Comparison of the NAVSTAR Program with the Acquisition Plan Recommended by the Commission on Government Procurement

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1977-01-24.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                            DOCUMENT RESUME
 01115 - [A0751051]

 Comparison of the NAVSTAR Program with the
                                             Acquisiticn Plan
 ReLsmmended by the Commission on Government
 PSAD-77-50; B-182956. January 24, 1977. 22 pp.
 pp.).                                           + appendices (14

 Report  to the Congress; by Blmer BS Staats, Comptroller
 Issue Area: Federal Procurement of Goods and
 Contact: Procurement and Systems Acquisition Services (1900).
 Budget Function: National Defense: weapon Systems
     National Defense: Department of Defense - Prccurement
     Contracts (058).                                         &
 Organization Concerned: Department of the Air
     of Defense.                                Force; Department
 Congressional Relevance: House CoamJ.ttee on
                                              Armed Services:
     Senate Committee on Armed Services; Congress.
 Authority: OHB Circular A-109.
           in 1972 tho Commission on Government Prccurement
 recommendeJ a    uew
                    plan for the acquisition of major weapons
 systems and other major systeos which has become
                                                       the basis for a
 revised policy in procurement for all executive
 Department of Defense sugaested that the RAVSTAR    agencies.    The
 Positioning System resembled the Commissionts        Global
 Findings/Conclusions: The evolution of the NAYSTAR
 reueabled the Commission's recommendations              Progran
 NtWSTAB system did aot begin with a statementcnly   slightly.    The
 capability, cost, and time goals stated independent'ymission
 specific system solution; did not follow a                  of a
 asignment to a service or services for responding          of Defense
 statement of needs and goals; did not use industry      to  a
 and innovativeness to identify alternative              initiative
                                             system concepts; and
did not maintain competition by exploring
                                            rival systers.
 However, the Office of the Secrctary o: Defense
                                                    involvement in
the identification and reconciliation ot navigational
greater than the level of involvement criticized             needs was
Commission. Recommendations: Executive agencies       by  the
understand that under the new acgquisition process,have to
deficiencies must be determined and stated               mission area
                                             independently      of any
specific system soluticn,. Effort allowed under
base requires redefinition so that solutions       the   technology
result from competition between alternative to mission needs
must be given greater flexibility to propose solutions. Industry
                                                a wide range of
alternative solutions to mission area deficiencies
to Government requests. (Author/SC)                     in responding


Comparison Of The NAVSTAR
Program With The Acquisition Plan
Recommended By The Commission
On Government Procurement

The :C'mmission on Government Procure-
ment recommended a new plan for acquiring,
major weapons systems and other major
systems which has become the basis for a re-
vised policy in procurement for all executive
GAO has compared the NAVSTAR Global
Positioning System with the Comn ission's
plan and has concluded that the evolution of
the NAVSTAR program resembled only
slightly the Commission's recommendations.

 PSAo-77-5o                                     JAN. 24. 1 977
                          WASHINGTON, D.C.   W0

11-18 2956

To the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives

     This report on the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System is
one of three reports on our review to determine how closely
recent Department of Defense acquisition programs parallel
the major system acquisition plan the Commission on Govern-
ment Procurement recommended.

     We made 'his review at the request of Senator Lawton
Chiles, Chairman, Subcommittee on Federal Spending Practices,
Efficiency, and Open Government, Senate Committee on Govern-
ment Operations. As agreed with the Senator's office, we
asked the Department of Defense to suggest systems for our
review which came closest to the Commission's plan.

     The Pershing II and the Shipboard Intermediate Range
Combat System are covered in separate reports.  Of the
three programs, only the Shipboard Intermediate Range
Combat System had any significant similarity to the begin-
ning steps of the Commission's plan.

     We made our review pursuant to the Budget and Account-
ing Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting and Audit-
ing Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67).

     Copies of this report are being sent to the Director,
Office of Management and Budget; and the Secretary of

                                      Comptroller General
                                      of the United States

DIGEST                                              i


   1       INTRODUCTION                             1
               Scope of review                      2


             POSITIONING SYSTEM                     7
               Three-phase system development       7
               Estimated program cost               9

               Starting and coordinating
                 programs                           11
               Congressional review of needs and
                 goals                              14
               Technology base                      15
               Creating new systems
               Cong:essional review of system
                 exploration                        19
               Reinstating meaningful competition   21


   I       Description of existing navigation
             systems                                23

  II       Department of Defense assessment of
             navigation and positioning             25

 III       Summary of satellite navigation
             efforts                                29

  IV       Principal officials responsible for
             matters discussed in this report        36

ACP     area coordination paper

DOD     Department of Defense

DCP     development concept paper

DSARC   Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council

GAO     General Accounting Office

OSD     Off:.ce of the Secretary of Defense

SAMSO   Space and Missile Systems Organization
                                         TION PLAN RECOMMENDED BY
                                         THE COMMISSION ON GOVERN-
                                         MENT PROCUREMENT
                                         Department of Defense

           D 1 G E S T

           In December 1972 the Commission on Government
           Procurement recommended a new plan for acquir-
           ing major systems.  The Commission's recommenda-
           tions were the basis for an April 5, 1976,
           Office of Management and Budget circular on
           major system acquisitions; it prescribed policy
           for all executive branch agencies.

           GAO was asked to compare the beginning steps
           in the acquisition process of some recent
           major systems with the Commission's plan. (See
           p.   1.)

           Because Department of Defense officials had
           indicated that the Commission's intent had
           been accomplished either formally or informally
           in some Defense programs, GAO asked Defense to
           suggest programs which came closest to the
           recommended procedures.

           One suggested program, the NAVSTAR Global
           Positioning System, is a satellite navigation
           system which will allow strategic and attack
           aircraft, ships, submarines, and ground
           vehicles and troops to ascertain their posi-
           tions to within 10 meters. NAVSTAR will meet
           the need for a continuous, all-weather, world-
           wide system that is difficult for an enemy to
           jam or destroy. The program cost estimate is
           $1.2 billion. It does not, however, include
           procurement costs for equipment the above users
           must have.
            The evolution of the NAVSTAR program resembles
            only slightly the Commission's recommendations
            for acquiring a major system. Chief reasons
            for this conclusion are that the program did

IeaLShJS. Upon removal. the report
cover date should be noted hereon.   i             PSAD-77-50
-- Begin with a statement of mission capability,
   cost, and time goals stated independently of
   X specific system solution.

--Follow a Secretary of Defense assignment
  to a service or services for responding to a
  statement of needs and goals.

-- Use industry initiative and innovativeness to
   identify alternative system concepts.

-- Maintain competition by exploring rival
   systems.  (See p. 10.)

However, the Office of the Secretary of Defense
involvement in the identification and reconcilia-
ticn of navigational needs was greater than
the level of involvement criticized by the
Commission. (See p. 10.)

