Status of the Utility Tactical Transport Aircraft System Program

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1977-02-25.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                              DOCURBIT RBSUlE
01122 -     &0891453 1
Status of the tility Tactical Transport Aircraft System
Program. WSAD-77-31; B-163058. February 25, 1977. 12 pp.
Report tc the Congress; by Robert       . Keller,   acting Comptroller
issue Area: ederal Procurement of Goods and Services (1900);
    Federal Procurement of oods and Services: otifying the
    congress of Status of Iaprtant Procureent Programs (1905).
Contacts Procurement and Systems Acquisition Div.
Budget Fenction:  ational Defense (050); ational Defense:
    ger.ipon SIu 'bi (057).
C'anination     . ncerned: Department of Defense; Department of the
Congressional Relevances      ouse Committee on Armed Services;
    Senate Comittee on Armed Services; Congress.
          The Utility Tactical Transport System Program is a
twin-engined elicopter cheduled to replace the Army's current
utilite helicopter, the    -1, in air assault, air cavalry, and
medical support units. fininlos/conclusions: Imaroved
:eliability, maintainability, availability, survivability, and
performance were primary factors in the justification for this
development.    competitive development program has been
substantially completed at a cost of about $463 million, and
production contrtc?ft£r 15 of the aircraft was awarded in
December 1976. The eliability and maintainability results
demonstrated during:competitise testing are questionable and may
not be valid. GAO is uncertain whether the Army has met the
objective of developing an aircraft with major improvements in
reliability and maintainability, as the OR-1 demacnstrated uch
better reliability and maintainability than the competing
prototypes during overnment competitive testing. Recent life
cycle cost estiates indicate that the cost of a fleet of new
aircraft will be ore expensive than a comparable fleet of new
al-1 helicopters. This is contrary to the figures used to
lustify the development program.   Recommendations: The Secretary
of Defense hould ake sure that reliability nd maintainability
goals have been achieved before the Arry exercises contract
options for follow-on production. (&uthor/SC)


         s,    OF THE UNITED STATES

               Status Of The Utility
               Tactical Transport Aircraft
               System Program
               Department of the Army

               The Utility Tactical Transport Aircraft Sys-
               tem is being purchased to replace the Army's
               current utility helicopter, the UH-1. The
               Armv has completed the competitive develop-
               ment phase and awarded a production con-
               tract in December 1976.
               GAO is uncertain whether the Army has met
               the objective of developing an aircraft with
               major improvements in reliability and main-
               The Secretarv of Defense should make sure
               that reliability and maintainability goals have
               been echieved before the Army exercises con-
               tract options for follow-on production.

               PSAD-77-31                                  FE     .   25, 1977
                                                           F     B. 2 i5,   9 7 7
            COMPTRLLR olNL''L OF THE UNITI   SrATl
                      WASHINTON. D.C.   MO


To the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives
     This report presents our views on the major issues
of the Utility Tactical Transport Sstem Program. For
the past several years we have annually reported to the
Congress on the status of selected major weapons systems.
This report is one of a series of 29 reports that we are
furnishing this year to the Congress for their use in
reviewing fiscal year 1978 requests for funds.

     A draft of this report was reviewed by agency officialg
associated with the program and their comments are incorpor-
ated as appropriate.
     We made our review pursuant to the Budget and Accounting
Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting and Auditing Act
of 950 (31 U.S.C. 67).

     We are sending copies of this report to the Director,
Office of Management and Budget, and the Secretary of Defense.

                         ACTING Comptroller General
                                of the United States
                                       Department of the Army

          D I G E S T

          The Utility Tactical Transport Aircraft
          System is being developed to replace the
          Army's current utility helicopter, the
          UH-1, in air assault, air cvalry, and
          medical support units. It is a twin-
          engined helicopt?.r that will provide the
          Army with increased operational capabilitylift
          because of its greater internal size and
          capability. Design improvements and increased
          performance make the aircraft less vulner-
          able to enemy fire.     Improved reliability,
          maintainability,   availability,  survivability,
           and performance were   primary factors in
           the justification  for  this development.

