oversight

Force Structure: Opportunities for the Army to Reduce Risk in Executing the Military Strategy

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1999-03-15.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                  United States General Accounting Office

GAO               Report to Congressional Committees




March 1999
                  FORCE STRUCTURE

                  Opportunities for the
                  Army to Reduce Risk
                  in Executing the
                  Military Strategy




GAO/NSIAD-99-47
      United States
GAO   General Accounting Office
      Washington, D.C. 20548                                                                                    Leter




      National Security and
      International Affairs Division                                                                            Leter




      B-281688

      March 15, 1999

      The Honorable John Warner
      Chairman
      The Honorable Carl Levin
      Ranking Minority Member
      Committee on Armed Services
      United States Senate

      The Honorable Floyd D. Spence
      Chairman
      The Honorable Ike Skelton
      Ranking Minority Member
      Committee on Armed Services
      House of Representatives

      The fiscal year 1996 National Defense Authorization Act requires us to
      annually assess, through 2001, the Army's plans to allocate its end strength
      to meet the force structure requirements of its combat and support forces. 1
      This is the third in a series of reports to respond to this congressional
      mandate.2

      The Army's force structure requirements are based on the national military
      strategy to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars. In
      1996, the Army completed its biennial force structure review and
      concluded that it faced a moderate risk in carrying out the strategy because
      of significant shortfalls in support forces.3 This report addresses the
      Army’s risks after completing its 1998 force structure review. To respond
      to the act's requirement, we (1) compared the Army’s 1996 and 1998
      reviews to determine if there were changes in the Army’s risk of not having
      sufficient forces to implement the national military strategy and (2)
      assessed the Army’s potential for mitigating risk by reallocating its existing
      end strength. To assess risk for the 1998 review, we considered factors that


      1
        End strength is the total number of positions authorized annually by Congress. Force structure is the
      Army’s organization of its forces into units.

      2Our two previous reports were Force Structure: Army Support Forces Can Meet Two-Conflict Strategy
      With Some Risk (GAO/NSIAD-97-66, Feb. 28, 1997) and Force Structure: Army's Efforts to Improve
      Efficiency of Institutional Forces Have Produced Few Results (GAO/NSIAD-98-65, Feb. 26, 1998).

      3
        Support forces deploy to sustain combat forces in wartime and include specialties such as chemical,
      engineering, quartermaster, and transportation.




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                   the Army used to measure risk in its 1996 review, including support force
                   shortfalls, the number of support forces not expected to arrive on time, and
                   challenges expected if a second war were to occur. We also assessed the
                   Army’s underlying assumptions for determining its war-fighting
                   requirements using available criteria such as the Quadrennial Defense
                   Review (QDR).



Results in Brief   The Army did not assess risk in its 1998 force structure review, but our
                   analysis shows that the Army’s risk in implementing the national military
                   strategy increased since its 1996 review. A comparison of both reviews
                   shows that war-fighting requirements for two wars increased at the same
                   time the Army’s forces decreased; support force shortfalls are higher; and
                   the number of support forces arriving late has increased. Further, risk is
                   higher in a second war because few active forces are planned to be
                   deployed in the second war and support force shortfalls are higher in the
                   second war.

                   The Army’s risk may be even higher than this comparative analysis
                   indicates for two reasons. First, the Army’s 1998 force structure review
                   was based on the following “best case” assumptions which are consistent
                   with defense guidance—limited chemical use by the enemy; immediate
                   access to ports and airfields; and immediate redeployment of forces
                   involved in contingencies to a major theater war. In contrast, the (QDR)
                   stated that U.S. forces should be prepared to encounter adverse conditions
                   such as enemy use of chemical weapons. Second, support force shortfalls
                   may be higher than Army data indicates because the Army’s analysis did
                   not include all the QDR reductions in reserve component end strength.
                   Finally, the 1998 analysis assumed that the National Guard will convert
                   nonwar-fighting positions to war-fighting support forces. Shortfalls will be
                   higher if the conversions do not occur as planned.

                   Although the risk of not having sufficient forces to implement the strategy
                   has increased, the full extent of the increase is unknown since the Army did
                   not perform all the analyses needed to assess and quantify its risks.
                   According to defense guidance, Army components are encouraged to
                   conduct analyses to explore the implications of different assumptions.
                   Such analyses may assist the Army in identifying and reducing the risk
                   involved in carrying out the strategy. The Army did perform sensitivity
                   analyses in its 1996 review that concluded additional support forces would
                   be needed if these “best case” assumptions did not occur.




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             The Army has several options to mitigate its risks. The Army’s end strength
             exceeds its war-fighting requirements, yet the Army has allocated
             significant end strength to nonwar-fighting missions. One option to
             mitigate risk is its plan to convert nonwar-fighting positions in two National
             Guard divisions to war-fighting support forces. This would reduce
             shortfalls if implemented as planned. Another option is to analyze the
             extent to which nonwar-fighting missions may be performed by civilians or
             contractors rather than by military personnel. If the Army used civilians or
             contractors to perform more nonwar-fighting missions, it could then
             allocate a larger proportion of military positions to meet war-fighting
             support requirements. Lastly, if the Army had more current data on the
             type and availability of host nation support, it could use such resources to
             reduce shortfalls.



Background   The 1993 Bottom-Up Review and the 1997 QDR require that U.S. forces be
             able to fight and win two nearly simultaneous theater wars. The QDR also
             determined that this strategy could be implemented with a smaller force at
             an acceptable level of risk and, for the Army, recommended reductions of
             60,000 military positions. Accordingly, the Army plans to eliminate 35,000
             positions by fiscal year 2000: 15,000 active, 17,000 National Guard, and
             3,000 Army Reserve positions. These reductions will bring the Army's end
             strength to 1,035,000. The remaining 25,000 reductions will be allocated to
             the National Guard and Army Reserve as part of the Army’s next force
             structure review, Total Army Analysis (TAA) 2007, which will be completed
             in November 1999.

             The Army performs TAA every 2 years to determine the number and types
             of support forces needed by combat forces and to allocate end strength to
             these requirements. The TAA process focuses on support forces because
             combat forces are defined in defense guidance and allocated 100 percent of
             their end strength requirements.4 The combat and support force structure
             is projected to be maintained within the resources available in the
             Department of Defense's (DOD) Future Years Defense Plan. The TAA force
             structure drives development of the Army’s Program Objective
             Memorandum (POM), which is the Army's input into the Future Years
             Defense Plan.



             4
               The combat force is defined in defense and Army guidance and consists of 10 active Army divisions, 2 active
             cavalry regiments, and 15 National Guard enhanced brigades.




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                      In its TAA, the Army uses a series of models to simulate the two nearly
                      simultaneous major theater wars described in the national military strategy.
                      The defense guidance describes the various phases of the campaign,
                      including the buildup of support forces, launching the counteroffensive,
                      and post-hostility stability. The models also include assumptions about
                      campaign conditions (see app. I). The Army models project support force
                      requirements based on the simulated campaigns and the defined combat
                      force. The Army then matches existing force structure units to the
                      requirements until the inventory is exhausted. Shortfalls occur when the
                      requirements exceed the available inventory. The Army calls these
                      shortfalls unresourced requirements.

                      According to defense guidance, Army components are encouraged to
                      conduct analyses to explore the implications of different assumptions.
                      Such analyses may assist the Army in identifying and reducing the risk
                      involved in carrying out the strategy. The Army made the following "best
                      case" assumptions which are consistent with defense guidance—limited
                      chemical use by the enemy; immediate access to ports and airfields; and
                      immediate redeployment of forces involved in contingencies to a major
                      theater war. In its 1996 force structure review, the Army performed various
                      analyses that identified the effects on support force requirements if these
                      assumptions changed.

