DOCUMENT RESUME 01115 - [A0751051] Comparison of the NAVSTAR Program with the Acquisiticn Plan ReLsmmended by the Commission on Government Procurement. PSAD-77-50; B-182956. January 24, 1977. 22 pp. pp.). + appendices (14 Report to the Congress; by Blmer BS Staats, Comptroller General. Issue Area: Federal Procurement of Goods and Contact: Procurement and Systems Acquisition Services (1900). Div. Budget Function: National Defense: weapon Systems (057); National Defense: Department of Defense - Prccurement Contracts (058). & Organization Concerned: Department of the Air of Defense. Force; Department Congressional Relevance: House CoamJ.ttee on Armed Services: Senate Committee on Armed Services; Congress. Authority: OHB Circular A-109. in 1972 tho Commission on Government Prccurement recommendeJ a uew plan for the acquisition of major weapons systems and other major systeos which has become the basis for a revised policy in procurement for all executive Department of Defense sugaested that the RAVSTAR agencies. The Positioning System resembled the Commissionts Global recommedations. Findings/Conclusions: The evolution of the NAYSTAR reueabled the Commission's recommendations Progran NtWSTAB system did aot begin with a statementcnly slightly. The cf capability, cost, and time goals stated independent'ymission specific system solution; did not follow a of a Secretary asignment to a service or services for responding of Defense statement of needs and goals; did not use industry to a and innovativeness to identify alternative initiative system concepts; and did not maintain competition by exploring rival systers. However, the Office of the Secrctary o: Defense involvement in the identification and reconciliation ot navigational greater than the level of involvement criticized needs was Commission. Recommendations: Executive agencies by the understand that under the new acgquisition process,have to deficiencies must be determined and stated mission area independently of any specific system soluticn,. Effort allowed under base requires redefinition so that solutions the technology result from competition between alternative to mission needs must be given greater flexibility to propose solutions. Industry a wide range of alternative solutions to mission area deficiencies to Government requests. (Author/SC) in responding REPORT TO THE CONGRESS B Y THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES Comparison Of The NAVSTAR Program With The Acquisition Plan Recommended By The Commission On Government Procurement The :C'mmission on Government Procure- ment recommended a new plan for acquiring, major weapons systems and other major systems which has become the basis for a re- vised policy in procurement for all executive agencies. GAO has compared the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System with the Comn ission's plan and has concluded that the evolution of the NAVSTAR program resembled only slightly the Commission's recommendations. PSAo-77-5o JAN. 24. 1 977 COMPTROILER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATS WASHINGTON, D.C. W0 11-18 2956 To the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives This report on the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System is one of three reports on our review to determine how closely recent Department of Defense acquisition programs parallel the major system acquisition plan the Commission on Govern- ment Procurement recommended. We made 'his review at the request of Senator Lawton Chiles, Chairman, Subcommittee on Federal Spending Practices, Efficiency, and Open Government, Senate Committee on Govern- ment Operations. As agreed with the Senator's office, we asked the Department of Defense to suggest systems for our review which came closest to the Commission's plan. The Pershing II and the Shipboard Intermediate Range Combat System are covered in separate reports. Of the three programs, only the Shipboard Intermediate Range Combat System had any significant similarity to the begin- ning steps of the Commission's plan. We made our review pursuant to the Budget and Account- ing Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting and Audit- ing Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67). Copies of this report are being sent to the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and the Secretary of Defense. Comptroller General of the United States Contents DIGEST i CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1 Scope of review 2 2 COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 4 3 EVOLUTION OF THE NAVSTAR GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM 7 Three-phase system development 7 Estimated program cost 9 4 COMPARISON OF THE NAVSTAR PROGRAM WITH THE COMMISSION'S ACQUISITION PLAN 10 Starting and coordinating programs 11 Congressional review of needs and goals 14 Technology base 15 Creating new systems Cong:essional review of system exploration 19 Reinstating meaningful competition 21 APPENDIX I Description of existing navigation systems 23 II Department of Defense assessment of navigation and positioning 25 III Summary of satellite navigation efforts 29 IV Principal officials responsible for matters discussed in this report 36 ABBREVIATIONS ACP area coordination paper DOD Department of Defense DCP development concept paper DSARC Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council GAO General Accounting Office OSD Off:.ce of the Secretary of Defense SAMSO Space and Missile Systems Organization COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S COMPARISON OF THE NAVSTAR REPORT TO THE CONGRESS PRGCRAM WITH THE ACCQISI- TION PLAN RECOMMENDED BY THE COMMISSION ON GOVERN- MENT PROCUREMENT Department of Defense D 1 G E S T In December 1972 the Commission on Government Procurement recommended a new plan for acquir- ing major systems. The Commission's recommenda- tions were the basis for an April 5, 1976, Office of Management and Budget circular on major system acquisitions; it prescribed policy for all executive branch agencies. GAO was asked to compare the beginning steps in the acquisition process of some recent major systems with the Commission's plan. (See p. 1.) Because Department of Defense officials had indicated that the Commission's intent had been accomplished either formally or informally in some Defense programs, GAO asked Defense to suggest programs which came closest to the recommended procedures. One suggested program, the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System, is a satellite navigation system which will allow strategic and attack aircraft, ships, submarines, and ground vehicles and troops to ascertain their posi- tions to within 10 meters. NAVSTAR will meet the need for a continuous, all-weather, world- wide system that is difficult for an enemy to jam or destroy. The program cost estimate is $1.2 billion. It does not, however, include procurement costs for equipment the above users must have. The evolution of the NAVSTAR program resembles only slightly the Commission's recommendations for acquiring a major system. Chief reasons for this conclusion are that the program did not: IeaLShJS. Upon removal. the report cover date should be noted hereon. i PSAD-77-50 -- Begin with a statement of mission capability, cost, and time goals stated independently of X specific system solution. --Follow a Secretary of Defense assignment to a service or services for responding to a statement of needs and goals. -- Use industry initiative and innovativeness to identify alternative system concepts. -- Maintain competition by exploring rival systems. (See p. 10.) However, the Office of the Secretary of Defense involvement in the identification and reconcilia- ticn of navigational needs was greater than the level of involvement criticized by the Commission. (See p. 10.) It should be noted that: -- Only three of the six pertinent recommenda- tions are suitable for a meaningful com- parison; implementation of the other three requires changes in the Federal budgeting process or in the Department of Defense technology base which have not yet been made. --The NAVSTAR program began before the Com- mission's report was issued. -- The evolution of the program das consistent with then-existing acquisition regulations. (See p. 10) GAO presented the results of its review of the three programs during August 24, 1976, hearings before the Subcommittee on Federal Spending Practices, Efficiency, and Open Government. GAO observed that implementation of the Commission's plan as outlined in the o2ffice of Management and Budget circular will require improvements in several areas: -Executive agencies have to understand that inder the new acquisition process, mission ii area deficiencies must be determined and stated independently of any specific system solution. This will enable agency heads and the Congress to make decisions based on a clear understanding of the mission de- ficiency and need for new systems. -- Effort allowed under the technology base requires redefinition so that solutions to mission needs are not dictated by in-house efforts but result from competition between alternative solutions. -- Industry must be given greater flexibility to propose a wide range of alternative solutions to mission area deficiencies