           A competitive development .program has been
           substantially completed a a cost of about
           $463 million, and on December 23, 1976,  15
           Army awarded a production  contract  for
           aircraft to Sikorsky Aircraft Division of
           United Technologies Corporation.    (See
           pp. 1, 5, and 6)

           The following important matters were roted
           during our review:

           -- Government competitive testing of the
              Prototypes and the UH-i completed in
              September 1976 at Fort Campbell, Kentucky,
              shows the new helicopter has met its interim
              reliability and maintainability goals. The
              UH-1, which is a mature system, demonstrated
              much better reliability and maintainability
              than the competing Prototypes. (See ch.

            -- Recent life cycle cost estimates indicate
               the cost of a fleet of new eircraft will
               be more expensive than a comparable
               fleet of new UH-1 helicopters. This is
               contrary to estimates used to justify the
               new helicopter development.  (See p. 4 .)

                                         i           PSAD-77-31
     r.B . Upon ruroval, the report
    calr dte should be noted hereon.
-- An August 1976 independent cost estimate
   indicates the design-tc-cost goal will be
   exceeded by about 6 percent. The Army now
   believes the goal may be slightly exceeded.
   (See p. 4 .)

Sikorsky's prototypes generally met aircraft
performance requirements except for vertical
flight performance. Excessive weight of the
prototypes resulted in less vertical rate
of climb than anticipated. However, production
models are expected to improve because of a
350-pound weight reduction. The prototypes
also substantially exceeded the allowable
vibration levels, and the vibration specifi-
cations for the production model have been
relaxed.  (See pp. 6-7 .)

GAO believes that reliability and aintain-
ability results demonstrated during competitive
testing are questionable and may not be valid.
GAO is uncertain whether the Army has met
the objective of developing an aircraft with
major improvements in reliability and main-
tainability. The Army advised that the new
helicopter is expected to be better than the
UH-1 as it becomes a mature system.

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
make sure reliability and maintainability
goals have been achieved before the Army
exercises contract options for follow-on pro-

A draft of this report was reviewed by agency
officials associated with management of the
program and their comments have been in-
corporated das appropriate.

                      C o n t e n't s


DIGEST                                                    i

   1       INTRODUCTION                                   1
                Relationship to other systems             2
                Scope of review                           2

   2       SYSTEM STATUS                                  3
                Cost                                      3
                     Design-to-cost goal                  4
                     Life cycle costs                     4
                Schedule                                  5
                Performance                               6
                Conclusions                               8

      3    GOVERNMENT COMPETITIVE TESTING                 9
                Mean time between failures                9
                Maintenance man-hours                     11
                Conclusions and recommendation            11


      I    Government competitive test results            12


GAO        General Accounting Office

UTTAS      Utility Tactical Transport Aircraft System
;trl~i ~P
       I~I ~1                     I I a f-s

                 -            ~          7    r

     The Utility Tactical Transport Aircraft System (UTTAS)
is a new twin-engined helicopter that is scheduled to re-
place the Army's current utility helicopter, the UH-1 in
air assault, air cavalry, and medical evacuation missions.
It is planned to be the Army's first true squad assault
helicopter, designed to transport 11 fully-equipped combat
troops. The UTTAb is to perform the missions of trans-
porting troops and equipment into combat, resupplying the
troops while in combat, and performing associated functions
of aeromedical evacuation, repositioning of reserves,
and ',ther combat support missions.    a.
                                       AI   objective for
UTTAS is to achieve increased cost effectiveness through
substantially improved maintainability, availability, re]i-
ability, survivability, and performance.
     UTTAS development was approved by the Deputy Secretary
of Defense in June 1971. In March 172 he General Electric
Company was awarded a cost-plus-incentive fee contract to
develop, furnish, and support ground and flight test engines
for the UTTAS. A contract for further development of the
engine, issued in March 1975, is scheduled to run until Decem-
ber 1979. Cost-plus-incentive fee contracts were awarded for
airframe prototype design and fabrication in August 1972 to
the Boeing Vertol Company, division of Boeing Company, and
to Sikorsky Aircraft, division of the United Technologies Cor-
poration. Initial Army plans called for 16 developmental air-
craft; however, the Congress provided funds for only 10--1
static test article, 1 ground test vehicle, and 3 flying pro-
totypes per contractor. In October and November 1974 the air-
frame contractors accomplished first flight with their air-
craft and began prototype flight tests. Each contractor's
flight testing consisted of about 700 flight hours. The test-
ing was completed in March 1976, and the aircraft were turned
over to the Army for competitive testing.
     The development program is substa ttially completed at
a cost of about $463 million. On December 23, 1976, a pro-
duction contract for 15 aircraft was awarded to Sikorsky
Aircraft for $83.4 million. The contract contains options
for 56 aircraft in v.he second year, 129 in the third year,
and 168 to 185 in the fourth year. The Decision Cooldinating
Paper requires the Army to demonstrate that reliability and
maintainability goals for the mature aircraft have been

