NATO: Progress Toward More Mobile and Deployable Forces

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1999-09-30.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                   United States General Accounting Office

GAO                Report to the Chairman and Ranking
                   Minority Member, Subcommittee on
                   Defense, Committee on Appropriations,
                   U.S. Senate

September 1999

                   Progress Toward More
                   Mobile and
                   Deployable Forces


Letter                                                                                 3

Appendixes   Appendix I:    Fieldwork Observations, by Country                        24
             Appendix II: Characteristics of Transport and In-flight
               Refueling Aircraft in NATO Nations’ Inventories                        30
             Appendix III: Characteristics of Sealift Vessels in NATO
               Nations’ Inventories                                                   32
             Appendix IV: Comments From the Department of Defense                     34

Tables       Table 1: Increases, Decreases, or No Change in Airlift, Sealift, and
               In-flight Refueling Capabilities                                        5
             Table 2: Events in the 2-Year Defense Planning Process and
               Annual Defense Review                                                  11
             Table 3: Countries’ Increases in Transport Aircraft Since 1990           14
             Table 4: Countries That Have Not Increased Their Transport
               Aircraft and Airlift Capability Since 1990                             15
             Table 5: Countries’ Inventories of Large Amphibious and Sealift
               Vessels                                                                16
             Table 6: Countries’ Inventories of In-flight Refueling Capability        17
             Table 7: Force Restructuring in Selected Countries                       19
             Table 8: Characteristics of Transport Aircraft                           30
             Table 9: Tanker Aircraft, by Type and Fuel Offload Capacity              31
             Table 10: Characteristics of Sealift Vessels                             32

Figures      Figure 1: NATO Members’ Active Duty Forces and Percent of
               Conscripts                                                             18

             Page 1                                                 GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO


DOD        Department of Defense
MNC        Major NATO Commanders
NATO       North Atlantic Treaty Organization
SDR        Strategic Defence Review

Page 2                                          GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO
United States General Accounting Office                                                       National Security and
Washington, D.C. 20548                                                                 International Affairs Division

                                    B-283443                                                                            Leter

                                    September 30, 1999

                                    The Honorable Ted Stevens
                                    The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
                                    Ranking Minority Member
                                    Subcommittee on Defense
                                    Committee on Appropriations
                                    United States Senate

                                    In 1991, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) revised its strategic
                                    concept to reflect the reduced threat of a large east-west military
                                    confrontation. The concept revision provided for major changes in NATO’s
                                    integrated military forces, including reductions in size and readiness;
                                    improvements in mobility and deployability for contingencies such as crisis
                                    management, search and rescue, and peacekeeping; and greater use of
                                    multinational formations. Because of instability in and around the
                                    Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of crises at the periphery of the
                                    alliance, the strategic concept was revised again in 1999 to further
                                    emphasize the need for greater mobility and deployability of forces to meet
                                    these potential crises. The United States has the capability to deploy troops
                                    and equipment over large distances. Many of our European allies, however,
                                    did not see the need for this kind of capability because during the Cold War,
                                    they were planning to fight in place with logistical support provided by
                                    fixed facilities and their civilian economies.

                                    Concerned about European allies’ ability to share in the cost of providing a
                                    common defense and specifically whether they are improving mobility and
                                    deployability, you asked us to undertake two studies: one to assess how the
                                    European Economic and Monetary Union, the enlargement of the
                                    European Union, and other factors may affect countries’ ability to share in
                                    the cost of NATO over the long run and another to address NATO force
                                    planning and implementation issues. On June 30, 1999, we reported to you
                                    on the first study.1 This study identifies (1) how NATO determines its force
                                    requirements and each member’s contribution to meeting those

                                     NATO: Implications of European Integration for Allies’ Defense Spending
                                    (GAO/NSIAD-99-185, June 30, 1999).

                                    Page 3                                                        GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO

                   requirements and (2) how NATO allies have responded to the need for
                   increased mobility and deployability in their military forces.

                   To address this study, we assessed the forces of 13 NATO members2 to
                   determine whether their military forces had become more mobile and
                   deployable. To make this assessment, we consulted with Department of
                   Defense (DOD) officials and other experts and developed 10 indicators:
                   (1) the number of active duty personnel; (2) the percent of the force that is
                   a professional volunteer force rather than a conscripted force, and thus
                   generally more deployable; (3) airlift inventory; (4) sealift inventory;
                   (5) in-flight refueling aircraft inventory; (6) the number of trucks to
                   transport heavy equipment, and petroleum, oil, and lubricants; (7) the
                   number of transport helicopters; (8) the number of satellite communication
                   terminals; (9) the number of mobile airfield communications systems; and
                   (10) changes in types of training. We analyzed data on these indicators
                   obtained from U.S. embassies in 13 countries and did follow-up work in
                   6 countries3 that represent over 80 percent of the 13 countries’ active duty
                   personnel. (App. I summarizes our country-specific findings.)

Results in Brief   NATO establishes its force goals through an iterative 2-year defense
                   planning process that starts with an analysis of the threat and other NATO
                   missions, such as search and rescue; incorporates political and
                   affordability considerations through multiple negotiations with each
                   country; and ends with the members’ defense ministers’ adoption of force
                   goals. Through this process, NATO commanders and planners identify the
                   forces needed and seek commitments from member countries to develop
                   the forces necessary for the broad range of potential NATO missions. The
                   force planning process differs from the process for generating forces for
                   specific operational missions such as those in Bosnia. Although U.S. and
                   NATO officials believe that the planning process is a fair method for
                   distributing the burden of providing for NATO’s common defense, the

                    The United Kingdom, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Italy,
                   Greece, Turkey, Luxembourg, Germany, and Canada. We did not include Iceland, which does
                   not have a military; France, which does not participate in the NATO defense planning
                   process; or the Czech Republic, Hungary, or Poland, which have only recently joined the
                    The six countries are the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, and

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process does not quantify the costs associated with what each country is
asked to contribute.

As NATO members’ forces have become smaller in size and the
composition of those forces has changed, NATO allies have become more
mobile and deployable as envisioned by the strategic concept. Our analysis
of 10 indicators for the 13 countries’ military forces indicates that each
country has acquired specific equipment to increase mobility, and some
have reorganized and restructured forces to make them more deployable.
Table 1 shows, for example, whether countries have increased, decreased,
or maintained the same airlift, sealift, and in-flight refueling capability. It
shows that for these indicators almost all countries have either increased
or maintained existing capabilities, which combined with force reductions
would indicate greater mobility and deployability of existing forces.

Table 1: Increases, Decreases, or No Change in Airlift, Sealift, and In-flight Refueling

Country                                      Airlift                  Sealift     In-flight refueling
Belgium                                                                     0                         0
Canada                                            +                          -                        +
Denmark                                           0                         0                         0
Germany                                           +                         +                         0
Greece                                            +                         +                         0
Italy                                             +                         +                         +
Luxembourg                                        0          Not applicable                           0
The Netherlands                                   +                         +                         +
Norway                                            0                         0                         0
Portugal                                          0                         0                         0
Spain                                             +                         +                         +
Turkey                                            +                         +                         +
United Kingdom                                     -                        +                             -

+ = increase
- = decrease
0 = no change
 Belgium has one less aircraft, but that was offset by the increased capacity of two aircraft purchased
to replace two older aircraft.
Source: GAO analysis.