It should be noted that:

-- Only three of the six pertinent recommenda-
   tions are suitable for a meaningful com-
   parison; implementation of the other three
   requires changes in the Federal budgeting
   process or in the Department of Defense
   technology base which have not yet been

--The NAVSTAR program began before the Com-
  mission's report was issued.

-- The evolution of the program das consistent
   with then-existing acquisition regulations.
   (See p. 10)

GAO presented the results of its review of
the three programs during August 24, 1976,
hearings before the Subcommittee on Federal
Spending Practices, Efficiency, and Open
Government.   GAO observed that implementation
of the Commission's plan as outlined in the
o2ffice of Management and Budget circular will
require improvements in several areas:

 -Executive agencies have to understand that
  inder the new acquisition process, mission

                area deficiencies must be determined and
                stated independently of any specific system
                solution. This will enable agency heads
                and the Congress to make decisions based on
                a clear understanding of the mission de-
                ficiency and need for new systems.
              -- Effort allowed under the technology base
                 requires redefinition so that solutions to
                 mission needs are not dictated by in-house
                 efforts but result from competition between
                 alternative solutions.
              -- Industry must be given greater flexibility
                 to propose a wide range of alternative
                 solutions to mission area deficiencies in
                 responding to Government requests.

              Officials of the Office of the Secretary of
              Defense and the Air Force agreed generally
              with the report. Comments of these officials
              have been incorporated.

                           CHAPTER 1

      Major system acquisitions account fo: a large
                                                 February 1976
of Federal expenditures. We reported 1/ in          as of June 30,
that major Federal acquisitions 2/ inat process
                                            completion.     About
1975, would cost aboe,' $404 billion                   acquisitions,
$220 billion is for Dvpartment of Defense (DOD)
excluding the Army Corps of Engineers.
                                                     of study,
       In December 1972, after about 2-1/2 years its report
the Commission on Government Procurement           Federal procure-
containing 149 recommendations    for  improving
                                                  system   acquisi-
ment. Twelve recommendations were on majorPolicy, Office of
tions. The Office of Federal Procurement        A-109, "Major
Management and Budget, issued Circular No.
                                                  prescribed policy
System Acquisitions," on April 5, 1976. It the Commission's
 for all executive branch agencies based on
       During July 1975 tearings on major system Spending
 reform, the Chairman, Subcommittee or.    Federal
                                                  Senate Committee
 Practices. Efficiency, and Open Government,
                                                        a special
 on Government Operations, asked us to undertake                 pro-
 study of the "very beginning steps" in the requirements  compare  the
 cess for some current programs. pe asked that            recommen-
 evolution of these programs with the Commission's
        DOD officials had indicated in congressional
                                               had  been  implement-
  that the intent of the Com.ission'S plan          acquisitions.
 ed either formally or informally in some           office, we asked'
 Therefore, with agreement   from  the  Senator's
  the Deputy Secretary of Defensa to suggest acquisitions
                                                    corresponded to
 which were managed in a way that most nearly
  the procedures the Commission recommended.

                                                 30, 1975,"
 1/"Financial Status of Major Acquisitions, June
   PSAD-76-72, dated February 27, 1976.
                                             million were
 2/For civil agencies, acquisitions ovet $25 research, devel-
   considered major. For DOD, programs with             or
   opment, test, and evaluation costs over $50 million major.
   production costs over $200 million were considered

     The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) asked
each service to suggest systems to be reviewed. The systems
selected were (1) the Army's Pershing II missile system, (2)
the Navy's Shipboard Intermediate Range Combat System, and
(3) the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System, which has a joint
service program office with the Air Force as the executive
service. Tile Pershing II and Shipboard Intermediate Range
Combat System are the subjects of separate reports.

     We presented the results of our review of the three
programs during August 24, 1976, hearings before the Sub-
committee on Federal Spending Practices, Efficiency, and
Open Government. We observed that implementation of the
Commission's plan as outlined in the Office of Management
and Budget circular will require improvements in several

     -- Executive agencies have to understand that under the
        new acquisition process mission area deficiencies
        must be determined anc stated independently of any
        specific system solution. This will enable agency
        heads and the Congress to make decisions based on a
        clear understanding of the mission deficiency and
        need for new systems.
     -- Effort allowed under the technology base requires
        redefinition so that solutions to mission needs are
        not dictated by in-house efforts but result from com-
        petition between alternative solutions.
     -- Industry must be given greater flexibility to propose
        a wide range of alternative solutions to mission area
        deficiencies in responding to Governme.it requests.

      Our review covered only the Commission's first six
recommendatioans.  To determine the evolution of the selected
programs, we conferred with officials of OSD, military de-
partment headquarters, program offices, and selected con-
tractors. We reviewed available correspondence; reports;
briefing charts; contracting documents; and planning, pro-
gr_,ning, and budgeting system documents.

     we did not evaluate the conclusions reached or decis-
ions made in the programs' evolution. Rather, we compared
the program. with -he major system acquisition plan envis-
ioned by the Commission and with the Office of Management
and Budget circular on major system acquisitions.

     Formal comments were not obtained from DOD on this
report. However, OSD and Air Force officials reviewed the
report and were generally in agreement with its findings and
conclusions. Comments of these officials have been incorpo-

                          CHAPTER   2
      The Commission on Government Procurement's recommenda-
tions on major system acquisitions called for:

      -- Establishing a common plan for conducting and
         controlling all acquisition programs. The
         plan should highlight the key decisions for all
         involved organizations: the Congress, agency
         heads, agency components, and the private sector.

      -- Defining each organization's role so it can exercise
         proper responsibility and control over acquisition
      -- Providing the Congress and agency heads with the in-
         formation needed to make program decisions and com-
      The plan forms a structure applicable to programs of
all agencies. The recommendations were not designed to be
applied selectively to the acquisition process but, rather,
to be used together to improve the entire acquisition pro-

      Specific actions called for in the early stages of the
process were:

      --Agency components (such as the Army, Navy, and Air
        Force) would submit their perceptions of mission de-
        ficiencies to their agency head (such as the Secre-
        tary of Defense).
     --The agency head would reconcile a perceived need with
       overall agency mission capabilities and, if there
       was agreement that a nead existed, would (1) set
       initial cost, time, and capability goals and (2)
       direct one or more agency components to respond to
       the need.
     --An agency component would establish a program office
       and solicit proposals from industry for conceptual
       solutions to the stated need.

     -- Industry would respond to the solicitation with pro-
        posed systems.

     -- The agency budget request and the congressional
        authorizations for front-end research and develop-
        ment would be by mission purpose rather than by in-
        dividual items.

     -- The agency head would allocate funds to agency com-
        ponents for the proposed systems.
     -- The agency component would fund selected alternative
        systems using annual fixed-level funding, after re-
        viewing their progress each year.