in responding to Government requests. Officials of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Air Force agreed generally with the report. Comments of these officials have been incorporated. IMLrhaM1iii CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION portion Major system acquisitions account fo: a large February 1976 of Federal expenditures. We reported 1/ in as of June 30, that major Federal acquisitions 2/ inat process completion. About 1975, would cost aboe,' $404 billion acquisitions, $220 billion is for Dvpartment of Defense (DOD) excluding the Army Corps of Engineers. of study, In December 1972, after about 2-1/2 years its report issued the Commission on Government Procurement Federal procure- containing 149 recommendations for improving system acquisi- ment. Twelve recommendations were on majorPolicy, Office of tions. The Office of Federal Procurement A-109, "Major Management and Budget, issued Circular No. prescribed policy System Acquisitions," on April 5, 1976. It the Commission's for all executive branch agencies based on recommendations. acquisition During July 1975 tearings on major system Spending reform, the Chairman, Subcommittee or. Federal Senate Committee Practices. Efficiency, and Open Government, a special on Government Operations, asked us to undertake pro- study of the "very beginning steps" in the requirements compare the we cess for some current programs. pe asked that recommen- evolution of these programs with the Commission's dations. hearings DOD officials had indicated in congressional had been implement- that the intent of the Com.ission'S plan acquisitions. DOD ed either formally or informally in some office, we asked' Therefore, with agreement from the Senator's the Deputy Secretary of Defensa to suggest acquisitions corresponded to which were managed in a way that most nearly the procedures the Commission recommended. 30, 1975," 1/"Financial Status of Major Acquisitions, June PSAD-76-72, dated February 27, 1976. million were 2/For civil agencies, acquisitions ovet $25 research, devel- considered major. For DOD, programs with or opment, test, and evaluation costs over $50 million major. production costs over $200 million were considered 1 The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) asked each service to suggest systems to be reviewed. The systems selected were (1) the Army's Pershing II missile system, (2) the Navy's Shipboard Intermediate Range Combat System, and (3) the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System, which has a joint service program office with the Air Force as the executive service. Tile Pershing II and Shipboard Intermediate Range Combat System are the subjects of separate reports. We presented the results of our review of the three programs during August 24, 1976, hearings before the Sub- committee on Federal Spending Practices, Efficiency, and Open Government. We observed that implementation of the Commission's plan as outlined in the Office of Management and Budget circular will require improvements in several areks: -- Executive agencies have to understand that under the new acquisition process mission area deficiencies must be determined anc stated independently of any specific system solution. This will enable agency heads and the Congress to make decisions based on a clear understanding of the mission deficiency and need for new systems. -- Effort allowed under the technology base requires redefinition so that solutions to mission needs are not dictated by in-house efforts but result from com- petition between alternative solutions. -- Industry must be given greater flexibility to propose a wide range of alternative solutions to mission area deficiencies in responding to Governme.it requests. SCOPE OF REVIEW Our review covered only the Commission's first six recommendatioans. To determine the evolution of the selected programs, we conferred with officials of OSD, military de- partment headquarters, program offices, and selected con- tractors. We reviewed available correspondence; reports; briefing charts; contracting documents; and planning, pro- gr_,ning, and budgeting system documents. we did not evaluate the conclusions reached or decis- ions made in the programs' evolution. Rather, we compared the program. with -he major system acquisition plan envis- ioned by the Commission and with the Office of Management and Budget circular on major system acquisitions. 2 Formal comments were not obtained from DOD on this report. However, OSD and Air Force officials reviewed the report and were generally in agreement with its findings and conclusions. Comments of these officials have been incorpo- rated. 3 CHAPTER 2 COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT The Commission on Government Procurement's recommenda- tions on major system acquisitions called for: -- Establishing a common plan for conducting and controlling all acquisition programs. The plan should highlight the key decisions for all involved organizations: the Congress, agency heads, agency components, and the private sector. -- Defining each organization's role so it can exercise proper responsibility and control over acquisition programs. -- Providing the Congress and agency heads with the in- formation needed to make program decisions and com- mitments. The plan forms a structure applicable to programs of all agencies. The recommendations were not designed to be applied selectively to the acquisition process but, rather, to be used together to improve the entire acquisition pro- cess. Specific actions called for in the early stages of the process were: --Agency components (such as the Army, Navy, and Air Force) would submit their perceptions of mission de- ficiencies to their agency head (such as the Secre- tary of Defense). --The agency head would reconcile a perceived need with overall agency mission capabilities and, if there was agreement that a nead existed, would (1) set initial cost, time, and capability goals and (2) direct one or more agency components to respond to the need. --An agency component would establish a program office and solicit proposals from industry for conceptual solutions to the stated need. 4 -- Industry would respond to the solicitation with pro- posed systems. -- The agency budget request and the congressional authorizations for front-end research and develop- ment would be by mission purpose rather than by in- dividual items. -- The agency head would allocate funds to agency com- ponents for the proposed systems. -- The agency component would fund selected alternative systems using annual fixed-level funding, after re- viewing their progress each year. -- Industry would explore 1/ the selected systems with- in the established funding goals. -- The agency component would choose systems for compe- titive demonstration on the basis of this explora- tion. -- The agency head would specifically approve the com- petitive demonstration. As an exception, agency head approval would be required if the agency component determined it should concentrate development resources on a single system. The attached chart from the Commission's report shows the interaction of the Congress, agency heads, agency components, and private sector in the recommended major system acquisition plan. 1/As used by the Commission, "exploring alternative systems" includes the study, design, and development effort occur- ing between agency head direction for a component to res- pond to a need statement and the selection of systems for competitive demonstration. 5 YI -J 4~~~~~ U a ~z a~z 40.~~~~~~~~~~~~ zO 1L~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Z 0 PO j: z Pt 7z c U de 2,I. IL C- UU oWo Z).ZZU LII>fr o~~~~~~~~~~ & IL I On .~~~~~ 0 o w I~~~~. U' U O Z U ~9 w D:o Z o (L~~~n (, u au m 41.AmXI oD> w ILX X U0 0.I~_ > bU o~~~ PP ~00YI U ~ U f wP X PZ O u,,u Z la w X 0 o3t w LL6 L Oz c z~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -J~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~' -l cz~~~~~~-A' 'I Gz o z goL ziu VL. C V2 LL.ILu 3 -U 0'000 z ;u '- CA 0 O( X w4 P ~~~~~~~Z /* a CP, 3. 