oversight

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1999-01-01.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                United States General Accounting Office

GAO             Performance and Accountability
                Series




January 1999
                Major Management
                Challenges and Program
                Risks
                National Aeronautics and
                Space Administration




GAO/OCG-99-18
GAO   United States
      General Accounting Office
      Washington, D.C. 20548

      Comptroller General
      of the United States



      January 1999
      The President of the Senate
      The Speaker of the House of Representatives

      This report addresses the major performance and
      management challenges that have limited the
      effectiveness of the National Aeronautics and Space
      Administration (NASA) in carrying out its mission. It also
      addresses corrective actions that NASA has taken or
      initiated on these challenges, including the progress the
      agency has made in evaluating its field centers’
      procurement activities based on international quality
      standards and its own procurement surveys. Since 1990,
      we have identified a number of significant management
      problems at NASA. These problems are the results of
      serious deficiencies in financial management systems,
      continuing threats to the International Space Station
      Program that translate into higher program costs, and a
      lack of closure in the implementation of cooperative
      efforts with the Department of Defense regarding
      aerospace test facilities.

      To date, NASA has made progress in resolving these
      challenges. For example, in the contract management
      area—an important activity in light of the agency’s annual
      procurement budget of over $12 billion—NASA has made
      progress in developing systems to correct contract
      management weaknesses. However, NASA has not
      implemented its integrated financial management system.
      Agencywide implementation is now scheduled for June 1,
2000. The agency recognizes that such a system must be
implemented to fix a number of problems, including
decentralized, nonintegrated systems with policies,
procedures, and practices that are unique to its field
centers. Consequently, until corrective actions are
completed—such as a fully operational integrated
financial management system—we believe that NASA’s
contract management remains a high-risk area.

This report is part of a special series entitled the
Performance and Accountability Series: Major
Management Challenges and Program Risks. The series
contains separate reports on 20 agencies—one on each of
the cabinet departments and on most major independent
agencies as well as the U. S. Postal Service. The series
also includes a governmentwide report that draws from
the agency-specific reports to identify the performance
and management challenges requiring attention across
the federal government. As a companion volume to this
series, GAO is issuing an update to those government
operations and programs that its work has identified as
“high risk” because of their greater vulnerabilities to
waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. High-risk
government operations are also identified and discussed
in detail in the appropriate performance and
accountability series agency reports.

The performance and accountability series was done at
the request of the Majority Leader of the House of
Representatives, Dick Armey; the Chairman of the House
Government Reform Committee, Dan Burton; the



            Page 2             GAO/OCG-99-18 NASA Challenges
Chairman of the House Budget Committee, John Kasich;
the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs, Fred Thompson; the Chairman of the Senate
Budget Committee, Pete Domenici; and Senator Larry
Craig. The series was subsequently cosponsored by the
Ranking Minority Member of the House Government
Reform Committee, Henry A. Waxman; the Ranking
Minority Member, Subcommittee on Government
Management, Information and Technology, House
Government Reform Committee, Dennis J. Kucinich;
Senator Joseph I. Lieberman; and Senator Carl Levin.

Copies of this report series are being sent to the
President, the congressional leadership, all other
Members of the Congress, the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, the Administrator of the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the
heads of other major departments and agencies.




David M. Walker
Comptroller General of
the United States




            Page 3             GAO/OCG-99-18 NASA Challenges
Contents



Overview                                              6

Major                                                11
Performance and
Management
Issues
Related GAO                                          28
Products
Performance and                                      31
Accountability
Series




                  Page 4   GAO/OCG-99-18 NASA Challenges
Page 5   GAO/OCG-99-18 NASA Challenges
Overview



           The National Aeronautics and Space
           Administration (NASA) conducts research for
           the solution of problems of flight within and
           outside the Earth’s atmosphere and
           develops, constructs, tests, and operates
           aeronautical and space vehicles. It conducts
           activities required for the exploration of
           space with manned and unmanned vehicles
           and coordinates the use of the scientific and
           engineering resources of the United States
           with other nations engaged in aeronautical
           and space activities for peaceful purposes.
           For example, in December 1998, NASA
           successfully coupled in orbit the first two
           elements of the International Space Station.
           Recently, NASA’s budget has been between
           $13 and $14 billion annually. NASA spends
           more than $12 billion annually for goods and
           services, mostly on contracts with
           businesses and other organizations.

