oversight

Department of Defense: Military Assistance Provided at Branch Davidian Incident

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1999-08-26.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                       United States General Accounting Office

GAO                    Report to the Secretary of Defense, the
                       Attorney General, and the Secretary of
                       the Treasury


August 1999
                       DEPARTMENT OF
                       DEFENSE

                       Military Assistance
                       Provided at Branch
                       Davidian Incident




GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133
United States General Accounting Office                                                                 National Security and
Washington, D.C. 20548                                                                           International Affairs Division



                                    B-276428                                                                                       Letter

                                    August 26, 1999

                                    The Honorable William S. Cohen
                                    The Secretary of Defense

                                    The Honorable Janet F. Reno
                                    The Attorney General

                                    The Honorable Lawrence H. Summers
                                    The Secretary of the Treasury

                                    In 1993, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) received
                                    assistance from the U.S. military, including counterdrug program support,
                                    while investigating violations of federal firearms laws by members of an
                                    obscure sect, the Branch Davidians, and their leader, Vernon Howell (also
                                    known as David Koresh), in Waco, Texas. On February 28, 1993, as the ATF
                                    tried to serve warrants on the sect’s compound, a gunfight erupted, killing
                                    and wounding agents and Davidians. A standoff ensued that soon involved
                                    the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The military provided support to
                                    the two federal law enforcement agencies (LEA) throughout the 51-day
                                    standoff, which ended April 19, 1993, when the compound was destroyed
                                    by fire.

                                    In August 1996, the House Committees on Government Reform and
                                    Oversight and on the Judiciary issued a report, “Investigation into the
                                    Activities of Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Toward the Branch
                                    Davidians” (Report 104-749). 1 The report recommended that we review
                                    certain aspects of the military assistance provided to the LEAs in this
                                    incident. We have reviewed the nature and extent of the assistance,
                                    including that from counterdrug programs, provided to these operations, as
                                    well as the counterdrug aspects of ATF’s plans to serve a search warrant at
                                    the Davidian compound. We pursued three specific objectives:

                                    • Determine whether the ATF’s requests for support from military
                                      counterdrug programs met requirements for authorizing that support.



                                    1
                                     This report was based on a joint investigation by the Subcommittee on National Security, International
                                    Affairs, and Criminal Justice of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, and the
                                    Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee of the Judiciary.




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                      • Identify the measures ATF took to deal with any drug activity it might
                        find during its warrant service, and determine whether those measures
                        were appropriate for such operations where a methamphetamine
                        laboratory might be encountered.
                      • Account for the types, costs, and reimbursements of all military support,
                        including that from counterdrug programs, provided to the ATF and the
                        FBI.



Results in Brief      ATF’s two requests for military counterdrug support of its Davidian
                      operations met requirements to authorize provision of that support under
                      the relevant statutes.2 The ATF cited possible drug-related activity at the
                      compound in both its written requests—the first to the Texas National
                      Guard and the second to Operation Alliance, a coordinating center for
                      counterdrug assistance. The military’s decision in both cases to provide the
                      counterdrug support was a reasonable exercise of agency discretion and
                      was authorized under the relevant statutes.

                      ATF’s planning for the warrant service addressed the possibility of
                      encountering hazardous drug materials. ATF agents were made aware of
                      the suspected drug laboratory and the appropriate precautions. Moreover,
                      a team from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was at the
                      command post the day of the operation to handle any drug-related
                      materials that might be found. This planning was consistent with ATF’s
                      own policies—and those of other federal LEAs—governing operations to
                      secure armed suspects and facilities, including those where a drug
                      laboratory is present.

                      Military assistance (both counterdrug and other) to the ATF and the FBI
                      included surveillance, reconnaissance, and transport; equipment and
                      supplies; training and instruction; and maintenance and repairs. The
                      military provided several items of major equipment, including helicopters
                      and unarmed tactical ground vehicles. We estimated the total cost of
                      military assistance to be about $1 million, of which nearly 90 percent was
                      incurred by the Texas National Guard and active Army units and the rest by
                      the Alabama National Guard and active Air Force. Under the Economy Act,


                      2
                       The military is authorized to provide support to LEAs under a number of statutes. Generally, these
                      agencies must reimburse the military for the cost of its assistance. However, the active military can
                      support counterdrug activities on a nonreimbursable basis under section 1004 of the National Defense
                      Authorization Act of 1991, as amended (P.L. 101–510), and the National Guard can do so under 32 U.S.C.
                      §112.




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              the ATF and the FBI reimbursed the Texas National Guard, the Army, and
              the Air Force for about three-quarters of the support. Repayment of
              another 14 percent, which came from counterdrug programs, was waived
              by the military, which has the authority to do so if the supported agency
              suspects a drug connection. These nonreimbursable expenses represented
              less than $140,000. The military also mistakenly undercharged these two
              agencies by a comparatively small amount (about 10 percent of the total),
              which should have been reimbursed. The Army does not plan to collect
              these undercharges, as it would realize no current benefit—it would have
              to apply any collection to prior-year obligations. Finally, under applicable
              statutes,3 the military gave the ATF and the FBI without charge some
              excess military items, mostly office and camp equipment, clothes, and
              tools.



Scope and     The events we examined occurred several years before we performed our
              work. Moreover, the ATF’s investigation of Vernon Howell during 1992–93
Methodology   focused on firearm violations, not on illegal drugs; neither the ATF nor any
              other agency, federal or state, performed a comprehensive, in-depth drug
              investigation of Howell or any other Davidian residing at the compound at
              the time.

              For our first two objectives, we interviewed many current and former
              employees of the military and of those federal, state, and local LEAs that
              had dealings with the case. We also reviewed pertinent case files and
              material provided to the Waco Administrative Review. 4 We did not try to
              substantiate actual drug activity by Howell or other compound residents.
              To obtain information concerning the authority under which their
              components assisted the LEAs, we contacted the Department of Defense
              (DOD), the National Guard Bureau, Joint Task Force Six, and the Texas
              National Guard.

              For our third objective, we sought to determine the types and costs of
              military assistance provided to the ATF and the FBI. To this end, we
              reviewed available records maintained by DOD, the Army, and the Texas
              National Guard (requests and authorizations for assistance, hand receipts,


              3
                  P.L. 101–189 § 1208 and P.L. 102–484 § 1044.
              4
               A group convened by the Department of the Treasury to review all aspects of ATF’s investigation of
              Howell and the Davidians, including the ATF’s effort to serve the arrest and search warrants on Feb. 28,
              1993.