Page 5                                                                     GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO

             Other indicators we assessed also show general gains in the mobility and
             deployability of forces. However, the alliance still faces challenges to
             continue to improve mobility and deployability capabilities. Recognizing
             that challenges still exist, NATO launched the Defense Capabilities
             Initiative at the April 1999 summit.

Background   NATO, a military alliance of 19 European and North American countries,
             receives support from its members in two ways. First, countries, at their
             own expense, maintain forces and assets that they pledge to NATO through
             a defense planning process. Second, countries make contributions to
             NATO’s commonly funded budgets. NATO does not quantify the cost of the
             forces that national governments commit to the alliance, although a
             country’s level of defense spending helps approximate this measure.

             In establishing force goals, NATO considers the missions it may be facing in
             the future. Before the end of the Cold War, NATO’s primary mission was to
             defeat a large-scale invasion by the Soviet Union and its allies with little or
             no warning. Accordingly, the alliance planned, through its defense planning
             process, to maintain (1) large numbers of forward-deployed forces, (2) the
             ability to reinforce Europe by safeguarding the Atlantic sea lanes, and (3) a
             robust nuclear deterrent. This plan enabled countries like Germany to rely
             on the civilian sector for support elements such as hospitals and
             transportation assets. In addition, host nations agreed to support
             forward-deployed forces from other countries, and those countries and
             NATO funded the development of substantial infrastructure, including
             aircraft shelters, prepositioned weapon storage facilities, and fuel storage
             and distribution networks.

             The end of the Cold War transformed the European security environment
             and made highly unlikely a large-scale attack on Western Europe;
             nevertheless, potential risks to security from instability or tension
             remained. In 1991, NATO revised its strategic concept to reflect the
             changed security environment from the threat of a single, massive global
             war to risks posed by diverse multinational contingencies. Specifically, the
             concept called for NATO to move from a large, static force structure to
             fewer, but more mobile, forces that could react to a wider range of
             contingencies. In many cases, this required countries to reorganize their
             militaries, acquire transport assets for mobility and sustainability, acquire
             deployable communications, and refocus training exercises to enable them
             to deploy forces outside their countries’ borders.

             Page 6                                                   GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO

NATO Defense           NATO establishes its force goals through an iterative 2-year defense
                       planning process that starts with a threat assessment and mission analysis
Planning Process       by NATO military commanders and planners. NATO assumes it may face
                       missions ranging from small search and rescue missions to the largest
                       possible invasion of NATO territory. Based on the force requirements
                       generated from these assessments, NATO commanders and planners seek
                       commitment from member nations to develop the necessary forces. This is
                       done through negotiations among NATO international civilian and military
                       staffs and member countries’ military and political representatives. During
                       this process, a range of political and affordability considerations are taken
                       into account to determine what forces each country should have available
                       for NATO to fulfill its missions. This aspect of the defense planning process
                       is completed when NATO defense ministers adopt the force goals.

                       Although affordability is a consideration when developing members’ force
                       goals, the alliance does not actually estimate the cost of the goals, and the
                       process therefore does not necessarily ensure a strictly equitable sharing of
                       the defense burden. Additionally, NATO’s force planning process does not
                       ensure that forces will be available for specific operations. When specific
                       operations are approved, NATO embarks on a force generation process to
                       obtain a commitment of forces from its member countries.

Development of Force   The basis of the force goal development process is guidance that NATO
Goals                  members’ defense ministers develop biennially and the North Atlantic
                       Council approves at a meeting at the defense ministers level.4 The
                       ministerial guidance establishes overall aims for members’ planning and
                       force structure during a 6-year planning period. NATO staff draft the
                       guidance, and the defense ministers approve it in the December preceding
                       the first year of the planning process. For example, Ministerial Guidance
                       approved in December 1998 will guide the development of force goals to be
                       approved in the spring of 2000.

                        The North Atlantic Council comprises permanent representatives of all member countries
                       and has effective political authority and powers of decision in the alliance. The Council also
                       meets with higher level officials such as foreign ministers, defense ministers, and heads of
                       government, but its decisions have the same status and validity, regardless of the level of
                       officials that meet.

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The development of NATO force goals is rooted in the defense
requirements review conducted by the major NATO commanders (MNC).5
The review is developed in even-numbered years, and its output is usually
issued in January of odd-numbered years. MNCs develop the review based
on NATO strategic intelligence guidance and planning scenarios illustrative
of the kinds of operations they could be called upon to execute during the
6-year planning cycle. Through modeling of the scenarios, planners
generate a set of force requirements necessary to execute the full range of
possible missions. Planners then rely on the ministerial guidance to
determine how many situations and the scale of which they need to be
prepared for at one time. Through this process, the overall requirements of
the alliance are established. The planners then look at the forces each of
the allies was asked to provide in the past and determine what each nation
should be able to contribute toward meeting the new requirements in the
future. Part of the future requirements for each country is based on a
concept called reasonable challenge. Under this concept, force
requirements are based on what a country could be expected to contribute
and additional requirements that represent a fair and reasonable challenge
to the country, above and beyond the requirements in its national plans.

 The results of this analysis serve as the basis for the MNCs force
proposals. The military planners then develop for each member country the
force proposals for forces, capabilities, and facilities to be provided to
enable the alliance to accomplish the full range of NATO missions during
the 6-year planning period.

The draft proposals are then evaluated in a series of meetings with an
expanding number of participants whose views and analyses are
incorporated through a process of negotiation. When these proposals are
first developed, they are shared with the member countries’ military
planners in “bilateral” meetings between two parties: the MNC planners
and the country military representatives. These meetings are held in March
of odd-numbered years in the country whose force proposals are being
developed. After the military planners incorporate the results of this
meeting into revised force proposals, NATO’s civilian and military staffs
examine the draft force proposals. “Trilateral” meetings are then held
among the MNC planners, the country military representatives, and the

 Major NATO commands are the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and the Supreme
Allied Commander Atlantic. As of September 1, 1999, under NATO’s new force structure
they will be called Strategic Commanders.

Page 8                                                         GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO

                       civilian and military staffs. The trilateral meetings are held at NATO
                       headquarters in January of even-numbered years.

                       Finally, in each of a series of “multilateral” meetings, which include the
                       parties from the trilateral meetings and representatives of all the member
                       countries, one country’s force goals are debated. Force goals are assigned
                       to the country under review based on consensus minus one. That is, all the
                       countries except the country being reviewed must agree to the assignment
                       of the force proposal to that country. When that occurs, usually during
                       March and April of even numbered years, the force proposals are
                       forwarded for approval by the defense ministers at NATO’s Defense
                       Ministerial meetings in June of even-numbered years. Force goals have four

                       • Force tables that show the required forces, by specific type of asset or
                         unit, that include readiness and command characteristics such as
                         number and types of ships, aircraft, or units.
                       • Force goals stated in narrative statements that qualitatively describe the
                         required capability, such as a nuclear, biological, or chemical capability
                         and its priority.
                       • Long-term requirements that are outside the 6-year planning horizon.
                       • Military assistance requirements, or unassigned force goals, that
                         countries can volunteer to undertake. (NATO military authorities in
                         practice work to minimize or eliminate these force goals, according to
                         officials from the U.S. Mission to NATO.)