           Since 1990, we have identified a number of
           major management challenges at NASA.
           Currently, three challenges continue to
           warrant NASA attention.




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                      Overview




The Challenges

Weaknesses in         NASA’s contract management function
Contract              encompasses several processes, including
Management            financial management and oversight. Both of
                      these processes require accurate and reliable
                      information. However, NASA lacks adequate
                      systems and processes to oversee
                      procurement activities and to produce
                      accurate and reliable management
                      information in a timely manner.


Controlling           Characterized as one of the most challenging
International Space   engineering feats ever attempted, the
Station Costs         International Space Station Program is
                      expected to culminate in 2004 in a football
                      field-sized laboratory manned by up to seven
                      crewmembers. However, until the space
                      station is completed, NASA will continue to
                      face challenges in controlling the cost and
                      schedule of the program. In May 1998, we
                      reported that since 1995, the life-cycle cost
                      for the station had increased almost
                      $2 billion, to $95.6 billion. At the time of our
                      report, the final assembly date of the station
                      had slipped from June 2002 to
                      December 2003.




                      Page 7               GAO/OCG-99-18 NASA Challenges
                      Overview




Following Through     NASA  and the Department of Defense (DOD)
on Aerospace Test     agreed in 1996 to form joint working groups
Facilities            for aerospace test facilities to coordinate
Cooperative Efforts   investments to avoid unnecessary
                      duplication, coordinate test schedules to
                      spread workload across the facilities, and
                      develop standardized business processes.
                      However, the agencies’ promise of closer
                      cooperation and the development of a
                      national perspective on aerospace test
                      facilities remains largely unfulfilled because
                      NASA and DOD (1) have not convened most
                      joint test facility working groups on a regular
                      basis, (2) have competed with each other to
                      test engines for new rockets, and (3) have
                      not prepared a congressionally required joint
                      plan on rocket propulsion test facilities.


Progress and          NASA  has made progress in meeting these
Next Steps            challenges. In the contract management
                      area, it has made progress in developing
                      systems to correct contract management
                      weaknesses. NASA still has not implemented
                      its integrated financial management system.
                      However, until NASA’s integrated financial
                      management system is operational, the
                      agency’s contract management should
                      remain a high-risk area. Regarding space
                      station challenges, since our May 1998
                      report, the final assembly date has slipped to


                      Page 8              GAO/OCG-99-18 NASA Challenges
               Overview




               July 2004. The prime contractor’s
               performance and Russia’s problems with
               funding its portion contributed to the cost
               increase and schedule delay in the space
               station program. We are currently reviewing
               both the cost of and Russia’s involvement
               with the space station. As to the promise of
               greater cooperation and the development of
               a national perspective on aerospace test
               facilities, NASA and DOD have agreed to go
               beyond cooperative working groups in
               aeronautics and jointly manage their
               aeronautical test facilities. However, they
               have not reached agreement on key aspects
               of a management organization.

               NASA’s  corrective actions on its management
               challenges should be viewed in the context
               of its efforts to respond to the Government
               Performance and Results Act of 1993. In a
               case in point, our review of NASA’s 1999
               annual performance plan found that the
               agency did not recognize major management
               challenges and associated corrective actions.
               NASA has indicated that it will continually
               improve the content of its annual
               performance plan.


Key Contacts   Louis J. Rodrigues, Director
               Defense Acquisitions Issues


               Page 9              GAO/OCG-99-18 NASA Challenges
Overview




National Defense and International
  Affairs Division
(202) 512-4841
rodriguesl.nsiad@gao.gov

Allen Li, Associate Director
Defense Acquisitions Issues
National Defense and International
   Affairs Division
(202) 512-4841
lia.nsiad@gao.gov




Page 10            GAO/OCG-99-18 NASA Challenges
Major Performance and Management
Issues


                Over the years, we have documented major
                management problems in NASA. This report
                summarizes our findings concerning several
                weaknesses in NASA’s contract management,
                the challenges NASA faces controlling the
                space station’s cost and schedule, and the
                efforts by NASA and DOD to coordinate their
                aerospace test facilities.


Weaknesses in   NASA spends more than $12 billion annually
Contract        for goods and services, mostly on contracts
Management      with businesses and other organizations. To
                adequately manage these expenditures, NASA
                requires systems and processes to oversee
                procurement activities and to routinely
                produce accurate and reliable management
                information. In 1990, we identified NASA’s
                contract management as an area at high risk.
                At that time, we began a special effort to
                review and report on federal program areas
                that our work had identified as high risk
                because of vulnerabilities to waste, fraud,
                abuse, and mismanagement. In 1992, we
                reported that the agency had ineffective
                systems and processes for overseeing
                contractors’ activities and that NASA field
                centers had failed to comply with contract
                management requirements.