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             flight logs, DOD reports, etc.). We also interviewed officials at Operation
             Alliance, Joint Task Force Six, the Texas National Guard counterdrug
             program, and the Army. In addition, we reviewed the military’s
             documentation concerning cost and reimbursement by the LEAs, including
             the accounting and recovery records. This information we compared with
             our data on the support rendered by the military.

             For all objectives, we visited or contacted various military and law
             enforcement organizations, reviewed hundreds of pertinent documents,
             and viewed other relevant media. Appendix I describes our contacts and
             sources in greater detail.

             We conducted our work between January 1997 and February 1999 in
             accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.



Background   Throughout the ATF’s investigation and the standoff at the compound, the
             military provided the ATF and the FBI a wide variety of assistance. A
             detailed discussion of the statutes authorizing the support is provided in
             appendix II.

             LEAs operating in Texas may obtain military assistance for investigations
             having a counterdrug component from the Texas National Guard
             counterdrug program. This program can provide a range of investigative
             support services, from aerial reconnaissance to logistics. 5 In accordance
             with regulations,6 requests for support from National Guard counterdrug
             programs must cite in writing a suspected drug connection. LEAs can also
             seek military counterdrug assistance via Operation Alliance, a
             clearinghouse representing the counterdrug interests of many federal,
             state, and local LEAs.7 The Alliance only accepts requests that cite in
             writing a suspected drug connection.




             5
              Program personnel will not normally become involved in arrests of suspects, chain-of-custody of
             evidence, searches, interdiction, or the physical security of law enforcement officers.
             6
              National Guard Regulation 500–2.
             7
              The Alliance comprises state and local representatives from several states and agents from the DEA,
             the Customs Service, the Border Patrol, Coast Guard, the FBI and the ATF, the Internal Revenue
             Service, U.S. Marshal’s Service, the Secret Service, and U.S. Attorneys. Representatives from DOD and
             the National Guard serve on the group as advisors only.




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Requests that the Alliance approves can be referred to military
organizations, which review the requests to ensure, among other things,
that a suspected drug connection is explicitly stated.8 Each military
organization can decline to provide the support despite the referral. In
addition to the National Guard program, the Alliance may refer the request
to Joint Task Force Six. This task force, an active service organization,
identifies military units that can provide the assistance and coordinates
with the requester. 9 It also has a rapid support unit to respond to any
immediate need.

Finally, LEAs can receive items without charge from DOD’s Regional
Logistics Support Office; these items come from its excess inventory. The
agencies can request this support directly, and their operations need not
have a counterdrug component.

According to the ATF, the drug connection in this operation was a possible
clandestine methamphetamine laboratory, perhaps active, that it suspected
was somewhere on the extensive Davidian compound. Drug laboratories,
active or not, are extremely volatile and toxic, and specialized training and
equipment are necessary to safely deal with the chemical materials. The
DEA, having lead responsibility for counterdrug activities, provides
extensive, highly detailed procedures that its agents are supposed to follow
when dealing with clandestine laboratories. These procedures, which cover
planning, entry, assessment, processing, exit, and follow-up, include such
requirements as

• planning with a lab-certified chemist the entry of the suspect premises,
• assigning safety officers for the entry,
• having self-contained breathing apparatus and lab-certified teams on
  hand,
• giving specific warnings to the entry team, and
• supplying the entry team with full heat- and chemical-resistant clothing.

However, other federal LEAs, including the ATF, which do not have drugs
as their primary focus and which lack DEA’s extensive training and
equipment have less elaborate drug-lab policies. In ATF’s case, its
instructions in this matter are quite explicit—agents are to call upon DEA


8
 The statutes, however, do not require a full discussion of the possible connection.
9
 Joint Task Force Six neither plans nor coordinates civilian operations, and active Army units can
perform only support roles, not law enforcement functions.




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                       to handle any possible drug evidence they encounter during their
                       investigations. ATF entry teams must be made aware of the drug laboratory
                       and of standard precautions. There is, however, no requirement that ATF
                       teams making a “dynamic entry”10 wear fully protective counterdrug suits
                       with self-contained breathing apparatus. This is also true for DEA entry
                       teams. According to officials from both agencies, such equipment would
                       restrict an entry team’s vision and mobility and place it at unacceptable
                       risk, as suspects are often armed.



Military Counterdrug   The ATF made two requests for military counterdrug support to its
                       Davidian operations. The first was made directly to the Texas National
Support to ATF’s       Guard counterdrug program, and the second was later made to Operation
Davidian Operation     Alliance, which approved and forwarded the request to the Texas National
                       Guard counterdrug program and Joint Task Force Six for their
Was Authorized Under   consideration. Some counterdrug support to the ATF during its attempt to
Statutes               serve the warrant extended through the ensuing standoff, constituting a
                       continued response to the agency’s second request.

                       For both of its requests, ATF cited a possible drug connection to its Howell
                       investigation. Although ATF conducted a firearms investigation of Howell
                       and other Davidians, it also acquired information on possible drug activity
                       when it decided to seek support from military counterdrug elements. Not
                       all of this information was shared with the military, but it formed the
                       backdrop to and reinforced the data that was shared.

                       During our review and in the following narrative, we focused on what the
                       ATF knew about a possible drug connection, when the ATF knew it, and
                       what information the ATF provided to the military counterdrug programs.
                       These points are central to determining whether the military was
                       authorized to provide counterdrug assistance under the relevant statutes.




                       10
                         A very rapid, vigorous, sudden, unexpected entry. It is intended to surprise suspects and prevent them
                       from getting to their guns or from destroying evidence and is used to prevent harm to agents and
                       civilians alike.




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ATF’s First Counterdrug    In 1992, the local sheriff’s office discovered that , between March and June
Request: Assistance From   of that year, Howell and other Davidians at the Waco compound had
                           received frequent shipments of weapons, explosive components, and
the Texas National Guard   related materials. 11 By June 1992 those shipments totaled more than
Counterdrug Program        $40,000. Realizing that matters were now beyond its capabilities, the local
                           sheriff’s office contacted the ATF and on June 4, 1992, briefed it on (1) the
                           situation at the compound, including armed guards at the site and (2) the
                           group’s violent history, including a 1987 gun battle between Howell and the
                           Davidians’ former leader. On June 9, 1992, the ATF formally opened an
                           investigation of Howell and his associates.12 The agency focused on the
                           conversion and manufacture of weapons and explosives, gathering
                           information on Davidian connections and gun related deliveries that
                           continued to arrive at the compound.