     -- Industry would explore 1/ the selected systems with-
        in the established funding goals.

     -- The agency component would choose systems for compe-
        titive demonstration on the basis of this explora-

    -- The agency head would specifically approve the com-
       petitive demonstration.

     As an exception, agency head approval would be required
if the agency component determined it should concentrate
development resources on a single system.

     The attached chart from the Commission's report shows
the interaction of the Congress, agency heads, agency
components, and private sector in the recommended major
system acquisition plan.

1/As used by the Commission, "exploring alternative systems"
  includes the study, design, and development effort occur-
  ing between agency head direction for a component to res-
  pond to a need statement and the selection of systems for
  competitive demonstration.

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                         CHAPTER 3
                  EVOLUTION OF THE NAVSTAR

     The NAVSTAR Global Positioning System, comprised of
satellites, satellite control stations, monitor sets, and
user equipment, will provide precise information on user
position and speed. Anticipated users include strategic
and attack aircraft, support aircraft, ships, submarines,
and ground vehicles and troops. The system will have 24
satellites--8 in each of three 10,900-nautical-mile orbital
planes. User equipment will receive and process data from
the best four of six to nine satellites available to a user
at any time. Six classes of user equipment have been pro-
posed for different user missions, environments, and user
vehicle characteristics, such as speed.

     Control stations and monitor sets d 11 determine satel-
lite locations and will update the information being trans-
mitted from the satellites. Users will be able to determine
their positions within about 10 meters and their velocities
on a global basis, 24 hours a day. The system will operate
in all weather conditions and will be difficult for an enemy
to jam or destroy.

     On April 17, 1973, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
directed the Air Force to consolidate two prior satellite
navigation and positioning proarams--the TIMATION and 621B
programs of the Navy arid Air Force, respectively. The
NAVSTAR program then came into being. Knpendixes to this re-
port describe existing navigation systems (app. I); DOD ef-
forts to assess its navigation and positioning capability
(app. II); and a summary of satellite navigation system ef-
forts, including NAVSTAR (app. III).


     The NAVSTAR program has been divided into three phases.

Phase I

     Phase 1, concept validation, extends from Defense Sys-
tem Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) I in December 1973 to
DSARC II scheduled in March 1978,  It now calls for a six-
satellite network to demonstrate the feasibility of the sys-
tem. The number of satellites has been increased from four
to six to support Navy fleet oallistic missile testing.

Before using the satellite system, approximately 6 months of
"inverted range" testing will take place in mid-1976. During
these tests, ground-based satellite transmitters will trans-
mit signals to aircraft to simulate the space-based system.
As the six-satellite system is launched, testing will     shift
to the space-based svstem; by November 1977 the six-satellite
system will be in use.

     User equipment will be developed concurrently with sat-
ellite development and launching. Two general development
models will be built to demonstrate the general requirements
and to provide production specifications for the six basic
types of user equipment. Based on these models, a prototype
of one type of user equipment will be built with a $25,000
cost goal. The equipment will be installed in low-perfor-
mance aircraft to test utility and maintenance. A third gen-
eral development model, being developed by the Air Force
Avionics Laboratory, will demonstrate maximum antijamming

     In addition to the above testing, the program will
investigate clock technology, particularly the extremely
a:curate and highly stable clocks necessary to achieve
nigh-positionin,    accuracy.
Phase II

     Phase II, system test and limited capability, will last
from March 1978 through DSARC III in early 1982. During this
period, the system is planned to attain precise three-dimen-
sional capability, periodically, and a continuous, two-dimen-
sional capability, with fully operational ground stations.
This phase will also include:

     1.     Initial operational test and evaluation and
            initial production of the low-cost class of
            user equipment.
     2.     Completion of initial operational test and
            evaluation on the other classes of user equipment.

     3.     Building satellites.
Phase III

     Phase III, full operational capability, extends from
1982 through 1987, during which time the remaining satel-
lites will be built, user equipment will be procured, and
the two-dimensional satellite system will be augmented by
further launches to provide a precise, three-dimensional
     T.e cost estimate for the NAVSTAR program is $1.2 bil-
lion. It does not, however, include the procurement costs
for equipment that users of the system must have.
                       NAVSTAR Cost estimate

               Phase                  Cost estimate

                   I                    $      288.3

                II                             516.8

               III                             394.9

                       Total            $1,200.0

     The most recent planning estimate available for phase
I, as of April 1976, shows the following funding require-
ments for each service.
                       Cost Rr-imate for Phase I

         Service                         Cost estimate

Air Force
     NAVSTAR                          $150.5
     Fleet Ballistic Missile
       Testing                          71.9           S222.4

Navy                                                     43.8
Army                                                     22.1

       Total                                           $288.3

     NAVSTAR has a requirement to establish a unit produc-
tion cost goal during phase I which will be updated during
the program. The program office plans to use it to support
its life-cycle-co3t goals. A life-cycle-cost model will be
used in making equipment trade-off decisions. If deployed
successfully, NAVSTAR would probably be complemented by some
type of inertial system. A reduction in other navigation
systems might reduce total DOD navigation costs.

                          CHAPTER 4

      The evolution of the NAVSTAR program only slightly re-
 sembles the Commission's recommended acquisition plan. Major
 reasons for this conclusion are that the program did not:

     -- Begin with a statement of mission capability, cost,
        and time goals stated independently of a specific
        system solution.
     -- Follow a Secretary of Defense assignment of responsi-
        bility to a service for responding to a mission
     -- Use industry initiative and innovativeness to iden-
        tify alternative system concepts.
     -- Maintain competition by exploring competing systems.

     Office of the Secretary of Defense involvement in the
identification and reconciliation of navigational needs was,
however, greater than the generally low level of involvement
criticized byv the Commission. Also, the program is maintain-
ing or considering competition for certain subsystems.

     It should be noted that:
     -- Only three recommendations (i, 4, and 6) are suitable
        for a meaningful comparison. Implementation of recom-
        mendations 2, 3, and 5 will require changes in the
        Federal budgeting process or in the Department of De-
        fense technology base. These changes have not yet
        been made.
     -- The NAVSTAR program began before the Commission's
        report was issued.
     -- The evolution of the program was consistent with
        then-existing acquisition regulations.

     The following sections present our comparison of the
Commission's first six recommendations with the evolution of
the NAVSTAR program.


     "Recommendation 1. Start new system acquisition pro-
     grams with agency head statements of needs and goals
     that have been reconciled with overall agency capabil-
     ities and resources.

     (a) State program needs and goals independently of any
         system product. Use long-term projections of mis-
         sion capabilities and deficiencies prepared and
         coordinated by agency component(s) to set program
         goals that specify:

         (1)   Total mission costs within which new systems
               should be bought and used.