                      The Army completed its most recent TAA (TAA 2005) in March 1998 and
                      projected total combat and support war-fighting requirements of 747,000
                      positions through fiscal year 2005 for a two-war scenario. The Army
                      initially projected support force shortfalls of 91,300 positions but reduced
                      them to 72,500 because it plans to convert almost 19,000 nonwar-fighting
                      positions in National Guard divisions by 2005 to meet war-fighting support
                      requirements. The Army plans to convert an additional 26,000
                      nonwar-fighting positions in National Guard divisions by the end of fiscal
                      year 2009, for a total of 45,000 converted positions.



The Army's Risk Has   The Army's risk in its ability to implement the national military strategy has
                      increased since its force structure review in 1996, when the Army assessed
Increased             its risk as moderate. Risk increased for the following reasons:

                      • Army war-fighting requirements increased at the same time that the
                        QDR planned significant force reductions.




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                            • Army requirements would have been even higher had the Army included
                              requirements for all campaign phases and accounted for adverse
                              conditions such as enemy use of chemical weapons.
                            • Army support force shortfalls have increased since the 1996 review and
                              may increase further if the conversion of National Guard
                              nonwar-fighting positions to war-fighting support positions does not
                              take place as planned.
                            • The number of support forces arriving late in the first 30 days of the first
                              war has increased since the 1996 review.

                            Further, risk is higher in a second nearly simultaneous war because fewer
                            active forces are planned to be deployed in the second war and support
                            force shortfalls are higher in the second theater.

                            Despite these indicators, the full extent of the Army's risk is not known
                            because the Army has not performed all the analyses needed to assess and
                            quantify risk. A risk assessment should include analyses of adverse
                            conditions to determine their effect on requirements and analyses of
                            effects on war-fight timelines under more severe conditions than those
                            identified in defense guidance.


Requirements Increased as   The Army's war-fighting requirements increased by 75,000 positions from
the Force Decreased         672,000 in the 1996 analysis (TAA 2003) to 747,000 in TAA 2005. At the
                            same time, the Army began implementing QDR reductions, which
                            decreased its end strength by 35,000. The growth in requirements is mostly
                            attributable to defense guidance changes and increases in the Army’s
                            requirements to support other services. For TAA 2005, defense guidance
                            directed the Army to include all the National Guard enhanced brigades,
                            which added about 40,000 combat positions. In addition, Army
                            requirements to support other services increased by about 25,000 positions,
                            including 13,000 positions to provide chemical decontamination for the
                            Navy and the Air Force. In response to theater commander plans and
                            defense guidance, the Army included four corps5 in TAA 2005 compared
                            with three in TAA 2003. Although some support decreased,6 the net change



                            5Some support forces are assigned to a corps that provides nondivisional support for two to five
                            divisions. Each theater is assigned two corps.

                            6
                              Support requirements for medical, equipment use, and some classes of supply decreased but, overall,
                            support requirements increased.




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from TAA 2003 to TAA 2005 was an increase in combat and support
requirements of 75,000 positions as shown in table 1.



Table 1: Army War-Fighting Requirements

                                                 TAA 2003               TAA 2005               Increase
Combat                                              199,031                240,006              40,975
Support                                             440,850                449,723                8,873
Support to other services                            32,119                 57,447              25,328
Total                                               672,000                747,176              75,176
Source: GAO analysis of Army data.


In fiscal year 1998, the Army's congressionally authorized end strength was
1,070,000 and consisted of 495,000 active, 367,000 National Guard, and
208,000 Army Reserve. In TAA 2005, the Army assumed an active end
strength reduction of 15,000 and a decrease in reserve component end
strength of 20,000 by fiscal year 2000. Assuming Congress authorized an
end strength consistent with the QDR recommendations to reduce Army
end strength by a total of 60,000 positions, the Army will need to allocate an
additional 25,000 reduction to the reserve components.

The QDR asserted that the Army would be able to implement these
reductions because of more efficient support through the redesign of its
heavy divisions and implementing "just in time" logistics. But until Army
doctrine is revised and TAA models are updated to reflect the new concept
of operations, no estimate can be made of future support force efficiencies.
TAA 2005 modeling did not include redesigned divisions or corps as
envisioned in Force XXI,7 even though two divisions and one corps will be
redesigned by 2005. The two digitized active divisions will save only about
2,500 active combat positions, but the active force will be reduced by
15,000 positions by the end of fiscal year 1999. According to an Army
official, the full effect of digitization on Army force structure may not be
known until TAA 2011, since the Army will be in various stages of transition
until then.




7
  Force XXI is the Army’s reorganization of its divisions to incorporate new operational and
organizational concepts.




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TAA Assumptions Limited         War-fighting support force requirements would have been higher had the
Support Force                   Army included all the campaign phases of both theaters and accounted for
                                adverse conditions. For example, the Army did not calculate or include
Requirements
                                additional support forces that would be required if opponents use chemical
                                weapons. Also, the Army did not assess the effects on support force
                                requirements of U.S. forces being denied immediate access to ports and
                                airfields. Finally, the Army assumed that forces deployed in ongoing
                                contingency operations would be available immediately for redeployment
                                to a major theater war and did not assess the effects on support force
                                requirements if this were not the case.

The Army Did Not Include        During TAA 2005, the Army modeled requirements for only three of five
Requirements for Two Campaign   campaign phases. Army officials stated that defense guidance does not
Phases                          clearly require the Army to identify requirements for the last two campaign
                                phases. Army officials believe the defense guidance is very vague on the
                                fifth phase and that the extent of the Army’s role and involvement in this
                                phase is unclear. The Army therefore never attempted to identify
                                requirements for the final phase. The Army did calculate 14,000 support
                                force requirements for the fourth phase but, consistent with its
                                interpretation of the guidance, did not include them in the total
                                requirement for 747,000 war-fighting positions. By not incorporating
                                requirements for all five campaign phases for both theaters, the Army does
                                not know its total requirements and cannot fully assess its risks in
                                implementing the strategy.

                                Theater commanders, on the other hand, develop war-plans for the entire
                                campaign. We found that one theater commander had identified
                                requirements for nearly 30,000 additional support positions needed in the
                                last two phases. Most of these spaces were for the engineering, field
                                artillery, medical, and transportation specialties.

The Army Did Not Include        Support force requirements would also have been higher had the Army
Requirements for a Chemical     included the additional forces required in a chemical environment.
Environment                     However, TAA 2005 assumed enemy forces would employ only limited use
                                of chemical weapons in both theaters and thus did not increase
                                war-fighting requirements. The Army later modeled more intense chemical
                                use in one theater but did not identify or include additional support
                                requirements in TAA 2005 results. According to Army officials, the
                                chemical analysis was not completed until after the TAA requirements
                                phase, and the Army did not accomplish all of the study goals. The Army




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                                did not complete this analysis sooner because it redirected its resources
                                toward performing QDR analyses.

                                Even though the Army followed defense guidance, the QDR stated that U.S.
                                forces must plan to fight and win theater wars in which adversaries use
                                chemical or biological weapons because this is a likely condition of future
                                warfare. The QDR also stressed the importance of increased investment in
                                capabilities to prevent and defend against the use of chemical and
                                biological weapons.

The Army Did Not Include        In TAA 2005, the Army assumed that U.S. forces would have immediate and
Requirements Needed if U.S.     unobstructed access to ports and airfields in both theaters. The Army did
Forces Are Denied Immediate     not identify the effects on support force requirements if access were
Access to Ports and Airfields   denied, although it initially planned to do so. Army officials said they did
                                not have time to perform this analysis. As a result, TAA 2005 requirements
                                do not include forces that may be needed if the U.S. does not have access
                                to primary ports and airfields.

                                In TAA 2003, the Army did assess the effects on support force requirements
                                if U.S. forces were denied immediate access to primary ports and airfields
                                in a one theater war. The results showed a requirement for additional
                                positions above that needed for two nearly simultaneous wars. Ninety
                                percent of the increase was in the transportation and quartermaster
                                specialties.