31~ I C ~ IL i ~ I *~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ t BLI z1 ~~~O to~~~~O ~~ OI c,, wt zmX... Zw Im C 0 -J. P_ur O P3~~~~~~A O.C A 0 PC MA 7 X U O ZUU w -l >tU ~~ O N 0(tr~~~~~~~~ t 4, n U a, 56 .4 4 q r o~~~~~u I"0 (L , I X oX ~ 0 Lu LZM ~ ~ ny HU OIO~.4 C9Uw l -J , a~Pt : 1 00 z ( 10 >U31 CUo z 2: w 40 In a, 0.4 -CIA I- U -0-A .4 L U- 0 UJ Z W U S.I =wu W0 - w ~ tW" Z~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ mb ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ w w UI of 0 _ IWU0 4I >0w 0 0:LL U a U 2 ' -oI ~~~ Ji cr~~~~~~ uC o ~ ~ ~ u uw c' I ru6 CHAPTER 3 EVOLUTION OF THE NAVSTAR GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM The NAVSTAR Global Positioning System, comprised of satellites, satellite control stations, monitor sets, and user equipment, will provide precise information on user position and speed. Anticipated users include strategic and attack aircraft, support aircraft, ships, submarines, and ground vehicles and troops. The system will have 24 satellites--8 in each of three 10,900-nautical-mile orbital planes. User equipment will receive and process data from the best four of six to nine satellites available to a user at any time. Six classes of user equipment have been pro- posed for different user missions, environments, and user vehicle characteristics, such as speed. Control stations and monitor sets d 11 determine satel- lite locations and will update the information being trans- mitted from the satellites. Users will be able to determine their positions within about 10 meters and their velocities on a global basis, 24 hours a day. The system will operate in all weather conditions and will be difficult for an enemy to jam or destroy. On April 17, 1973, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the Air Force to consolidate two prior satellite navigation and positioning proarams--the TIMATION and 621B programs of the Navy arid Air Force, respectively. The NAVSTAR program then came into being. Knpendixes to this re- port describe existing navigation systems (app. I); DOD ef- forts to assess its navigation and positioning capability (app. II); and a summary of satellite navigation system ef- forts, including NAVSTAR (app. III). THREE-PHASE SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT The NAVSTAR program has been divided into three phases. Phase I Phase 1, concept validation, extends from Defense Sys- tem Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) I in December 1973 to DSARC II scheduled in March 1978, It now calls for a six- satellite network to demonstrate the feasibility of the sys- tem. The number of satellites has been increased from four to six to support Navy fleet oallistic missile testing. 7 Before using the satellite system, approximately 6 months of "inverted range" testing will take place in mid-1976. During these tests, ground-based satellite transmitters will trans- mit signals to aircraft to simulate the space-based system. As the six-satellite system is launched, testing will shift to the space-based svstem; by November 1977 the six-satellite system will be in use. User equipment will be developed concurrently with sat- ellite development and launching. Two general development models will be built to demonstrate the general requirements and to provide production specifications for the six basic types of user equipment. Based on these models, a prototype of one type of user equipment will be built with a $25,000 cost goal. The equipment will be installed in low-perfor- mance aircraft to test utility and maintenance. A third gen- eral development model, being developed by the Air Force Avionics Laboratory, will demonstrate maximum antijamming protection. In addition to the above testing, the program will investigate clock technology, particularly the extremely a:curate and highly stable clocks necessary to achieve nigh-positionin, accuracy. Phase II Phase II, system test and limited capability, will last from March 1978 through DSARC III in early 1982. During this period, the system is planned to attain precise three-dimen- sional capability, periodically, and a continuous, two-dimen- sional capability, with fully operational ground stations. This phase will also include: 1. Initial operational test and evaluation and initial production of the low-cost class of user equipment. 2. Completion of initial operational test and evaluation on the other classes of user equipment. 3. Building satellites. Phase III Phase III, full operational capability, extends from 1982 through 1987, during which time the remaining satel- lites will be built, user equipment will be procured, and the two-dimensional satellite system will be augmented by further launches to provide a precise, three-dimensional capability. 8 ESTIMATED PROGRAM COST T.e cost estimate for the NAVSTAR program is $1.2 bil- lion. It does not, however, include the procurement costs for equipment that users of the system must have. NAVSTAR Cost estimate Phase Cost estimate (millions) I $ 288.3 II 516.8 III 394.9 Total $1,200.0 The most recent planning estimate available for phase I, as of April 1976, shows the following funding require- ments for each service. Cost Rr-imate for Phase I Service Cost estimate (millions) Air Force NAVSTAR $150.5 Fleet Ballistic Missile Testing 71.9 S222.4 Navy 43.8 Army 22.1 Total $288.3 NAVSTAR has a requirement to establish a unit produc- tion cost goal during phase I which will be updated during the program. The program office plans to use it to support its life-cycle-co3t goals. A life-cycle-cost model will be used in making equipment trade-off decisions. If deployed successfully, NAVSTAR would probably be complemented by some type of inertial system. A reduction in other navigation systems might reduce total DOD navigation costs. 9 CHAPTER 4 COMPARISON OF THE NAVSTAR PROGRn' WITH THE COMMISSION'S ACQUISITION PLAN The evolution of the NAVSTAR program only slightly re- sembles the Commission's recommended acquisition plan. Major reasons for this conclusion are that the program did not: -- Begin with a statement of mission capability, cost, and time goals stated independently of a specific system solution. -- Follow a Secretary of Defense assignment of responsi- bility to a service for responding to a mission deficiency. -- Use industry initiative and innovativeness to iden- tify alternative system concepts. -- Maintain competition by exploring competing systems. Office of the Secretary of Defense involvement in the identification and reconciliation of navigational needs was, however, greater than the generally low level of involvement criticized byv the Commission. Also, the program is maintain- ing or considering competition for certain subsystems. It should be noted that: -- Only three recommendations (i, 4, and 6) are suitable for a meaningful comparison. Implementation of recom- mendations 2, 3, and 5 will require changes in the Federal budgeting process or in the Department of De- fense technology base. These changes have not yet been made. -- The NAVSTAR program began before the Commission's report was issued. -- The evolution of the program was consistent with then-existing acquisition regulations. The following sections present our comparison of the Commission's first six recommendations with the evolution of the NAVSTAR program. 10 STARIING AND COORDINATING PROGRAMS "Recommendation 1. Start new system acquisition pro- grams with agency head statements of needs and goals that have been reconciled with overall agency capabil- ities and resources. (a) State program needs and goals independently of any system product. Use long-term projections of mis- sion capabilities and deficiencies prepared and coordinated by agency component(s) to set program goals that specify: (1) Total mission costs within which new systems should be bought and used. (2) The level of mission capability to be achieved above that of projected inventories and existing systems. (3) The time period in which the new capability is to be achieved. (b) Assign responsi, lity for responding to statements of needs and goals to agency components in such a way that either: (1) A single agency component is responsible for developing system alternatives when the mis- sion need is clearly the responsibility of one component; or (2) Competition between agency components is for- mally recognized with each offering alternative system solutions when the mission responsibil- ities overlap." The Commission envisioned that an agency component, such as a military service, would submit long-term projec- tions of mission capabilities and deficiencies to the agency head for review. The agency head would then have these pro- jections reconciled with overall agency resources and cap- abilities. A major system acquisition program could be started according to recommendation 1 if there was agreement that a deficiency existed. This action was to include a statement of needs and goals which did not call for a speci- fic solution and was to occur before identifying and explor- ing specific systems and before possible solutions were re- duced to a single system. Under the Commission's plan, the Secretary of Defense would assign a service or services the responsibility for responding to a statement of specific needs and goals. 11 The conceptual study which led to NAVSTAR began about 1964--the year the Air Force and Navy began studying ways to use satellites to improve navigation. The services initiated these efforts rather than the Secretary of De- fense. Undoubtedly, they did so with the knowl-dne that in- creased navigation and positioning would improve military operations. DOD documented the needs and goals for navigation and positioning. (See app. II.) These efforts, particularly those involving the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, are consistent with that portion of recommPenion ion aimed at preventing a single service from perceiving a ? ;sion need and proceeding with- out Secretary cZ i)efends, Ivement. Several aspects of these efforts, however, a., not similar to the Commission's plan tecause -- they occurred at a later point in the acquisition process; -- mission needs apparently reflected the projected capability of the Air Force's satellite navigation system under development, rather than a determination of the specific reed; -- from the beginning, the services assumed that only a satellite system would fulfill their needs. Program initiation In 1964, as a result of navigational capability achieved for submarines by the TRANSIT program (see app. I), the Navy and the Air Force started to explore ways to improve satellite navigational systems. This could be des- cribed as exploration of a technological opportunity. The Commission recognized that a program could be prompted by technological opportunities. In these instances, however, under the Commission's plan, the mission need would be questioned. The system idea would evolve freely based on mission goals, not on premature product specifications. The need would be separated from any particular system and goals would be defined independently of the performance, cost, and sc..dule characteristics of any particular system. Alternative systems, performance requirements, and unit costs would then be explored. Unlike the Commission's plan, the services pursued satellite solutions without independently establishing mis- sion needs and goals. 