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                       Issues




                       In July 1998, we reported that NASA was
                       developing systems to provide it with the
                       oversight and information needed to
                       improve its contract management. In
                       addition, we reported that NASA had made
                       progress evaluating its field centers’
                       procurement activities based on
                       international quality standards and its own
                       procurement surveys. We also reported,
                       however, that NASA had delayed
                       implementation of its integrated financial
                       management system and not implemented its
                       new system for measuring procurement
                       performance.


NASA Delayed           In its August 1997 Integrated Financial
Implementation of      Management Project Management Plan, NASA
Integrated Financial   stated that its financial management
Management System      environment comprised decentralized,
                       nonintegrated systems with policies,
                       procedures, and practices that are unique to
                       its field centers. NASA stated that for the most
                       part, data formats were not standardized,
                       automated systems are not interfaced, and
                       on-line financial information was not readily
                       available to program managers. In addition,
                       NASA pointed out, the cost to maintain these
                       systems was high since both data and
                       software were replicated at each field
                       center.


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NASA’s new integrated financial management
system is intended to fix these problems. It
offers the promise of providing reliable and
timely information. However, its
implementation has been delayed. In
May 1998, NASA and its contractor, KPMG
Peat Marwick LLP, signed a contract
modification delaying initial implementation
of the financial management system at
Marshall Space Flight Center and Dryden
Flight Research Center from October 1, 1998,
to June 1, 1999. The modification also
postponed agencywide implementation from
July 1, 1999, to June 1, 2000.

According to a NASA official, KPMG has had
difficulties upgrading its software to support
new technologies and to meet all federal
requirements. These difficulties have been
especially prevalent in two systems that are
directly related to contract management,
namely, the core financial and procurement
systems. The core financial system,
according to NASA, is the “backbone” of the
integrated financial management system and
is to provide common processing routines,
including budget execution and funds
control; support for common data for critical
financial management functions affecting the
entire agency; and maintenance of the
required general ledger control over


Page 13                GAO/OCG-99-18 NASA Challenges
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                   Issues




                   financial transactions and resource balances.
                   In addition, it is to provide data for the
                   measurement of financial performance,
                   analysis, full cost management, financial
                   reporting, and preparation of financial
                   statements. The procurement system,
                   according to NASA, will support an end-to-end
                   acquisition process. Specifically, it will
                   prepare and track the status of procurement
                   requests, purchase orders, and contracts;
                   record and validate the receipt of goods and
                   services; and provide information to the core
                   financial system.


NASA Is            In response to our March 1997 report on
Implementing Its   NASA’s contract management and our
New System for     observation on the agency’s need to produce
Measuring          accurate and reliable procurement-related
Procurement
                   information, a NASA official stated in an
Performance
                   August 27, 1997, letter that NASA was
                   “actively working on performance measures
                   in order to determine our metric needs and
                   how best they can be used to measure
                   performance.” In an October 3, 1997, letter, a
                   NASA official stated that NASA’s Procurement
                   Quality Assessment Initiative would involve
                   “the development of measurable
                   performance metrics, the benchmarking of
                   these metrics,” and the development of both
                   NASA Headquarters and agencywide



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procurement customer surveys. According
to a NASA official, the purpose of the metrics
initiative is to determine a family of
performance metrics that will help
procurement managers measure and
improve the performance of their
organizations. The purpose of the customer
survey is to periodically assess customer
satisfaction with field centers’ procurement
office support in areas of timeliness, quality,
and service.

In May 1998, the NASA Headquarters Office of
Procurement forwarded a draft of customer
survey to the senior procurement officers at
its field centers for comment. The final
version of the survey was approved in
October. The customer survey is presently
undergoing in-house testing prior to
dissemination to the center procurement
customers in early January 1999. A NASA
official said that the customer survey will be
conducted annually.

In August, the agency circulated a draft
metrics report for review and comment by
NASA’s senior procurement officials at its
field centers. The final metrics report was
approved by the Acting Associate
Administrator for Procurement on
November 19, 1998, and transmitted to the


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                     Issues




                     centers’ senior procurement officials the
                     same day. In the transmittal memorandum,
                     he said that the revised system of
                     procurement measures will be implemented
                     effective fiscal year 1999.


