oversight

Defense Acquisitions: Evaluation of Navy's Anti-Submarine Warfare Assessment

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1999-07-12.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                  United States General Accounting Office

GAO               Report to the Chairman and Ranking
                  Minority Member, Subcommittee on
                  Military Research and Development,
                  Committee on Armed Services, House of
                  Representatives
July 1999
                  DEFENSE
                  ACQUISITIONS

                  Evaluation of Navy’s
                  Anti-Submarine
                  Warfare Assessment




GAO/NSIAD-99-85
United States General Accounting Office                                                National Security and
Washington, D.C. 20548                                                          International Affairs Division



                                    B-280335                                                               Letter

                                    July 12, 1999

                                    The Honorable Curt Weldon
                                    Chairman
                                    The Honorable Owen B. Pickett
                                    Ranking Minority Member
                                    Subcommittee on Military
                                    Research and Development
                                    Committee on Armed Services
                                    House of Representatives

                                    This letter responds to your request that we review (1) the Department of
                                    Defense’s (DOD) 1997 antisubmarine warfare (ASW) assessment and
                                    (2) the role and funding influence of the Navy’s recently established
                                    Antisubmarine Warfare Requirements Division. The conferees on the
                                    Fiscal Year 1997 National Defense Authorization Act directed the ASW
                                    assessment and supported the establishment of the ASW Requirements
                                    Division in response to concerns that ASW funding was declining relative
                                    to other Navy programs, the Navy lacked a clear plan for identifying ASW
                                    requirements and funding priorities, and ASW requirements were not being
                                    adequately considered in establishing overall Navy funding priorities. The
                                    conferees directed an assessment be made of ASW shortfalls and
                                    capabilities supported by a rigorous analysis and the establishment of
                                    priorities among ASW programs. To meet this congressional directive, the
                                    Navy said it would perform a quantitative analysis of ASW shortfalls and
                                    capabilities.

                                    As agreed with your representative, we reviewed the assessment to
                                    determine the extent it was responsive to these requirements and provided
                                    a sound basis for making resource allocation decisions. In reviewing the
                                    ASW Requirements Division, we identified activities it had taken to
                                    influence ASW funding decisions and the outcomes of those decisions.



Results in Brief                    The ASW assessment concluded that proficiency had declined and that the
                                    programs and funding levels in the fiscal year 1999 budget, as proposed at
                                    the time of the assessment, provided for adequate equipment to respond to
                                    the most likely threats. However, in providing its conclusions, the
                                    assessment notes concerns regarding the data available for its analysis.
                                    The assessment noted that tools for quantitatively assessing ASW



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                     performance--particularly modeling and simulation tools--and available
                     ASW studies and fleet exercise data are deficient. Much of the
                     assessment’s modeling data was based on open-ocean ASW rather than the
                     more complex littoral environment where the Navy now believes the most
                     likely threat exists. In our view, the assessment was not fully responsive to
                     the conferees’ direction because (1) it was not supported by a rigorous
                     analysis of ASW shortfalls and capabilities, (2) information to support the
                     assessment’s findings was not always complete, and (3) priorities among
                     ASW programs were not established. The Navy has subsequently provided
                     Congress with an ASW Roadmap that places ASW programs in one of three
                     priority categories but does not identify program priorities within each
                     category. The absence of complete and reliable data--particularly on ASW
                     operations in the littoral--and the absence of program priorities limit the
                     assessment’s value in making resource allocation decisions.

                     The ASW Requirements Division, which prepared the 1997 assessment, has
                     sought to influence Navy ASW funding decisions in the fiscal year 1999 and
                     2000 budget submissions through briefings and meetings with resource
                     sponsors and senior Navy officials, including the Chief of Naval Operations.
                     The Division believes it has had some success in influencing decisions to
                     fund early ASW-related research and development projects within the
                     Office of Naval Research and to restore funding for a number of ASW
                     programs whose funding had been reduced, deferred, or eliminated by
                     platform divisions under the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
                     Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessment.