12 Documentationi of the mission needs and goals At different times from about 1966-73, the military services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense docu- mented navigation needs. (See app. II.) This occurred after the Air Force and Navy began developing and advocating se- parate satellite navigation systems. In 1966, the LORAN Installation Plan listed navigation characteristics considered essential or desirable by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A comprehensive review of all navigation systems was made in 1968 to determine the most cost effective solution to navigation deficiencies. The resulting Joint Chiefs of Staff study, which repeated the above-mentioned characteristics, was the basis of the 1971 Joint Chiefs of Staff Master Navigation Plan. This plan was reviewed by the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, who pointed out several problems, including accuracy require- ments that seemed to be based on the Air Force's proposed 621B system, rather than on actual operational needs. The plan also assumed that a defense navigation satellite system would be developed. It did not state mission deficiencies independently of a specific system solution as recommended by the Commission. The Director requested in November 1970 that an area coordination paper (ACP) on navigation be prepared. It was signed on January 10, 1973. One principal conclusion was that navigation requirements need to be reexamined to estab- lish their value. It advocated (1) continuing investigation of systems having the potential, singly or jointly, of meet- ing long-range DOD navigation needs and (2) a decision on a satellite system within the next few years. The ACP also recognized the need for coordination of DOD navigation devel- opment. Shortly after approval of the ACP, the Deputy Secre- tary of Defense issued a memorandum stating that DOD would proceed to Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council I with a navigation satellite system. It made the Air Force respon- sible for the effort. Mission cost goals The Commission felt that mission cost goals, within which new systems could be bought and used, should be estab- lished before alternative system concepts were identified to solve a mission need. DOD has not addressed mission cost goals in this manner. As an example, the 1973 ACP presented costs in terms of navigation system costs with a NAVSTAR system and without a NAVSTAR system. Cost estimates were limited to the classes of navigation equipment which would 13 be directly affected by the NAVSTAR. LORAN, OMEGA, TRANSIT, and doppler systems (see app. I) would be competitors, while inertial systems would primarily be backup systems. Assignment of mission needs and goals_to agency components As stated previously, the Air Force and Navy initiated efforts to improve the satellite navigation system. Under the Commission's plan the Secretary of Defense would assign responsibility to a service or services for responding to a statement of needs and goals. In 1973, the Deputy Secre- tary of Defense directed the Air Force to develop a satel- lite navigation system by incorporating elements of the Air Force and Navy concepts. This assignment was not the kind envisioned by the Commission, because it specified a speci- fic solution. Also, it occurred at a later point in the acquisition process than recommended by the Commission. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF NEEDS AND GOALS "Recommendation 2. Begin congressional budget proceedings with an annual review by the appro- priate committees of agency missions, capabilities, deficiencies, and the needs and goals for new acquisition programs as a basis for reviewing agency budgets." In accordance with current budgeting p:ocedures, fund- ing for navigation systems has been by project or program rather than by mission area. Thus, funding has been obtained for projects related to 621B and TIMATION and for NAVSTAR, TRANSIT, LORAN C, LORAN D, inertial systems, and others but not for navigation. Budget proceedings have not been started witn a mission area presentation. The 1974 Congressional Budget Act requires that starting with fiscal year 1979, the President's budget request will contain descriptive informa- tion in terms of national needs, agency missions, and basic programs. The Commission stated that the Congress cannot effec- tively review expenditures and the allocation of national resources without clearly understanding the needs and goals for new programs. It continued that the needs and goals for a program are presented to the Congress when a single system is proposed, with cost, schedule, and performance estimates often predicated on insufficient research and development. At this point, the cost to meet a mission need is largely determined by the cost of the new system, not the worth of the new system compared to others. 14 The Congress should have an early opportunity to (1) understand and debate any agency's mission needs and goals for new acquisitions and (2) discuss the relationship of proposed mission capabilities to current national policy and the allocation of resources in accordance with national priorities. TECHNOLOGY BASE "Recommendation 3. Support the general fields of knowledge that are related to an agency's assigned responsibilities by funding private sector sources and Government in-house techni- cal centers to do: (a) Basic and applied research. (b) Proof of concept work. (c) Exploratory subsystem development. Restrict subsystem development to less than fully designed hardware until identified as part of . system candidate to meet a specific operational need." This recommendation is directed toward establishing a broad technology base to support an agency'. assigned re- sponsibilities through technology base efforts. The Com- mission's recommended budgeting process calls for a separate appropriation to finance the technology base. This restruc- turing of the budget has not been done. Also, current re- search and development practices allow subsystem development to proceed farther than would be allowed under the Com- mission's plan. The early Air Force and Navy development was aimed at independently establishing the workability of the system concept each was pursuing. Some of these efforts fall with- in the Commission's definition on technology base effort; others go beyond it because fully designed hardware was developed. This happened before Y.e Deputy Secretary of De- fense acted in 1973 to centralize control over the space- based navigation system development. Some early develop- ments in the 621B and TIMATION programs are presented below. In 1968 the Air Force contracted with Hughes Aircraft Company and TRW Systems for a satellite navigation concept and system design study. The information developed from these studies identified certain aspects of satellite navigation 15 which the Air Force then pursued in its efforts to prove the feasibility of a global-positioning system. Such cluded (1) a study to predict the total electron efforts in- content over the entire world, (2) examination of signal wave forms as means to transfer data, and (3) activity to determine optimum frequency and structure of signals; and were under- taken before the concept had been approved for development. The Air Force also contracted to have transmitters and airborne receivers or user ground-based equipment built to support the concept. Although the equipment was not fully designed for use, the Air Fcrce did pursue the idea of satellite navigation from study and technology to simulated demonstration. Again, this was done before the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved the concept for development. The Navy's TIMATION efforts were designed to support the satellite navigation concept. The Navy emphasized actual demonstration and carried out tests using technology lites and user equipment. satel- The most advanced work was the de- velopment of space clocks. Now these efforts have been in- terwoven with the NAVSTAR program to avoid duplicating velopment of clock technology. An important de- point is that specific and integral subsystems of a satellite system--satellites and clocks--were Leing navigation developed before the Secretary of Defense approved a manor system acquis- ition effort. The efforts identified above are in