         (2)   The level of mission capability to be achieved
               above that of projected inventories and
               existing systems.
         (3)   The time period in which the new capability
               is to be achieved.
     (b) Assign responsi, lity for responding to statements
         of needs and goals to agency components in such a
         way that either:

         (1)   A single agency component is responsible for
               developing system alternatives when the mis-
               sion need is clearly the responsibility of one
               component; or
         (2)   Competition between agency components is for-
               mally recognized with each offering alternative
               system solutions when the mission responsibil-
               ities overlap."
     The Commission envisioned that an agency component,
such as a military service, would submit long-term projec-
tions of mission capabilities and deficiencies to the agency
head for review. The agency head would then have these pro-
jections reconciled with overall agency resources and cap-
abilities. A major system acquisition program could be
started according to recommendation 1 if there was agreement
that a deficiency existed. This action was to include a
statement of needs and goals which did not call for a speci-
fic solution and was to occur before identifying and explor-
ing specific systems and before possible solutions were re-
duced to a single system. Under the Commission's plan, the
Secretary of Defense would assign a service or services the
responsibility for responding to a statement of specific
needs and goals.
     The conceptual study which led to NAVSTAR began about
1964--the year the Air Force and Navy began studying ways
to use satellites to improve navigation. The services
initiated these efforts rather than the Secretary of De-
fense.  Undoubtedly, they did so with the knowl-dne that in-
creased navigation and positioning would improve military

     DOD documented the needs and goals for navigation and
positioning.   (See app. II.) These efforts, particularly
those involving the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director,
Defense Research and Engineering, are consistent with that
portion of recommPenion ion  aimed at preventing a single
service from perceiving a ? ;sion need and proceeding with-
out Secretary cZ i)efends,    Ivement.  Several aspects of
these efforts, however, a., not similar to the Commission's
plan tecause

     -- they occurred at a later point in the acquisition

     -- mission needs apparently reflected the projected
        capability of the Air Force's satellite navigation
        system under development, rather than a determination
        of the specific reed;

     -- from the beginning, the services assumed that
        only a satellite system would fulfill their needs.
Program initiation

      In 1964, as a result of navigational capability
achieved for submarines by the TRANSIT program (see app.
I), the Navy and the Air Force started to explore ways to
improve satellite navigational systems. This could be des-
cribed as exploration of a technological opportunity. The
Commission recognized that a program could be prompted by
technological opportunities. In these instances, however,
under the Commission's plan, the mission need would be
questioned. The system idea would evolve freely based on
mission goals, not on premature product specifications. The
need would be separated from any particular system and
goals would be defined independently of the performance,
cost, and sc..dule characteristics of any particular system.
Alternative systems, performance requirements, and unit
costs would then be explored.

     Unlike the Commission's plan, the services pursued
satellite solutions without independently establishing mis-
sion needs and goals.

Documentationi of the mission
needs and goals
     At different times from about 1966-73, the military
services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense docu-
mented navigation needs.  (See app. II.)  This occurred after
the Air Force and Navy began developing and advocating se-
parate satellite navigation systems.

      In 1966, the LORAN Installation Plan listed navigation
characteristics considered essential or desirable by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. A comprehensive review of all
navigation systems was made in 1968 to determine the most
cost effective solution to navigation deficiencies. The
resulting Joint Chiefs of Staff study, which repeated the
above-mentioned characteristics, was the basis of the 1971
Joint Chiefs of Staff Master Navigation Plan. This plan was
reviewed by the Director, Defense Research and Engineering,
who pointed out several problems, including accuracy require-
ments that seemed to be based on the Air Force's proposed
621B system, rather than on actual operational needs. The
plan also assumed that a defense navigation satellite system
would be developed.   It did not state mission deficiencies
independently of a specific system solution as recommended
by the Commission.

     The Director requested in November 1970 that an area
coordination paper (ACP) on navigation be prepared. It was
signed on January 10, 1973. One principal conclusion was
that navigation requirements need to be reexamined to estab-
lish their value. It advocated (1) continuing investigation
of systems having the potential, singly or jointly, of meet-
ing long-range DOD navigation needs and (2) a decision on
a satellite system within the next few years. The ACP also
recognized the need for coordination of DOD navigation devel-
opment. Shortly after approval of the ACP, the Deputy Secre-
tary of Defense issued a memorandum stating that DOD would
proceed to Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council I with
a navigation satellite system. It made the Air Force respon-
sible for the effort.

Mission cost goals

     The Commission felt that mission cost goals, within
which new systems could be bought and used, should be estab-
lished before alternative system concepts were identified
to solve a mission need. DOD has not addressed mission cost
goals in this manner. As an example, the 1973 ACP presented
costs in terms of navigation system costs with a NAVSTAR
system and without a NAVSTAR system. Cost estimates were
limited to the classes of navigation equipment which would

be directly affected by the NAVSTAR.  LORAN, OMEGA, TRANSIT,
and doppler systems (see app. I) would be competitors, while
inertial systems would primarily be backup systems.

Assignment of mission needs and
goals_to agency components

     As stated previously, the Air Force and Navy initiated
efforts to improve the satellite navigation system. Under
the Commission's plan the Secretary of Defense would assign
responsibility to a service or services for responding to
a statement of needs and goals. In 1973, the Deputy Secre-
tary of Defense directed the Air Force to develop a satel-
lite navigation system by incorporating elements of the Air
Force and Navy concepts. This assignment was not the kind
envisioned by the Commission, because it specified a speci-
fic solution. Also, it occurred at a later point in the
acquisition process than recommended by the Commission.

     "Recommendation 2. Begin congressional budget
     proceedings with an annual review by the appro-
     priate committees of agency missions, capabilities,
     deficiencies, and the needs and goals for new
     acquisition programs as a basis for reviewing
     agency budgets."
     In accordance with current budgeting p:ocedures, fund-
ing for navigation systems has been by project or program
rather than by mission area. Thus, funding has been obtained
for projects related to 621B and TIMATION and for NAVSTAR,
TRANSIT, LORAN C, LORAN D, inertial systems, and others but
not for navigation. Budget proceedings have not been started
witn a mission area presentation. The 1974 Congressional
Budget Act requires that starting with fiscal year 1979, the
President's budget request will contain descriptive informa-
tion in terms of national needs, agency missions, and basic
     The Commission stated that the Congress cannot effec-
tively review expenditures and the allocation of national
resources without clearly understanding the needs and goals
for new programs. It continued that the needs and goals for
a program are presented to the Congress when a single system
is proposed, with cost, schedule, and performance estimates
often predicated on insufficient research and development.
At this point, the cost to meet a mission need is largely
determined by the cost of the new system, not the worth of
the new system compared to others.

     The Congress should have an early opportunity to (1)
understand and debate any agency's mission needs and goals
for new acquisitions and (2) discuss the relationship
of proposed mission capabilities to current national policy
and the allocation of resources in accordance with national


     "Recommendation 3. Support the general fields
     of knowledge that are related to an agency's
     assigned responsibilities by funding private
     sector sources and Government in-house techni-
     cal centers to do:

     (a)   Basic and applied research.