                           In late June, the sheriff’s office notified ATF of a recent delivery to the
                           compound of “chemicals, instruments, and glassware.” The sheriff’s
                           explosives technician did not regard these items as consistent with the
                           manufacture of explosives; an ATF agent thought these items could be used
                           to manufacture drugs, suggesting a current operation. Later, in November
                           1992, while pursuing its firearms investigation, the ATF acquired
                           information about a possible drug connection when the sheriff’s office told
                           the agency about one of Howell’s associates. A search of criminal
                           databases showed that this individual had a long history of drug
                           involvement and had been paroled to the Waco area in April 1992 after
                           serving time for his latest drug conviction.

                           From the first months of the investigation, ATF had kept in touch with the
                           DEA office in Waco, seeking information it might have about the suspects.
                           The DEA agents offered their help on the case, including undercover work,
                           and performed some minor investigative assistance. In the summer or fall
                           of 1992, the ATF and DEA agents speculated on how the Davidians were
                           financing their heavy gun purchases and substantial building projects while
                           supporting 100 or so compound residents. Based on their enforcement



                           11
                            Assault rifles and conversion kits, ammunition, inert grenades, sensors, night-vision devices,
                           chemicals, combat vests, etc. According to the Treasury Department report, some of these items could
                           be used to illegally manufacture and possess machine guns and destructive devices contrary to the
                           National Firearms Act (26 U.S.C. § 5845).
                           12
                            The sheriff’s office gave ATF the names of more than 30 current residents of the compound, which
                           ATF checked for criminal histories.




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experience, it seemed possible to the agents that a resident might be
dealing in illegal drugs.

Having decided that it needed military assistance, on December 4, 1992,
ATF discussed with a liaison from DOD13 how the military might help. The
liaison suggested that the military could provide aerial thermal (infrared)
photography of the site. He also informed ATF that it would have to
reimburse the military unless there was a drug connection to its
investigation.

On December 11, 1992, ATF contacted officers of the Texas National Guard
counterdrug program to learn what aid it could provide to the Howell
investigation. The Texas National Guard discussed the types of assistance
available, including surveillance overflights, but explained that, to receive
help from this program, the investigation must have a drug connection. The
Texas National Guard advised the ATF to determine whether it might have
a drug connection and, if so, to send a formal written request citing that
connection.

On December 14, 1992, ATF wrote the Texas National Guard counterdrug
program, requesting it to support the investigation with aerial photography
and surveillance but mentioning no drug connection. The Texas National
Guard told ATF it must submit a revised request that contained a possible
drug connection.14

The ATF decided to inquire of all its contacts in this case whether they had
knowledge of any drug activity in connection with the suspects. The first to
be asked was a former resident of the compound; on December 16, 1992,
this individual responded in writing with the following statements.

• Howell had told him that drug trafficking was a desirable way to raise
  money.
• Howell had told him about finding a methamphetamine laboratory when
  he took over the compound.




13
  This position was filled by a military officer under the Office for Drug Enforcement Policy and
Support; he was stationed at ATF’s Special Operations Division, Washington, D.C.
14
 According to Texas National Guard counterdrug officers, it is not unusual for LEAs to make requests
without stating a drug connection. In those cases the Texas National Guard returns the request with an
explanation of the need for a written statement of possible drug activity.




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• Howell had told him that he turned the laboratory over to the sheriff’s
  office, but another former resident maintained to this individual that
  Howell had not surrendered any drug materials.
• Another former resident was rumored to have trafficked in drugs while
  living at the compound.

ATF discussed this information with the sheriff’s office, which confirmed
that a methamphetamine laboratory was thought to have existed at the
compound at one time. The sheriff’s office denied ever receiving drug
evidence from Howell or any other Davidian.15 This raised the possibility
that the illegal equipment might still be at the compound.

The sheriff’s office also confirmed for ATF that the alleged drug trafficker
named by the former resident had lived at the compound along with
another suspicious person. ATF searched the state’s criminal database and
found that (1) the first individual had an extensive history of narcotics and
firearms violations and was in prison and (2) the second had violated
federal firearms laws and was in prison for possessing a firearm during a
drug-trafficking crime. It may also be at this time that the ATF learned of a
third former resident who had produced methamphetamine at the
compound. ATF’s computer checks also showed that several current
compound residents had prior drug involvement, including possession of
marijuana, cocaine, and “tablets of dangerous drugs.”

This information suggested to ATF that there were reasonable grounds to
suspect a drug connection to its investigation. Consequently, on
December 17, 1992,16 ATF notified DEA to that effect, informing it of the
suspected laboratory, and asked DEA to handle all drug evidence when the
warrants would be served. ATF also informed the DOD liaison that a
methamphetamine laboratory might be at the compound. The next day the
ATF sent a revised request for aid to the Texas National Guard counterdrug
program, this time citing a drug connection—specifically, that Howell was
“suspected of unlawfully being in possession of firearms and possibly
narcotics.”

Since its requirement for a drug connection was met in this new letter, the
Texas National Guard approved the request. In all, six reconnaissance


15
     In our discussions with the sheriff’s office, it denied receiving drug material from Howell.
16
 Report of the Department of the Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
Investigation of Vernon Wayne Howell, also known as David Koresh (Sept. 1993).




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                               overflights would be made, with thermal imaging used on at least two
                               flights to search for armed guards and drug-manufacturing facilities.17


ATF’s Second Counterdrug       By late January 1993, the ATF had taken statements from other former
Request: Assistance From       Davidians and their relatives that suggested a drug connection:
Joint Task Force Six and the   • Information about affidavits and testimony in a 1992 court case that a
Texas National Guard             methamphetamine laboratory was still at the compound after it had
Counterdrug Program              supposedly been turned over to the sheriff’s office.
                               • Reports that Howell may have used the laboratory.
                               • Reports that Howell gave illegal drugs to some of his followers.

                               At the same time, an ATF undercover agent reported that Howell had told
                               him, in conversation at the compound, that (1) the site would be a good
                               place for making methamphetamine and (2) the sheriff suspected him of
                               manufacturing drugs. Another Davidian resident, according to two
                               undercover ATF agents, told them that he himself had been involved in
                               drugs at one time. In addition, thermal images made by National Guard
                               overflights had shown a “hot spot” inside the compound, possibly
                               indicating a methamphetamine laboratory.