Review of Force Goal   A country’s status in achieving an assigned force goal is reviewed in an
Implementation         annual defense review. A full defense review is conducted in the autumn of
                       even-numbered years. In odd-numbered years, the preceding year’s review
                       is updated. The review process is similar to the force goal development
                       process in that a series of meetings are held with an expanding list of
                       participants. The mechanism for this review is the defense planning
                       questionnaire, to which each country is asked to respond by July, on the
                       status of achieving each force goal. Countries can classify the status of a
                       force goal in one of five ways: (1) fully implemented, (2) partially
                       implemented, (3) extended implementation, (4) under consideration, and
                       (5) will not be implemented. For those goals that are not being fully
                       implemented, countries are required to provide an explanation.

                       MNCs initially assess the questionnaire responses and follow that
                       assessment with trilateral meetings, beginning in September, that include

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the country representatives and representatives from NATO’s civilian and
military staff. Thereafter, all the members review each country’s
questionnaire response in multilateral meetings in the Defense Review
Committee in October. The result of this review is captured for each
country in a report that summarizes the status of the country’s force goal
achievement. In addition, the Military Committee assesses the military
suitability and attendant risk associated with any resulting shortfalls in
force availability. On the basis of the country chapters and the military
assessment, the Defense Review Committee submits to the North Atlantic
Council a general report, in which it recommends a NATO 5-year force plan
for adoption by the Defense Ministers. Table 2 shows the chronological
order of events in the force goal development process and annual defense

Page 10                                              GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO

Table 2: Events in the 2-Year Defense Planning Process and Annual Defense Review

Month                       Planning process               Annual defense review
December                    Ministerial Guidance issued
January (odd-numbered       Defense requirements
years)                      review report is issued
March                       Major NATO commanders’        Questionnaire is updated
                            discuss draft force proposals and distributed to nations for
                            with nations                  responses
July                                                       Countries reply to
September                                                  Trilateral meetings are held
                                                           for defense review update
October                                                    Multilateral meetings are
                                                           held for defense review
November                                                   Multilateral meetings
December                                                   Defense ministers agree and
                                                           issue update year General
January (even-numbered      International staff and
years)                      international military staff
                            jointly screen major NATO
                            commanders’ force
March                       Each individual country’s     Questionnaire is updated
                            representatives meet with all and issued for full defense
                            other country                 review
                            representatives present
June                        Defense ministers adopt
                            force goals
July                                                       Countries reply to
September                                                  Trilateral meetings are held
                                                           for full defense review
October                                                    Multilateral meetings are
                                                           held for full defense review
November                                                   Country chapters and
                                                           general report are submitted
                                                           to North Atlantic Council for
December                    Ministerial Guidance issued    Defense ministers agree and
                                                           issue General Report

Source: GAO Summary of NATO Documents.

Page 11                                                         GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO

Out-of-Cycle Requirements   The planning process allows for dealing with unforeseen events that occur
                            outside the planning cycle. Out-of-cycle consultation with allies can be
                            conducted when a country is contemplating important changes to
                            commitments and plans that would substantially impact the common
                            defense. Out-of-cycle force goals may also be developed for emerging
                            requirements that should not wait for the next biennial cycle.

Force Planning Differs      Force planning as conducted in the defense planning process and
From Operational Planning   operational planning for specific operations are quite different. The former
                            requires countries to identify and commit forces to the alliance to meet
                            various missions envisioned in the planning process. On the other hand, in
                            planning for a proposed contingency operation such as that in Kosovo,
                            NATO defines the missions, tasks, and force structure of the NATO force
                            for the specific operation. The forces committed in the defense planning
                            process are not automatically available to the alliance for these proposed
                            operations. Through a separate force generation process, NATO’s military
                            headquarters determines the resources required for the specific
                            contingency operation under consideration, and each NATO member
                            decides what resources it will provide to address those requirements.
                            Although all members must agree to NATO’s conduct of contingency
                            operations, they are not obligated to provide forces identified or committed
                            for them during the defense planning process.

Alliance Members            Our analysis indicates that each of the 13 allied countries we studied have
                            achieved greater mobility and deployability either by procuring additional
Have Become More            assets or by reorganizing their force structures. While we were able to
Mobile and                  develop consistent data that compares airlift and sealift assets and
                            personnel (which fall under the first five indicators we used) among the
Deployable, but NATO        13 countries, the data on trucks, transport helicopters, communications,
Still Faces Challenges      and training (which fall under the last five indicators) are less consistent
                            among the countries. Thus, we describe achievements in the latter in terms
                            of the specific country and make no comparisons among countries. Despite
                            the 13 countries’ achievements, NATO may be challenged in fulfilling its
                            missions because of the changing nature of the contingencies it is likely to
                            face in the future.

Airlift Inventory           In evaluating countries’ airlift capabilities, based on increases in the
                            quantity and capacity of their transport aircraft, we found that NATO allies

                            Page 12                                                GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO

as a whole have more lift capability now than they had in 1990, but some
countries have achieved more than others.6 Seven of the 13 countries for
which we collected data increased airlift capability, 4 countries made no
change in airlift capability, and 1 country (the United Kingdom) decreased
airlift capability.7 In one country a change in quantity was offset by a
change in capacity, and we concluded that capability had neither increased
nor decreased.

Despite NATO’s progress, the alliance still depends heavily on the United
States for airlift capability. For example, only the United States has the
capability to airlift unusually large or heavy weapon systems such as a
Patriot missile system. (Tables 3 and 4 show the progress made in acquiring
airlift assets by country. App. II contains information about the
characteristics of the assets described in the tables.)

We define capacity as the ability to move troops and tons of equipment.
 Although the United Kingdom did not increase airlift, its inventory of transport aircraft is
among the largest in the alliance. With a traditionally global outlook, the United Kingdom
has maintained more mobile and deployable forces than its European counterparts and has
focused most of its efforts on restructuring its forces and acquiring major combat
capabilities such as attack helicopters and cruise missiles.