Background           The primary goal of ASW is to deny the enemy the effective use of
                     submarines. To accomplish this goal, the Navy uses ASW systems on
                     surface ships, submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, and helicopters and
                     fixed systems to detect, track, classify, localize, and destroy threat
                     submarines. Such systems include acoustic and nonacoustic sensors and
                     torpedoes.

                     Most current ASW systems were designed during the Cold War to pursue
                     nuclear submarines operating in the open-ocean environment. During this
                     period, ASW was one of the Navy’s highest priority missions because of the
                     global threat posed to the United States by submarines of the former Soviet
                     Union. Since the end of the Cold War, DOD has shifted its focus to regional
                     threats and conflicts. As part of this shift, the Navy is emphasizing
                     pursuing smaller diesel-electric submarines operating in the more
                     acoustically complex littoral environment.



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During the Cold War era, naval forces were trained, organized, and
equipped to counter the Soviet influence throughout the world. With the
end of the Cold War and the subsequent decline in defense budgets, the
Navy recognized the need to reshape its forces for regional contingencies.
Consequently, the Navy began focusing its resources on joint operations in
the world’s littoral areas. As a result, ASW when compared to joint mission
areas, such as strike warfare, antiair warfare, missile defense, and
amphibious warfare, often received a lower funding priority. For example,
the Navy’s fiscal year 1999 budget projected a decline from about
$884 million for ASW research, development, test, and evaluation
(RDT&E), or about 10.9 percent of the Navy’s RDT&E budget for fiscal year
1999, to about $566 million or about 6.8 percent for fiscal year 2003.

The 1997 assessment, which was submitted in March 1998, was required
because the previous 1996 assessment did not meet congressional needs.
The 1996 assessment was to provide the defense committees a long-range
plan for improving ASW capabilities against potential threats in both
littoral and open ocean areas. That assessment, however, did not include a
rigorous analysis of ASW capabilities or establish program priorities.

The newly established ASW Requirements Directorate prepared the 1997
assessment. The Directorate was established in September 1996 under the
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare Requirements,
and Assessment, to determine and assess Navy requirements in the ASW
mission area. The Deputy Chief serves as the Chief of Naval
Operations’(CNO) principal advisor in determining warfare requirements
and allocating resources among surface, submarine, and air warfare
divisions; the Expeditionary Warfare Division; and the Special Programs
Division. In September 1998, after a period of evaluation, the Directorate
was formally elevated to a permanently staffed division headed by a Navy
captain assigned to a flag rank billet. The ASW Requirements Division
monitors platform division program proposals and identifies and provides
support for ASW programs. The Division has no direct control over
RDT&E or procurement funds but communicates ASW requirements and
capabilities to the platform divisions and the Deputy CNO.




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Data Deficiencies Limit   In its ASW assessment, the Navy concluded that proficiency had declined
                          and that the programs and funding levels in the fiscal year 1999 budget, as
Responsiveness to         proposed at the time of the assessment, provided for adequate equipment
Congressional             to respond to the most likely threats. However, in providing its
                          conclusions, the Navy noted concerns regarding the data available for its
Directions                analysis. Much of the assessment’s modeling data was based on
                          open-ocean ASW rather than the more complex littoral environment where
                          the Navy now believes the most likely threat exists. In our view, the
                          assessment was not fully responsive to the conferees’ direction because
                          (1) it was not supported by a rigorous analysis of ASW shortfalls and
                          capabilities, (2) information to support the assessment’s findings was not
                          always complete, and (3) priorities among ASW programs were not
                          established. The absence of complete and reliable data--particularly on
                          ASW operations in the littoral--and the absence of program priorities limit
                          the assessment’s value in making resource allocation decisions