 achieved prior to the full-scale production
                                              decision. The
 Army does not plan to demonstrate the attainment
 goals until 200 aircraft are on contract.         of these
                                             The total po-
 gram acquisition cost is currently estimated
 $3.4 billion for 10 development and 1,107      to be about
                                           production air-


      Both UTTAS competitior's prototypes are being
 for the Navy'i Light Airborne Multi-Purpose          considered
                                              System. The Navy
 plans to obtain competition in the selection
 for tis program rather than automatically     of an airframe
                                             accepting the
winner of UTTAS competition. The Navy has
for proposals which were to be received by issued requests
Eight contractors have expressed interest November 5, 1976.
gram. Three airframe contractors including the Navy's pro-
                                              Boeing and
Sikorsky bOve responded to the Navy's request
                                                for proposal.
      The UTTAS is also being considered for the
                                                  Navy's carrier
antisubmarine warfare helicopter and as a
                                            arine Corps troop
transport helicopter. Marine Corps officials
due to differences in squad size and distance told us that
the Marine Corps may need a larger helicopter requirements,
than UTTAS.                                     with more speed

     Our review primarily dealt with UTTAS program
schedule, performance testing, and related
                                            technical matters
at the UTTAS project manager's office and
Systems Command, St. Louis, Missouri. We   the Army Aviation
testing data at a test site at Fort Campbell,        Government
discussed procedures with testing personnel.   Kentucky,   and
                                               We discussed
program results with Department of Army officials
officials of the Army Materiel Systems Analysis     and with
at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland.

                           CEAPTE     2
                         SYSTEM STATUS
     Cost, schedule, and technical performance goals have
generally been met during the UTTAS development program.
Program cost has increased about $1 billion over the fiscal
year 1971 estimate, primarily because of inflation. We
believe the design-to-cost goal for the UTTAS will be ex-
ceeded. However, the Army advised that any increase would
be slight. The scheduled milestones for the development
program have generally been met, on a timely basis, with
the production contract awarded only 1 month behind schedule.
The Army has considered several changes to the initial produc-
tion quantities. Current plans call for 200 aircraft to be
purchased during the first 3 years of production with a
fourth year op' .on for 168 to 185 additional aircraft. Pre-
vious plans to t,'rchasae 85 arcraft dring the first 3 years
were changed because of cost considerations. (ee p. 4 .)
     Perfcrmance goals for UTTAS have generally been demon-
strated except for the prototype helicopters exceeding
weight limitations which affect hover and climb capabilities
and excessive vibration in the cabin-and cockpit areas.
     The Army estimates the verage program unit acquisition
cost for developmental and production helicopters is about
$3 million. The average -rii' cost in the Army's planning
estimate was about $2 million. The following chart lists
the program development and procurement acquisition cost

               Sel ected Acquist ionRepor t Csts
                      Planning            Current
                      estimate            estimate
                       FY 1971            9-30-75
Development          $  409.9             $     463.0
Procurement           1,897.4                 2s963.6
Program cost         $2,307.3             $3,366;6

      Inflation has increased the 1971 planning estimate
by Riire than $50 million for development and $1.2 billion
for procurement. The net increase of about $1 billion
in procurement also included decreases for deletion of
program requirements, removal of replenishment spare parts
from the estimate, and application of revised estimating
techniques. The estimated price overrun at completion for
the research and development contracts for both contractors
amounted to $57 million.