                                Officials at one theater command stated that their current war-plans are
                                consistent with defense guidance—the plans assume immediate access to
                                primary ports and airfields. However, the officials recognized there could
                                be significant effects if U.S. forces are denied access. In a 1997 memo, the
                                theater commander stated that the use of weapons of mass destruction
                                against airports or seaports would delay the buildup of forces and would
                                severely impede the ability to blunt an initial attack. As a result, the
                                command is planning analyses to identify the impact of such events on U.S.
                                forces.

Army Assumed Forces Can Be      In TAA 2005, the Army initially planned to analyze the effects that
Redeployed Immediately From     redeploying forces from a contingency operation to a major theater war
Contingency Operations          would have on requirements, but, according to officials, the Army did not
                                complete this analysis because it redirected its efforts to support the QDR.
                                The assumption that forces involved in contingency operations can be
                                immediately redeployed to a major theater war is consistent with defense
                                guidance. However, we reported in 1997 that this assumption is risky



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                           because the critical support forces needed in the early stages of a major
                           theater war are needed to facilitate the redeployment of military forces
                           from the contingency operation.8 DOD agreed that the assumption used in
                           TAA 2003 that made all units involved in contingencies immediately
                           available for war-fighting is “flawed and overly optimistic.” One Army
                           study on strategic risks assumed that 20,000 Army active component
                           resources would be committed to one or more contingency operations and
                           would not be available to participate in the two-war scenario.

                           The Army does not know how many additional support forces would be
                           required to extract forces from a contingency operation and redeploy them
                           to a major theater war or how such a redeployment would affect
                           war-fighting timelines, according to Army and theater command officials.
                           The European Command Deputy for Operations has estimated that it
                           would take 90 days to disengage forces from Bosnia and redeploy them to a
                           major theater war. Further, the President's 1998 National Security Strategy
                           for a New Century and defense guidance state that U.S. forces must be
                           prepared to withdraw from contingency operations to deploy to a major
                           theater war.


Support Force Shortfalls   The Army's estimate of its support force shortfalls9 increased by 14,000 to
Increased but May Be       72,500 positions since TAA 2003 but may still be understated. The Army
                           has accepted most of its risk in three support specialties—transportation,
Understated
                           quartermaster, and chemical—which account for 75 percent of the
                           shortfalls.10 For example, TAA 2005 includes a requirement for nearly
                           13,000 spaces for the Army to provide chemical support to other services.
                           This resulted in a requirement for 110 chemical decontamination
                           companies, but the Army allocated end strength to only 36 of these units.
                           Therefore, the Army's overall chemical support requirement is significantly
                           under resourced, with only about 12,300 of 23,600 required positions
                           allocated end strength during TAA 2005.




                           8
                            Force Structure: Army Support Forces Can Meet Two-Conflict Strategy With Some Risks
                           (GAO/NSIAD-97-66, Feb. 28, 1997).

                           9Shortfall   refers to units that are not allocated any end strength and exist only on paper.

                           10
                             Appendix II shows the number of positions the Army requires in each specialty in a two-war scenario
                           and the end strength allocated to each speciality.




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TAA 2005 support force shortfalls of 72,500 positions may be understated
for two reasons. The Army had initially estimated shortfalls of 91,300 but
then reduced the estimate because it plans to convert 19,000
nonwar-fighting positions in National Guard divisions to war-fighting
support positions. However, similar conversion plans that were part of
TAA 2003 (66,400 active and reserve positions were supposed to be
converted to higher priority support units) were never implemented. Army
officials said the conversions did not take place because the National
Guard announced it would convert combat positions to support positions.
If the conversions planned in TAA 2005 are delayed, shortfalls will increase.

Second, the Army allocated end strength as of 2000, not 2005 when the
Army expects it will have completed the QDR reductions. By not including
the remaining 25,000 reductions in TAA 2005, the Army has allocated 25,000
more positions than DOD plans to request in congressional end strength
authorizations for fiscal year 2005. Implementing these reductions will
increase support shortfalls if the cuts are allocated to the National Guard
and Army Reserve war-fighting support force structure. In contrast,
allocating the reductions to the reserve components' 228,000 position
nonwar-fighting structure will not increase war-fighting support force
shortfalls. If Congress chose not to reduce reserve force levels further, the
Army would not necessarily have more support forces because it would
still have to convert nonwar-fighting positions to war-fighting support
positions.

The Army relies heavily on reserve components for support force structure.
As table 2 shows, over 70 percent of the resourced war-fighting support
force requirement is met with reserve end strength allocations in the civil
affairs, public affairs, quartermaster, transportation, chemical, ordnance,
and engineering specialities.




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                             Table 2: Support Specialties Predominately in the Reserve Components

                                                            Active component           Reserve components
                                                            End strength                 End strength
                             Specialty                        allocation   Percent         allocation     Percent
                             Civil Affairs                          131         2.49            5,139       97.51
                             Public Affairs                         108         7.61            1,312       92.39
                             Quartermaster                         6,757       16.79           33,482       83.21
                             Transportation                       12,206       20.91           46,173       79.09
                             Chemical                              3,356       27.25            8,961       72.75
                             Ordnance                             12,186       27.96           31,405       72.04
                             Engineering                          20,764       28.90           51,077       71.10
                             Source: GAO analysis of Army data.




Support Forces Required in   Defense and Army guidance stipulate that support units needed in the first
the First 30 Days Arrive     30 days of the first theater war should be predominately active forces.
                             Army officials stated that they do not expect most reserve component units
Late, Increasing Risk
                             to be able to begin moving to the theater until about 30 days after they are
                             mobilized because of the time needed to call up, train, and begin moving
                             forces. The Army estimated in TAA 2005 that over 105,000 support forces
                             would not arrive in the first 30 days as required. This estimate is higher
                             than the 79,000 support forces that TAA 2003 estimated would arrive late.
                             Furthermore, the requirements for several support specialties will probably
                             not be met within the first 30 days because significant portions of these
                             forces are in the reserve components. For example, about 71 percent of
                             engineering forces, 58 percent of ordnance forces, 57 percent of
                             quartermaster forces, and 54 percent of the transportation forces needed in
                             the first 30 days are in the reserve components.

                             We compared one theater commander's requirements to execute the first
                             30 days of the campaign, against the Army's TAA requirements for the same
                             theater. The theater commander's requirements for the first 30 days were
                             less than the TAA requirements and were met mostly with active forces.
                             The commander’s support force requirements were about 37,500 positions,
                             of which 80 percent were active Army. In contrast, the TAA 2005
                             requirements for this theater, were about 177,000 positions of which only
                             about 40 percent were active Army. Whereas TAA uses the doctrinally
                             correct force flow—the number, mix, and sequencing of forces needed to
                             support combat forces—the theater commander may stagger the flow of
                             forces and plan to have some support forces arrive after the first 30 days.



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                              Theater command officials stated that, given limitations in lift, the priority
                              in the first 30 days is to move combat forces into the theater. However,
                              both the TAA models and the theater commander's plans achieve
                              sufficiency of support forces at about the same time.


Risks in the Second Theater   Risks in implementing the national military strategy are higher in the
Are Higher                    second of two theaters because shortfalls are higher and the proportion of
                              active support forces is significantly less in the second theater. TAA 2005
                              showed that support shortfalls are 11,500 spaces higher in the second
                              theater than the first. Also, active forces comprise only 15 percent of the
                              total required support forces in the second theater compared with
                              36 percent in the first. Fewer active forces in the second theater increases
                              risk if the mobilization of reserve forces is delayed or if the second war
                              occurs with little warning time. The significance of the second theater was
                              highlighted by the QDR, which asserted that maintaining forces capable of
                              winning two nearly simultaneous wars is essential to the credibility of the
                              overall national security strategy. The QDR also stated that a one theater
                              war capacity would undermine the deterrence and credibility of U.S.
                              commitments.