The 1997 ASW Assessment   In its 1997 assessment, the Navy concluded that ASW proficiency had
                          declined and that effective organization, comprehensive training, and
                          modern equipment were needed to optimize proficiency. The assessment
                          noted that organizational improvements were needed to provide an
                          integrated approach to ASW and pointed to the establishment of the ASW
                          Requirements Division as a step in the right direction. The assessment also
                          noted that the opportunity to practice ASW had declined because many
                          units are now required to perform multiple missions. For example, it cited
                          the change in mission of the S-3 aircraft. Designed as the primary ASW
                          aircraft flown from aircraft carriers, the S-3 has now become the air
                          refueling platform for the carrier air wing and is not being used for the ASW
                          mission. The assessment further noted the potential to gain greater
                          performance from ASW systems. The assessment concluded that the
                          program of record--programs and funding levels--in the proposed fiscal
                          year 1999 budget provides for adequate equipment to respond to likely
                          threats to the end of the Future Years Defense Plan.

                          The 1997 assessment, which was prepared by the ASW Requirements
                          Division, was based on data collected from many diverse sources, including
                          fleet observations, at-sea exercises, studies, and simulations. However, the
                          Requirements Division noted concerns regarding the data available for its
                          analysis. The Division noted that it initially expected to provide a
                          straightforward quantitative analysis and that the evidence would be
                          consistent and the metrics contained in the evidence would be



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                                    unambiguous. Division officials said that tools for quantitatively assessing
                                    ASW performance--particularly modeling and simulation tools--and
                                    available ASW studies and fleet exercise data are deficient. They stated
                                    that studies to support ASW investment decisions are often too narrowly
                                    focused and the whole system of identifying ASW shortfalls and correcting
                                    them is fragmented.


Assessment Not Fully                The conferees on the Fiscal Year 1997 National Defense Authorization Act,
Responsive to                       in directing the Navy to assess ASW capabilities and shortfalls, stated that
                                    the assessment be supported by a rigorous analysis of ASW shortfalls and
Congressional Direction
                                    capabilities and establish priorities among ASW programs.

Assessment Lacks Complete and       The Navy could not rely on the use of modeling and simulation to
Reliable Quantitative Analyses of   quantitatively analyze ASW capabilities and shortfalls because most of the
ASW Capabilities and Shortfalls     models are based on open-ocean conditions rather than shallow water
                                    littoral conditions that the Navy believes are the most likely future
                                    submarine threat environment. Moreover, the models have not been
                                    updated to adequately depict acoustic and environmental conditions found
                                    in the littorals or the way the fleet operates during ASW at-sea exercises.
                                    For example, the Navy said the models

                                    • do not use multiple types of ocean bottoms, such as hilly or rocky
                                      bottoms;
                                    • do not reflect complex sound velocity profiles typically found in the
                                      littoral environment;
                                    • assume incorrectly that the loss of signal strength over distance is the
                                      same in both littoral and open-ocean environments;
                                    • do not adequately account for littoral environmental conditions such as
                                      changes in temperature and levels of salinity; and
                                    • make performance predictions based only on one-on-one platform
                                      engagements, rather than combined ASW force operations.

                                    The lack of quantitative modeling analyses of ASW capabilities and
                                    shortfalls in shallow water littoral conditions raises concerns regarding the
                                    basis and support for the assessment’s conclusions and its usefulness for
                                    making resource allocation decisions. A Navy modeling official stated that
                                    about $1.5 million would be required annually to upgrade and maintain the
                                    full spectrum of ASW simulations and models. The official noted that the
                                    Undersea Warfare Center received $200,000 to analyze how the littoral
                                    environment adversely affected ASW system performance during one




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                                  specific at-sea training exercise and that this data will be used to improve
                                  its models.

Information to Support Findings   The assessment contained significant ASW data and analyses, but in
Was Not Always Complete           several areas the information was not complete. Examples included
                                  (1) information from ASW at-sea exercises; (2) plans for addressing threats
                                  from the most advanced submarines; (3) information on key ASW
                                  command, control, communication, and intelligence requirements,
                                  capabilities and shortfalls; and (4) the impacts of using multiple platforms
                                  to conduct ASW. In addition, the assessment’s conclusions assumed higher
                                  funding levels for ASW programs than were ultimately budgeted.