     (b)   Proof of concept work.

     (c)   Exploratory subsystem development.

     Restrict subsystem development to less than
     fully designed hardware until identified as
     part of . system candidate to meet a specific
     operational need."

     This recommendation is directed toward establishing a
broad technology base to support an agency'. assigned re-
sponsibilities through technology base efforts.  The Com-
mission's recommended budgeting process calls for a separate
appropriation to finance the technology base. This restruc-
turing of the budget has not been done.  Also, current re-
search and development practices allow subsystem development
to proceed farther than would be allowed under the Com-
mission's plan.

     The early Air Force and Navy development was aimed at
independently establishing the workability of the system
concept each was pursuing.  Some of these efforts fall with-
in the Commission's definition on technology base effort;
others go beyond it because fully designed hardware was
developed. This happened before Y.e Deputy Secretary of De-
fense acted in 1973 to centralize control over the space-
based navigation system development.  Some early develop-
ments in the 621B and TIMATION programs are presented below.

     In 1968 the Air Force contracted with Hughes Aircraft
Company and TRW Systems for a satellite navigation concept and
system design study.  The information developed from these
studies identified certain aspects of satellite navigation

 which the Air Force then pursued in its efforts
                                                  to prove the
 feasibility of a global-positioning system.
 cluded (1) a study to predict the total electron efforts in-
 over the entire world, (2) examination of signal
                                                   wave forms
 as means to transfer data, and (3) activity
                                             to determine
 optimum frequency and structure of signals;
                                             and were under-
 taken before the concept had been approved for
     The Air Force also contracted to have
transmitters and airborne receivers or user ground-based
                                             equipment built
to support the concept.  Although the equipment was not fully
designed for use, the Air Fcrce did pursue
                                            the idea of
satellite navigation from study and technology
                                                to simulated
demonstration. Again, this was done before
                                             the Deputy
Secretary of Defense approved the concept for
     The Navy's TIMATION efforts were designed to
the satellite navigation concept.  The Navy emphasized actual
demonstration and carried out tests using technology
lites and user equipment.                              satel-
                           The most advanced work was the de-
velopment of space clocks.  Now these efforts have been in-
terwoven with the NAVSTAR program to avoid duplicating
velopment of clock technology. An important              de-
                                             point is that
specific and integral subsystems of a satellite
system--satellites and clocks--were Leing        navigation
                                          developed before
the Secretary of Defense approved a manor system
ition effort.

      The efforts identified above are in keeping
                                                   with the
methods used by DOD to establish new systems.
nology effort is intended to validate a system. A  major tech-
                                                   Some efforts
progressed to the development of specific equipment
satellite navigation.                                 for
                        A U.S. Air Force Space and Missile
Systems Organization (SAMSO) comment summarizes
                                                  these ef-

     "System 621B has systematically progressed
     preliminary design and analysis studies for
     cal feasibility through the completion of receiver
     breadboard development.  The * * *emphasis [was]
     * * *to establish a solid advocacy base for
     acquisition approval* * *"


     "Recommendation 4.   Create alternative system
     candidates by:

     (a)   Soliciting industry proposals for new systems
           with a statement of the need (mission deficiency);
           time, cost, and capability goals; and operating

           constraints Lf the responsible agency and com-
           ponent(s), with each contractor free to propose
           system technical approach, subsystems, and main
           design features.

     (b)   Soliciting system proposals from smaller firms
           that do not own production facilities if they

           (1)   Personnel experienced in major development
                 and production activities.
           (2)   Contingent plans for later use of required
                 equipment and facilities.

     (c)   Sponsoring, for agency funding, the most promisiiig
           system candidates selected by agency component
           heads from a review of those proposed, using a
           team of experts from inside and outside the agency
           component development organization."

     DOD did not solicit proposals for alternative systems
from industry to meet its needs and goals for navigation.
The Air Force and the Navy developed different concepts
(621B and TIMATION) to meet their perceptions of navigation
needs and goals. These concepts were developed in-house;
industry involvement was limited to specific tasks to sup-
port the services' concepts.
     Moreover, the method used to develop the NAVSTAR con-
cept resulted in requests for proposals that effectively
ruled out smaller firms from being awarded development con-

Rationale for the recommendation

      According to the Commission, agency components prema-
turely commit themselves to a system because (1) a predeter-
mined design !s often linked to the statement of "need," (2)
industry is pressured to propose the kind of system the
agency component wants, (3) limited resources are available
to explore alternatives, and (4) the services must de ond a
system before many resources are committed to it. The prema-
ture commitments are, according to the Commission, made for
a system that reflects design contributions from many public
aiid private organizations. This "design by committee" cuts
off real alternatives and results in a complex and not eas-
ily managed system.

     In an environment of uncertain needs and technology,
alternative systems would provide relatively inexpensive
insurance against the possibiiity that a premature choice
may later prove to be poor and costly. Alternative concepts
introduce the benefits of competition early in the evolution
of a system when the cost to maintain competitors is only a
small fraction of that needed for later development and p:o-
duction phases. A wider base of innovative talent can be ap-
plied rather than concentrating resources on a single system.

Alternative systems concepts

     Alternative system concepts for satisfying
needs and goals were not developed or explored. navigation
                                                 The military
services each decided that a satellite navigation system
was the best solution. As a result, the Navy was pursuing
TIMATION and the Air Force was pursuing the 621B. Neither
system would have met all of DOD's navigation requirements--
TIMATION would not meet security requirements for signals
and 621B required stations in foreign countries. Elements
of each were eventually incorporated into NAVSTAR.

     The TIMATION and 621B programs cannot be considered
alternative systems, as they used the same technical ap-
proach with variations in design and did not address the
same stated needs. Under NAVSTAR, only one system is being
Solicitation of industry proposals

      In April 1973, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed
the Air Force to develop a navigation satellite program.
Thus, requests for proposals issued to industry were not in-
tended to produce alternative system concepts, but elements
of the satellite system which had been developed in-house.

     The requests for proposals did allow for subsystem com-
petition. With NAVSTAR, the requests were functionally
oriented and cited only minimal constraints, such as average
mission duration and the weight of the satellite.

Relationship with smaller firms

     Solicitations were essentially limited to larger firms
familiar with satellites, particularly satellite navigation.
Before issuing requests for space vehicles, the program of-
fice visited 13 aerospace contractors to determine the state
of the art and to provide information on the possible devel-
opment. Small firms, previously uninvolved in satellite
technology, were not invited to this meeting.