NASA Has Made        NASA  requires a quality management system
Progress in          for itself and its suppliers that, at a
Evaluating           minimum, complies with the International
Procurement at Its   Organization for Standardization (ISO) 9000
Field Centers
                     series of standards, which includes a
                     standard for purchasing. The ISO 9000 series
                     consists, in part, of 20 quality management
                     and assurance standards. The general
                     purchasing standard states that the supplier
                     (for example, NASA’s field centers’
                     procurement offices) shall establish and
                     maintain documented procedures to ensure
                     that purchased products conform to
                     specified requirements. To this end, NASA has
                     hired contractors to annually evaluate its
                     field centers’ compliance with these
                     standards.

                     To prepare for ISO 9000 certification, the field
                     centers’ personnel conduct internal audits,
                     including audits of the centers’ compliance
                     with the purchasing standard. To date, NASA’s
                     contractors have certified Johnson Space
                     Center, Johnson’s White Sands Test Facility,


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Marshall Space Flight Center, and Kennedy
Space Center as having complied with the ISO
9000 standards. All field centers are to be
certified by the end of fiscal year 1999.

NASA  Headquarters also conducts
procurement management surveys of its
field centers’ procurement activities. Before
1998, such surveys were performed in
addition to the field centers’ own
procurement self-assessments, which are
now being replaced by the ISO 9000-related
internal audits. NASA plans to survey either
Goddard or Johnson field center each year
because each of these centers has the largest
amounts of procurement activity and to
survey other centers at least once every
3 years. NASA Headquarters completed
surveys at Dryden, Goddard, Langley, and
Stennis field centers in fiscal year 1997 and
at Johnson, Lewis, and Marshall field centers
in fiscal year 1998. Also, the Langley field
center was resurveyed in fiscal year 1998.

In April 1998, NASA’s procurement officers
agreed that a combination of ISO 9000
external and internal audits and
procurement surveys should provide
sufficient confidence in the soundness of
NASA’s procurement system. They also agreed
to periodically sample for review a random


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                     Issues




                     number of procurement actions. On
                     September 30, 1998, NASA’s Acting Associate
                     Administrator for Procurement issued
                     guidance to the procurement officers for the
                     random reviews. The guidance stated that, at
                     a minimum, the random reviews should be
                     performed semiannually.


Contract             NASA has made progress in correcting
Management Should    weaknesses in contract management.
Remain a High-Risk   However, a critical component of evaluating
Area                 NASA’s ability to manage contracts is the
                     establishment of a financial management
                     system and its integration with full cost
                     accounting. Until the financial management
                     system is operational, performance
                     assessments relying on cost data may be
                     incomplete. Because implementation of the
                     financial management system has been
                     delayed, we believe that NASA’s contract
                     management should remain a high-risk area.
                     We will continue to monitor NASA’s future
                     progress in the contract management area.


Controlling          NASA and its international partners—Japan,
International        Canada, the European Space Agency, and
Space Station        Russia—are building a space station as a
Costs                permanently orbiting laboratory to conduct
                     research on materials and life sciences, to


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observe the earth, and to provide for
commercial purposes under nearly
weightless conditions. In December 1998,
NASA astronauts successfully coupled in orbit
the first two elements of the space station.

Since the space station project was first
approved in the mid-1980s, NASA has had to
redesign the station several times to meet
decreasing budgets. The most recent major
redesign was in 1993. At about the same
time, the Russians became a partner in the
program. Since 1993, NASA and its partners
have made progress in developing and
constructing space station elements, and
early flight hardware has been delivered to
U.S. and Russian launch sites.

In September 1997, we reported that the cost
and schedule performance of the station’s
prime contractor had continued to steadily
worsen and that program financial reserves
for contingencies had deteriorated,
principally because of program uncertainties
and cost overruns. We also reported that
NASA had questioned the accuracy of the
prime contractor’s reported estimate of a
cost overrun at completion. On the basis of
an internal review, the prime contractor
more than doubled its estimate of the total
cost growth at contract completion, from


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Major Performance and Management
Issues




$278 million to $600 million. We also
reported that NASA had become concerned
with Russia’s ability to provide steady and
adequate funding to meet its commitments.