Design-to-cost goal
     The Army Aviation Systems Command's independent cost
estimate for the UTTAS prepared in August 1976 indicated the
UTTAS cost would exceed the design-to-cost goal by 6 percent.
Design-to-cost goals are stated in terms of the flyaway cost
which includes the unit cost of the airframe, engines, a ion-
ics, and Government-furnished equipment. Stated in 1977 dol-
lars, the unit design-to-cost goal is $1.44 million. The
independent cost estimate for the UTTAS is $1.52 million or
about $80,000 more than the goal. This estimate was based
on an initial production of 85 aircraft over a 3-year period.
We were advised by an Army official that increasing the ini-
tial production quantity from 85 aircraft to 200 resulted in
substantial savings which reduced the average flyaway cost of
the aircraft. The Army advised that the design-to-cost goal
may be slightly exceeded.

Life cycle costs
       The rmy Deputy Chief of Staff for Operati ns and
Plans directed a cost and operational effectiveness analysis
be performed to determine the ranking of alternative systems
in performing the UTTAS missions.  The Aviation Systems Com-
mand was assigned the responsibility of providing lfe   cycle
cost estimates of alternative aircraft systems  fr  the analysis.

     The Aviation Systems Command's study, prepared in
September 1976, showed that UTTAS life cycle costs will be
about $319 million more than a new UH-1 fleet. The following
are the comparisons of the life cycle cost estimates in 1977
dollars for these systems.

                    Life Cycle Cost Summary
                               UH-i                  UTTAS

    Development            $    -                $     .112
    Investment                 1.058                  2.249
    Operating and
      support                  10.625                 9.632
           Total life
             cycle cost    $11.683               $11.993

     The investment cost in the above table is based on the
procurement of sufficient numbers of aircraft to perform the
UTTAS mission--1,587 UH-ls and 1,107 UTTASs. The quantity
of UTTAS is lower because of its improved operational effec-
tiveness. The operating and support costs are based on
a 20-year aircraft life and 27 flying hours per month. De-
velopment costs were not included in the UH-1 cost because
development has been completed.
     The Army's Decision Coordinating Paper, dated May ';4,
1971, stressed several fundamental. considerations which
required the UTTAS development. One consideration was that
an airfkeet composed of UH-1 helicopters would be $600 mil-
lion to $850 million (1971 dollars) more expensive to own and
operate than a comparable UTTAS fleet. The life cycle cost
estimate above shows that the UTTAS will be about $300 million
(l77 dollars) more expensive than the UH-i. Based on the
Aviation Systems Command's study, it appears that te antic-
ipated cost savings will not be achieved and the consider-
ation is no longer valid.
     The Army advised that the most recent life cycle cost
estimate shows the UTTAS will be about $236 million (1977
dollars) move expensive than a comparable fleet of new
UH-1 aircraft.
     minor slippages in program schedule milestones have
occurred. Government competitive testing was completed
4 months behind schedule because icing tests were not com-
pleted until December 1976. However, the initial production

contract for 15 aircraft was awarded to Sikorsky Aircraft in
December 1976, only 1 month bhind schedule. A follow-on
development effort to correct deficiencies disclosed during
competitive testing and to continue reliability and main-
tainability testing will run concurrently with initial
production. Except for this effort, which is estimated to
cost about $61 million, the basic engineering evelopment
phase is complete.
     Scheduled major milestones are shown below.
              Scheduled   aor Progam   ilesto   es
Producibility engineering planning
  contract completion--engine               September 1977
Exercise second year option for
  56 aircraft                              October 1977
Deliver first limited production
  aircraft                                  August 1978
Completion of follow-on engineer-
  ing development testing                   September 1978
Exercise third year option for
  129 aircraft                             October 1978
Phase III development and oper-
  ational test completion                   April 1979
Defense Systems Acquisition
  Review Council IIA                        August ,979
                                              (note a)
Exercise fourth year option for
  168 to 185 aircraft                      October 1979

a/Replaced by Army Systems Review Council IIIA in August 1979.
     There have been no changes to the performance require-
ments since the competitive contracts were awarded. Follow-
ing are the performance requirements reported in the
September 30, 1976, Selected Acquisition Report.