                              Another indication that risk in the second theater is higher came from one
                              theater commander who estimated higher shortfalls if his forces are
                              involved in the second of two wars. The theater commander stated that if
                              his theater was second, he was concerned about the lack of support forces
                              to sustain the fight and delays in execution that may be caused by support
                              force shortfalls.


Full Extent of Army's Risk    The Army does not know the full extent of its risks in implementing the
Is Not Known                  national military strategy because it did not perform a risk assessment in
                              TAA 2005. Even though TAA 2005 used assumptions that were generally
                              consistent with defense guidance, the guidance also encourages analyses
                              to identify risks under conditions different from these best case
                              assumptions. In TAA 2003, the Army performed sensitivity analyses that
                              concluded additional support forces would be needed if (1) an adversary
                              used chemical weapons, (2) access to ports and airfields was denied, and
                              (3) forces deployed in a contingency operation were not immediately
                              available. Officials at one theater command stated they routinely perform
                              analyses to identify the effects of worst case conditions. The Army planned
                              to perform some of these sensitivity analyses in TAA 2005 but, according to
                              Army officials, did not do so because resources were shifted to support



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                      QDR analyses. As a result, the Army does not know the full extent of its
                      risk. We believe sensitivity analyses are essential in assessing risk.
                      Without them, the Army cannot specify the additional support forces
                      required under adverse conditions.

                      For example, in TAA 2005, the Army did not run the transportation,
                      campaign, and support models with the resourced force11 to determine the
                      impact of support force shortages on war-fighting timelines. The Army did
                      run the transportation and support models with the TAA 2005 required
                      forces and, according to Army officials, determined that there was no
                      significant change in combat and support unit arrival dates and therefore,
                      the Army did not re-run the campaign models. While this "relook" analysis
                      is a positive change from TAA 2003, re-running the transportation model
                      using the required force does not assess the effects on war-fighting
                      timelines or identify risks resulting from support force shortfalls that could
                      be assessed if the Army re-ran the campaign models with the resourced
                      force. As many as 72,500 support force positions are unresourced with
                      many shortages falling in specialities such as transportation, quartermaster,
                      and chemical. Re-running the models with the resourced force would
                      identify any effects on war-fighting timelines because the models' transition
                      to counteroffensive is based on the level of support forces in the theater.
                      Also, re-running the campaign models with the resourced force would
                      enable the Army to better assess risks of shortages in specific specialties
                      such as transportation, quartermaster, and chemical.

                      Army officials stated that the objective of TAA modeling is to identify the
                      required forces. While the Army has modeled deployments with the
                      resourced force on special requests from the theater commanders, it has
                      not included such analyses in TAA. Army officials agreed, however, that
                      re-running TAA models with the resourced force would improve the Army's
                      ability to assess risk.



Options to Mitigate   The Army has several opportunities to mitigate its risks in executing the
                      national military strategy. The Army's total end strength exceeds its
Risk                  requirements to fight two wars, but the Army has allocated 417,000 end
                      strength positions to force structure that does not have a war-fighting
                      mission, such as for institutional or unique positions. In TAA 2005, the


                      11
                           The resourced force is that portion of the required force for which the Army allocated end strength.




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                             Army did not determine whether the military end strength allocated to
                             institutional or unique force structure was essential. If this structure could
                             be filled with civilians or contractors, then more military end strength
                             would be available to meet war-fighting requirements. The Army could also
                             reduce shortfalls by converting military positions that do not have a war-
                             fighting mission to war-fighting support positions. If implemented, the
                             Army’s National Guard Division Redesign Program will convert 45,000
                             positions in two National Guard divisions to war-fighting support positions
                             by 2009. But, the conversion program is not effectively managed. Finally,
                             the Army could consider support from host nations to help meet its war-
                             fighting requirements, but theater commanders will need to provide more
                             current data on how much support will be available and when.


Significant Portion of End   The Army's congressionally authorized end strength exceeds war-fighting
Strength Does Not Have       requirements, yet the Army still has support force shortfalls because a
                             significant portion of its end strength is allocated to nonwar-fighting
War-Fighting Mission
                             missions. In TAA 2005, the Army projected its end strength in fiscal
                             year 2000 would total 1,035,000, which exceeds the war-fighting
                             requirement of 747,000. For purposes of TAA, the Army actually allocated
                             1,073,000 spaces, which includes additional spaces for the National Guard.
                             But the Army has allocated about 417,000 end strength spaces to
                             nonwar-fighting structure, leaving 656,000 spaces to allocate to war-fighting
                             requirements. The nonwar-fighting structure includes institutional
                             positions, National Guard divisions, trainees, transients, holdees, students,
                             uniques, and uncommitted forces (see table 3). As a result, the Army
                             initially projected 91,300 unresourced positions before accounting for the
                             National Guard conversions. Table 4 shows how the Army allocated end
                             strength in TAA 2005.




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Table 3: End Strength Allocated to Nonwar-Fighting Force Structure

Nonwar-fighting force                                   National           Army
structure                               Active            Guard          Reserve            Total Army
Institutionala                         115,000            36,000            63,000              214,000
TTHSb                                   61,000                   0                0                 61,000
Guard divisions
(strategic reserve)                            0         112,517                  0             112,517
    Subtotal                           176,000           148,517            63,000              387,517
Uncommittedc                                   0            2,719                 0                  2,719
Uniquesd                                12,932            10,853             3,103                  26,888
Total                                  188,932           162,089            66,103              417,124
a
  The Institutional force is generally nondeployable and supports Army infrastructure activities such as
training, doctrine development, base operations, supply, and maintenance.
bTTHS = trainees, transients, holdees, and students. TTHS make up the portion of the active force in
temporary status.
c
  The uncommitted force structure, consisting primarily of engineering units, is not required for
war-fighting.
d
 Force structure that did not match war-fighting requirements but that the Army has retained to meet
nonwar-fighting needs such as joint, DOD, and alliance commitments.
Source: GAO analysis of Army data.




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                                  Table 4: Army Force Structure Allocations

                                                                                              National          Army
                                                                                Active          Guard         Reserve               Total
                                  End strength (as of fiscal
                                  year 2000)                                   480,000        388,000a         205,000        1,073,000
                                      Minus nonwar-fighting force
                                      structure                                188,932         162,089          66,103           417,124
                                  Force structure available for
                                  war-fighting requirements                    291,068         225,911         138,897           655,876
                                      Minus war-fighting requirements                                                            747,176
                                  Initial support force shortfallsb                                                              91,300c
                                      Minus National Guard
                                      conversions by 2005                                                                         18,846
                                  Remaining shortfalls                                                                            72,454
                                  a
                                   The Army assumed end strengths as of fiscal year 2000. However, in the case of the National Guard,
                                  the Army allocated 388,000 force structure Guard spaces rather than the 350,000 assumed end
                                  strength.
                                  bTheArmy has units that are under resourced, i.e., the units are not allocated all required positions.
                                  However, when mobilization occurs, the Army fills these vacancies using the Individual Ready
                                  Reserves or recruits.
                                  c
                                    These shortfalls should be reduced by converting positions in two National Guard divisions to war-
                                  fighting support positions.
                                  Source: GAO analysis of Army data.


Army Process for Allocating End   The Army's process for allocating 417,000 spaces to nonwar-fighting
Strength Is Not Consistent With   functions is not consistent with defense guidance. Defense guidance states
Defense Guidance                  that the services should reduce forces not required to support missions
                                  envisioned by the national military strategy and minimize the number of
                                  military personnel assigned to support organizations. The guidance further
                                  states that positions that do not meet military essential requirements will
                                  be eliminated or converted to civilian positions. The QDR also addressed
                                  this topic, stating that DOD should improve the efficiency of support
                                  activities and consider nonwar-fighting support functions as candidates for
                                  outsourcing.

