, and ongoing R&D, consolidation is possible. For
                            instance, after the CB defense efforts of each of the four services were
                            coordinated through the CB Defense Program, 44 service-specific



                            9
                             The Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technical Working Group addresses preventing and detecting
                            the use of CB threats, but not responding to their use. The TSWG’s scope only includes terrorist, not
                            military, CB threats.
                            10
                             As an example of the results of informal coordination, program officials repeatedly noted a project for
                            detecting CB agents based on “parallel micro separations” that is funded jointly by DOD and DOE at the
                            Sandia National Laboratory.




                            Page 10                                      GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense
B-282700




developmental efforts in the program’s contamination avoidance research
area were consolidated into 10 joint-service projects.

Programs have significantly less information on domestic preparedness
needs than on military needs. While military user needs and requirements
are coordinated among the military services and are relatively detailed,
domestic preparedness needs are uncoordinated and scantly defined. For
example, the InterAgency Board for Equipment Standardization and
InterOperability advising the National Domestic Preparedness Office at the
Federal Bureau of Investigation has developed a Standardized Equipment
List for first responders. Use of the list is voluntary, however, as there is
neither a validated set of requirements nor a consensus in the domestic
preparedness community on needed equipment.11 Two lists of R&D needs
to improve domestic capabilities to respond to CB incidents have been
developed, but these lists are short statements of equipment needs without
detailed performance specifications, and they do not incorporate mission
and threat analyses.12

The coordinating mechanisms also lack sufficient information on how two
of the four programs relate user needs to their program R&D goals. Only
R&D projects conducted by DOD’s CB Defense Program and the TSWG’s
Subgroup on Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
Countermeasures are formally tied to user needs. One example of how
DOD’s R&D efforts are tied to user needs is the use of Defense Technology
Objectives. Each Defense Technology Objective identifies a specific
technology advancement that will be developed or demonstrated as well as
the specific benefits to military operational capabilities from the
technology advance. In other cases, R&D efforts are tied directly to
performance specifications as part of the equipment acquisition cycle. In
the case of TSWG, all R&D projects directly support the user needs
developed within TSWG; though, as noted above, equipment needs are
stated without detailed performance specifications, and they do not
incorporate mission and threat analyses.



11
   Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response Equipment and Sustainment Costs
(GAO/NSIAD-99-151, June 9, 1999).
12
 A prioritized list of R&D needs to detect, protect from, and mitigate CB weapons is developed by
TSWG annually; and, in a recent Institute of Medicine study, Chemical and Biological Terrorism:
Research and Development to Improve Civilian Medical Response, the nonmedical R&D needs of
civilian health providers were delineated (e.g., personal protective equipment, detection and
measurement of chemical agents).




Page 11                                     GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense
                      B-282700




                      The DARPA and DOE programs, by contrast, do not formally incorporate
                      user needs in planning their R&D efforts. Each DARPA R&D area is
                      internally developed by DARPA and does not necessarily support a
                      documented military requirement. Proposals in each area are evaluated by
                      a peer review panel consisting primarily of nongovernment experts, and
                      the final decision for funding a proposal is made by the DARPA program
                      manager for that R&D area. Similarly, the planning and review of DOE
                      projects do not utilize any requirements developed for domestic
                      preparedness programs. Project reviews are primarily concerned with
                      technical merit, although potential user benefits are considered. Review
                      panels consisted primarily of DOE personnel in 1997-98, and are planned to
                      consist of non-DOE technical experts in 1999.

                      Agency officials are aware of the deficiencies in the existing coordination
                      mechanisms, and some have initiated additional informal contacts in
                      response. Informal coordination between DOD and DOE has been
                      particularly active.



Agency Comments and   We provided a draft of our report to DOD and DOE. DOD provided
                      technical comments, which we incorporated into our report, where
Our Evaluation        appropriate. In a written response, DOE stated that they had no comments
                      with our report as written. DOE’s response is reprinted in appendix I.