Page 13                                                            GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO

Table 3: Countries’ Increases in Transport Aircraft Since 1990

Country          Assets              Changes since 1990
Canada           32 CC-130E/Hs,      Added six C-130s (two C-130H-30s) and five CC-150s; eliminated three Boeing 707s, one
                 5 CC-150s (Airbus   CC-132, and eight CC-115s. The CC-150s have greater capacity than the 707s and the
                 310s),              CC-132s, and CC-115s are about half the size of C-130s and cannot carry the same types and
                 6 CC-115s,          volume of cargo.
                 2 CC-142s
Germany          86 C-160s,          Added seven Airbus A310 aircraft and added one Tu-154 from the East German inventory, while
                 7 A310s,            eliminating one C-160 and 3 707 aircraft for a net gain of four aircraft.
                 1 Tu-154
                 1 707
Greece           10 C-130Hs,         Added five C-130Hs, one 747 and three A-300s; eliminated 2 C-130Hs and retired four old C-47
                 5 C-130Bs,          aircraft. The three A-300s are leased by the military.
                 4 C-47s,
                 1 747,
                 3 A-300s
Italy            11 C-130Hs,         Added one C-130H and has 18 C-130Js on order.
                 32 G-222s
Netherlands      2 F-50s,            Added all transport aircraft; eliminated 12 older F-27s. The eight new aircraft represent an
                 4 F-60s,            overall increase in payload and range.
                 2 C-130H-30s
Spain            7 C-130Hs,          Added 2 C-130Hs and 11 CN-235s.
                 34 C-212s,
                 18 CN-235s
Turkey           6 C-130Bs           Added 6 C-130Bs and 54 CN-235s; eliminated 40 old C-47s and 1 C-160D. This represents a
                 7 C-130Es           net increase in both cargo and troop transport capacity and results in a significantly modernized
                 19 C-160Ds,         transport fleet.
                 54 CN-235s

                                           Source: The countries’ ministries of defense and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
                                           The Military Balance 1998/99, The Military Balance 1990/91, and Jane’s World Air Forces 1997-98.

                                           Page 14                                                                     GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO

Table 4: Countries That Have Not Increased Their Transport Aircraft and Airlift Capability Since 1990

Country                    Assets                 Changes since 1990
                                                  No change in airlift capability
Denmark                    3 C-130Hs              No change in transport aircraft inventory.
Luxembourg                 None                   None.
Norway                     6 C-130Hs              No change in transport aircraft inventory.
Portugal                   6 C-130Hs,             No change in transport aircraft inventory.
                           18 C-212s
                                                  Decrease in airlift capability
United Kingdom             55 C-130s,             Added one Tristar; eliminated five C-130s. The loss of five C-130s represents a
                           3 Tristars             decrease in cargo capacity not completely offset by the addition of the Tristar.
                                                  However, 25 C-130Js are on order.
                                          Data inconclusive regarding airlift capability
Belgium                    11 C130Hs,             Lost one C-130 in an accident and replaced two Boeing 727 aircraft with Airbus
                           2 A310-200s,           A310-200s. The A310-200s are more capable than the 727s in both payload and
                           3 HS 748s              range, but the loss of the C-130 means a loss in the ability to carry certain types of

                                            Source: The countries’ ministries of defense, IISS The Military Balance 1998/99, The Military Balance
                                            1990/91, and Jane’s World Air Forces 1997-98.

Sealift Inventory                           In evaluating countries’ inventories based on increases in the quantity and
                                            capacity of their naval vessels, we found, as with the airlift inventories, that
                                            NATO allies as a whole have greater sealift capability now than in 1990
                                            although some countries have achieved more than others. Seven of
                                            12 countries8 increased sealift capability, 4 countries made no change in
                                            sealift inventories, and one decreased sealift capability. (Table 5 shows the
                                            progress made in acquiring sealift assets, by country, and app. III provides
                                            information on the characteristics of the assets.)

                                             We did not include Luxembourg in our sealift analysis because it is a landlocked country.

                                            Page 15                                                                  GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO

Table 5: Countries’ Inventories of Large Amphibious and Sealift Vessels

Country                   Assets                                        Changes since 1990
                                                       Increase in sealift capability
Germany                   1 roll-on, roll-off vessel                    Added one. A civilian shipping company owns it, but the military
                                                                        has absolute priority in its use.
Greece                    10 amphibious vessels                         Replaced five old smaller amphibious vessels with two new
                                                                        amphibious vessels; three more are on the way.
Italy                     3 amphibious vessels                          Added one amphibious vessel.
Netherlands               1 amphibious vessel                           Acquired one amphibious vessel.
Spain                     5 amphibious vessels                          Acquired one new amphibious vessel and two newer amphibious
                                                                        vessels to replace three old amphibious vessels.
Turkey                    8 amphibious vessels                          This represents an increase of one amphibious vessel.
United Kingdom            8 amphibious vessels and 2 roll-on,  Added one amphibious vessel. Also added two roll-on, roll-off
                          roll-off vessels                     vessels, which are leased and not equipped to enter war zones.
                                               No change in sealift capability
Belgium                   0                                             No change.
Denmark                   0                                             No change.
Norway                    0                                             No change.
Portugal                  0                                            No change.
                                                       Decrease in sealift capability
Canada                    2 auxiliary vessels                           No dedicated sealift assets; reduced auxiliary vessels, which can
                                                                        carry limited amounts of cargo, troops, and equipment, by one.

                                              Sources: The countries’ ministries of defense and IISSs, The Military Balance 1998/99, The Military
                                              Balance 1990/91, and Jane’s 1997-1998 Fighting Ships.

In-flight Refueling                           In-flight refueling capability increases the deployability of national forces
Capability                                    because it can extend the range of aircraft. Prior to 1990, only three NATO
                                              countries other than the United States had in-flight refueling capability;
                                              today that number has doubled to six. Turkey, Italy, and the Netherlands
                                              have developed in-flight refueling capabilities that they did not possess
                                              before 1990. The Netherlands is using its newly acquired capability to
                                              participate in air operations in the Balkans. Further, the Netherlands and
                                              Belgium have agreed to the joint use of their assets and Luxembourg army
                                              assets for peace support operations under the auspices of the United
                                              Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, NATO,
                                              or the Western European Union. Through this agreement, Belgium has
                                              access to the Netherlands’ refueling capabilities, and the Netherlands has

                                              Page 16                                                                  GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO

                                              access to Belgium’s airlift assets. Table 6 shows the 13 countries’ in-flight
                                              refueling aircraft capabilities.

Table 6: Countries’ Inventories of In-flight Refueling Capability
Country                              Assets                                           Changes since 1990
                                              Increase in in-flight refueling capability
Canada                               5 KC-130 tanker/transports                       Five KC-130s have replaced two CC-137
Italy                                4 707-320 tanker/transports                      All added
Netherlands                          2 DC-10 tanker/transports                        All added
Spain                                5 KC-130s,                                       Added two 707 tanker/transports
                                     4 707 tanker/transports
Turkey                               7 KC-135R                                 All added
                                           No change in in-flight refueling capability
Germany                              None                                             No change
Belgium                              None                                             No change
Denmark                              None                                             No change
Greece                               None                                             No change
Luxembourg                           None                                             No change
Norway                               None                                             No change
Portugal                             None                                        No change
                                              Decrease in in-flight refueling capability
United Kingdom                       2 Tristar K-1 tanker/transports,                 Reduced by two VC-10-K-2 tankers and one
                                     4 Tristar KC-1 tanker/cargo,                     VC-10C-1/C-1K tanker/transport
                                     3 VC-10-K-2 tankers,
                                     4 VC-10-K-3 tankers,
                                     12 VC-10C-1/C-1K tanker/ transports

                                              Source: The country ministries of defense, IISS The Military Balance 1998/99, The Military Balance
                                              1990/91, and Jane’s World Air Forces 1997-98.