keeping with the methods used by DOD to establish new systems. nology effort is intended to validate a system. A major tech- Some efforts progressed to the development of specific equipment satellite navigation. for A U.S. Air Force Space and Missile Systems Organization (SAMSO) comment summarizes these ef- forts: "System 621B has systematically progressed from preliminary design and analysis studies for techni- cal feasibility through the completion of receiver breadboard development. The * * *emphasis [was] * * *to establish a solid advocacy base for system acquisition approval* * *" CREATING NEW SYSTEMS "Recommendation 4. Create alternative system candidates by: (a) Soliciting industry proposals for new systems with a statement of the need (mission deficiency); time, cost, and capability goals; and operating 16 constraints Lf the responsible agency and com- ponent(s), with each contractor free to propose system technical approach, subsystems, and main design features. (b) Soliciting system proposals from smaller firms that do not own production facilities if they have: (1) Personnel experienced in major development and production activities. (2) Contingent plans for later use of required equipment and facilities. (c) Sponsoring, for agency funding, the most promisiiig system candidates selected by agency component heads from a review of those proposed, using a team of experts from inside and outside the agency component development organization." DOD did not solicit proposals for alternative systems from industry to meet its needs and goals for navigation. The Air Force and the Navy developed different concepts (621B and TIMATION) to meet their perceptions of navigation needs and goals. These concepts were developed in-house; industry involvement was limited to specific tasks to sup- port the services' concepts. Moreover, the method used to develop the NAVSTAR con- cept resulted in requests for proposals that effectively ruled out smaller firms from being awarded development con- tracts. Rationale for the recommendation According to the Commission, agency components prema- turely commit themselves to a system because (1) a predeter- mined design !s often linked to the statement of "need," (2) industry is pressured to propose the kind of system the agency component wants, (3) limited resources are available to explore alternatives, and (4) the services must de ond a system before many resources are committed to it. The prema- ture commitments are, according to the Commission, made for a system that reflects design contributions from many public aiid private organizations. This "design by committee" cuts off real alternatives and results in a complex and not eas- ily managed system. In an environment of uncertain needs and technology, alternative systems would provide relatively inexpensive 17 insurance against the possibiiity that a premature choice may later prove to be poor and costly. Alternative concepts introduce the benefits of competition early in the evolution of a system when the cost to maintain competitors is only a small fraction of that needed for later development and p:o- duction phases. A wider base of innovative talent can be ap- plied rather than concentrating resources on a single system. Alternative systems concepts Alternative system concepts for satisfying needs and goals were not developed or explored. navigation The military services each decided that a satellite navigation system was the best solution. As a result, the Navy was pursuing TIMATION and the Air Force was pursuing the 621B. Neither system would have met all of DOD's navigation requirements-- TIMATION would not meet security requirements for signals and 621B required stations in foreign countries. Elements of each were eventually incorporated into NAVSTAR. The TIMATION and 621B programs cannot be considered alternative systems, as they used the same technical ap- proach with variations in design and did not address the same stated needs. Under NAVSTAR, only one system is being developed. Solicitation of industry proposals In April 1973, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the Air Force to develop a navigation satellite program. Thus, requests for proposals issued to industry were not in- tended to produce alternative system concepts, but elements of the satellite system which had been developed in-house. The requests for proposals did allow for subsystem com- petition. With NAVSTAR, the requests were functionally oriented and cited only minimal constraints, such as average mission duration and the weight of the satellite. Relationship with smaller firms Solicitations were essentially limited to larger firms familiar with satellites, particularly satellite navigation. Before issuing requests for space vehicles, the program of- fice visited 13 aerospace contractors to determine the state of the art and to provide information on the possible devel- opment. Small firms, previously uninvolved in satellite technology, were not invited to this meeting. Program personnel explained some concerns about smaller firms. For example, a small firm's knowledge and capital 18 reserve usually are less than a larger firm's. Both of these items can be vital if a contractor has an unexpected problem. The Government deals with the prime contractor only. If a small firm has a design proposal and subcontracts with a large firm for production, control of the project is likely to rest with the large firm, with whom the Government has no con- tractual relationship. Although the requests for proposals for space vehicles were issued to any interested firm, 13 firms in the satel- lite industry were favored, as the request was based on in- put from them. Requests for proposals for user equipment and control systems were limited to contractors familiar with satellite navigation: (1) General Dynamics and Magna- vox and (2) TRW and Philco-Ford. These companies had been awarded prior contracts which stated that one of them would be awarded the phase I contract. The requests for space vehicles resulted in four pro- posals. Three of the four firms had worked on satellite nav- igation systems, and the other, which had worked on communi- cation satellites, subcontracted with a firm knowledgeable about 621B. Source selection committees, composed of personnel from inside and outside the program office, evaluated the pro- posals. In early 1974, Rockwell International was awarded the space vehicle contract and General Dynamics/Magnavox was awarded the user equipment and control system contracts. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF SYSTEM EXPLORATION "Recommendation 5. Finance the exploration of alternative systems by: (a) 3roposing agency development budgets according to mission need to support the exploration of alternative system candidates. (b) Authorizing and appropriating funds by agency mission area in accordance with review of agency mission needs and goals for new acquisition programs. (c) Allocating agency development funds to components by mission need to support the most promising system candidates. Monitor components' exploration of alternatives at the agency head level through annual budget and approval reviews using updated mission needs and goals." 19 The Commission stated that the Congress could better understand where research and development money was spent if it reviewed, authorized, and appropriated funds for studying candidate systems according to mission. This would segregate funds for (1) maintaining the technology base, (2) exploring alternative solutions to mission needs, and (3) developing the selected systems. All development projects associated with the alternatives to meet each agency mission need would be grouped together. Previous comments under recommendation 2 apply to this section also. Budget requests, authorizations, and appro- priations have not been made by mission area. Accordingly, congressional review of NAVSTAR and the effort leading to NAVSTAR has been by individual item. Although DOD is not exploring alternatives to the NAV- STAR program, it followed a mission area approach in estab- lishing the program. Within OSD, reviews were made of DOD avigational capability and needs. As a result, the decision made to pursue development and production of NAVSTAR and st eral other non-space-based systems. These systems are not alternative systems but are complementary to NAVSTAR. Among these are self-contained inertial systems and ground-based OMEGA and LORAN systems which provide backup in case NAVSTAR malfunctions and additional assurance of navigational cap- ability in the event of physical or electronic attack by a sophisticated foe. Before the NAVSTAR concept was selected in 1973, TIMATION and 621B were reviewed. The best aspects of each were incor- porated into NAVSTAR. This selection considered the needs of all the services and was undertaken to avoid obvious dup- lication. Early review of navigation needs and capability included the 1966 LORAN Installation Plan, a 1968 Joint Chiefs of Staff study, and numerous efforts of the individual services. (See app. II.) The relationship between military requirements and the systems in existence or being developed was examined in the 1973 ACP. The mission needs and goals identified by the services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and examined in the ACP were presented in detail in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Master Navigation Plan. Originally prepared fron. their 1968 study on navigation, this plan stated that only a satellite system could meet the requirements. Despite this restriction, the plan is a mission area approach to deter- mining needs and goals for navigation. It has been updated several times since 1968. 