Scope and             The scope of our study was limited to federally funded R&D of nonmedical
                      technologies to address CB threats. We did not evaluate any classified
Methodology           R&D.

                      To address objective (1), to identify federal programs funding R&D in this
                      area, we conducted interviews, literature searches, and collected program
                      documents. We queried officials from the Department of Defense,
                      Department of Energy, the Technical Support Working Group, and the
                      White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. We also conducted
                      searches of Department of Defense databases, governmentwide databases,
                      and the Commerce Business Daily. In addition, we reviewed recent
                      legislation addressing the threat from chemical and biological weapons to
                      both the military and civilians, including legislation establishing new
                      programs in this area. Program documents we examined included program
                      budgets, strategic and performance plans, annual reports, internal program




                      Page 12                          GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense
B-282700




planning documents, program briefings, and proceedings to program
review meetings.

For objective (2), to describe the mechanisms for coordinating these
programs, we interviewed program officials, examined legislation and
program documents, observed program review meetings, and attended
scientific conferences. Our interviews included discussions of formal
coordination mechanisms as well as informal mechanisms. We also
reviewed legislation establishing formal coordinating bodies and
documents produced by these bodies. This documentation included annual
reports, briefing slides, and documentation made available on the world
wide web. Our assessment of informal coordination included our
observation of interagency participation in program meetings and scientific
conferences. We observed a 1999 TSWG requirements determination
meeting as well as the 1999 DOD Technology Area Review and Assessment
of CB defense. Scientific conferences we attended included the 1998 Joint
Workshop on Standoff Detection for Chemical and Biological Defense and
the 1998 Scientific Conference on Chemical and Biological Defense
Research. We also obtained proceedings from these and other scientific
conferences from previous years.

We contacted the following organizations:

•   Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Arlington, Virginia;
•   Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Dulles, Virginia;
•   Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.;
•   Office of the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, Washington,
    D.C.;
•   Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground,
    Maryland;
•   Joint Program Office for Biological Defense, Falls Church, Virginia;
•   National Domestic Preparedness Office, Washington, D.C.;
•   National Ground Intelligence Center, Charlottesville, Virginia;
•   Nonproliferation and National Security Office, Department of Energy,
    Washington, D.C.;
•   Office of Science and Technology Policy, White House, Washington,
    D.C.;
•   Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.;
•   Technical Support Working Group, Fort Washington, Maryland;
•   U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command, Aberdeen
    Proving Ground, Maryland; and
•   U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia.



Page 13                         GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense
B-282700




We conducted our evaluation from November 1998 to April 1999 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.


As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 7 days after its
issue date. At that time, we will send copies to other congressional
committees and the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy. We
will also make copies available to others on request.

If you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact me or
Sushil K. Sharma at (202) 512-3092. Key contributors to this report were
Weihsueh Chiu and Jeffrey Harris.




Kwai-Cheung Chan
Director, Special Studies and Evaluations




Page 14                           GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense
Page 15   GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix I

Comments from the Department of Energy                                       AppenIx
                                                                                   di




(713040)     Letr   Page 16   GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense
Ordering Information

The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free.
Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the
following address, accompanied by a check or money order made
out to the Superintendent of Documents, when necessary, VISA and
MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also.

Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are
discounted 25 percent.

Orders by mail:

U.S. General Accounting Office
P.O. Box 37050
Washington, DC 20013

or visit:

Room 1100
700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW)
U.S. General Accounting Office
Washington, DC

Orders may also be placed by calling (202) 512-6000
or by using fax number (202) 512-6061, or TDD (202) 512-2537.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and
testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any list
from the past 30 days, please call (202) 512-6000 using a touchtone
phone. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain
these lists.

For information on how to access GAO reports on the INTERNET,
send an e-mail message with “info” in the body to:

info@www.gao.gov

or visit GAO’s World Wide Web Home Page at:

http://www.gao.gov
United States                       Bulk Rate
General Accounting Office      Postage & Fees Paid
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001           GAO
                                 Permit No. GI00
Official Business
Penalty for Private Use $300

Address Correction Requested