Personnel                                     In general, the alliance members have made progress in establishing
                                              smaller militaries, as envisioned by the strategic concept, and more
                                              professional militaries. Professional forces are generally more deployable,
                                              as many European countries have legislation limiting the deployability of
                                              conscripts. Of the 13 countries from which we collected data, 12 have
                                              reduced the total end strengths of their militaries, and 10 have changed the
                                              composition of their forces by increasing the proportion of professional
                                              forces (see fig. 1).

                                              Page 17                                                                 GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO

Figure 1: NATO Members’ Active Duty Forces and Percent of Conscripts

     Number of
     Active Duty
     Forces and
  Percent Conscript
     1990    1998/99

   37,000    31,150

    66%        61%

   306,000   210,940

    0%         0%
  30,142     25,220

   34%        31%
                                                        United Kingdom
  104,024    54,689

   46%         0%
   467,000   330,547

   44%        41%

   92,326    42,125
    41%        0%                                                               Germany
    700        808
    0%         0%

  389,000    265,500

    67%       47%
   59,480    48,110

    61%       57%                  Portugal

  290,926    201,491                                                                                 Turkey
    72%       50%                                                                         Greece

  164,333    158,167

    73%       59%

  646,100    616,900

    85%       83%

  87,976     58,847

    0%        0%

                                         Source: Countries’ Ministries of Defense.

                                         Page 18                                           GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO

Force Reorganization and                    The strategic concept recognized that the changing security environment
Restructuring                               required different force structures and capabilities. Accordingly, some
                                            countries have reorganized their force structures, and others have begun to
                                            reorganize their force structures from largely territorial defense forces to
                                            force structures that can deploy outside their territory. The forces of all six
                                            countries we visited had reorganized. In most cases, countries reorganized
                                            because of the changed security environment and financial considerations.
                                            Although force restructuring was not in response to any specific NATO
                                            force goals, it was consistent with the direction of the new strategic
                                            concept and emphasized by officials in the countries we visited. The
                                            countries’ restructuring is summarized in table 7.

Table 7: Force Restructuring in Selected Countries

Country                  Force restructuring
Germany                  Developed reaction forces, which do not contain conscripts, for peace support, rescue and evacuation, or
                         relief operations. Forces are maintained in a high state of readiness for rapid response to NATO defense
                         operations. Main force for territorial defense largely comprises conscripts maintained at lower readiness
                         levels than during the Cold War, since Germany assumes it will have 12 months’ warning as opposed to
                         48 hours for any aggression.
Italy                    Implementing a new defense model that calls for a reduced but more flexible and readily deployable force
                         capable of undertaking a wider range of operational capabilities. Also participating in more diversified
                         operational scenarios in a more multinational joint context.
Netherlands              Military restructuring, begun in 1991 and expected to conclude in 2000, is intended to increase ability to
                         sustain prolonged crisis management or peacekeeping operations and meet NATO’s collective defense
                         requirements. Has eliminated conscription and is now an entirely professional force. Is disbanding three tank
                         battalions, increased the number of combat-ready armored infantry companies from six to nine, plans to
                         increase combat-ready division by 800 personnel, and consolidated medical services into a joint brigade.
                         Each of three partially active mechanized brigades will be capable of deploying one battalion-sized task
                         force for SFOR-type operations.a
Spain                    Reorganized and has begun to modernize its army. Cut the number of army personnel in half and closed
                         many small bases and detachments. Will also end conscription officially in 2003.
Turkey                   Finished restructuring of forces in 1993. Has developed more independent, deployable brigades and leased
                         or purchased tanker aircraft for greater flexibility. New force structure provides for a minimum of one-third of
                         the land forces to be combat ready.
United Kingdom           Defense review envisions a joint rapid reaction force comprising air, ground, and naval assets. Will
                         restructure its army to retain two deployable divisions, one based in Germany and the other in Britain, and
                         will establish an additional mechanized brigade. It also plans to convert airborne brigade to mechanized
                         brigade and reduce front-line naval forces, including destroyers and frigates.

                                            SFOR = Stabilization Force, NATO’s ongoing operation in Bosnia.
                                            Source: GAO analysis.

                                            Page 19                                                             GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO

Trucks, Transport       The data for these indicators were less consistent across countries due to
Helicopters,            definitional problems, so we have not made any comparisons between or
                        among countries, but rather have noted change in a country between 1990
Communication, and
                        and the present. Most countries’ defense ministries reported little change in
Training Capabilities   inventories of transport helicopters and trucks for heavy equipment and
                        fuel. Notable exceptions are the Netherlands, which added 13 CH-47
                        Chinook helicopters to its inventory where they previously did not have
                        any, and Denmark, which more than doubled the number of its heavy
                        equipment transports, from 31 to 65.

                        Many countries have acquired satellite communications terminals and
                        other mobile communication assets; not all countries responded to our
                        queries about this indicator, however. These types of assets are necessary
                        to allow units to deploy from areas where they have preexisting
                        communication links. For example, Luxembourg, Belgium, and Portugal
                        had no mobile satellite communication terminals in 1990, and all have that
                        capability today. Similarly, Norway had no mobile airfield communications
                        capability in 1990 and does today.

                        Since 1990, NATO members have increased their focus on multinational
                        exercises and on exercises and missions other than countering a
                        large-scale invasion as called for in the 1991 strategic concept. Some
                        countries stated that increased deployments have reduced the frequency of
                        exercises but that out-of-area deployments have provided valuable
                        experience. For example, Spain not only has participated in NATO
                        operations in the Balkans but also has executed other deployments, most
                        recently to Central America, when it sent engineers and supplies in the
                        wake of Hurricane Mitch. Similarly, Belgium has deployed units to Rwanda
                        and the Congo in addition to its NATO activities.

Despite Progress,       Although alliance members have made progress in increasing mobility and
Challenges Remain       deployability, challenges remain. Recognizing that challenges still exist,
                        NATO launched the Defense Capabilities Initiative at the April 1999 summit
                        to encourage member countries’ greater movement toward mobility and
                        deployability of their forces by working together to develop assets that
                        support each other’s forces. This represents a shift from the alliance’s
                        position that each country is responsible for the sustainability
                        requirements and logistics resources for the forces it contributes. The five
                        areas identified for improvement under this initiative include deployability
                        and mobility of alliance forces; sustainability and logistics; effective

                        Page 20                                                GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO

              engagement capability; survivability of forces and infrastructure; and
              command and control and information systems.

Scope and     To describe how NATO establishes its force requirements and how it
              identifies what it asks each member to contribute, we obtained and
Methodology   reviewed documents relevant to the defense planning process from U.S.
              Department of Defense and NATO officials. We interviewed DOD and State
              officials as well as scholars and defense analysts to obtain their perspective
              on the process. We also visited the U.S. Mission to NATO in Brussels,
              Belgium, and conducted in-depth interviews with U.S. Mission officials;
              NATO international staff and international military staff; and U.S. European
              Command staff. We also interviewed military officers from Belgium,
              Germany, and Norway.