                                  Army officials stated they did not assess, as part of the TAA 2005 process,
                                  whether civilians or contractors could perform the functions of
                                  institutional or unique military forces. Army institutional functions in
                                  particular have received increasing scrutiny in recent years because the
                                  Army has been unable to support requirements based on workload and
                                  ensure that these functions are carried out in the most efficient and
                                  cost-effective manner. As shown in table 3, 214,000 military positions are



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                               allocated to institutional functions. A previous GAO report found that the
                               Army's efforts to establish workload-based requirements and redesign
                               institutional functions had not been very successful.12

                               If the Army reduced the number of military institutional forces, then more
                               would be available to meet war-fighting requirements. The Force XXI
                               Institutional Army Redesign Pamphlet 100-1, published in March 1998,
                               acknowledged the potential benefits of reducing military forces that
                               perform institutional functions. The pamphlet states that many of the
                               services currently being performed at all levels of the institutional force,
                               "support military missions, but, are not uniquely military in nature." It
                               states that privatization on an Army-wide basis, if done with proper
                               analysis, could achieve the objective of greater cost savings for more
                               efficient operations.

Army Could Reduce Allocation   According to Army officials, there were nearly 27,000 unique force
of Military Positions to       structure positions left after TAA 2005 matched the existing structure with
Nonwar-Fighting Unique         war-fighting requirements (excluding the strategic reserve). The officials
Structure                      stated that much of the 27,000 unique structure is required to meet joint,
                               DOD, and alliance commitments. However, they acknowledged that they
                               have not assessed this structure to determine whether unique positions
                               require military personnel or could be filled by civilians or contractors.
                               The Army could reduce unfilled war-fighting support requirements by
                               allocating unique force structure to war-fighting missions. Some of the
                               unique structure is in the same specialty as unfilled war-fighting
                               requirements, although it does not provide the same capability. For
                               example, unique structure in the transportation specialty contains
                               minimum equipment, and its units contract for port services. In contrast,
                               some of the unresourced transportation requirements are for units with
                               heavy equipment such as cranes and forklifts. The Army has not identified
                               the additional training or equipment modifications that would be needed in
                               order to convert these units to fill war-fighting requirements. Table 5
                               shows Army unique force structure by component.




                               12
                                Force Structure: Army's Efforts to Improve Efficiency of Institutional Forces Have Produced Few
                               Results (GAO/NSIAD-98-65, Feb. 26, 1998).




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                                 Table 5: Army Unique Force Structure

                                 Force structure                                 Unique spaces             Percentage of total
                                 Active                                                     12,932                        48.1
                                 National Guard                                             10,853                        40.4
                                 Army Reserve                                                3,103                        11.5
                                 Total                                                      26,888                       100.0
                                 Source: GAO analysis of Army data.


Potential Exists to Apply        The Army may be able to reduce its support shortfalls and thus its risk by
Nonwar-Fighting National Guard   using resources in the National Guard divisions to meet war-fighting
Division Assets to Meet          requirements. In 1997, we recommended that the Army determine whether
War-Fighting Support             war-fighting support missions could be assigned to the National Guard
Requirements                     division force structure.13 As a result, in TAA 2005 the Army assigned
                                 war-fighting missions to a few units in National Guard divisions that did not
                                 previously have a war-fight mission. These units—totaling about 3,600
                                 spaces—consist of two National Guard division aviation companies, one
                                 attack helicopter battalion, seven chemical companies, and three field
                                 artillery battalions.

                                 In addition, the National Guard gave us a list of about 21,800 Guard division
                                 spaces that are currently on theater commanders' deployment rosters.
                                 These represent the theater commanders' assessment of the units needed
                                 for war-fighting. We compared this list to the TAA 2005 unresourced
                                 requirements and found over 1,800 spaces in 11 aviation units that closely
                                 or exactly matched the 2,400 space aviation war-fighting shortfall. This
                                 illustrates the potential for the Army to further reduce its unresourced
                                 requirements by assigning war-fighting missions to units in National Guard
                                 divisions.


National Guard Conversions       As part of the National Guard Division Redesign program the Army plans to
Can Reduce Support               convert about 45,000 positions in two Guard divisions from nonwar-fighting
                                 missions to war-fighting support between 2000 and 2009. If the program is
Shortages, but Program Is
                                 successful, it will halve the TAA 2005 support force shortfall from 91,300 to
Not Effectively Managed


                                 13
                                   Force Structure: Army Support Forces Can Meet Two-Conflict Strategy With Some Risks
                                 (GAO/NSIAD-97-66, Feb. 28, 1997).




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                               46,300 spaces by the end of fiscal year 2009.14 Even though about
                               68 percent of the spaces will convert to specialties with the largest number
                               of unresourced requirements—transportation, quartermaster, and
                               chemical--only 25 percent are planned to convert by 2003. Further, the
                               program's success will depend on buying new equipment according to
                               Army officials. In 1997, the Army estimated the program to cost about
                               $5 billion, which does not include costs to upgrade facilities. However,
                               only $1.9 billion are programmed in the Army's fiscal year 2000-05 POM,
                               most of it (66 percent) is programmed for fiscal years 2004-05. Army
                               officials stated that they have not updated the program's costs since 1997
                               when they prepared the 1999-2003 POM, and do not have a current estimate
                               of how much money will be needed to convert all 45,000 positions.

Most Spaces to Convert After   About 75 percent (almost 34,000) of the conversions are planned to take
2003                           place in 2004 or later. Table 6 shows near-term and long-term planned
                               conversions by support specialty.




                               14
                                 In 1996, we reported that the National Guard combat divisions were not needed for the two-war
                               strategy and recommended that some be converted to support roles or eliminated if the forces
                               exceeded validated requirements.




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                                 Table 6: Planned National Guard Conversions

                                                                         Fiscal years             Fiscal years
                                 Specialty                                   2000-03                 2004-09a                   Total
                                 Air Defense                                       406                    4,488                 4,894
                                 Army-level headquarters                            32                         0                   32
                                 Aviation                                             0                   1,448                 1,448
                                 Chemical                                          720                    3,021                 3,741
                                 Engineer                                           92                    1,008                 1,100
                                 Field Artillery                                      0                   1,305                 1,305
                                 Military Police                                   647                         0                  647
                                 Ordnance                                          965                    1,330                 2,295
                                 Quartermaster                                   3,628                    8,810               12,438
                                 Signal                                            624                    2,131                 2,755
                                 Transportation                                  4,196                   10,113               14,309
                                 Total                                         11,310                    33,654               44,964
                                 a
                                  According to Army officials, the conversions planned for fiscal years 2006-09 may change as a result
                                 of subsequent TAAs and POM programming decisions.
                                 Source: GAO analysis of Army data.


                                 The Army's fiscal year 2000-05 POM shows the planned conversion of
                                 18,846 spaces from six brigades. However, as of December 1998, the Army
                                 had identified only three of the six brigades and only about half the spaces
                                 it budgeted to convert in the POM. Army officials stated that the next three
                                 brigades may be identified in February 1999.

The Army Did Not Convert         Prior Army efforts to reduce support force shortfalls have not been
66,000 Positions as Planned in   implemented as planned. In February 1997, when we reported on the
TAA 2003                         results of TAA 2003, the Army had two major plans to significantly reduce
                                 unresourced requirements. The first was to shift 66,000 active and reserve
                                 positions from support units excess to the war-fight to higher priority
                                 support units. Converting these positions was estimated to cost
                                 $2.6 billion. The second plan was to convert 42,700 positions in National
                                 Guard divisions from combat to support. This plan was estimated to cost
                                 an additional $2.8 billion. In total, both plans would eliminate 108,700
                                 unresourced requirements and cost $5.4 billion. We also reported in
                                 January 1997 that procurement for converting the 66,000 spaces was to be
                                 fully funded before any of the National Guard redesign would be
                                 undertaken. However, Army officials stated that none of the 66,000 spaces
                                 have been converted and that the Army currently plans to implement only




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                                the National Guard division redesign. Table 7 shows the changes in the
                                Army's plans.