20 A mission area budget can then be processed. DOD has already begun to think in terms of mission areas and to re- late systems to them. Formulatin. a mission area budget would mean regrouping existing information. REINSTATING MEANINGFUL COMPETITION "Recommendation 6. Maintain competition between con- tractors exploring alternative systems by: (a) Limiting commitments to each contractor to annual fixed-level awards, subject to annual review of their technical progress by the sponsoring agency component. (b) Assigning agency representatives with relevant operational experience to advise competing con- tractors as necessary in developing performance and other requirements for each candidate system as tests and tradeoffs are made. (c) Concentrating activities of agency development organizations, Government laboratories, and tech- nical management staffs during the private sector competition on monitoring and evaluating con- tractor development efforts, and participating in those tests critical to determining whether the system candidate should be continued." Alternatives to NAVSTAR are not being explored. How- ever, several alternatives concerning technological risk and cost for user equipment are being sponsored. In addition, a second source for phase II satellite procurement is now being considered. The Commission felt that most programs would benefit from competition among contractors which are independently responsible for their systems. This could be aided by chal- lenging industry to use a wider span of technologies for system solutions that are of lower cost and simpler design. Contract incentives for competitors should be directed to- ward economy and austerity in system design. The Commission also stressed the integrity of contracts, which makes each contractor independent and fully responsible for designing the system contained in the proposals. Ultimately, success or failure of any alternative system should be determined by demonstration. When the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved NAVSTAR on December 22, 1973, he stated that competitive development 21 contracts should be used for all user continuation of the program beyond equipment, because phase I depends largely on the development of accurate but inexpensive ment. user equip- To meet this request, SAMSO is developing for manpacks (portable sets) and high two alternates aircraft and helicopters. These will dynamics sets for those user classes where the potential provide competition in equipment investment is greatest. The original contract for awarded to General Dynamics and Magnavox user equipment was Research Labora- tory. Later, contracts were awarded Inc., for both alternate development to Texas Instruments, efforts in early 1975. Through these contracts, SAMSO hopes to achieve the best and least costly design by insuring active petitors. incentive among com- Although only one contractor for phase I, SAMSO officials have isrequested developing a satellite approval for a second contractor for phase II. In addition, two sources through phase III would assure procurement from competition in the future. The competitive, the benefits of satellite would not be a copy of the second-source same design and would be compatible with all users. To insure second contractor would be directed to competition, the have only a limited number of subcontractors in common with the original con- tractor. This competition hopefully life-cycle cost. would result in lower In other areas. evidence showed no contractor tion. General Dynamics competi- and Magnavox Research Laboratory developing ground controls, and technological are the clock are being made by the Navy. choices for 22 APPENDIX I APPENDIX I DESCRIPTION OF EXISTING NAVIGATION SYSTEMS A brief description of present navigational systems is presented below. Each offers some of the characteristics needed for military purposes, such as global coverage, con- tinuous availability, all-weather operation, and being im- pervious to enemy countermeasures. After NAVSTAR becomes operational, some of the more specialized systems may remain in use, but some of the more general purpose systems may be phased out. 1. LORAN-C is a system of radio signal transmitting stations used by ships and submarines. User position is determined from the time it takes signals to arrive from different stations. The system covers the North Atlantic, Mediterranean, Norwegian Sea, east coast of America, North and Central Pacific, and Southeast Asia. Accuracy depends on the user's distance from the stations and can be obtained to within 200 meters at 1,600 kilometers. Greater accuracy, to within 70 meters, can be obtained at lesser distances. Continuous, two-dimensional (longitude and latitude) infor- mation is provided. 2. LORAN-D is a tactical, short-range version of LORAN-C. It employs portable transmitters and is designed for rapid deployment into an area. 3. OMEGA is a chain of eight stations which transmit very low frequency signals. Use of this kind of signal and high power enable the system to cover the entire world. It provides continuous, all-weather navigation with two-dimen- sional (longitude and latitude) accuracy of 1 to 2 nautical miles for civil and military aircraft, surface ships, and submarines. The system does not provide altitude data. 4. Bottom navigation uses contour maps of the ocean bottom and a means of determining depth at the user's loca- tion. It can be used in all weather conditions and is im- pervious to enemy countermeasures. Data on system limita- tions is classified. 5. Inertial systems are self-contained systems which determine position by tracking movement from a known start- ing or reference point. They work on the principle that a vehicle's movement over the surface of the globe will dis- place a pendulum pointing at the center of the earth. Posi- tioning becomes less accurate with the passage of time. 23 APPENDIX I APPENDIX I Because of decreasing accuracy, these systems do not meet all military requirements. However, with a satellite system, such as NAVSTAR, to periodically update the positional in- formation, inertial systems could be used when enemy count- ermeasures prevent the use of NAVSTAR. 6. Celestial navigation is reliable and provides world- wide coverage in clear weather. It cannot be used to deter- mine altitude and is not continuously available. 7. TRANSIT is the only operational satellite naviga- tion System. It is used primarily by submarines. The sys- tem requires a user to obtain several readings at different times from TRANSIT satellites. Satellites are not available continuously, however, and submarines must expose their an- tennas to obtain navigational readings. 24 APPENDIX II APPENDIX II DE RTMENT OF DEFENSE ASSESSMENT OF NAVIGATION AND POSITIONING Deficiencies in existing or planned navigation systems have been documented numerous times by DOD. Some of these efforts are summarized below. LORAN INSTALLATION PLAN--1966 DOD needs were stated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the 1966 LORAN Installation Plan. It listed several essen- tial and desirable navigation system characteristics, such as improved accuracy, nonsaturability, and continuous avail- ability. DOD defines two areas requiring navigational data: general purpose and objective. An objective area is that specific area in which a crew or unit leader must be able to navigate to a precise position to deliver stores, operate sensors, carry out operational tasks, or transit to term- inals. A general purpose or en route area is all area exter- nal to the objective areas. The LORAN Installation Plan con- tained general purpose and objective area accuracy require- ments for subsurface, air, ground, and sea operations. MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND--1966 The Military Airlift Command identified deficiencies in global aircraft navigation in a July 1966 required opera- tional capability document. This document described the navigation systems in use as limited in coverage and range. For example, the Navy's TRANSIT program was not compatible with aircraft velocity, and inertial systems were too expen- sivp and not sufficiently accurate. AEROSPACE CORPORATION MISSION ANALYSIS--1967 A March 1967 mission analysis by Aerospace Corporation presented existing navigation system limitations and a re- commendation concerning future systems. Data on limitations of existing systems is classified. 