At-sea Exercises                  To assess the performance of ASW systems, the Navy analyzed the results
                                  of at-sea exercises conducted under the Ship Antisubmarine Warfare
                                  Readiness/Effectiveness Measuring program in both open ocean and
                                  littoral environments. The assessment concluded that ASW proficiency
                                  had declined. However, the exercise data did not provide information on
                                  the causes for the reduced performance, and the assessment did not
                                  address the impact of environmental conditions on ASW performance. In
                                  addition, exercise data on torpedo performance was based on a limited
                                  number of firings. Officials of the Surface Warfare Development Group told
                                  us that the small number of torpedo firings in shallow water littoral
                                  environments made it practically impossible to draw conclusions on
                                  torpedo performance.

Advanced Submarine Threat         ASW modeling results against a technologically advanced nuclear
                                  submarine in the open ocean identified a number of shortfalls. The
                                  assessment discussed the capabilities and shortfalls of ASW systems
                                  against the more advanced threat but provided little information on plans
                                  to address these shortfalls. According to Navy officials, the assessment did
                                  not address the shortfalls because it assumed the most likely threat would
                                  be a diesel submarine operating in the littoral environment. The
                                  assessment concluded that the program of record in the proposed
                                  President’s fiscal year 1999 budget was adequate to meet the likely
                                  submarine threat to the end of 2003.

Command, Control,                 The assessment did not evaluate ASW command, control, communication,
Communications, and               and intelligence (C3I) capabilities and shortfalls. Because a small,
Intelligence Issues               slow-moving, and quiet diesel submarine operating in the littoral is difficult
                                  for ASW platforms to detect, there is a greater need for ASW platforms to
                                  share submarine threat data. The assessment recognized C3I systems as



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                            important components of ASW but did not include information on current
                            requirements, capabilities, or shortfalls.

Using Combined Platforms    The assessment did not address the use of combinations of ASW assets to
                            detect, track, and destroy enemy submarines. Attrition rates in the Navy
                            campaign warfare models considered only one-on-one ASW engagements
                            to predict the number of enemy submarines detected and destroyed over
                            time. The predictions do not reflect the increased effectiveness of
                            combined air, surface, and subsurface assets that the Navy plans to use in
                            littoral ASW operations.

Funding Changes             The assessment’s conclusion that there would be adequate ASW
                            capabilities to respond to the most likely threats was based on program and
                            funding levels projected at the time of the assessment in the fiscal year
                            1999 budget. However, ASW funding projected in the fiscal year 2000
                            budget submission was lower than the fiscal year 1999 budget projections.
                            For example, the Navy reduced funding for the Lightweight Hybrid MK-54
                            Torpedo program, which will delay the torpedo’s introduction into the fleet
                            by 2 years. Also, the MK-50 Lightweight Torpedo Phase II shallow water
                            upgrade was canceled because of funding constraints.

Assessment Identifies ASW   The assessment concluded that the ASW program of record as contained in
Needs but Not Priorities    the proposed President’s fiscal year 1999 budget was adequate to meet the
                            likely future threat and identified the following near-, mid-, and long-term
                            ASW mission requirements.

                            • Near-term requirements
                              • Improve ASW crew proficiency by increasing training.
                              • Buy additional towed array sensors for submarines.
                              • Develop an ASW system for the new DD-21 destroyer.
                              • Accelerate MK-48 torpedo upgrades.
                            • Mid-term requirements
                              • Further improve the proficiency of the entire ASW team.
                              • Develop operational concepts for network centric operations.
                            • Long-term requirements
                              • Develop long endurance sensors and unmanned ASW vehicles.
                              • Design sensors that automatically adjust to a complex acoustic
                                environment.