                                Table 7: Changes in Army Plans to Reduce Support Shortfalls

                                                            Plan as of TAA       Plan as of TAA
                                                            2003                 2005                           Difference
                                Spaces to convert           108,700              45,000                         63,700
                                Conversion cost             $5.4 billion         $1.9 billion through fiscal    $3.5 billion
                                                                                 year 2005a
                                Conversion timeline         1998-2012            2000-2009 (10 years)           5 years
                                                            (15 years)
                                aTotalcost unknown. This amount does not include all equipment, training, and facilities costs
                                expected during fiscal years 2006 through 2009.
                                Source: GAO analysis of Army data.


Total Cost for National Guard   The total program cost is unknown because the Army's fiscal year 2000-05
Redesign Program Is Unknown     POM did not include an estimate for facilities costs, and Army officials said
                                that procurement costs for fiscal years 2006-09 have not been updated.
                                However, the Secretary of the Army in August 1997 wrote that the Army
                                was committed to the conversions and that meeting this objective would
                                require about $586 million per year through 2007 to buy equipment. If
                                funding is provided at this level, procurement costs would add $1.17 billion
                                to the $1.9 billion programmed in the POM. However, Army officials stated
                                that the costs for the years beyond the POM can change depending on how
                                the composition of unresourced requirements is changed by subsequent
                                TAAs and which brigades are identified for conversion. For example,
                                converting a unit to aviation (combat support) is much more expensive
                                than converting a unit to quartermaster.

                                Although the largest cost is for equipment procurement, the conversions
                                will also require funding for training and facilities. But the Army's most
                                recent POM did not include any funding for facilities. Military construction
                                to upgrade facilities will be needed to support the change in units. For
                                example, Army officials stated that an armor unit may not have the
                                facilities or infrastructure needed to support an aviation or truck company.
                                The National Guard has estimated that facilities costs for converting the
                                first 3 brigades would total $130 million and that facilities costs for all
                                12 brigades could be as high as $590 million. However, National Guard
                                officials cautioned that, because only the first three brigades have been
                                identified, facilities cost estimates for the remaining nine brigades are very



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                       preliminary. Estimates can change depending on units selected and the
                       type of units to which they are converting.

                       The POM shows a total training cost estimate of $85.5 million, of which
                       $76.7 million has been programmed. The Army estimates that training
                       costs for fiscal years 2006-09 will total $214 million, which means that the
                       POM only funds 26 percent of the total estimated training cost.

Redesign Program Not   It is difficult for the Army to monitor the program's progress because no
Effectively Managed    office provides consolidated, periodic reporting on the program's status.
                       For example, Army officials agreed that no office is responsible for
                       monitoring or reporting periodically on all program costs, including for
                       equipment, training, and facilities expected between 2000-09; unfunded
                       requirements; comparisons between planned converted units and
                       unresourced requirements to show whether the most critical shortfalls are
                       being addressed first; risk assessments if conversions are delayed; and
                       comparisons between actual conversions and conversion plans to assess
                       progress.

                       The only current program oversight is provided by a Process Action Team,
                       which has been tasked with identifying total resource requirements
                       through 2009.15 The Secretary of the Army approved the redesign program
                       in May 1996, yet the team has only met three times since then and has not
                       yet identified the total resource requirements. According to Army
                       documents, the team agreed that it would be prudent to give visibility to the
                       total program costs to avoid giving the impression that the POM will cover
                       all the costs. However, because there is no separate budget line item or
                       project code for the program, the program's costs can not be identified in
                       the POM, according to Army officials.

                       Further, fragmentation of program oversight among the many different
                       offices that have representatives on the team creates ambiguity concerning
                       who is responsible for program implementation issues such as ensuring
                       that the most urgent conversions take place first. For example, only
                       8 percent of the total program spaces are in the chemical specialty, even
                       though 48 percent of the chemical war-fighting requirement is unresourced.




                       15
                            An Army Headquarters office chairs the team, which consists of 32 members representing 10 different offices.




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Host Nations Can Provide    Both Army and theater command officials agree that host nations can
Some Support, Potentially   provide some types of war-fighting support, potentially helping to reduce
                            Army support force shortfalls. According to Army guidance, the Army
Reducing Army Shortfalls
                            should consider the availability of host nation support to reduce unmet
                            requirements. However, Army officials told us that theater commanders
                            had not provided updated host nation support data for use in TAA 2005
                            because agreements were still being negotiated. As a result, the Army only
                            matched 1,300 spaces of host nation support against its war-fighting
                            requirements, although Army "best estimates" suggest as many as 30,000
                            spaces of host nation support could potentially be available in the two
                            theaters.

                            According to Army officials, since the end of the Cold War, theater
                            commanders have found it difficult to determine how much host nation
                            support would be available in their theaters and when. For example, the
                            Secretary of Defense has repeatedly told Congress that at least one theater
                            commander has had significant problems with the host nation support
                            program because the command has few assurances that host nation
                            support will be available when or where it is needed. The theater
                            commander has begun to review host nation capabilities, but command
                            officials told us that validating available resources from host nations will be
                            a long-term process.



Conclusions                 The Army's risk in carrying out the national military strategy has increased
                            since the Army's TAA 2003 force structure review because requirements
                            have increased, optimistic assumptions about war-fighting conditions have
                            limited requirements, and support force shortfalls have increased. In
                            addition, a higher number of support forces would not be expected to
                            arrive at a major theater war within the first 30 days as required, and few
                            active support personnel would be available to deploy to the second war.

                            The Army does not know the full extent of its risk because it did not
                            perform the analyses needed to do so. For example, the Army did not
                            re-run its models with the resourced force. Doing so would provide the
                            Army information on how force structure decisions affect the war-fighting,
                            including the availability of support forces and how the late arrival of
                            support units affects war-fighting timelines. Another reason the Army does
                            not know the full extent of its risk is because the Army did not include
                            requirements for all campaign phases and did not identify what effects
                            varying war-fighting conditions contained in defense guidance would have



                            Page 23                                          GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure
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                  on requirements. For example, the Army did not identify requirements in
                  cases where the adversary uses chemical weapons or for the redeployment
                  of forces from a contingency operation to a major theater war, even though
                  the guidance encourages such analyses. It is important to quantify the
                  effects of including all phases and adverse conditions on support
                  requirements since this data could influence Army force structure
                  decisions and could be used to modify future defense guidance and modify
                  force structure decisions to mitigate risk.

                  Since the Army still has substantial forces in excess of its war-fighting
                  requirements, it can mitigate risk by converting positions from
                  nonwar-fighting to war-fighting structure without increasing the force.
                  Converting the two National Guard divisions from nonwar-fighting
                  structure to war-fighting support positions as planned is a sound concept
                  that would increase the proportion of end strength performing war-fighting
                  missions and help reduce shortfalls. However, the program requires
                  careful management, and the Army has not yet identified the total cost.
                  Also, the Army could further mitigate risk by assessing whether other
                  nonwar-fighting structure—such as institutional and unique—must be filled
                  by military personnel. If these positions were filled by civilians or
                  contractors, more military structure could be used to reduce support force
                  shortfalls. Lastly, as theater commanders develop more current data on the
                  availability of host nation support, the Army could consider such support
                  when filling war-fighting requirements, as called for in Army guidance.



Recommendations   To improve the Army's ability to accurately determine war-fighting
                  requirements, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense clarify
                  guidance to require that the Army include all campaign phases in
                  determining its war-fighting requirements.