In May 1998, we reported that the life-cycle
cost estimate to develop, operate, and
decommission the station had increased by
about $2 billion since 1995, to about
$95.6 billion. The major component of this
increase was in the development cost of the
station, which increased from $17.4 billion to
$21.9 billion. The increase in development
cost was offset by a dramatic reduction in
NASA’s estimate of the shuttle support costs
for the station. We also reported that the
final assembly date of the station had slipped
from June 2002 to December 2003 and a
number of potential program changes could
further increase costs, including additional
schedule delays and the need for more
shuttle launches. In addition, we continued
to report that station financial reserves
might be inadequate, considering that the
development phase was still about 6 years
from completion.

Since May 1998, the program has continued
to face cost and schedule challenges and the
effects of funding shortfalls in Russia. NASA
continues to identify cost growth and limited


Page 20                GAO/OCG-99-18 NASA Challenges
Major Performance and Management
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reserves as major program concerns and is
now giving added attention to problems with
contractors other than prime contractors.
Regarding the prime contractor’s
performance, its latest estimate of a cost
overrun at completion has increased from
$600 million to over $780 million. In addition,
the concerns we expressed in May 1998
regarding potential threats to the program
have, in fact, occurred. For example, in
October 1998, NASA and its partners revised
the official assembly sequence, adding
additional shuttle flights and extending the
final assembly date of the station to
July 2004.

Regarding Russia’s funding shortfalls, in
September 1998, NASA sought congressional
support for its plan to transfer $60 million
from within the agency to the Russian Space
Agency in return for goods and services, to
help ensure the timely completion of Russian
components. NASA also said that the Russian
Space Agency could need an additional
$600 million in funding transfers. As an
added consequence of Russia’s funding
problems, NASA has identified more than
$500 million in new U.S.-built hardware and
shuttle modifications to lessen dependence
on Russia during station assembly and
operations. The total amount of U.S. funds


Page 21                GAO/OCG-99-18 NASA Challenges
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                 that will ultimately be needed to support
                 Russian participation is uncertain at this
                 time.

                 With the exception that NASA assumes the
                 space station partners will meet their own
                 schedules, the agency’s performance plan
                 responding to the Results Act does not
                 explain how NASA will address external
                 factors that could affect performance. This is
                 particularly important for budgetary
                 programmatic priorities, such as the space
                 station, which could consume a large portion
                 of future resources and affect
                 implementation of other NASA programs.

                 On the basis of a request from the Chairs of
                 the Senate Committee on Commerce,
                 Science, and Transportation and the
                 Committee’s Subcommittee on Science,
                 Technology and Space, we are pursuing both
                 the cost of and Russia’s involvement with
                 the space station program.


Following        NASA  is cooperating with DOD to address
Through on       issues of mutual interest regarding
Aerospace Test   investment in, and use of, aerospace test
Facilities       facilities. This cooperation was initiated
Cooperative      under the auspices of the joint NASA/DOD
                 Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating
Efforts

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Board. In April 1996, NASA and DOD agreed to
form joint working groups, called alliances,
for six types of major test facilities: wind
tunnels, aeropropulsion test cells, rocket
engine test stands, space environmental
simulation chambers, arc-heaters, and
hypervelocity gas guns and ballistic ranges.
The working groups were formed to
coordinate investments to avoid unnecessary
duplication, coordinate test schedules to
spread the workload across facilities, and
develop standardized and common business
processes. In September 1996, the Congress
added to this effort by requiring NASA and
DOD to prepare a joint plan on rocket
propulsion test facilities.

In March 1998, we reported that the
agencies’ promise of closer cooperation and
the development of a national perspective on
aerospace test facilities remained largely
unfulfilled because NASA and DOD (1) had not
convened most test facility working groups,
(2) have competed with each other to test
engines for new rockets, and (3) had not
prepared a congressionally required joint
plan on rocket propulsion test facilities. We
also reported that although NASA and DOD had
agreed to go beyond cooperative working
groups in aeronautics and jointly manage
their aeronautical test facilities, they had not


Page 23                GAO/OCG-99-18 NASA Challenges
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yet reached agreement on key aspects of a
management organization.