                               Meanwhile, in preparation for serving warrants at the compound, ATF
                               sought operational and logistical help from other agencies, including the
                               military. It updated the DOD liaison on its case, mentioning that
                               counterdrug support would soon be requested, and it gave information on
                               the drug connection to the head of the Texas National Guard counterdrug
                               program. On January 22, 1993, after some confusion over the appropriate
                               route to take, the ATF’s written request for military support of the
                               upcoming warrant service arrived at Operation Alliance. It asked for
                               certain training, as well as a loan of Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and
                               other equipment, for “a continuation of the firearms and drug case.”18 When
                               the ATF filled out the Alliance’s request form, it noted that the operation
                               involved a “possible meth lab.”



                               17
                                At that time, clandestine manufacture of methamphetamine was thought to produce considerable
                               heat, which infrared imaging could pick up. LEAs, including the DEA, sometimes used aerial thermal
                               imaging to detect the heat produced in illegal narcotics manufacture.
                               18
                                 The letter noted that no weapon systems on the Bradleys would be used; it requested floodlights,
                               loudspeakers, smoke generators, gas masks, night-vision goggles, and office and camping gear.




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On February 2, 1993, the Alliance and its military advisers met to consider
the request for support. The ATF discussed some of the indications of a
drug laboratory—statements by former residents; the suspicious delivery
of materials possibly intended for use in making drugs (sometimes referred
to as “precursor materials”);19 and the hot spot, which was identified on an
aerial photograph of the compound. Since its requirement for a possible
drug connection was met, the Alliance referred the request to Joint Task
Force Six and the Texas National Guard counterdrug program. In its letter
forwarding the request, the Alliance cited “a dangerous extremist
organization believed to be producing methamphetamine.”

On February 4, 1993, representatives of the Texas National Guard
counterdrug program and Joint Task Force Six met with the ATF to discuss
the request that Operation Alliance had passed on to them. This meeting
concentrated on parameters, limits, and training objectives but did discuss
the drug connection. The ATF presented indications of a possible
methamphetamine laboratory at the Davidian compound: reports by
former residents, deliveries of possible precursor materials, and thermal
images from reconnaissance overflights that indicated the possible location
of the laboratory. The ATF also noted in its presentation that some current
residents had recent drug-related arrests. According to one military
attendee, the evidence of a possible drug connection was not the strongest
they had ever seen, nor was it the weakest.

At this meeting the Texas National Guard agreed to provide the ATF
operation with vehicles, office and camp equipment.20 Approval by Joint
Task Force Six took somewhat longer. After its parent organization, the
Army Forces Command, had reviewed and modified the support requested,
Joint Task Force Six agreed on February 17, 1993, to provide range practice
and some limited training. During February 25–27, Joint Task Force Six’s
rapid-support unit trained ATF agents at Fort Hood, Texas.21




19
 The glassware, instruments, and chemicals mentioned earlier (p. 7).
20
 This request to the Texas National Guard was later modified (February 24, 1993) because the ATF now
needed support for a dynamic entry rather than a siege, as earlier planned.
21
 They did not receive training on securing or removing drug material. Texas National Guard helicopters
and crews also traveled to Fort Hood (February 27) to practice with the ATF their support of the
operation.




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Continuation of Military    On the day that the ATF attempted to serve arrest and search warrants at
Assistance During the       the compound, the Texas National Guard joined several local, state, and
                            federal LEAs to support the operation. ATF had planned a dynamic entry to
Standoff                    secure the Davidians before they could get to their weapons. However, the
                            Davidians were warned of the ATF’s approach and met the agents with
                            gunfire. A 51-day standoff resulted, from February 28 to April 19, 1993,
                            during which the ATF and the FBI (which took control of the operation)
                            requested and received a range of support from the active military and the
                            Texas National Guard.

                            The bulk of support during the standoff qualified as military assistance to
                            civilian authorities, which requires no connection to drugs in order to be
                            provided but which generally must be repaid. However, Texas National
                            Guard counterdrug assistance (mainly helicopters and personnel)
                            continued to be provided after the attempted warrant service became a
                            standoff because, upon the Davidians’ eventual surrender, this support
                            would be needed to finish the counterdrug mission.22


Approval of Military        DOD provided support for counterdrug activities of the Davidian operation
Counterdrug Support Was     under section 1004 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1991 (P.L.
                            101–510). The Texas National Guard also provided counterdrug support
Reasonable and Authorized
                            under 32 U.S.C. § 112. These laws authorize certain types of support of
                            LEAs’ counterdrug activities. 23 However, neither law provides a formal
                            standard for determining the level of counterdrug activity that a particular
                            operation must include for authorization of such support. Because there is
                            no formal standard, the military officials involved have considerable
                            discretion in determining the degree of counterdrug activity necessary to
                            approve the support. Based on our review of the relevant statutes, events
                            leading up to the decision by military officials to approve the support, and
                            interviews with key personnel, we found no basis to conclude that the
                            officials involved abused that discretion. We also found no indication that
                            ATF officials misrepresented the information provided to the military in
                            order to obtain the support. Therefore, we conclude that the military’s
                            decision to approve the counterdrug support was reasonable and
                            authorized under the relevant statutes.


                            22
                             According to the Texas National Guard, this counterdrug support did not require a new request, as it
                            was provided as a continuation of the ATF’s second request approved February 4, 1993.
                            23
                             See app. II for a more detailed discussion of these laws.




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ATF Planning for        ATF spent several months planning the operation to serve warrants at the
                        Davidian compound. Although the possible drug laboratory was not a
Warrant Service         major part of this effort, ATF did plan and take certain measures to deal
Included Measures for   with it.
Drug Laboratory         As recounted earlier, in December 1992 the ATF had already asked the DEA
                        to handle the illegal drug laboratory that it thought might be hidden on the
                        compound.24 By the end of January 1993, its plans reflected that agreement:
                        A team of DEA agents, including one certified to handle clandestine
                        laboratories, would be on hand the day of the warrant service specifically
                        to deal with drug evidence. If ATF agents should encounter any drug
                        materials while securing people or weapons/explosives evidence, they
                        were to pull back from that particular location, cordon it off, and call in the
                        DEA team. The DEA agents would manage the drug evidence and supervise
                        cleanup. This solution was in keeping with standard practice by ATF and
                        other federal LEAs.

                        These plans were shared with the military organizations supporting the
                        operation. At the February 4 meeting between ATF and the military,
                        participants discussed the dangers of operating around volatile substances
                        (chemicals for making methamphetamine and explosives are very volatile),
                        especially with gunfire and diversionary devices.25 The ATF also assured
                        the military representatives that it would have a DEA team ready to “take
                        down the lab.” Indeed, some days before the warrant service occurred, the
                        ATF informed DEA of the date, time, and place of the operation and
                        confirmed that DEA would have a certified clandestine-laboratory agent at
                        ATF’s command post to handle the drug evidence.