              To determine how NATO member militaries have become more mobile and
              deployable since the adoption of the strategic concept in 1991, we
              identified criteria in the 1991 strategic concept that reflected the force
              structure attributes the alliance wished to forge (that is, more mobile,
              flexible, and deployable forces). Using these criteria, we developed
              tentative indicators that reflect mobility and deployability. We reviewed
              these draft indicators with the help of expert analysts from the Brookings
              Institute, the National Defense University, and the Cato Institute; officials
              from the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Program Analysis and
              Evaluation Division, the Department of the Navy, and the Joint Chiefs of
              Staff, Washington, D.C.; the Logistics Management Institute, McLean
              Virginia; and U.S. and international military and civilian officials at NATO.
              Based on this review we selected 10 indicators on which to collect data.

              We collected data for three points: 1990, the last year before the adoption of
              the 1991 strategic concept; the most recent available data; and future plans.
              We then identified six countries for in-depth fieldwork to validate and
              expand on the information we received and obtained input from those
              countries’ ministries of defense on the status of their forces’ movement
              toward greater mobility and deployability. We selected these countries
              based on the coverage of NATO they represented in terms of budgets and
              forces and in terms of variance of progress toward the goals of mobility and
              deployability. We also solicited input from DOD desk officers for the
              selected countries, country delegation members at the U.S. Mission to
              NATO, NATO international staff, and European Command staff. We also
              collected data from published sources such as Jane’s and International
              Institute for Strategic Studies.

              Page 21                                                 GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO
                  We have not made judgments about what constitutes sufficient progress,
                  whether any particular country has made enough progress in enhancing
                  force mobility and deployability, or whether any particular country can
                  participate in or accomplish a specific mission.

                  We conducted our review from August 1998 to September 1999 in
                  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Agency Comments   In written comments on a draft of this report, the Defense Department
                  concurred with our findings. (DOD’s comments are reprinted in app. IV).
                  DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated where
                  appropriate. In oral comments on this report, the Department of State
                  concurred with our findings.

                  As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
                  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 15 days from the
                  issuance date. At that time, we will provide copies of this report to other
                  appropriate congressional committees; the Honorable William S. Cohen,
                  Secretary of Defense, and the Honorable Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary
                  of State. We will also provide copies to other interested parties upon

                  If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
                  contact me or Jim Shafer at (202) 512-4128. Key contributors to this report
                  were Muriel Forster, Hynek Kalkus, and Patricia Martin.

                  Harold J. Johnson, Associate Director
                  International Relations and Trade Issues

                  Page 22                                                 GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO
Page 23   GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO
Appendix I

Fieldwork Observations, by Country                                                                   AA

                     National priorities, independent of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
                     (NATO) requirements, have influenced NATO members’ progress in
                     changing their force structures to meet the new security environment. To
                     better understand the changes that these militaries have undergone,
                     quantitatively and qualitatively, we visited six NATO member
                     countries—the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy,
                     and Turkey—seeking in-depth information about our indicators and other
                     factors that would pertain to enhanced mobility and deployability of their

The United Kingdom   Historically, the United Kingdom has maintained a global outlook that
                     requires it to maintain more mobile and deployable forces than most of its
                     European counterparts. The United Kingdom has focused on restructuring
                     its forces and procuring weapons such as attack helicopters, cruise
                     missiles, and the Eurofighter, an attack aircraft. The United Kingdom’s
                     Strategic Defence Review (SDR) completed in July 1998 recognized a need
                     for more airlift and sealift capabilities and logistics support for their forces.

                     The United Kingdom has reduced its forces, all of which are professional,
                     by over 30 percent and is restructuring them to form joint rapid reaction
                     forces to be operational in 2001. These forces will consist of two echelons,
                     the first of which will be at a very high state of readiness to provide early
                     entry forces, and the second of which will provide follow-up forces. The
                     first echelon will comprise a maritime task group; air power; land forces,
                     including an armored battle group; a special forces component; and a fully
                     equipped, rapidly deployable headquarters to command the forces. The
                     SDR also calls for a restructuring of the United Kingdom’s reserve forces.
                     For example, the United Kingdom recognizes the need for additional
                     medical support in major operations such as the Gulf War but finds it too
                     expensive to maintain in the active force structure and hopes to use
                     reservists for such tasks.

                     The SDR specifically calls for enhanced strategic lift to enable movement
                     of the joint rapid reaction forces to an overseas theater. In the near term, it
                     calls for the acquisition of four C-17-like aircraft to meet short-term
                     strategic airlift needs in addition to the 25 C-130Js already on order and the
                     addition of four roll-on, roll-off container ships for strategic sealift needs.
                     In the long term, it recognizes the need to replace the rest of the aging
                     transport fleet, possibly with the European Future Large Aircraft.
                     Additionally, the SDR acknowledges the need for additional medical
                     support. According to a United Kingdom Ministry of Defense official, prior

                     Page 24                                                   GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO
          Appendix I
          Fieldwork Observations, by Country

          defense cuts resulted in severe shortages in medical support. U.S. officials
          and other military experts said that the results of the SDR are consistent
          with NATO’s vision for what allied forces should look like and could serve
          as a model for other countries.

Germany   In 1990, Germany’s military found itself in a position unique to any NATO
          state. Reunification added about 100,000 East German troops to Germany’s
          military, but the treaty enabling reunification mandated that the military be
          reduced to a maximum of 370,000 troops. Further, Germany had spent the
          past 40 years preparing to defend its territory from an invasion and did not
          foresee sending any combat forces outside of Germany. Therefore, it
          invested less in logistics and support, since it expected to use civilian
          assets such as hospitals and trucks, and more in combat forces.

          In 1994, Germany issued a white paper that detailed its restructuring
          actions based on the reunification and the need for additional changes to
          reflect the changed security environment. One key decision was to develop
          rapid reaction units that would consist entirely of professionals or
          temporary career volunteers.1 The rapid reaction units total 53,000 men and
          include air, naval, and ground units.

          German officials believe in the need for and benefits of conscription. For
          national and NATO defense purposes they want to maintain the ability to
          mobilize a 680,000-man force. To do this, Germany needs a large number of
          skilled reservists, which are available through conscription. Germany’s
          ability to significantly increase its forces in case of a major war may
          contribute to other European allies’ abilities to restructure their forces into
          smaller, professional militaries. At the same time, Germany maintains that
          its ability to contribute up to 53,000 rapid reaction forces to a NATO or
          other coalition force is significant. Also, over 50 percent of Germany’s
          regular officers and noncommissioned officers are recruited from its pool
          of conscripts, and without conscription the overall quality of the military
          would probably decrease, since entire segments of the population would
          not consider military service. Finally, Germany does not accept that
          professionals are necessarily better than conscripts. According to German

           Temporary career volunteers are conscripts that have volunteered to serve for an additional
          2 to 13 months beyond their basic military service of 10 months and can be deployed for
          duties other than national or NATO defense missions, which is all that is asked of regular

          Page 25                                                           GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO
                  Appendix I
                  Fieldwork Observations, by Country

                  officials, units with conscripts have proven themselves in military
                  exercises, military competitions, and peacetime support operations. For
                  example, German units with temporary career volunteers that are in Bosnia
                  have performed as well as units of professional armies, according to the
                  Stabilization Force Commander.