     Program personnel explained some concerns about smaller
firms. For example, a small firm's knowledge and capital

reserve usually are less than a larger firm's.  Both of these
items can be vital if a contractor has an unexpected problem.
The Government deals with the prime contractor only. If a
small firm has a design proposal and subcontracts with a large
firm for production, control of the project is likely to rest
with the large firm, with whom the Government has no con-
tractual relationship.
     Although the requests for proposals for space vehicles
were issued to any interested firm, 13 firms in the satel-
lite industry were favored, as the request was based on in-
put from them. Requests for proposals for user equipment
and control systems were limited to contractors familiar
with satellite navigation: (1) General Dynamics and Magna-
vox and (2) TRW and Philco-Ford. These companies had been
awarded prior contracts which stated that one of them would
be awarded the phase I contract.

     The requests for space vehicles resulted in four pro-
posals. Three of the four firms had worked on satellite nav-
igation systems, and the other, which had worked on communi-
cation satellites, subcontracted with a firm knowledgeable
about 621B.

     Source selection committees, composed of personnel from
inside and outside the program office, evaluated the pro-
posals.  In early 1974, Rockwell International was awarded
the space vehicle contract and General Dynamics/Magnavox was
awarded the user equipment and control system contracts.

    "Recommendation 5. Finance the exploration of
     alternative systems by:
     (a) 3roposing agency development budgets
         according to mission need to support the
         exploration of alternative system candidates.
     (b) Authorizing and appropriating funds
         by agency mission area in accordance with
         review of agency mission needs and goals
         for new acquisition programs.

     (c) Allocating agency development funds
         to components by mission need to support the
         most promising system candidates. Monitor
         components' exploration of alternatives at
         the agency head level through annual budget
         and approval reviews using updated mission
         needs and goals."
      The Commission stated that the Congress could better
 understand where research and development money was spent
 if it reviewed, authorized, and appropriated funds for
 studying candidate systems according to mission.
     This would segregate funds for (1) maintaining the
technology base, (2) exploring alternative solutions to
mission needs, and (3) developing the selected systems. All
development projects associated with the alternatives to
meet each agency mission need would be grouped together.

     Previous comments under recommendation 2 apply to this
section also. Budget requests, authorizations, and appro-
priations have not been made by mission area. Accordingly,
congressional review of NAVSTAR and the effort leading to
NAVSTAR has been by individual item.

     Although DOD is not exploring alternatives to the NAV-
STAR program, it followed a mission area approach in estab-
lishing the program. Within OSD, reviews were made of DOD
 avigational capability and needs. As a result, the decision
    made to pursue development and production of NAVSTAR and
st eral other non-space-based systems. These systems are not
alternative systems but are complementary to NAVSTAR. Among
these are self-contained inertial systems and ground-based
OMEGA and LORAN systems which provide backup in case NAVSTAR
malfunctions and additional assurance of navigational cap-
ability in the event of physical or electronic attack by a
sophisticated foe.

     Before the NAVSTAR concept was selected in 1973, TIMATION
and 621B were reviewed. The best aspects of each were incor-
porated into NAVSTAR. This selection considered the needs
of all the services and was undertaken to avoid obvious dup-
      Early review of navigation needs and capability included
the 1966 LORAN Installation Plan, a 1968 Joint Chiefs of Staff
study, and numerous efforts of the individual services. (See
app. II.) The relationship between military requirements
and the systems in existence or being developed was examined
in the 1973 ACP. The mission needs and goals identified by
the services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and examined in
the ACP were presented in detail in the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Master Navigation Plan. Originally prepared fron. their
1968 study on navigation, this plan stated that only a
satellite system could meet the requirements. Despite this
restriction, the plan is a mission area approach to deter-
mining needs and goals for navigation. It has been updated
several times since 1968.

     A mission area budget can then be processed. DOD has
already begun to think in terms of mission areas and to re-
late systems to them. Formulatin. a mission area budget
would mean regrouping existing information.


     "Recommendation 6. Maintain competition between con-
      tractors exploring alternative systems by:

     (a) Limiting commitments to each contractor
         to annual fixed-level awards, subject to
         annual review of their technical progress
         by the sponsoring agency component.

     (b) Assigning agency representatives with relevant
         operational experience to advise competing con-
         tractors as necessary in developing performance
         and other requirements for each candidate system
         as tests and tradeoffs are made.

     (c) Concentrating activities of agency development
         organizations, Government laboratories, and tech-
         nical management staffs during the private sector
         competition on monitoring and evaluating con-
         tractor development efforts, and participating in
         those tests critical to determining whether the
         system candidate should be continued."

     Alternatives to NAVSTAR are not being explored. How-
ever, several alternatives concerning technological risk and
cost for user equipment are being sponsored. In addition, a
second source for phase II satellite procurement is now
being considered.

     The Commission felt that most programs would benefit
from competition among contractors which are independently
responsible for their systems. This could be aided by chal-
lenging industry to use a wider span of technologies for
system solutions that are of lower cost and simpler design.
Contract incentives for competitors should be directed to-
ward economy and austerity in system design. The Commission
also stressed the integrity of contracts, which makes each
contractor independent and fully responsible for designing
the system contained in the proposals. Ultimately, success
or failure of any alternative system should be determined by

     When the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved NAVSTAR
on December 22, 1973, he stated that competitive development

contracts should be used for all user
continuation of the program beyond    equipment, because
                                   phase I depends largely
on the development of accurate but inexpensive
ment.                                          user equip-

      To meet this request, SAMSO is developing
for manpacks (portable sets) and high            two alternates
aircraft and helicopters. These will   dynamics  sets for
those user classes where the potential provide  competition  in
                                        equipment investment
is greatest. The original contract for
awarded to General  Dynamics and Magnavox user equipment was
                                           Research Labora-
tory. Later, contracts were awarded
Inc., for both alternate development to Texas Instruments,
                                      efforts in early 1975.
Through these contracts, SAMSO hopes
                                      to achieve the best and
least costly design by insuring active
petitors.                               incentive among com-

      Although only one contractor
 for phase I, SAMSO officials have isrequested
                                       developing a satellite
                                               approval for a
second contractor for phase II. In addition,
two sources through phase III would assure       procurement from
competition in the future. The competitive,  the  benefits of
satellite would not be a copy of the           second-source
                                       same design and would
be compatible with all users. To insure
second contractor would be directed to     competition, the
                                         have only a limited
number of subcontractors in common with
                                          the original con-
tractor. This competition hopefully
life-cycle cost.                       would result in lower

     In other areas. evidence showed no contractor
tion. General Dynamics                             competi-
                        and Magnavox Research Laboratory
developing ground controls, and technological             are
the clock are being made by the Navy.         choices for

APPENDIX I                                      APPENDIX I


     A brief description of present navigational systems
is presented below. Each offers some of the characteristics
needed for military purposes, such as global coverage, con-
tinuous availability, all-weather operation, and being im-
pervious to enemy countermeasures. After NAVSTAR becomes
operational, some of the more specialized systems may remain
in use, but some of the more general purpose systems may be
phased out.