NASA   and DOD took 20 months to negotiate
and sign agreements formally establishing
the six test facility-related cooperative
working groups. During that time, only the
space environmental simulation working
group met regularly and conducted business.
The already established rocket propulsion
working group met only once during this
period, despite a desire by some members to
meet regularly. NASA and DOD officials did not
regularly convene the other four working
groups in the absence of approved charters.
Since our March 1998, report, according to a
DOD official, a joint meeting attended by
representatives of all the NASA/DOD test
working groups, except the wind tunnel
working group, was held in May 1998 at the
Air Force’s Arnold Engineering Development
Center. The wind tunnel working group held
an organizing meeting on June 30, 1998, and
its first full meeting on August 5, 1998. In
addition to the joint meeting, a NASA official
said that the rocket propulsion test and the
space environmental simulation working
groups met on a quarterly basis in 1998.

Despite the formation of the rocket
propulsion working group, NASA and DOD


Page 24                GAO/OCG-99-18 NASA Challenges
Major Performance and Management
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have competed against each other to test
engines for new rocket programs. A
principal arena of competition is the next
phase of the Air Force’s Evolved Expendable
Launch Vehicle Program. In particular, the
Air Force spent millions of dollars to
upgrade a test stand on the assumption that
it, not NASA, would test the new launch
vehicle’s engines.

On November 19, 1998, a NASA official said
that DOD and NASA has still not prepared the
legislatively mandated joint plan to
coordinate rocket propulsion test facilities.
However, he added that the rocket
propulsion test working group is performing
joint planning and preparing guidance to
ensure the best use of each agency’s test
facilities.

In October 1997, NASA and Air Force officials
took a step toward creating a national
perspective on test facilities in the
aeronautics area. Specifically, they reached
an understanding on the scope and approach
for joint strategic management of their
aeronautical test facilities, including a new
management organization to be called the
National Aeronautical Test Alliance.
However, as of our March 1998 report, they
had not resolved basic issues, such as the


Page 25                GAO/OCG-99-18 NASA Challenges
                  Major Performance and Management
                  Issues




                  organization’s structure and authority. On
                  December 9, 1998, a NASA official said that
                  NASA and DOD expect to establish the new
                  alliance soon because NASA has signed the
                  charter for the alliance and DOD currently has
                  it in final review. He added that once the
                  charter is signed, the wind tunnel and
                  aeropropulsion test working groups will
                  merge into the new alliance. Ultimately, if
                  the National Aeronautical Test Alliance is
                  successful, its adaption to other types of test
                  facilities could be considered.


Relationship      NASA’s  corrective actions on its management
Between NASA’s    challenges should be viewed in the context
Corrective        of its strategic and performance plans. The
Actions and the   agency pursued strategic planning prior to
Results Act       its being required by the Results Act.
                  However, our review of the draft strategic
                  plan NASA submitted to the Congress in
                  response to the Results Act showed that the
                  plan did not fully address all key elements
                  required by the Act. Also, the plan did not
                  discuss major management challenges and
                  problems, such as a long-standing weakness
                  in contract management and the lack of a
                  fully integrated accounting system, that
                  could affect NASA’s ability to fulfill its
                  mission. Our review of NASA’s 1999
                  performance plan found that it also did not


                  Page 26                GAO/OCG-99-18 NASA Challenges
Major Performance and Management
Issues




recognize major management challenges and
associated corrective actions. Further, the
performance plan should better link
performance goals and measures to the
program activities in the agency’s budget and
show that NASA coordinated the plan with
agencies having complementary activities. In
responding to our review, NASA stated that it
will continually improve the content of its
annual performance plan.




Page 27                GAO/OCG-99-18 NASA Challenges
Related GAO Products



Contract        NASA Procurement: Status of Efforts to
Management      Improve Oversight (GAO/NSIAD-98-198R, July 13,
                1998).

                NASA: Major Management Challenges
                (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-178, July 24, 1997).

                High-Risk Program: Information on Selected
                High-Risk Areas (GAO/HR-97-30, May 16, 1997).

                NASAProcurement: Contract Management
                Oversight (GAO/NSIAD-97-114R, Mar. 18, 1997).

                NASA: Procurement Assessments
                (GAO/NSIAD-97-80R, Feb. 4, 1997).

                NASA: Contract Management (GAO/NSIAD-96-95R,
                Feb. 16, 1996).

                NASA Budgets: Gap Between Funding
                Requirements and Projected Budgets
                (GAO/NSIAD-95-155BR, May 12, 1995).


International   Space Station: U.S. Life-Cycle Funding
Space Station   Requirements (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-212, June 24,
                1998).

                International Space Station: U.S. Life-Cycle
                Funding Requirements (GAO/NSIAD-98-147,
                May 22, 1998).