                  Germany is now undertaking another broad defense review by a blue
                  ribbon panel representing all segments of German society. This review will
                  take at least a year to complete and will cover all aspects of Germany’s
                  defense policy. Although the review may lead to more improvements in
                  Germany’s ability to react to a crisis, until it is completed, Germany will
                  probably not undergo any major changes in its current policies.

The Netherlands   The Netherlands has made numerous changes in its force structure, but
                  limited defense spending may impact sustainability. Changes to date in the
                  structure illustrate a move toward NATO-desired mobility. In 1991,
                  recognizing it unlikely that its forces would be needed for home defense,
                  the Netherlands began to restructure its forces. As the country determined
                  to act militarily only in partnership with others, its goal was to increase
                  mobility and the ability to integrate with other forces in the alliance. It has
                  reduced its forces by about 50 percent and now has an all-volunteer force,
                  which eliminates restrictions on where they can be deployed. In addition,
                  the Netherlands has changed its force structure to have more rapidly
                  deployable, flexible, and mobile units. However, according to the
                  Clingendale Institute, a Dutch think tank, the force structure changes are
                  still insufficient. According to the Institute, the Army needs additional
                  combat personnel to enable it to sustain its forces in the field for longer
                  lengths of time.

                  The Netherlands plans to add about 800 additional personnel to its
                  combat-ready infantry companies and engineer and logistics units and is
                  considering consolidating logistic support among the services. The country
                  has increased both its airlift and sealift capability since 1990. Current plans
                  focus on equipment purchases: two amphibious transport ships, Patriot
                  missile upgrades, and Apache helicopters—all high-priced items. However,
                  the Netherlands plans no increases in its defense budget, which at
                  1.9 percent of the gross domestic product is already under NATO’s average
                  of 2.8 percent of the gross domestic product.

                  According to U.S. embassy officials, the Netherlands has added some
                  courses to its training requests in response to NATO force goals. For

                  Page 26                                                  GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO
        Appendix I
        Fieldwork Observations, by Country

        example, Dutch forces will attend civil-military affairs training in the
        United States, since the Netherlands has been designated a lead country in
        establishing a civil-military unit.

Spain   Spain joined NATO in 1982 and joined NATO’s integrated military structure
        in 1999. According to U.S. and Spanish officials, Spain recognized in the
        early 1990s that the integration would require a reorganization and
        modernization of its armed forces. Since 1990, Spain has reduced its active
        duty forces by 30 percent and reduced its proportion of conscript forces
        from 72 percent to 50 percent. During this effort, Spain reorganized its
        army and cut its force level by half. Conscription will end officially in 2003,
        but will as a practical matter end sooner.

        According to U.S. officials, modernization in the army is less advanced than
        the reorganization process. Modernization of the C-130 fleet is scheduled to
        be completed this year. Since 1990 Spain has increased its sealift capacity
        by acquiring one amphibious vessel. Spain’s newest ship is an oiler/supply
        ship. Spain plans to add another amphibious vessel, which will be
        configured with command and control capability.

        U.S. officials described Spain as having a “small but robust military,” but it
        is not a power projection force. Further, while recognizing the need for
        greater mobility and deployability and making advances in that direction,
        Spain believes it will never operate alone, that it will always be part of
        some multinational coalition or operation. Therefore, Spain will limit the
        resources it devotes to strategic acquisitions such as lift. However,
        according to U.S. officials, Spain does much for the alliance, at great
        domestic political cost, that tends to be overlooked, such as making basing
        agreements and serving as an air bridge. For example, over the last 4 years,
        Spain has permitted 50,000 U.S. flights from its bases for various operations
        and contingencies. It has also contributed to the operations in Bosnia and
        Albania. Spain contributed about 1,500 troops to both the United Nations
        Protection Force and the NATO-led Implementation Force. The current
        commitment for the Stabilitzation Force is about 1,100 troops, which given
        rotation requirements represents a commitment of about one-third of
        Spain’s nine-brigade army. Spain also commits one frigate each to NATO’s
        standing naval forces in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, which
        represents one-third of its frigates.

        Page 27                                                  GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO
         Appendix I
         Fieldwork Observations, by Country

Italy    In response to the changed security environment and NATO’s strategic
         concept, Italy has adopted a new defense model and is now implementing
         it. This model calls for a reduced but more flexible and readily deployable
         force capable of undertaking a wider range of operational capabilities and
         participating in more diversified, multinational operational scenarios. Italy
         has reduced its active duty personnel level by 30 per cent and plans to
         reduce it another 22 percent by 2005. About 47 percent of the armed forces
         are conscripts, but Italy hopes to reduce that percentage to 11 per cent by
         2005. According to U.S. officials, however, this goal is optimistic.

         U.S. officials said that Italy does not have a power projection force and that
         deploying more than 5,000 troops outside its territory would stretch its lift
         and sustainability resources. Italy has provided support to the alliance that
         has been domestically unpopular, such as the use of Aviano Air Base. Italy
         also has 400 policemen in Bosnia performing civil police duties. According
         to U.S. officials, Italy took the lead in this initiative, which NATO was
         unable to persuade any other ally to perform. Since 1993, Italy has
         maintained 1,800 troops in Bosnia, which in addition to land, navy, and air
         infrastructure for land and air operations requires a total commitment of
         about 10,000 personnel, according to Italy’s Minister of Defense. In 1997,
         Italy led a coalition of 7,000 troops from 11 nations in the United Nations-
         mandated Operation Alba to provide internal peace and restore
         governmental authority in Albania. Italy provided 3,000 troops and
         coordinated the operation through its completion in August 1997.

Turkey   Turkey’s security challenges differ from other NATO members, and this
         difference affects its strategic posture. Turkey borders Iran, Iraq, and Syria;
         has cultural and historical connections to the Balkans and Caucasus; and is
         near the Middle East and central Asian energy sources. Therefore, Turkey’s
         defense planning is focused more on responding to crises in this region and
         being reinforced with forces from its allies than on deploying its forces
         great distances outside its territory. According to U.S. and Turkish officials,
         this focus is entirely consistent with NATO interests. In addition, Turkey is
         containing civil unrest in the country’s southeast quadrant. For these and
         other social and economic reasons, Turkey plans to reduce the size of its
         armed forces and the proportion of conscripts in its forces slowly. Since
         1990, Turkey has reduced its active duty forces less than 5 percent and its
         conscript active duty forces from 85 percent to 83 percent. A Turkish
         official said that the deployment and disposition of conscripts in the armed

         Page 28                                                  GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO
Appendix I
Fieldwork Observations, by Country

forces are not constrained in any way and that conscription therefore does
not present the same problems it does for other NATO allies.