     1. LORAN-C is a system of radio signal transmitting
stations used by ships and submarines. User position is
determined from the time it takes signals to arrive from
different stations. The system covers the North Atlantic,
Mediterranean, Norwegian Sea, east coast of America, North
and Central Pacific, and Southeast Asia. Accuracy depends
on the user's distance from the stations and can be obtained
to within 200 meters at 1,600 kilometers. Greater accuracy,
to within 70 meters, can be obtained at lesser distances.
Continuous, two-dimensional (longitude and latitude) infor-
mation is provided.

     2. LORAN-D is a tactical, short-range version of
LORAN-C.  It employs portable transmitters and is designed
for rapid deployment into an area.

      3. OMEGA is a chain of eight stations which transmit
very low frequency signals. Use of this kind of signal and
high power enable the system to cover the entire world. It
provides continuous, all-weather navigation with two-dimen-
sional (longitude and latitude) accuracy of 1 to 2
nautical miles for civil and military aircraft, surface
ships, and submarines. The system does not provide altitude

      4. Bottom navigation uses contour maps of the ocean
bottom and a means of determining depth at the user's loca-
tion.   It can be used in all weather conditions and is im-
pervious to enemy countermeasures. Data on system limita-
tions is classified.

     5. Inertial systems are self-contained systems which
determine position by tracking movement from a known start-
ing or reference point. They work on the principle that a
vehicle's movement over the surface of the globe will dis-
place a pendulum pointing at the center of the earth. Posi-
tioning becomes less accurate with the passage of time.

APPENDIX I                                        APPENDIX I
Because of decreasing accuracy, these systems do not meet all
military requirements. However, with a satellite system,
such as NAVSTAR, to periodically update the positional in-
formation, inertial systems could be used when enemy count-
ermeasures prevent the use of NAVSTAR.

     6. Celestial navigation is reliable and provides world-
wide coverage in clear weather. It cannot be used to deter-
mine altitude and is not continuously available.

     7. TRANSIT is the only operational satellite naviga-
tion System. It is used primarily by submarines. The sys-
tem requires a user to obtain several readings at different
times from TRANSIT satellites. Satellites are not available
continuously, however, and submarines must expose their an-
tennas to obtain navigational readings.

APPENDIX II                                          APPENDIX II


     Deficiencies in existing or planned navigation systems
have been documented numerous times by DOD. Some of these
efforts are summarized below.

     DOD needs were stated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
the 1966 LORAN Installation Plan. It listed several essen-
tial and desirable navigation system characteristics, such
as improved accuracy, nonsaturability, and continuous avail-
ability. DOD defines two areas requiring navigational data:
general purpose and objective. An objective area is that
specific area in which a crew or unit leader must be able
to navigate to a precise position to deliver stores, operate
sensors, carry out operational tasks, or transit to term-
inals. A general purpose or en route area is all area exter-
nal to the objective areas. The LORAN Installation Plan con-
tained general purpose and objective area accuracy require-
ments for subsurface, air, ground, and sea operations.

     The Military Airlift Command identified deficiencies in
global aircraft navigation in a July 1966 required opera-
tional capability document. This document described the
navigation systems in use as limited in coverage and range.
For example, the Navy's TRANSIT program was not compatible
with aircraft velocity, and inertial systems were too expen-
sivp and not sufficiently accurate.


     A March 1967 mission analysis by Aerospace Corporation
presented existing navigation system limitations and a re-
commendation concerning future systems. Data on limitations
of existing systems is classified.

                                                APPENDIX II

       In October 1967 the Deputy Secretary of Defense
 requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff review
 gation systems in use or being developed to      all Lavi-
 most cost-effective combination of systems. recommend the
                                               The resulting
 study identified a need for worldwide coverage,
 instantaneous response, continuous availability, redundancy,
 to resist enemy countermeasures. It included      and ability
                                                accuracy re-
 quirements for en route needs and objective
 three dimensions (longitude, latitude, and area needs in
                                             altitude) for
 close air support, helicopter assault, mapping,
 warfare, and bombing missions.                   electronic

      The study found no system or combination of
 available in the 1970-80 period to meet the       systems
 It stated that satellite systems appeared    requirements.
 promise of providing continuous, worldwide to have the most

     The study stated that no single system
ing DOD needs existed and that a navigationalcapable of meet-
tem and an inertial system were complimentary. satellite sys-
                                                 The satel-
lite system would provide precise positioning
flight corrections for the inertial system.    data and in-
system would be self-contained and would      The inertial
                                         be essentially im-
pervious to enemy countermeasures.


      On April 9, 1968, a Required Operational Capability
D.cument for a navigation satellite system
Military Airlift Command. Unlike the previouswas issued by the
 identified specific needs for all types of      document, it
system was to have worldwide, all-weather,   users.  The new
                                             and continuous
coverage; passive user operation; low vulnerability
ming; and accuracy of 1 nautical mile for             to jam-
                                            en route needs and
0.01 nautical mile for objective area navigation.
space Defense Command, the Strategic Air Command, The Aero-
Tactical Air Command listed their accuracy          and the

     The Navy issued OPNAV Instruction 03530.1A,
Navigation Policy, on September 16, 1968.          Navy
no navigation system with worldwide coverageIt  stated  that
or being developed which would accomplish      was in  use
fic requirements of all tasks and missions.the Navy's speci-
                                               Taking into

APPENDIX II                                       APPENDIX II

consideration the most likely systems, the Navy presented
two types of requirements:
     -- General purpose, a 1-nautical mile, continuous,
        all-weather requirement for forces en route to an
        objective area or in port-to-port or long-range,
        point-to-point operations.
     -- Precision, a 0.1- to 0.5-nautical mile, continuous,
        all-weather requirement to support flight operations
        and weapons systems.
     The Navy also distinguished between essential and
desirable characteristics:

     -- Essential:

          -- Worldwide coverage.

          -- All-weather, day and night operation.

          -- Effective, instantaneous response.

          -- Nonsaturability.

          -- No electronic radiation by user.

          -- Determination of position when user equipment
             is activated.

     --Desirable: 1/
          --No foreign bases.
          -- Easy to maintain, repair, and operate.

          --Not limited to line of sight.
          -- Denies enemy use.

          --No environmental propagation limitations.

1/One of the desirable characteristics is classified.

APPENDIX II                                     APPENDIX II

     The Joint Chiefs of Staff study became the principal
referenc. for the 1971 Joint Chiefs of Staff Master Naviga-
tion Plan which called for accuracy of about 18 meters
in 3 dimensions and an all-weather, continuous, world-
wide system. It supported early implementation of OMEGA,
selection of an advanced navigational satellite system for
early implementation, support for the development and pro-
curement of a self-contained system, and improvement of the
LORAN-C and LORAN-D equipment.