       Characteristics                    Requirements
Basic mission payload (n,Ue a)    11 combat-equipped troops
Mission endurance (note a)        2.3 hours
Mission reliability                .986909 (probability
                                    ,f completing a
Cruise speed (note a)             145 t     175 knots
Vertical flight performance
  (note a)                        450 :o 550 feet per
                                  minute at 95-percent
                                  intermediate (military)
                                  rated power
Maintenance man-hours per
  flight-hour (note b)            3.8 hours
a/Performance at 4,000 feet/95 degrees Fahrenheit.
b/1.0 hour preventive and 2.8 hours fault
     Sikorsky generally met the performance character-
istics listed above except vertical flight performance. The
weight of the prototypes was above the weight originally esti-
mated in the contractors' specifications. As a esult, the
prototypes demonstrated lees hover out of ground effect/
vertical rate of climb performance than required of the pro-
duction aircraft. The production specifications were estab-
lished at 480 feet per minute rate of climb. The Army advised
the production helicopter is expected to be within the required
weight tolerances, and should achieve the required rate of
     Sikorsky's prototypes exceeded the specifications for
allovable vibration levels in the cockpit and cabin areas
by about 100 percent. The development specifications allowed
a vibration level of .05g. Sikorsky's prototypes demonstrated
appr'inmately .10g. The production specifications have
been relaxed to .10g for the cockpit and .12g for the cabin.
'he Army advised that this is better than the .20g normally
specified for helicopters.

     As of October 6, 1976, General Electric and the airfrae
contractors have accomplished about 29,000 total test hours
on the development engines. Project officials advised that
the production configuration engine successfully completed
the 150-hour military qualification test in March 1976 and
is ready to go into production.
     Cost, schedule, and technical erformance goals of the
UTTAS have generally been met during the basic engineering
development phase. Excessive weight of the prototypes and
excessive vibration in the cabin and cockpit areas were en-
countered during the development phase.   n our opinion, air-
craft weight and vibration levels should be closely watched
during initial production when further refinement and develop-
ment testing will be conducted.

                         CHAPTER 3


     Government competitive tests ahow that the UTTAS
contractors' prototypes have exceeded the Army's interim re-
liability and maintainability goals of 2.6 hour, mean time
between failures and 4.3 hours fault corrective .iaintenance
man-hours per flight hour. However, test results also show
that the UH-1 demonstrated much better reliability and main-
tainability than the UTTAS. As shown in appendix , Govern-
ment test results are questionable in view of the results
of the UH-1 helicopter, and may not be valid
     Government competitive tests for rliability and main-
tainability were conducted from March through September 1976.
The purpose of the testing was to establish a reliability,
maintainability, logistics, and operational ffectiveness
data base for se in evaluation of the UTTAS evelopment pro-
gram. The testing was comprised of two major phases--
developmental esting and operational testing. The dvelop-
mental testing was conducted by the Army Test and Evaluation
Command at Fort Rucker, Alabama; the Aviation Systems Commad,
Aviation Engineering Flight Activity at Edwards Air Force
Base, California; and at Fort Wainwright, Alaska. Operational
testing was conducted by the Army Operational Test and Evalua-
tion Agency at Fort Campbell, Kentucky.
     The contractors provided six aircraft for competitive
testing. The three aircraft from each contractor were flown
about 750 hours during Government testing. Two aircraft were
utilized for engineering flight testing and four were utilized
during the developmental and operational testing. U-1 air-
craft were also flown about 540 hours during testing to ob-
tain reliability and maintainability data for comparison
purposes. The final 200 hours of operational testing was
established as the time frame to demonstrate the attainment
of reliability goals.

     Simply stated, mean time between failures indicates the
length of time aircraft will fly without a failure. The Army's
UTTAS goal for this development phase was 2.6 hours with an
eventual goal of 4.0 hours by full production. The Army ex-
pected the UTTAS prototypes to demonstrate a mean time between
failure rate of 2.3 hours by the end of the competitive tests.

During the last 200 hours Boeing demonstrated 3.59 hours
and Sikorsky 2.97 hours for mean time between failures,
while the UH-1 demonstrated significantly better performance--
6.29 hours.
     Testing disclosed differences in mean time between
failures between each contractor's prototypes. For example,
during the last 200 hours of testing, one of Boeing's two
prototypes demonstrated 5.0 hours mean time between failures
and the other prototype only 3.4 hours. The prototype demon-
strating the highest reliability crashed in November 1975
before Government competitive testing. Army official s in-
dicated some of the repairs made to the damaged helicopter
resulted in new parts and general refurbishment of the aircraft
which could account for some of the differences. The Army
advised us that the refurbished helicopter did not incur the
same vibration problems experienced by the other prototype.