                            The assessment did not establish ASW program priorities. However, the
                            Navy subsequently developed an integrated ASW Roadmap that defines and




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                              prioritizes a set of broad ASW requirements. This document (1) places
                              each ASW-related requirement into its primary functional area (i.e.,
                              surveillance, detection, and localization) and (2) prioritizes each
                              requirement into three priority categories—essential, critical, and
                              important. This document was completed in late February 1999 and
                              provided to Congress. Although the Roadmap does provide priorities by
                              category, it does not prioritize programs within the three priority
                              categories. Thus, the Roadmap would be of little value in making funding
                              decisions among all the programs identified as essential.



Requirements Division         In addition to preparing the 1997 assessment, ASW Requirements Division
                              officials told us they have sought to restore funding for a number of ASW
Seeks to Influence            programs whose proposed funding had been reduced or eliminated. For
ASW Funding Priorities        the most part, the ASW Requirements Division sought to influence funding
                              decisions by the primary resource sponsors—the Surface, Submarine, and
and Decisions                 Air Warfare Divisions. They also sought to influence the funding of early
                              ASW-related research and development projects within the Office of Naval
                              Research (ONR).


Efforts to Influence Fiscal   According to Division officials, they reviewed the fiscal year 1999 platform
Year 1999 Funding             division program proposals and identified ASW programs for which funds
                              had been deferred or deleted and sought to have funding restored on those
                              programs they considered to be most important. Since the 1997 ASW
                              assessment had not yet been completed, the officials stated that they used
                              their judgment in making recommendations affecting fiscal year 1999
                              program proposals. Examples of their efforts to influence fiscal year 1999
                              funding decisions are presented below. We could not determine that the
                              Division’s efforts were the sole cause for the funding decisions, but we did
                              verify the Division’s actions and the final outcome of the funding
                              decision-making process based on documents and records of meetings and
                              decisions.

                              During development of its fiscal year 1999 program plan, the Surface
                              Warfare Division proposed delaying the initial operating capability for the
                              Lightweight Hybrid Torpedo Development Program from fiscal year 2001 to
                              2005. This would have potentially made available for other uses about
                              $82 million of the torpedo’s planned funding over the fiscal year 1999 to
                              2003 period. Because ASW Requirements Division officials believed that
                              the program represented an important and needed capability for surface
                              combatants and air platforms, they questioned the proposed reduction


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                              during a July 1997 meeting attended by surface, submarine, and air division
                              directors. Though no specific funding restoration decision was made at
                              that meeting, about $58 million was eventually restored to the program
                              plan. According to an official from the Programming Division, the restored
                              funds permitted the program’s initial operating capability to be moved back
                              up to fiscal year 2003.

                              The ASW Requirements Division also sought to influence ONR funding of
                              ASW research projects. For example, due to funding constraints, ONR staff
                              tentatively decided to not conduct sea trials of an automated radar
                              periscope detection and discrimination technology they had successfully
                              tested on land. Because this technology held promise for detecting
                              diesel-electric submarines in littoral waters, the ASW Requirements
                              Division Director, in an April 1, 1998, memorandum, requested the Chief of
                              Naval Research to support continued program testing in fiscal year 1998.
                              On May 22, 1998, the Chief of Naval Research committed to providing the
                              necessary funding to perform the sea trials during July 1998 and
                              demonstrating the system aboard a research maritime patrol aircraft in
                              fiscal year 1999.


Efforts to Influence Fiscal   The 1997 assessment indicated potential shortfalls in ASW programs
Year 2000 Funding             related to (1) surveillance and cueing; (2) tactical sensors and systems
                              needed to improve detection of submarines, including high search rate
                              airborne platforms; and (3) torpedo upgrades. Using these as a baseline
                              reference, ASW Requirements Division officials sought to influence the
                              resource sponsors during the fiscal year 2000 budget development process
                              as shown in the following examples. As noted earlier, we could not
                              determine that the ASW Requirements Division’s efforts were the sole
                              cause for the funding decision, but we did verify the Division’s actions and
                              the final outcome of the decision process.