                  To determine the risks in implementing the national military strategy, we
                  recommend that the Secretary of the Army include the following as part of
                  the next TAA:

                  • an analysis of the number of support forces needed under a range of
                    conditions such as the small, medium, or large use of chemical agents by
                    an adversary;
                  • a re-run of TAA models using the resourced force to assess the effects of
                    end strength allocation decisions on war-fighting, including the late
                    arrival of critical support forces;




                  Page 24                                        GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure
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                      • an assessment of the differences between TAA models and theater
                        commanders' plans in support force requirements in the first 30 days of
                        a conflict; and
                      • an analysis of the support forces required to extract forces from ongoing
                        contingency operations and redeploy them to a major theater war and
                        the effects of such redeployment on war-fighting timelines.

                      To improve the Army's ability to effectively monitor the progress of its
                      National Guard Division Redesign program, we recommend that the
                      Secretary of the Army require the Process Action Team to prepare a
                      periodic report on the program that includes: (1) total program costs
                      (including equipment, training, and facilities); (2) unfunded requirements;
                      (3) a comparison of planned converted units with unresourced
                      requirements to determine whether the most critical shortfalls are being
                      addressed first; (4) an assessment of the risks arising from delays in
                      conversion; (5) a comparison of actual conversions with plans; and
                      (6) identification of obstacles.

                      To allocate end strength to nonwar-fighting force structure consistent with
                      defense guidance, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army identify
                      which nonwar-fighting positions could be filled by civilians or contractors,
                      fill them with either civilians or contractors, and allocate the military
                      positions saved to reduce war-fighting support force shortfalls.

                      To more accurately identify support force requirements, we recommend
                      that the Secretary of the Army expedite the incorporation of Force XXI
                      concepts into doctrine that would provide the necessary information to
                      update TAA models.



Agency Comments and   In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the
                      report and indicated that the Army plans to incorporate several of our
Our Evaluation        recommendations in the ongoing TAA 2007. Overall, DOD said it was
                      confident that the Army’s initiatives would yield the right mix of trained
                      and fully equipped ground forces to support the national strategy. DOD’s
                      comments are reprinted in full in appendix IV.

                      In response to our recommendations relating to TAA requirements
                      determination and risk analysis, DOD stated that the Army plans to capture
                      the projected land force requirements generated in all phases of both
                      campaigns for inclusion in TAA 2007 requirements. DOD also stated that
                      the Army would focus its efforts on the most likely weapons of mass



                      Page 25                                        GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure
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destruction employment case in TAA 2007, based upon the best available
intelligence estimates of enemy capabilities. We believe this will be an
improvement over TAA 2005, but continue to recommend that the Army
conduct additional analyses to better assess the risks of war-fighting
conditions that are different than expectations. DOD also said the Army
plans to implement our recommendation to rerun TAA models with the
resourced force to assess the effects of available end strength on war-
fighting. The Army will also assess the differences between theater
commanders’ and Army support force requirements. In conducting this
analysis, we encourage the Army to fully consider the theater commanders’
war-plan troop lists to ensure, for example, that the Army is able to
resource, with predominantly active forces, the theater commanders’
requirements for early arriving support forces. Last, DOD noted that TAA
2007 will consider the forces required to disengage from on-going
contingencies and redeploy forces to a major theater war.

DOD also concurred with our recommendation to improve the Army’s
monitoring of the National Guard Division Redesign program and stated
the program will be focused on determining the total costs and benefits of
this effort. To ensure the conversion program is successful, we believe it is
imperative that the Army implement our recommendation immediately, to
include identifying total costs through fiscal year 2009, identifying
unfunded requirements, and assessing risks if the program is delayed.
DOD also noted that the Army is participating in a rigorous program to
identify military positions for potential conversion to civilian or contractor
positions. A successful conversion program could make more military
personnel available to alleviate support force shortfalls; however, at the
time of our review, the Army was unable to tell us how many military
positions were candidates for conversion. With respect to updating Army
models to reflect Force XXI concepts, DOD stated that the Army is
continuing to develop doctrine and to design the force structure necessary
to support the Force XXI digitized division and corps organizations and
that this work is proceeding in a disciplined manner. We recognize that
updating Army doctrine to incorporate Force XXI concepts is a challenging
process but note that the intent of TAA is to focus on the Army’s future
force structure requirements (i.e., 2005) and any delays in incorporating
Force XXI logistics or war-fighting concepts will result in a force structure
that is linked more to past concepts than to the Army’s future direction.

DOD further noted that, according to the Joint Staff, theater commanders
are responsible for assessing the availability and appropriate use of host
nation support to offset a portion of the Army’s requirement. We agree that



Page 26                                          GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure
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theater commanders are responsible for validating host nation support and
for assessing the potential risks of host nation support offsets to
war-fighting. But as our report notes, neither theater commander has been
able to provide the Army with current host nation support data for use in
TAA and one theater commander has reported significant deficiencies in
his host nation support program. According to TAA guidance, the Army
should consider host nation support during its resourcing process, and the
Army has attempted to do this to some extent in both TAA 2003 and TAA
2005, despite shortcomings in the data.

Our scope and methodology are described in appendix III.

We conducted our review from April to December 1998 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.


We are providing copies of this report to Senator Wayne Allard, Senator
Robert C. Byrd, Senator Max Cleland, Senator Pete V. Domenici, Senator
Daniel K. Inouye, Senator Frank R. Lautenberg, Senator Joseph I.
Lieberman, Senator Ted Stevens, and Senator Fred Thompson, and to
Representative Neil Abercrombie, Representative Rod R. Blagojevich,
Representative Dan Burton, Representative Stephen E. Buyer,
Representative John R. Kasich, Representative Jerry Lewis, Representative
John P. Murtha, Representative David R. Obey, Representative Christopher
Shays, Representative John M. Spratt, Jr., Representative Henry A.
Waxman, Representative C. W. Bill Young in their capacities as Chair or
Ranking Minority Member of Senate and House Committees and
Subcommittees. We are also sending copies of this report to the
Honorable William Cohen, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Louis
Caldera, Secretary of the Army; and the Honorable Jacob Lew, Director,
Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available to
others upon request.




Page 27                                       GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure
B-281688




If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact Gwendolyn Jaffe at (202) 512-4691. Major contributors to this
report are listed in appendix V.




Henry L. Hinton, Jr.
Assistant Comptroller General




Page 28                                       GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure
Contents



Letter                                                         1


Appendix I                                                    31
Key TAA 2005
Assumptions

Appendix II                                                   32
Army Requirements for
Two Wars, Resourced
and Unresourced

Appendix III                                                  33
Scope and
Methodology

Appendix IV                                                   35
Comments From the
Department of Defense

Appendix V                                                    39
Major Contributors to
This Report




                        Page 29   GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure
Tables   Table 1: Army War-fighting Requirements                                   6
         Table 2: Support Specialties Predominately in the Reserve
           Components                                                             11
         Table 3: End Strength Allocated to Nonwar-Fighting Force Structure       14
         Table 4: Army Force Structure Allocations                                15
         Table 5: Army Unique Force Structure                                     17
         Table 6: Planned National Guard Conversions                              18
         Table 7: Changes in Army Plans to Reduce Support Shortfalls              20




         Abbreviations

         DOD           Department of Defense
         QDR           Quadrennial Defense Review
         POM           Program Objective Memorandum
         TAA           Total Army Analysis
         TTHS          Transients, Trainees, Holdees, and Students



         Page 30                                      GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure
Appendix I

Key TAA 2005 Assumptions                                                                                                                      AppenIx
                                                                                                                                                    di