      Sikorsky experienced a similar difference with its pro-
totypes. During the last 200 hours of testing, one of its
prototypes demonstrated mean time between failures of 4.2
hours, while the other demonstrated 2.8 hours. Project of-
ficials were unable to explain the differences on the Sikorsky

     The UH-1 achieved 6.29 hour- for mean time between fail-
ures during the last 200 hours of Government testing. Army
officials have said that the UH-1, based on historical data,
demonstrates 2.6 hours for mean time between failures. When
the 6.3 hours is compared to the 2.6 hours, the validity of
Government test results becomes somewhat questionable.

     There are several possible reasons why reliability
achieved by the UTTAS prototypes during Government competitive
testing was better than anticipated:

       -- Improvements were incorporated by the contractors
          during the testing.

       -- Major components had few failures because of the
          relatively low number of flying hours on the system.

      -- The failure criteria was changed, with certain
         maintenance actions being reclassified as preventive
         maintenance and therefore not chargeable.


     An Aiay objective during the UTTAS development was to
obtain low maintenance man-hours per flight hour. The interim
goal at the end of competitive development was 4.8 hours for
fault corrective maintenance with it being reduced to 2.8
hours before October 1979. During the last 200 hours of
Government competitive testing Boeing end Sikorsky both de-
monstrated their aircraft reqhuired less fault corrective main-
tenance than the goal for the mature aircraft.
      However, the UH-1 fault corrective maintenance was
at least three times better than either UTTAS contractor demon-
strated during the last 200 hours of Government testing. We
believe and project officials agreed that the demonstrated
maintenance values are not representative of what will be
experienced on the UTTAS. Some possible reasons for the un-
realistically low maintenance hours were:

     -- Maintenance tat could have been performed was deterred
        because of design change considerations.

     -- Some items that could have been repaired in the field
        were repaired at the contractors' plants and not charged
        to the contractor. Army officials advised that they
        elected to rely on contractor support where feasible
        to minimize costs associated with training of personnel
        and parts stockage.

     -- The low number of flight hours on the prototypes and
        allowing contractors to incorporate improvements during
        Government competitive tests may have resulted in fewer

     Although maintenance man-hours per flight hour demonstrated
we.e much better than anticipated, project officials believe
required maintenance will increase. However, they estimate
it will not exceed the 2.8 hour goal for the UTTAS.

     Government test results show that the UTTAS prototypes
have exceeded the interim reliability and maintainability
goals. However, we believe that reliability and maintainability
test results are questionable and may not be valid. Therefore,
we recommend that the Secretary of Defense make sure the relia-
bility and maintainability goals have been achieved before
the Army exercises contract options for fellow-on production.

        APPENDIX    I                                                         APPENDIX    I

                                   GOVERNMENT COMPETITIVE TEST RESULTS

                                       UTTAS                             Development
                                      interim    Develop-     Opera-         and       Last 200
                                       goals    Development   tional      oeraional      hours

Boeing (note a):
    Mean tia. between                   2.6        2.35        3.60          2.82        3.59
    Mission reliability                b/.90          .954      .973          .963        .967
    Fault corrective main-
      tenance man-hours per             4.3           .819      .447          .643        .466
      flight hour
    Operational availability           d/.75          .838      .859          .n.9        .855
      (note c)

Sikorsky (note a):
    Mean time between
      failures                          2.6        2.37        3.11          2.65        2.97
    Mission reliability                  .90        .940        .965          .952        .967
    Fault corrective main-
      tenance an-hours per              4 .3          .703      .589          .646        .632
      flight hour
    Operational availability           d/.75          .850      .854          .853        .849
      (nott c)
        Mean time between
          failures                                            5.2                        6.29
        Mission reliability                                    .993                       .990
        Fault corrective main-
          tenance man-hours per                                ,177                       .148
          flight hour
        Operational availability                               .853                       .850
          (note c)

a/Figures include assumed failure rates for Government-furnished equipment.

b/Figure represents mrinimum acceptable values to be demonstrated during Government
  competitive testing.   No interim goal was established for this parameter.

c/No interim goal was established for this parameter. However, .75 is to be demons-
   trated during Developmental/Operational Test III, which is to take place October
   1978 through March 1979.

d/Operational availability test results were computed using a 10-percent factor for
  aircraft not operational because of supply parts.  (Not operationally ready-
  supply. )