25 APPENDIX II APPENDIX II JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF STUDY In October 1967 the Deputy Secretary of Defense requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff review gation systems in use or being developed to all Lavi- most cost-effective combination of systems. recommend the The resulting study identified a need for worldwide coverage, instantaneous response, continuous availability, redundancy, to resist enemy countermeasures. It included and ability accuracy re- quirements for en route needs and objective three dimensions (longitude, latitude, and area needs in altitude) for close air support, helicopter assault, mapping, warfare, and bombing missions. electronic The study found no system or combination of available in the 1970-80 period to meet the systems It stated that satellite systems appeared requirements. promise of providing continuous, worldwide to have the most navigational accuracy. The study stated that no single system ing DOD needs existed and that a navigationalcapable of meet- tem and an inertial system were complimentary. satellite sys- The satel- lite system would provide precise positioning flight corrections for the inertial system. data and in- system would be self-contained and would The inertial be essentially im- pervious to enemy countermeasures. MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND--1968 On April 9, 1968, a Required Operational Capability D.cument for a navigation satellite system Military Airlift Command. Unlike the previouswas issued by the identified specific needs for all types of document, it system was to have worldwide, all-weather, users. The new and continuous coverage; passive user operation; low vulnerability ming; and accuracy of 1 nautical mile for to jam- en route needs and 0.01 nautical mile for objective area navigation. space Defense Command, the Strategic Air Command, The Aero- Tactical Air Command listed their accuracy and the requirements. NAVY REQUIREMENTS--1968 The Navy issued OPNAV Instruction 03530.1A, Navigation Policy, on September 16, 1968. Navy no navigation system with worldwide coverageIt stated that or being developed which would accomplish was in use fic requirements of all tasks and missions.the Navy's speci- Taking into 26 APPENDIX II APPENDIX II consideration the most likely systems, the Navy presented two types of requirements: -- General purpose, a 1-nautical mile, continuous, all-weather requirement for forces en route to an objective area or in port-to-port or long-range, point-to-point operations. -- Precision, a 0.1- to 0.5-nautical mile, continuous, all-weather requirement to support flight operations and weapons systems. The Navy also distinguished between essential and desirable characteristics: -- Essential: -- Worldwide coverage. -- All-weather, day and night operation. -- Effective, instantaneous response. -- Nonsaturability. -- No electronic radiation by user. -- Determination of position when user equipment is activated. --Desirable: 1/ --No foreign bases. -- Easy to maintain, repair, and operate. --Not limited to line of sight. -- Denies enemy use. --No environmental propagation limitations. 1/One of the desirable characteristics is classified. 27 APPENDIX II APPENDIX II JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MASTER NAVIGATION PLAN--1971 The Joint Chiefs of Staff study became the principal referenc. for the 1971 Joint Chiefs of Staff Master Naviga- tion Plan which called for accuracy of about 18 meters in 3 dimensions and an all-weather, continuous, world- wide system. It supported early implementation of OMEGA, selection of an advanced navigational satellite system for early implementation, support for the development and pro- curement of a self-contained system, and improvement of the LORAN-C and LORAN-D equipment. Several issues, such as affect of user equipment on the cost of navigation systems and analysis of the operational requirements, were not resolved by the master plan. More- over, the accuracy requirement was based on the expected copability of the ongoing Air Force development rather than on actual needs. The plan assumed that a satellite naviga- tion system would be developed and that some of the other systems would be phased out. 28 APPENDIX III APPENDIX III SUMMARY OF SATELLITE NAVIGATION EFFORTS The concept of a satellite navigation and positioning system originated in the 1950s at the Applied Physics Labora- tory. By tracking Soviet satellites, the laboratory found that a satellite transmitting radio signals could be used to determine the position of an object on Earth. Radio sig- nals from a satellite could be used to determine the dis- tance from rhe satellite to the object. If the position of the s& ellite were known, several of these measurements could be used to compute the position of the object. NAVY SATELLITE EFFORT--TRANSIT The Navy became interested in satellite navigation for its flee: ballistic missile submarines, and the TRANSIT sys- tem became operational in 1964 as a result. It includes six satellites in low-altitude, subsynchronous orbits which allow submarines to determine their positions within 0.1 nautical mile. The system is worldwide, all-weather, and meets the accuracy needs of submarines. Limitations of the system are classified. The advantages and problems of TRAN- SIT resulted in further Navy study of space-based navigation. This effort started in 1964 and was called TIMATION. NAVY SATELLITE EFFORT--TIMATION The TIMATION program advocated a system of 9 satellites in each of 3 medium altitude orbits, for a total of 27 sat- ellites. The proposed system would give instantaneous posi- tion data, would provide worldwide coverage, and would not be affected by the user's velocity. To prove the approach was workable, the Navy explored (1) methods for establishing precise time data 1/ for satellites, (2) the capability of transferring time data for synchronization, and (3) orbital configurations. l/Precise time data is required. The concept is based on accurate knowledge of the position of satellites, exact time at that position, and the transit time of a signal from that position. Distances from three satellites are required to compute the users' positions. 29 APPENDIX III APPENDIX III In 1967, the Navy launched an experimental satellite (TIMATION-I) to demonstrate the feasibility of the system. Receivers were placed on aircraft, trucks, and a boat, and two-dimensional accuracy of 100 meters was obtained. Use of this technique to transfer time was verified to one-mil- lionth of a second. TIMATION II was launched in 1969. It used two differ- ent radio signal frequencies to reduce errors caused by the ionosphere and an improved clock for increased stability and synchronization. Tests demonstrated two-dimensional position accuracy of 50 meters under conditions similar to TIMATION I and instantaneous two-dimensional positioning within 70 meters. The effort demonstrated that the clock was stable and could be synchronized from the ground. Also, time transfer experiments were carried out. The Navy also developed user-related equipment and assembled four tracking systems to monitor the satellites. AIR FORCE SATELLITE EFFORTS--621B In 1964, the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Organi- zation (SAMSO) also began work on a satellite navigation system, including studies and laboratory tests to develop a practical system. A 1967 mission analysis by the Aero- space Corporation of El Segundo, California, and SAMSO ana- lyzed satellite navigation for jet aircraft. This was a cri- tical aspect of any new system, since TRANSIT could not pro- vide the desired accuracy for jets. The resulting report, "Improvement in Navigation of High Speed Aircraft," (Oct. 23, 1967), identified s;tillite navigation as the best ap- proach. Based on an investigation of different navigation systems for tactical fighter command and control, the report concluded that an advanced satellite navigation system was the most cost-effective system. It also stated that accu- racy of about 18 meters was achievable with then current technology. The report discussed regional satellite systems which would be linked together for a continuous, worldwide system. Numerous ground stations, some in foreign countries, would be needed for tracking and control. SAMSO later awarded two contracts of about $500,000 each in May 1968 to TRW Systems and Hughes Aircraft for system formulation and design work. In January 1969 they submitted reports which SAMSO used to finalize a Concept Formulation Package/Technical Develop- ment Plan. The plan advocated using a 621B satellite navigation system. This proposal was submitted to the 30 APPENDIX III aPPENDIX III Air Force Systems Command in April 1969 and was modified following a request by the Command for an Advance Develop- ment Plan which did not commit the Air Force to the total system at initial program approval. During the first half e. 1969, SAMSO awarded several study and feasibility contracts in aroas, such as optimi- zation of user equipment for cost savings, building bread- 621B board models of receivers and transmitters, integrating into existing aircraft avionics, and the impact of 621B on naval fleet and air operations. From 1969 to 1972, SAMSO made many studies to investigate 621B, including: -- Delay of signals by atmospheric effects. -- Application of 621B to missile and space guidance. -- Financial impact of 621B on procurement and main- tenance of DOD navigation equipment. -- 621B signal. acquisition and tracking. -- Range measuring. -- Signal frequency and structure. -- Design, fabrication, and test of 621B equipment using ground-jased transmitters. -- Performance characteristics of signal wave forms. Single-channel and multichannel receiver tests were made at White Sands Missile Range to confirm performance of the proprosed receivers. These tests used an NC-135 air- craft and two continuous-tracking receivers to determine system performance, equipment design, and effects of envi- ronment and atmosphere on radio signals. Results proved that position-fixing to 5 meters and velocity to 0.3 meter per second were attainable. Tests were also carried out using other equipment. The 621B program thus progressed from a concept to pre- liminary design and analysis for technical feasibility and demonstration to establish a basis for system acquisition approval. 