                              The Submarine Warfare Division, during development of its fiscal year 2000
                              program proposal, decided to terminate the Compact Low Frequency
                              Active development program, resulting in the availability of $10.5 million in
                              fiscal year 2000 and 2001 development funding to apply to other division
                              program needs. Because this program would enhance a very limited ASW
                              surveillance capability in littoral waters, the ASW Requirements Division
                              Director, during an April 30, 1998, meeting with the Deputy CNO for
                              Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessments, and later with the
                              CNO, recommended that the entire $10.5 million be restored to the
                              program. In late May 1998, the Submarine Warfare Division reinstated this



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                      development program and restored a total of $22 million of development
                      funding through fiscal year 2004.

                      The Submarine Warfare Division proposed to delay the Advanced
                      Deployable System development program, resulting in the availability of
                      nearly $93 million in out-year development funding to apply to other
                      division program needs. This program would develop cueing to enhance
                      the ability of Navy submarines and other ASW platforms to conduct ASW in
                      littoral waters against diesel-electric submarines. Because of this potential
                      enhancement, the ASW Requirements Division Director, during an April 30,
                      1998, meeting with the Deputy CNO for Resources, Warfare Requirements,
                      and Assessments, and later with the CNO, recommended that the entire
                      $93 million reduction be restored. Based on the ASW Requirements
                      Division Director’s recommendation, $92.3 million was initially restored.
                      Subsequent adjustments by the Navy Comptroller and DOD resulted in an
                      additional $50.2 million being added to the program.

                      Although it is not possible to directly or fully attribute the Division’s actions
                      to specific budget decisions, ASW Requirements Division officials noted
                      that the fiscal year 2000 budget requested about $759 million for
                      ASW-related RDT&E funding, or about 9.5 percent of the Navy’s RDT&E
                      budget for fiscal year 2000, and projected about $643 million, or about
                      7.8 percent of the Navy’s RDT&E budget for fiscal year 2003. This
                      $643 million amount is about $77 million more than the amount projected
                      for 2003 in the fiscal year 1999 budget.



Conclusions           The Navy’s 1997 assessment noted a number of deficiencies in the data that
                      was available for its analysis. The assessment was not fully responsive to
                      congressional direction because of data limitations and concerns
                      associated with the Navy’s shift in ASW emphasis from open ocean to
                      littoral operations. Until more data and analyses of ASW operations and
                      capabilities in the littoral become available, uncertainties will surround the
                      effectiveness of ASW plans, programs, and capabilities. The ASW
                      Requirements Division has been active in its efforts to influence ASW
                      funding decisions.



Agency Comments and   In written comments, DOD concurred with a draft of this report
                      (see app. I). DOD said the Navy has reaffirmed that ASW is a priority
Our Evaluation        mission as well as a core and enduring competency. The CNO has



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              requested a systematic plan to tackle the issues identified in the 1997 ASW
              assessment and integrated roadmap and the ASW Requirements Division is
              leading the development of this plan. DOD also provided technical
              clarifications that we incorporated as appropriate.



Scope and     To determine the extent that the 1997 ASW assessment included a
              quantitative analysis of ASW capabilities and shortfalls, we reviewed the
Methodology   data and sources of information used to support the assessment’s findings
              and conclusions. This included discussions with officials of the ASW
              Requirements Division; Office of Naval Research; Office of Naval
              Intelligence; Naval Sea Systems Command, including the Surface Ship
              Directorate and Submarine Directorate; Naval Air Systems Command
              (ASW Division); and the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport Division.
              We also interviewed officials of the Center for Naval Analyses; the Naval
              Surface Warfare Center; Presearch, Inc., a contractor that helped prepare
              the 1997 ASW assessment; and the former Director of Antisubmarine
              Warfare programs, who was responsible for preparing the 1996 ASW
              assessment. We also reviewed modeling documentation prepared by the
              Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport Division. We also discussed with
              Center officials the benefits and shortfalls of the Center’s models the Navy
              planned to use to perform the quantitative analysis. We discussed the deep
              water modeling used in the assessment with officials of Johns Hopkins
              University. We also discussed modeling and simulation with the Director
              and Technical Director of the ASW Requirements Division.