                        ATF also took certain standard measures to guard against explosives,
                        weapons, and hazardous chemicals:

                        • During final training for the operation, according to ATF and military
                          sources, ATF leaders discussed with their agents the suspected
                          laboratory and urged caution in the use of weapons. Those few agents




                        24
                         Its location was not known.
                        25
                         These devices, sometimes referred to as “flashbangs,” are useful in diverting criminal suspects. Their
                        explosions create a very brilliant flash and a very loud noise to disorient or stun people in the
                        immediate vicinity.




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  carrying diversionary devices were reminded to look before deploying
  them.
• Before ATF attempted to serve the warrants, at least one ATF leader
  went over routine cautions with the agents—do not taste, smell, or
  touch anything, do not interfere with any chemical reaction, be sure to
  undergo decontamination if you get drug material on yourself or
  weapons, etc.
• During the attempted warrant service, ATF teams wore helmets,
  anti-ballistic vests, protective gloves, sturdy boots, and eye protection.
  They also had first-aid kits and fire extinguishers on hand.

These measures also conform in large part with DEA’s drug-laboratory
safety measures for initial-entry teams. They differ only in that the entire
clothing of DEA teams (hoods, gloves, pants, and jackets) are made of
Nomex,26 whereas only the gloves of ATF agents are made of this material.

ATF planners acknowledged that their entry teams were not heavily
protected against hazardous drug materials. This did not concern them,
however, because the laboratory was not a tactical consideration. They
believed they could eliminate some parts of the main residence (e.g.,
bedrooms, dining room, and entrances) as likely sites for a drug laboratory.
Moreover, the need to secure the weapons and armed suspects overrode
the hazards of a possibly disassembled laboratory.

On the day of the warrant service, DEA agents with special gear were at the
command post specifically to handle any drug laboratory ATF might
encounter. According to the DEA, it had arranged for a state chemist to be
on standby to assist it, and its hazardous-materials van was on standby that
day at its Waco office. Moreover, DEA agents, including the
laboratory-certified individual, remained part of the law enforcement
support during the standoff to handle any drug evidence that might be
uncovered once the residence had been secured and vacated. 27 At DEA’s
request, the state chemist was also at the command post at least 1 day
during the siege.




26
 Nomex is a highly fire-resistant commercial material used in protective clothing.
27
 At some point in the standoff, the DEA asked to be part of the final clearing of the site after removal of
the Davidians, but that task was later assumed by another LEA in the aftermath of the fire.




Page 14                                            GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 Department of Defense
                              B-276428




Types, Cost, and              Military support of the Davidian operation came from both active and
                              National Guard units. The cost of all that support amounted to almost
Reimbursement of              $1 million, of which about 76 percent was reimbursed to the military and
Military Support to the       another 14 percent ($137,400) waived as counterdrug support. The
                              remaining 10 percent represent the military’s billing discrepancies.
Davidian Operation

Types and Costs of Military   Military support for the Davidian operation ranged from aircraft and
Support                       vehicles to equipment, supplies, and services (training, maintenance, etc).
                              We have estimated the cost of this support to be at least $982,400.28 The
                              Alabama and Texas National Guard, the Army (including Special Forces
                              units), the Air Force, and other DOD activities—the Uniformed Services
                              University of the Health Sciences, the Regional Logistics Support Office
                              and its Defense Reutilization and Marketing Offices—all provided some
                              form of military assistance.

                              Table 1 summarizes the types and costs of this support. The FBI incurred
                              the largest single costs—about $230,000 for damages to an Army UH-1
                              helicopter and $170,000 in operational costs for three Army UH-1s. In these
                              two instances, assistance was provided during the standoff; the helicopter
                              damage was due to pilot error, not Davidian gunfire.




                              28
                                This total does not include a cost for medical support from the Uniformed Services University of the
                              Health Sciences (which provided 133 staff days of services to the FBI during the standoff) because the
                              military no longer has documents available. The total also does not include the value of material
                              provided by the Regional Logistics Support Office and Defense Reutilization and Marketing Offices,
                              since those items, as excess inventory, were provided free of charge.




                              Page 15                                          GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 Department of Defense
                                           B-276428




Table 1: Types and Costs of Military Assistance to the ATF and the FBI in Their Branch Davidian Operations
Types of support            Description                                                                                                     Cost
Aircraft                    Reconnaissance and surveillance overflights, aerial diversion, transportation, standby
                            for medical evacuation, and recovery of loaned items (helicopters and fixed-wing
                            aircraft)                                                                                                  $548,400
Vehicles                    Surface transportation, protection, and recovery (tanks and other combat vehicles,
                            utility vehicles, and various tracked and wheeled transport and recovery vehicles)                           196,600
Equipment and supplies      Flak vests, helmets, masks, night-vision goggles, cameras, binoculars, electronic
                            jammers, cellular telephones, ammunition for grenade launcher, tents, generators,
                            lighting, clothing, fuel for vehicles and generators, and medical dressings                                   68,200
Personnel                   Coordination, liaison, logistics, maintenance, 24-hr. medical and health clinic,
                            operation of classified equipment, driver training, grenade-launcher training,
                            mine-detector training, communications training, medical training, and firing-range
                            support                                                                                                     169,200
Total                                                                                                                                  $982,400
                                           Note: In figuring costs for active-duty military participants, incremental costs alone—per diem and
                                           travel, but not pay and benefits—were used.
                                           Source: DOD and the Texas National Guard.




Reimbursement of Support                   As required by the Economy Act, the ATF and the FBI reimbursed the
                                           military for most of its assistance. Reimbursements covered 76 percent
                                           (about $747,300) of the costs, of which the FBI paid about 96 percent
                                           (about $718,300) and the ATF the remainder (about $29,000). The FBI also
                                           paid directly for the services of the Uniformed Services University of the
                                           Health Sciences. Appendix III provides more detail on reimbursements.


Billing Discrepancies                      In five instances the active Army failed to properly bill the FBI for services,
                                           equipment, and supplies, resulting in undercharges totaling about $100,000.
                                           The largest instance was an undercharge of $73,000 in operational
                                           expenses for the UH-1 and CH-47 helicopters lent by Fort Hood. According
                                           to a Fort Hood official, the Army does not plan to collect these
                                           undercharges, since it would realize no current benefit—that is, it would
                                           have to apply any collection to prior-year obligations. There were also two
                                           minor Texas National Guard overcharges for vehicle parts and helmets.
                                           Appendix IV provides more details on these billing discrepancies.