31 APPENDIX III APPENDIX III NAVSTAR PROGRAM In 1970, the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, recommended that an area coordination paper (ACP) and a development concept paper (DCP) be prepared to resolve the issues remaining in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Master Naviga- tion Plan. ( See app. II.) The ACP was to review all navi- gation systems and relate them to each other according to cost and need; the DCP was to show the merit and cost of a satellite system. This recommendation was supported by the Secretary of Defense and the two papers were prepared. The Director signed the ACP on January 19, 1973, and it was updated on December 11, 1973. The ACP reviewed the sta- tus of navigation development programs and possible answers for future requirements. Its major conclusions were that: 1. Navigation requirements be reexamined to establish their value and to facilitate trade-offs between requirements, design, and cost. 2. The key econromic question be answered: Can acquisition costs be offset by reducing the number of navigation systems? 3. A decision be made on whether or not to develop an advanced system, such as NAVSTAR, in the next few years. 4. System options having the potential, singly or jointly, of meeting long-range DOD needs continue to be investigated. Three options were identified: (a) global systems, (b) deployable and mobile systems, and (c) self-contained systems. 5. A navigation focal point be established in the Office of the Secretary of Defense to review DOD efforts and to provide the Deputy Secretary of Defense specific recommendations on new development, cost avoidance, and phasing out of navigation systems. 32 APPENDIX III APPENDIX III The DCP which was to show the merit and cost of a sat- ellite system was also signed on January 10, 1973. However, there was disagreement within OSD, and the paper was not officially approved. On April 17, 1973, the Depu;ty Secre- tary of Defense designated the Air Force as responsible for a Defense Satellite Navigation Development Program. He in- structed the Air Force to undertake the necessary coordina- tion; assign a program manager; and establish a joint Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force program office which would prepare detailed plans for the system. The Army and Navy were instructed to insure that their elements of the pro- gram were directed at establishing a comprehensive and inte- grated DOD sstem. The program office was to prepare a DCP for Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council I by July 1973. The program office was established at SAMSO in June 1973. The DCP, which was signed on January 10, 1973, in- cluded joint-service :equirements and some aspects of TIMA- TION. Thus, the main task was to consolidate the Air Force and Navy programs. SAMSO studied the best concept to present to DSARC I and determined potential users. After the classes of user equipment had been determined, contracts for defining the user equipment and the control systems were awarded in June 1973 to (1) General Dynamics and Magnavox Research Labora- tories and (2) TRW Systems, Inc., and Philco Ford. In accor- dance with these contracts, the contract for developing user equipment and control systems would be awarded to one of these teams. The program office also investigated the state of the art for navigation. Program personnel visited 13 satellite contractors before giving an information briefing on pos- sible development of a global positioning system. Informa- tion was also obtained on other aspects of satellite naviga- tion. Studies were made on the capabilities of existing sys- tems; potential cost avoidances resulting from NAVSTAR; and cost, performance, and schedule analyses. The latter were 'bsed on various constellations of satellites with different orbits, boosters, satellites, or support facilities. The DCP continued to be revised as the system changed. DSARC I was rescheduled to October and was finally held on December 13, 1973. In November 1973, the system was named NAVSTAR Global Positioning System to more accurately des- cribe the proposed system and to relieve it of past connota- tions. 33 APPENDIX III APPENDIX III The DCP based its concept of NAVSTAR on the bst as- pects of TIMATION and 621B. The orbit configuration was patterned after TIMATION's orbit configuration. Unlike 621B, it provided worldwide coverage without foreign ground sta- tions. The satellite signal. however, w s based on 621B re- search. This signal would provide more resistance to enemy countermeasures. The precise clock was to be developed by the Navy. Considerable research on stability and precision of spaceborne clocks was done under TIMATION, and the Navy had overall responsibility for work on time and clock devel- opment for DOD. The Council recommended this approach: -- Evolutionary system development. --4 years to validate the concept--phase I. -- Some operational testing. -- Subsynchronous operational satellites. -- Cost of $150 million to complete phase I. -- Carry over of experimental hardware to system development. This recommendation was approved by the Deputy Secre- tary of Defense on December 22, 1973. He indicated that since user equipment costs would be a major factor in pro- gram approval beyond phase I, the program should use compe- titive development contracts for user equipment. After the first council, SAMSO issued several requests for proposals. The first, issued in January 1974, was for space vehicles. It contained functional specifications, giving contractors flexibility to propose different designs. It cited constraints such as weight--dictated by the launch vehicle--and reliability requirements. The requests also stated that emphasis would be on technical competition ra- ther than on price competition. Four proposals were received in April 1974, and source selection began. The contract was awarded to Rockwell International in June 1974. Requests for proposals for user equipment end the con- trol system were issued to General Dynamics/Magnavox Re- search Laboratory and TRW/Philco-Ford in April 1974. These requests contained functional specifications and few cons- straints. Constraints concerned the size and weight of the 34 APPENDIX III APPENDIX III as signal structure unit; interfaces with the satellite, such computer language and data flow; and the use of a high order to meet changing technology. contracts Similar to the space vehicle contract, the result control system were the for the user equipment and competition. of source selection based largely on technical received the General Dynamics/Magnavox Research Laboratory contracts for the two segments. with the To pursue a somewhat higher risk technologyof lower opportunity for additional payoffs in the form separate re- life-cycle-cost user equipment, SAMSO issued development of the man- quests for proposals for alternate Proposals pack and the high dynamic set in February 1975. were evaluated by one for the high eynamic user equipment unit were eval- selection committee; those for the manpack of these separate evaluations, uated by another. As a result Texas Instruments, Inc. was awarded both contracts. Alter- for the low-cost nate requests for proposals were not issued user equipment or the control system. 35 APPENDIX IV APPENDIX IV PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR MATTERS DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT Tenure of Office From To DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: Donald H. Rumsfeld Nov. 1975 Present William P. Clements, Jr. (acting) Nov. 1975 James R. Schlesinger Nov. 1975 July 1973 Nov. 1975 William P. Clements, Jr. (acting) May 1973 Elliot L. Richardson July 1973 Jan. 1973 May 1973 Melvin R. Laird Jan. 1969 Jan. 1973 DEPUTY SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE: Robert-Ellsworth Dec. 1975 William P. Clements, Jr. Present Jan. 1973 Present Kenneth Rush Feb. 1972 Vacant Jan. 1973 Dec. 1971 Feb. 1972 David Packard Jan. 1969 Dec. 1971 DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING: Malcolm R. Currie June 1973 John S. Foster, Jr. Present Oct. 1965 June 1973 SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE: Thomas C. Reed Jan. 1976 John L. McLucas Present July 1973 Nov. 1975 RobeLt C. Seamans, Jr. Feb. 1969 May 1973 36
Comparison of the NAVSTAR Program with the Acquisition Plan Recommended by the Commission on Government Procurement
Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1977-01-24.
Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)