              To determine if the Navy performed a sufficient detailed analysis to support
              the assessment’s findings and conclusions, we performed a detailed review
              and analysis of the assessment. We reviewed and analyzed the assessment
              to determine if it established or contained priorities among ASW programs.
              We also reviewed torpedo plans and performance particularly in shallow,
              littoral water. We obtained the views of an ASW Requirements Division
              torpedo official on the effectiveness and capabilities of lightweight and
              heavyweight torpedoes. We reviewed and analyzed the Commander,
              Surface Warfare Development Group’s March 1997 “Cross-Sharem Analysis
              of Antisubmarine Warfare Effectiveness in Shallow Water/Littoral
              Undersea Warfare Exercises.” We interviewed torpedo officials from the
              Undersea Weapons Program Office and the Naval Undersea Warfare
              Center, Newport Division. We discussed torpedo data contained in the
              assessment with an official of the Surface Warfare Development Group. We
              obtained and reviewed heavyweight and lightweight torpedo firing data in
              shallow/littoral water since the assessment was completed. We also



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obtained data on torpedo upgrades and the schedule status of the new
MK-54 Lightweight development program.

To identify the impact and influence that the Division has had on Navy ASW
funding decisions, we asked ASW Requirements Division staff to provide
examples of where their influence affected funding decisions during
development of the Navy’s fiscal year 1999 and 2000 budget requests. For
each example identified, we determined the basis for the initiated action
and collected supporting budget briefings and other documentation from
both the Division and the respective Navy organization responsible for
budgeting action. We also reviewed Navy database documentation that
supported the funding restorations.

To identify trends in ASW funding, we first determined the ASW-related
RDT&E programs included in the Navy’s 1997 ASW assessment report. We
then determined the Navy’s funding projections applicable to these
programs over the fiscal year 1999 to 2003 period as contained in the fiscal
year 1999 and 2000 President’s budgets. In addition, we compared the
ASW-related RDT&E funding projections to the Navy’s funding projections
of total RDT&E budget authority to arrive at the ASW-related percentage.
We limited our analyses to RDT&E funding because of the difficulties
associated with classifying the extent to which other appropriations are
ASW-related. Finally, we asked ASW Requirements Division officials to
comment on funding projections of ASW-related RDT&E programs
contained in the fiscal year 1999 and 2000 President’s budgets.

We performed our review between August 1998 and April 1999 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.


We are also sending copies of this report to Senator John Warner,
Chairman, and Senator Carl Levin, Ranking Minority Member, Senate
Committee on Armed Services; Senator Ted Stevens, Chairman, and
Senator Robert C. Byrd, Ranking Minority Member, Senate Committee on
Appropriations; and Representative C.W. Bill Young, Chairman, and
Representative David R. Obey, Ranking Minority Member, House
Committee on Appropriations. We are also sending copies of this report to
the Honorable William Cohen, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Richard
Danzig, Secretary of the Navy; the Honorable William J. Lynn, Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); and the Honorable Jacob Lew,
Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be made
available to others upon request.



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Please contact me on (202) 512-4841 or Richard Price on (202) 512-3630 if
you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Key
contributors to this assignment were John Heere, Richard Silveira, and
Ralph Tavares.

Sincerely yours,




James F. Wiggins
Associate Director
Defense Acquisitions Issues




Page 13                                   GAO/NSIAD-99-85 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix I

Comment from the Secretary of Defense                             AppeIx
                                                                       ndi




(707360)     L
             ertet   Page 14   GAO/NSIAD-99-85 Defense Acquisitions
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