Waivers of Reimbursement                   The military waived reimbursement for the costs of support from its
for Counterdrug Support                    counterdrug programs. This assistance represented a small part of the
                                           overall military support to the Davidian operation, accounting for only



                                           Page 16                                          GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 Department of Defense
                  B-276428




                  14 percent of costs (about $137,400) and consisting of aerial overflights,
                  helicopter logistical support, fuel, telephone service, and training. Most of
                  this nonreimbursable assistance was provided by the Texas National Guard
                  counterdrug program at a cost of about $130,600 (about 37 percent of the
                  Texas National Guard’s total support). The Alabama National Guard and
                  Joint Task Force Six waived the minor costs of the counterdrug support
                  they provided—$1,200 and $5,600, respectively. Appendix V contains more
                  details on these waivers.



Conclusions       The ATF requests for assistance from military counterdrug programs met
                  the requirements of the relevant statutes for authorizing such support. In
                  these written requests, ATF cited its suspicions of drug activity. In both
                  cases, the military reasonably exercised its discretion in providing that
                  support as authorized under the relevant statutes.

                  In planning how it would serve warrants at the compound, ATF planned for
                  the possibility of encountering a methamphetamine laboratory or other
                  hazardous drug materials. As required by agency policy, ATF agents in the
                  operation were made aware of the suspected laboratory and of the
                  appropriate precautions. Moreover, DEA agents were at the command post
                  to handle any drug-related materials.



Agency Comments   In oral comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense
                  stated it accepted the report as presented and the Department of Justice
                  (including the Drug Enforcement Agency and the Federal Bureau of
                  Investigation) stated it concurred with the substance of the report. In
                  written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of the Treasury
                  (including the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms) stated it
                  concurred with the report’s conclusions. All three departments provided
                  technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate.


                  We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
                  committees. We are also sending copies to the Honorable Louis Caldera,
                  Secretary of the Army; the Honorable Russell C. Davis, Chief of the
                  National Guard Bureau; the Honorable John W. Magaw, Director of the
                  Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; the Honorable Louis J. Freeh,
                  Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and the Honorable




                  Page 17                              GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 Department of Defense
B-276428




Thomas A. Constantine, Administrator of the Drug Enforcement
Administration. Copies will also be made available to others upon request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-5140 if you have any questions concerning
this report.




Mark E. Gebicke
Director, National Security and
 Preparedness Issues




Page 18                            GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 Department of Defense
                                              Letter




Page 19   GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 Department of Defense
Contents



Letter                                                                      1


Appendix I                                                                 22
Organizations Visited
and Documents
Reviewed

Appendix II                                                                24
Statutes Related to
Military Support of
Branch Davidian
Operations

Appendix III                                                               27
Reimbursements to the
Military From the ATF
and the FBI for
Assistance to Their
Branch Davidian
Operations

Appendix IV                                                                28
Discrepancies in
Billing the FBI for
Military Support to Its
Branch Davidian
Operations




                          Page 20   GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 Department of Defense
                         Contents




Appendix V                                                                                         29
Costs Waived by the
Military in Support of
the Branch Davidian
Operations

Appendix VI                                                                                        30
Comments From the
Department of the
Treasury

Table                    Table 1: Types and Costs of Military Assistance to the ATF and
                           the FBI in Their Branch Davidian Operations                             16




                         Abbreviations

                         ATF        Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
                         DOD        Department of Defense
                         DEA        Drug Enforcement Administration
                         FBI        Federal Bureau of Investigation
                         LEA        law enforcement agencies



                         Page 21                            GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 Department of Defense
Appendix I

Organizations Visited and Documents
Reviewed                                                                                    Appenx
                                                                                                 Idi




              To obtain the information needed for our review, we visited or contacted
              the following organizations:

              • Military organizations
                • The Office of the Deputy General Counsel, the Department of
                   Defense (DOD); the Office of the Coordinator for Drug Enforcement
                   Policy and Support, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
                   Defense; and the National Guard Bureau, all in Washington, D.C.
                • Joint Task Force Six, Fort Bliss, Texas.
                • Texas National Guard, Camp Mabry, Texas.
                • U.S. Army Aviation and Troop Command, St. Louis, Missouri.
                • U.S. Army, III Corps, Fort Hood, Texas.
                • Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Fort Monmouth, New
                   Jersey.
              • Law enforcement organizations
                • Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), Federal Bureau of
                   Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and
                   Customs in Washington, D.C.
                • Local offices of federal law enforcement agencies (LEA) (ATF, DEA,
                   and the U.S. Attorney’s Office) in Texas.
                • Operation Alliance, Fort Bliss, Texas.
                • State and local LEAs—the McLennan County Sheriff’s Department
                   and District Attorney’s Office, the Texas Department of Public Safety,
                   and the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services.

              We also reviewed hundreds of documents and other media, including the
              following:

              • Investigation into the Activities of Federal Law Enforcement Agencies
                toward the Branch Davidians, Committee on Government Reform and
                Oversight in conjunction with the Committee on the Judiciary, House of
                Representatives Report 104–749 (Aug. 2, 1996), Union Calendar No. 395.
              • Activities of Federal Law Enforcement Agencies toward the Branch
                Davidians, Joint hearings before the Subcommittee on Crime of the
                Committee on the Judiciary and the Subcommittee on National Security,
                International Affairs, and Criminal Justice of the Committee on
                Government Reform and Oversight, Committee on the Judiciary Serial
                No. 72 (July 19–21, 24–28, 31, and Aug. 1, 1995), in three parts.
              • Events Surrounding the Branch Davidian Cult Standoff in Waco, Texas,
                House Judiciary Committee hearing (Apr. 28, 1993).




              Page 22                             GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 Department of Defense
Appendix I
Organizations Visited and Documents
Reviewed




• Report of the Department of the Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol,
  Tobacco, and Firearms Investigation of Vernon Wayne Howell, also
  known as David Koresh (Sept. 1993).
• Guidelines for the Cleanup of Clandestine Drug Laboratories, Joint
  Federal Task Force of the Drug Enforcement Administration,
  Environmental Protection Agency, and Coast Guard (March 1990).
• “ATF Policy Regarding Investigations Involving Clandestine
  Laboratories,” dated April 25, 1990 (subsequently incorporated into ATF
  Order 3210.7B).
• Excerpts from the DEA agent’s manual.
• All Waco Administrative Review documents.
• ATF investigative files.
• Final report by Brigadier General Sagsveen on the Waco/Mt. Carmel
  incident (July 30, 1996).
• Results of the focal group review of Texas National Guard support to the
  ATF, known informally as the “Spence Report” (Apr. 28, 1993).
• After-action report of Texas National Guard counterdrug support in
  Waco, Texas (Apr. 29, 1993).
• Other relevant DOD provisions, policies, and procedures as well as
  information on the National Guard counterdrug program, other Guard
  material, and the operational support planning guide for Joint Task
  Force Six.
• Operation Alliance procedures for reviewing counterdrug requests.
• Videotapes of overflights of the Davidian compound and of selected
  operational briefings.