                Page 28              GAO/OCG-99-18 NASA Challenges
                 Related GAO Products




                 Space Station: Cost Control Problems
                 (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-54, Nov. 5, 1997).

                 Space Station: Deteriorating Cost and
                 Schedule Performance Under the Prime
                 Contract (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-262, Sept. 18, 1997).

                 Space Station: Cost Control Problems Are
                 Worsening (GAO/NSIAD-97-213, Sept. 16, 1997).

                 Space Station: Cost Control Problems
                 Continue to Worsen (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-177,
                 June 18, 1997).

                 NASA: Major Management Challenges
                 (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-178, July 24, 1997).

                 Space Station: Cost Control Difficulties
                 Continue (GAO/T-NSIAD-96-210, July 24, 1996).

                 Space Station: Cost Control Difficulties
                 Continue (GAO/NSIAD-96-135, July 17, 1996).

                 Space Station: Estimated Total U.S. Funding
                 Requirements (GAO/NSIAD-95-163, June 12,
                 1995).


NASA and DOD     Aerospace Testing: Promise of Closer
Aerospace Test   NASA/DOD Cooperation Remains Largely
Facilities       Unfulfilled (GAO/NSIAD-98-52, Mar. 11, 1998).


                 Page 29                GAO/OCG-99-18 NASA Challenges
Related GAO Products




Best Practices: Elements Critical to
Reducing Successfully Unneeded RDT&E
Infrastructure (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-98-23, Jan. 8,
1998).

NASA: Major Management Challenges
(GAO/T-NSIAD-97-178, July 24, 1997).

NASA Facilities: Challenges to Achieving
Reductions and Efficiencies
(GAO/T-NSIAD-96-238, Sept. 11, 1996).

NASA Infrastructure: Challenges to Achieving
Reductions and Efficiencies (GAO/NSIAD-96-187,
Sept. 9, 1996).




Page 30                GAO/OCG-99-18 NASA Challenges
Performance and Accountability Series



             Major Management Challenges and Program
             Risks: A Governmentwide Perspective
             (GAO/OCG-99-1)

             Major Management Challenges and Program
             Risks: Department of Agriculture
             (GAO/OCG-99-2)

             Major Management Challenges and Program
             Risks: Department of Commerce
             (GAO/OCG-99-3)

             Major Management Challenges and Program
             Risks: Department of Defense (GAO/OCG-99-4)

             Major Management Challenges and Program
             Risks: Department of Education
             (GAO/OCG-99-5)

             Major Management Challenges and Program
             Risks: Department of Energy (GAO/OCG-99-6)

             Major Management Challenges and Program
             Risks: Department of Health and Human
             Services (GAO/OCG-99-7)

             Major Management Challenges and Program
             Risks: Department of Housing and Urban
             Development (GAO/OCG-99-8)




             Page 31            GAO/OCG-99-18 NASA Challenges
Performance and Accountability Series




Major Management Challenges and Program
Risks: Department of the Interior
(GAO/OCG-99-9)

Major Management Challenges and Program
Risks: Department of Justice (GAO/OCG-99-10)

Major Management Challenges and Program
Risks: Department of Labor (GAO/OCG-99-11)

Major Management Challenges and Program
Risks: Department of State (GAO/OCG-99-12)

Major Management Challenges and Program
Risks: Department of Transportation
(GAO/OCG-99-13)

Major Management Challenges and Program
Risks: Department of the Treasury
(GAO/OCG-99-14)

Major Management Challenges and Program
Risks: Department of Veterans Affairs
(GAO/OCG-99-15)

Major Management Challenges and Program
Risks: Agency for International Development
(GAO/OCG-99-16)




Page 32                  GAO/OCG-99-18 NASA Challenges
Performance and Accountability Series




Major Management Challenges and Program
Risks: Environmental Protection Agency
(GAO/OCG-99-17)

Major Management Challenges and Program
Risks: National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (GAO/OCG-99-18)

Major Management Challenges and Program
Risks: Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(GAO/OCG-99-19)

Major Management Challenges and Program
Risks: Social Security Administration
(GAO/OCG-99-20)

Major Management Challenges and Program
Risks: U.S. Postal Service (GAO/OCG-99-21)

High-Risk Series: An Update (GAO/HR-99-1)




The entire series of 21 performance and
accountability reports and the high-risk
series update can be ordered by using
the order number GAO/OCG-99-22SET.


Page 33                  GAO/OCG-99-18 NASA Challenges
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