TAA 2005 Assumption                                                   Army Rationale
By fiscal year 2000, Army end strengths will be 480,000 active,       These end strengths reflect QDR reductions of 15,000 active and
205,000 Army Reserve, and 350,000 National Guard.                     20,000 reserves. TAA 2005 did not include 25,000 reductions
                                                                      recommended by the QDR for reserve components because the
                                                                      Army had not decided how the reductions would be apportioned
                                                                      between the National Guard and Army Reserve.
The Army will deploy all 10 of its active divisions and make          Consistent with defense guidance, all 10 active divisions and all 15
available all enhanced brigades in the two-war scenario. Army         enhanced brigades will flow into the two-war scenario. Previously,
force structure will also contain eight National Guard divisions as   the Army only deployed those enhanced brigades that could arrive
strategic reserve.                                                    before cessation of hostilities. The National Guard divisions are a
                                                                      strategic reserve to respond to adverse situations.
The Army will employ four corps--two in each theater. Each corps Defense guidance lists four corps.
will have a doctrinal war-fighting mission. The Army will source the
4th corps as much as possible in accordance with doctrine.
Presidential Selected Reserve Callup occurs on the day of             This is consistent with defense guidance.
unambiguous warning of the first war.
The Army will have immediate access to ports and airfields in the     This is consistent with defense guidance.
theaters of operation.
There will be limited use of chemicals by adversaries consisting of   Defense guidance contains conflicting statements about the level of
both persistent/nonpersistent agents which will have limited          enemy chemical use U.S. forces can expect. Army interpretation of
operational/tactical effects.                                         defense guidance was "limited use" which meant that no force
                                                                      structure was added to the 747,000 war-fighting requirement.
Army requirements will be based on the first three phases of the      Army interpretation of defense guidance is not to add requirements
campaign.                                                             for the last two phases of the theater campaign.
Units due to arrive in the first 30 days of the first war will be     This is consistent with defense and Army guidance. The Army
composed predominately of active forces.                              determined that time delays associated with the mobilization of
                                                                      reserve forces generally preclude their arrival in the first 30 days.
The Army will begin the counteroffensive of a major theater war       Army models and one theater commander's plans are consistent in
when adequate support forces arrive in the theater.                   their estimate of when adequate support forces would arrive.
There will be no delays or degradation of capability resulting from   Defense guidance assumes that U.S. forces assigned to a
the transfer of support forces from a contingency operation to a      contingency operation are immediately available to redeploy to a
major theater war.                                                    major theater war.




                                                   Page 31                                                 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure
Appendix II

Army Requirements for Two Wars, Resourced
and Unresourced                                                                                                    AppeInx
                                                                                                                         Idi




                                                                                                      Percent
              Specialty                            Required Resourceda Unresourcedb                 resourced
              Logistics                              45,136        45,136                  0             100.00
              Public Affairs                          1,420          1,420                 0             100.00
              Army Level                              4,538          4,538                 0             100.00
              Headquarters
              Brigade & Division                      7,693          7,693                 0             100.00
              Headquarters
              Civil Affairs                           5,270          5,270                 0             100.00
              Psychological                           2,556          2,556                 0             100.00
              Operations
              Armor                                  37,965        37,965                  0             100.00
              Infantry                               71,116        71,116                  0             100.00
              Medical                                39,352        39,154               198               99.50
              Military Police                        35,606        35,425               181               99.49
              Personnel Service                      17,617        17,501               116               99.34
              Support
              Special Operations                      4,719          4,677                42              99.11
              Forces
              Field Artillery                        69,337        68,032             1,305               98.12
              Military Intelligence                  16,122        15,704               418               97.41
              Engineering                            75,104        71,841             3,263               95.66
              Aviation                               41,551        39,125             2,426               94.16
              Signal                                 34,235        31,840             2,395               93.00
              Ordnance                               46,932        43,591             3,341               92.88
              Air Defense                            25,285        21,203             4,082               83.86
              Quartermaster                          57,289        40,239            17,050               70.24
              Transportation                         84,749        58,379            26,370               68.88
              Chemical                               23,584        12,317            11,267               52.23
              Total                                 747,176       674,722            72,454               90.30
              a
               Resourced units are those allocated end strength and the Army assumes in TAA that these units are
              at 100 percent of wartime strength. During peacetime, some support units are authorized fewer
              positions than required. In TAA 2005, these shortfalls totaled 17,843 positions.
              b
               These are positions in units that are not authorized end strength and exist only on paper. The
              shortages in this column assume successful conversion of 18,846 nonwar-fighting spaces in National
              Guard divisions between fiscal year 2000 and 2005.
              Source: GAO analysis of Army data.




              Page 32                                                        GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure
Appendix III

Scope and Methodology                                                                            AppIeInx
                                                                                                        di




               To determine if there were changes in the Army’s risk of not having
               sufficient forces to implement the national military strategy, we compared
               the Army’s 1996 and 1998 force structure reviews. We obtained and
               reviewed the Army's documentation on its Total Army Analysis (TAA)
               processes, assumptions, and results at Department of Army Headquarters,
               Washington D.C.; Concepts Analysis Agency, Bethesda, Maryland; U.S.
               Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, and Fort
               Leavenworth, Kansas; Army National Guard Bureau; and Office of the Chief
               of Army Reserve. To better understand how the requirements of the joint
               war-fighting commands are considered in the TAA process and how theater
               commands are affected by TAA results, we requested information from the
               Commanders in Chief of the U.S. Central Command and the U.S. Pacific
               Command.

               Our review of TAA 2005 included analyses of the risks associated with the
               number and type of active and reserve support forces allocated to support
               war-fighting requirements including comparisons with TAA 2003 results
               and theater commander war-plans; the Army's assumptions compared with
               those in defense guidance, TAA 2003, theater commander war-plans, and
               more recent Department of Defense (DOD) assessments; and the major
               assumptions used in TAA and how they affect force structure outcomes
               (including measures of risk). We did not evaluate logistical data used in the
               TAA process, however, prior GAO recommendations to establish valid and
               consistent data have been implemented.

               We compared the Army's TAA 2005 reported results with automated data
               from the Army's MERLIN system. MERLIN is an analytical tool that allows
               programmed resources to be aligned against war-fighting requirements.
               The programmed resources are imported from the Army's official force
               structure data base (SAMAS). Based on our analysis, we were satisfied that
               the Army's automated data and reported results were in substantial
               agreement. We did not test the Army's management controls over its
               automated system.

               To assess the Army’s potential for mitigating risk by reallocating its existing
               end strength, we obtained the Army's justification for its nonwar-fighting
               force structure, including institutional forces; transients, trainees, holdees,
               and students; and National Guard divisions (strategic reserve). We
               considered the Army's recently reported material weakness and corrective
               action plan to determine if the plan included steps to ensure that the Army’s
               institutional force is efficiently organized and comprises the minimum
               number of personnel. We also reviewed Army Pamphlet 100-1, which



               Page 33                                          GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure
Appendix III
Scope and Methodology




provides the redesign objectives for the institutional force. We also
ascertained whether the Army determined that these institutional forces, as
well as other support forces such as its unique force structure, are military
essential.




Page 34                                         GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure
Appendix IV

Comments From the Department of Defense                     AppeV
                                                                nx
                                                                 Idi




              Page 35         GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure
Appendix IV
Comments From the Department of Defense




Page 36                                   GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure
Appendix IV
Comments From the Department of Defense




Page 37                                   GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure
Appendix IV
Comments From the Department of Defense




Page 38                                   GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure
Appendix V

Major Contributors to This Report                                                                 AppenV
                                                                                                       x
                                                                                                       di




National Security and   Gwendolyn R. Jaffe, Assistant Director
                        Irene A. Robertson, Senior Evaluator
International Affairs   Kenneth W. Newell, Senior Evaluator
Division, Washington,
D.C.

Norfolk Field Office    Brenda M. Waterfield, Evaluator-in-Charge
                        Dawn R. Godfrey, Senior Evaluator




(701140)     Letrt      Page 39                                     GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure
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