Page 23                               GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 Department of Defense
Appendix II

Statutes Related to Military Support of Branch
Davidian Operations                                                                                                            Appe
                                                                                                                                  nIx
                                                                                                                                    Idi




National Defense       Section 1004 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1991 authorized
                       the Secretary of Defense to provide the support of active military units for
Authorization Act of   the counterdrug activities “of any other department or agency of the
1991                   Federal Government or of any State, local, or foreign law enforcement
                       agency.”1 In 1993, when the Davidian operations occurred, the act limited
                       active military support for counterdrug activities to the following nine
                       categories:2

                       • Maintenance and repair of equipment made available by DOD to a
                         federal department or agency or to a state or local government.
                       • Maintenance, repair, and upgrading of non-DOD equipment to ensure
                         that it will be compatible with equipment used by DOD.
                       • Transportation of personnel, equipment, or supplies.
                       • Establishment and operation of bases of operation or training facilities.
                       • Training of law enforcement personnel, including associated support
                         expenses for trainees and the provision of materials necessary to carry
                         out such training.
                       • Detection, monitoring, and communication of movement of air, sea, and
                         surface traffic.
                       • Construction of roads and fences and installation of lighting to block
                         drug-smuggling across international boundaries of the United States.
                       • Establishment of command, control, communication, and computer
                         networks to improve integration of law enforcement, active military, and
                         National Guard activities.
                       • Provision of linguist and intelligence analysis services.


10 U.S.C. §§ 371–382   Sections 371–382 of title 10 of the U.S. Code authorize the Secretary of
                       Defense to provide certain types of support by active military units to
                       federal, state, or local law enforcement officials. LEAs are not required to
                       reimburse DOD for the support if it (1) is provided in the normal course of
                       military training or operations or (2) results in a benefit to DOD that is
                       “substantially equivalent” to that which would otherwise be obtained from




                       1
                        P.L. 101–510, div. A, title X, § 1004, as amended. Congress was extended the authority through 2002.
                       See P.L. 105-261, div. A, title X, § 1021
                       2
                        In 1993, Congress added a tenth purpose for which the Secretary may provide support—aerial and
                       ground reconnaissance. See P.L. 103–160, div. A., title XI, § 1121(b).




                       Page 24                                           GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 Department of Defense
                  Appendix II
                  Statutes Related to Military Support of
                  Branch Davidian Operations




                  military operations or training.3 Otherwise, DOD must be reimbursed as
                  required by the Economy Act.4

                  Title 10 authorizes the following types of support:

                  • Any information collected during the normal course of training or
                    operations that may be relevant to a violation of any federal or state law
                    within the jurisdiction of the officials supported.
                  • Equipment (including associated supplies or parts) and base or research
                    facilities.
                  • Training in the operation and maintenance of DOD equipment.
                  • Relevant expert advice.
                  • Maintenance of equipment.
                  • The operation of military equipment for (1) monitoring air and sea
                    traffic; (2) monitoring surface traffic outside U.S. borders, as well as
                    25 miles within U.S. borders if the initial detection occurred outside the
                    United States; (3) aerial surveillance; (4) intercepting vessels or aircraft
                    detected outside the land area of the United States; (5) facilitating
                    communications with federal LEAs; and (6) transporting and staffing an
                    operational base for civilian law enforcement personnel. 5


32 U.S.C. § 112   Under 32 U.S.C. § 112, the Secretary of Defense may provide funds
                  appropriated for National Guard activities to the governor of a state who
                  submits a drug-interdiction and counterdrug-activities plan that meets
                  certain statutory requirements. To obtain funding, a state’s plan must
                  (1) specify how National Guard personnel and equipment will be used in
                  such activities, (2) certify that the use of the National Guard of the state is
                  consistent with state law, and (3) certify that the activities included in the
                  plan serve a state law enforcement purpose. If a state’s plan is approved
                  and DOD provides funding, the state may use the funds to pay expenses
                  related to the use of its National Guard personnel (while not in federal




                  3
                      10 U.S.C. § 377.
                  4
                   The Economy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1535, generally mandates prompt repayment for goods and services
                  provided by one agency to another.
                  5
                   See 10 U.S.C. § 374. Federal LEAs responsible for enforcing the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. §
                  801 et seq.), certain Immigration and Naturalization Act provisions (8 U.S.C. §§ 1324–1328), section 401
                  of the Tariff Act of 1940, and the Maritime Law Enforcement Act may request such aid.




                  Page 25                                           GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 Department of Defense
                        Appendix II
                        Statutes Related to Military Support of
                        Branch Davidian Operations




                        service) and equipment for drug interdiction and counterdrug activities. 6
                        DOD considers support requests that are not specifically included in the
                        original plan on a case-by-case basis if accompanied by a certification from
                        the state’s attorney general that the operations requested are consistent
                        with state law. 7 LEAs are not required to reimburse the National Guard for
                        this support. 8



National Defense for    Section 1208 of the National Defense Authorization Act9 allowed DOD to
                        give federal and state agencies equipment—free of charge—that the
Authorization Act for   Secretary of Defense had declared excess to the military’s needs. Under
Fiscal Year 1990        this statute, the Secretary of Defense was required to determine that the
                        equipment was suitable for use in counterdrug activities.




                        6
                         The act defines “drug interdiction and counter drug activities” as “the use of National Guard personnel
                        in the drug interdiction and counter-drug law enforcement activities authorized by the law of the State
                        and requested by the Governor of the State.”
                        7
                            National Guard (NGR) 500–2.
                        8
                            P.L. 101–189.
                        9
                          In 1996, Congress repealed § 1208. P.L. 104-201, div. A., title X, section 1033(a) contained similar
                        language now codified as 10 U.S.C.§ 2576a.