As a result of its experience in the Gulf War, Turkey realized that its
division-based army had not been easy to move to southeast Turkey, so it
has since reorganized to achieve more independent deployable brigades.
Turkish forces have participated in numerous operations, including the
United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia, with over 1,460 personnel; in
Operation Alba with about 700 personnel; and numerous other United
Nations missions. Currently, it has about 800 personnel, equivalent to half a
brigade, in Bosnia.

Page 29                                                GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO
Appendix II

Characteristics of Transport and In-flight
Refueling Aircraft in NATO Nations’
Inventories                                                                                    Appendx

                The range of transport aircraft varies depending on the loads they carry. In
                table 8, we show the ranges for the payload listed in parentheses. Payloads
                are rounded to the nearest half ton for cargo and numbers of passengers or
                troops if listed that way. Nations may have reconfigured their specific
                aircraft, which affect these measures.

                Table 8: Characteristics of Transport Aircraft

                                                                          Maximum payload in
                Aircraft        Range in miles                               tons/passengers
                707-320         3,625 (40-ton payload)                                 44.5/219
                727-300         2,880 (maximum payload)                                  20/189
                A310            5,523                                                   55 /270
                A310-200        4,200 (220 passengers with bags)                         36/280
                C-130B          2,090                                                      −/92
                C-130E          2,420 (maximum payload)                                 22.5/92
                C-130H          2,238 (20-ton load)                                       25/92
                C-130H-30       2,238 (20-ton load)                                      23/128
                C-160           1,151 (maximum payload)                                 17.5/91
                C-212           519 (maximum payload)                                      3/25
                C-47            2,700                                                         4
                CC-115          754 (maximum payload)                                      9/41
                CC-132          1,335 (3-ton payload)                                    5.5/50
                CC-137           4,300 (maximum payload)                               45.5/219
                CC-142          1,357 (with 50 passengers)                                 7/50
                CL-215          1,301 (2-ton payload)                                      4/26
                Cn-235          950 (maximum payload)                                    6.5/48
                DC-10-30        4,606 (maximum payload)                                  53/380
                F-27            1,150 (5-ton payload)                                    6.5/45
                F-50            2,146 (5.5-ton payload)                                  6.5/48
                F-60            1,208 (7.5-ton payload) or
                                1,841 (50 troops)                                        8.5/55
                G-222           783 (maximum payload)                                     10/46
                HS 748          1,898 (4-ton load)                                       8.5/58
                Tristar C-2A    5,998 (400 passengers with bags)                       48.5/400
                Tu-154          2,299 (maximum payload)                                  20/166
                YS-11-200       680 (maximum payload)                                      7/60
                                                                      (Table notes on next page)

                Page 30                                                GAO/NSIAD-99-299 NATO
Appendix II
Characteristics of Transport and In-flight
Refueling Aircraft in NATO Nations’

The Canadian designation for an A310.
Source: Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft.

Tanker aircraft in NATO members’ inventories are detailed in table 9. We
converted their maximum fuel capability into U.S. gallons.

Table 9: Tanker Aircraft, by Type and Fuel Offload Capacity

Aircraft                                      Maximum fuel offload capability in tons/gallons
707 tanker/transport                                                                   61.5/18,917
CC-130T                                                                                   12/3,600
CC-137a                                                                                61.5/18,917
DC-10-30                                                                               100/30,760
KC-130                                                                                  35/10,769
KC-135R                                                                               101.5/31,221
Tristar K-1/KC-1                                                                       150/46,140
VC-10 K2                                                                                81/24,884
VC-10 K3                                                                                88/27,130

Canadian designation for 707 tanker/transports.
Sources: Various Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft and the U.S. Naval Institute.

Page 31                                                                     GAO/NSIAD-99-299 NATO
Appendix III

Characteristics of Sealift Vessels in NATO
Nations’ Inventories                                                                                                                 Appendx

                                               Sealift vessels are described in table 10 by class, size, and capacity for lift
                                               by either square footage or capacity of troops or equipment.

Table 10: Characteristics of Sealift Vessels

Country              Number/class/type                        Size in tons             Lift capability in troops/vehicles
Canadaa              2 Provider replenishment vessels         24,700 full              16,678 square feet
Germany              1 Germania roll-on, roll-off vessel      8,720 full               Not available
Greeceb              2 Chios LSTs                             4,400 full               300/not available
                     2 Inouse LSTs                            5,800 full               400/18 tanks
                     3 Ikaria LSTs                            4,080                    200/16 tanks
                     2 Roussen LSMs                           1,095                    50/4
                     1Nafkratoussa LSD                        9,357 full               200/18
Italy                2 San Giorgio LPDs                       7,665 full               400/30-36 armored personnel carriers or
                                                                                       30 medium tanks
                     1 San Giusto LPD                         7,950 full               400/30-36 armored personnel carriers or
                                                                                       30 medium tanks
Netherlands          1 Rotterdam LPD                          12,750 full              611/170 armored personnel carriers or
                                                                                       33 main battle tanks
Spain                2 Castilla LPAs                          10,709 light             1,657/not available
                     2 Cortes LSTs                            4,975 light              374/500 tons of vehicles
                     1 Galicia LPD                            12,250 full              611 troops or 170 armored personnel
                                                                                       carriers or 33 main battle tanks
Turkey               1 Osman Gazi LST                         3,773 full               900/15 tanks
                     2 Ertugal LSTs                           5,800                    395/2,220 tons cargo
                     2 Sarucabey LSTs                         2,600 full               600/11
                     1 Cakabey LSM                            1,600                    400/9 tanks
                     2 Bayraktar LSTs                         4,080 full               200/16 tanks
United Kingdom       2 Fearless LPDs                          12,120 full              400/15 main battle tanks
                     4 Sir Belvedere LSLs                     5,674 full               340/17 or 18 main battle tanks
                     1 Sir Galahad LSL                        8,585 full               343/18 main battle tanks
                     1 Ocean LPHc                             20,500 full              Most equipment for a marine commando
                     2 Sea Crusader roll-on, roll- off vessels 23,986 gross tons       2,300 lane meters of space
                                                                                                           (Table notes on next page )

                                               Page 32                                                       GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO
Appendix III
Characteristics of Sealift Vessels in NATO
Nations’ Inventories

LPA = landing platform attack
LPD = landing platform dock
LPH = landing platform helicopter
LSD = landing ship dock
LSL = landing ship logistics
LSM = landing ship medium
LST = landing ship tank
Note: Information was not always available in each category. Vessels in italics are those added to the
inventories since 1990.
 Canada does not have Amphibious or roll on, roll off vessels, but does use its replenishment vessels
for sealift. Its lift is measured by available square footage of space.
 Three additional Chios class vessels are under construction and are all scheduled for commissioning
by the end of 1999. They are scheduled to replace older LSTs and LSMs.
 This vessel is primarily a helicopter carrier but can carry almost an entire marine commando battalion
and its equipment.
Source: The country ministries of defense, IISS The Military Balance 1998/99, The Military Balance
1990/91, and Various years of Jane’s Fighting Ships.

Page 33                                                                   GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO
Appendix IV

Comments From the Department of Defense              Appendx

(711374)      Leter   Page 34    GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO
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