                        Page 26                                            GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 Department of Defense
Appendix III

Reimbursements to the Military From the ATF
and the FBI for Assistance to Their Branch
Davidian Operations                                                                                                                                  AppeInx
                                                                                                                                                           Idi




Support                                                                                                    Recipient              Reimbursement
Aircraft
Active Army—3 UH-1 utility helicopters and 3 CH-47 helicopters                                             FBI                             $375,179
Active Air Force—C-141 transport of FBI’s hostage rescue team (and its equipment) to and from              FBI                                73,112
Waco
Vehicles
Texas National Guard—2 M-35A2 2½-ton cargo trucks with transport trailers, 5 M-818 5-ton tractor ATF                                           6,858
trucks with trailers, 12 M-1009 high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles
Texas National Guard—10 M-2 Bradleys (infantry fighting vehicles), 3 M-332 tractor trailers, 5    FBI                                       174,313
M-728 combat engineer vehicles, 1 M-88A1 tracked recovery vehicle (tank retriever), miscellaneous
vehicles
Active Army—8 M-998 high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles, an M35A2 2½-ton cargo                    FBI                                15,466
truck, 2 5-ton trucks, 14 heavy equipment transports, miscellaneous vehicles
Equipment
Texas National Guard—unrecovered photographic and observation equipment, 100 canteens, 50                  ATF                                 5,022
first-aid dressings, 130 empty magazines for M-16A1 rifles, assorted field clothing
Texas National Guard—16 helmets, 13 helmet covers, 12 M-16A1 rifle slings, 54 empty magazines              FBI                                 5,190
for M-16A1s, an M-25A1 protective mask, 180 tent pins
Active Army—2,488 gallons of generator fuel, fencing, 200 sandbags, 6 boxes of chemical lights,            FBI                                 5,523
cellular-phone charges
Supplies
Texas National Guard—286 cases of field rations and 2,036 gallons of diesel fuel                           ATF                                17,015
Texas National Guard—62 cases of field rations, 10,529 gallons of diesel fuel, and transportation          FBI                                19,133
costs of tracked vehicles
Personnel (per diem, transportation, and travel costs)
Active Air Force—electronic jammers and travel costs                                                       FBI                                34,340
Active Army—liaison to LEAs and HQs; maintenance of aircraft, vehicles, and equipment; operation FBI                                          16,135
of equipment; and local transportation costs for DOD personnel
Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences—24-hr. medical control, 24-hr clinic, drafting FBI                                Reimbursed
of Waco medical plan                                                                                                                 133 staff-daysa
Total of known amounts reimbursed                                                                                                          $747,286
                                              a
                                               A flat rate plus all travel was used under a Memorandum of Understanding between the two parties.
                                              All travel vouchers were sent directly to the FBI for payment; FBI paid for expendable medical supplies.




                                              Page 27                                           GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 Department of Defense
Appendix IV

Discrepancies in Billing the FBI for Military
Support to Its Branch Davidian Operations                                                                                             Appenx
                                                                                                                                           IV
                                                                                                                                            di




Undercharges                                                                                                                   Amount
Active Army used the wrong flying-hour rates when determining charges for:                                                     $73,073
• flights by UH-1 helicopters for transport, deployment, medical evacuation support, and recovery
• flight by CH-47 helicopter on medical standby
Active Army did not bill for the loss of two night-vision goggles                                                                 9,168
Active Army did not bill for 40-mm grenade-launcher ammunition (200 target-practice rounds, 50 illumination rounds,               5,066
and 250 high-explosive rounds)
Active Army did not bill for 9 cases of field rations consumed by Army personnel while supporting the siege                        164
Active Army (Special Operations) did not bill for the following services provided during the siege:                              10,793
• observers and technical liaisons to the FBI’s hostage rescue team
• operation of classified/special equipment
• training federal agents in use of classified equipment
Total undercharges                                                                                                             $98,264
Overcharges
Texas National Guard overcharged for vehicular parts                                                                               $41
Texas National Guard overcharged for the loss of 8 Kevlar ground-troop helmets                                                     498
Total overcharges                                                                                                                 $539
Net undercharges                                                                                                               $97,725




                                                 Page 28                                     GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 Department of Defense
Appendix V

Costs Waived by the Military in Support of the
Branch Davidian Operations                                                                                                                                   Appe
                                                                                                                                                                nx
                                                                                                                                                                 Vdi




Support                                                           Recipient                Cost       Authority for waiver
Alabama National Guard
2 overflights for reconnaissance photography of the               ATF                    $1,238       32 U.S.C. § 112 (counterdrug)
compound
Subtotal                                                                                 $1,238
Active Army (Joint Task Force Six)
Counterdrug training                                              ATF                     5,610       10 U.S.C. § 377 (substantial training benefit)
• Communications                                                                                      P.L. 101–510 § 1004 (b) 4–5
• Medical evacuation                                                                                  10 U.S.C. § 373
• First aid
• Firing-range support
• Minor construction
Subtotal                                                                                 $5,610
Texas National Guard
UC-26 aircraft                                                    ATF                     8,032a      32 U.S.C. § 112 (counterdrug)
• 4 overflights of the compound for reconnaissance
  photography
• 1 flight in support of siege
Helicopter flights in support of warrant service                  ATF                   15,388b       32 U.S.C. § 112 (counterdrug)
Helicopter flights in support of siege                            ATF                     2,454       32 U.S.C. § 112 (counterdrug)
Personnel services in siege                                       ATF and FBI          102,301c       32 U.S.C. § 112 (counterdrug)
• Liaison, command and control
• Helicopter flight crews, drivers of various vehicles
• Vehicle and equipment maintenance
Fuel for non-tracked vehicles                                     ATF and FBI                410      32 U.S.C. § 112 (counterdrug)
Landline and cellular telephone service                           ATF and FBI             1,995       32 U.S.C. § 112 (counterdrug)
Subtotal                                                                              $130,580
Total amount of expenses waived by the military                                       $137,428
                                                   a
                                                       Includes costs for flying hours, personnel, and special maintenance contract.
                                                   b
                                                       Includes repair of gunshot damage sustained in warrant service.
                                                   c
                                                    Total pay, per diem, and travel (896 staff-days). All personnel were in title 32 (counterdrug program)
                                                   status.




                                                   Page 29                                             GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 Department of Defense
Appendix VI

Comments From the Department of the
Treasury                                                            Appenx
                                                                         V
                                                                         diI




              Page 30      GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 Department of Defense
                  Appendix VI
                  Comments From the Department of the
                  Treasury




(703183)   Lte
             rt   Page 31                               GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 Department of Defense
Appendix VI
Comments From the Department of the
Treasury




Page 32                               GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 Department of Defense
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