     Several issues, such as affect of user equipment on the
cost of navigation systems and analysis of the operational
requirements, were not resolved by the master plan. More-
over, the accuracy requirement was based on the expected
copability of the ongoing Air Force development rather than
on actual needs. The plan assumed that a satellite naviga-
tion system would be developed and that some of the other
systems would be phased out.

APPENDIX III                                    APPENDIX III


     The concept of a satellite navigation and positioning
system originated in the 1950s at the Applied Physics Labora-
tory. By tracking Soviet satellites, the laboratory found
that a satellite transmitting radio signals could be used
to determine the position of an object on Earth. Radio sig-
nals from a satellite could be used to determine the dis-
tance from rhe satellite to the object. If the position of
the s& ellite were known, several of these measurements could
be used to compute the position of the object.


     The Navy became interested in satellite navigation for
its flee: ballistic missile submarines, and the TRANSIT sys-
tem became operational in 1964 as a result. It includes six
satellites in low-altitude, subsynchronous orbits which
allow submarines to determine their positions within 0.1
nautical mile. The system is worldwide, all-weather, and
meets the accuracy needs of submarines. Limitations of the
system are classified. The advantages and problems of TRAN-
SIT resulted in further Navy study of space-based navigation.
This effort started in 1964 and was called TIMATION.


     The TIMATION program advocated a system of 9 satellites
in each of 3 medium altitude orbits, for a total of 27 sat-
ellites. The proposed system would give instantaneous posi-
tion data, would provide worldwide coverage, and would not be
affected by the user's velocity. To prove the approach was
workable, the Navy explored (1) methods for establishing
precise time data 1/ for satellites, (2) the capability of
transferring time data for synchronization, and (3) orbital

l/Precise time data is required. The concept is based on
  accurate knowledge of the position of satellites, exact
  time at that position, and the transit time of a signal
  from that position. Distances from three satellites are
  required to compute the users' positions.

APPENDIX III                                  APPENDIX III

     In 1967, the Navy launched an experimental satellite
(TIMATION-I) to demonstrate the feasibility of the system.
Receivers were placed on aircraft, trucks, and a boat, and
two-dimensional accuracy of 100 meters was obtained. Use of
this technique to transfer time was verified to one-mil-
lionth of a second.
     TIMATION II was launched in 1969.  It used two differ-
ent radio signal frequencies to reduce errors caused by the
ionosphere and an improved clock for increased stability
and synchronization. Tests demonstrated two-dimensional
position accuracy of 50 meters under conditions similar to
TIMATION I and instantaneous two-dimensional positioning
within 70 meters. The effort demonstrated that the clock was
stable and could be synchronized from the ground. Also,
time transfer experiments were carried out. The Navy also
developed user-related equipment and assembled four tracking
systems to monitor the satellites.


     In 1964, the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Organi-
zation (SAMSO) also began work on a satellite navigation
system, including studies and laboratory tests to develop
a practical system. A 1967 mission analysis by the Aero-
space Corporation of El Segundo, California, and SAMSO ana-
lyzed satellite navigation for jet aircraft. This was a cri-
tical aspect of any new system, since TRANSIT could not pro-
vide the desired accuracy for jets. The resulting report,
"Improvement in Navigation of High Speed Aircraft," (Oct.
23, 1967), identified s;tillite navigation as the best ap-
proach. Based on an investigation of different navigation
systems for tactical fighter command and control, the report
concluded that an advanced satellite navigation system was
the most cost-effective system.  It also stated that accu-
racy of about 18 meters was achievable with then current

     The report discussed regional satellite systems which
would be linked together for a continuous, worldwide system.
Numerous ground stations, some in foreign countries, would
be needed for tracking and control. SAMSO later awarded two
contracts of about $500,000 each in May 1968 to TRW Systems
and Hughes Aircraft for system formulation and design work.
In January 1969 they submitted reports which SAMSO used
to finalize a Concept Formulation Package/Technical Develop-
ment Plan. The plan advocated using a 621B satellite
navigation system. This proposal was submitted to the

APPENDIX III                                     aPPENDIX III

Air Force   Systems Command in April 1969 and was modified
following   a request by the Command for an Advance Develop-
ment Plan   which did not commit the Air Force to the total
system at   initial program approval.

     During the first half e. 1969, SAMSO awarded several
study and feasibility contracts in aroas, such as optimi-
zation of user equipment for cost savings, building bread-
board models of receivers and transmitters, integrating
into existing aircraft avionics, and the impact of  621B on
naval fleet and air operations.  From 1969 to 1972,  SAMSO
made many studies to investigate 621B, including:
     -- Delay of signals by atmospheric effects.

     -- Application of 621B to missile and space guidance.

     -- Financial impact of 621B on procurement and main-
        tenance of DOD navigation equipment.

     -- 621B signal. acquisition and tracking.
     -- Range measuring.

     -- Signal frequency and structure.

     -- Design, fabrication, and test of 621B equipment
        using ground-jased transmitters.

     -- Performance characteristics of signal wave forms.

     Single-channel and multichannel receiver tests were
made at White Sands Missile Range to confirm performance
of the proprosed receivers. These tests used an NC-135 air-
craft and two continuous-tracking receivers to determine
system performance, equipment design, and effects of envi-
ronment and atmosphere on radio signals. Results proved that
position-fixing to 5 meters and velocity to 0.3 meter per
second were attainable. Tests were also carried out using
other equipment.

     The 621B program thus progressed from a concept to pre-
liminary design and analysis for technical feasibility and
demonstration to establish a basis for system acquisition

APPENDIX III                                  APPENDIX III


     In 1970, the Director, Defense Research and Engineering,
recommended that an area coordination paper (ACP) and a
development concept paper (DCP) be prepared to resolve the
issues remaining in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Master Naviga-
tion Plan. ( See app. II.)  The ACP was to review all navi-
gation systems and relate them to each other according to
cost and need; the DCP was to show the merit and cost of a
satellite system. This recommendation was supported by the
Secretary of Defense and the two papers were prepared.

     The Director signed the ACP on January 19, 1973, and it
was updated on December 11, 1973. The ACP reviewed the sta-
tus of navigation development programs and possible answers
for future requirements. Its major conclusions were that:
     1.   Navigation requirements be reexamined to establish
          their value and to facilitate trade-offs between
          requirements, design, and cost.

     2.   The key econromic question be answered: Can
          acquisition costs be offset by reducing the
          number of navigation systems?

     3.   A decision be made on whether or not to develop
          an advanced system, such as NAVSTAR, in the next
          few years.

     4.   System options having the potential, singly or
          jointly, of meeting long-range DOD needs continue
          to be investigated. Three options were identified:
          (a) global systems, (b) deployable and mobile
          systems, and (c) self-contained systems.

     5.   A navigation focal point be established in the
          Office of the Secretary of Defense to review
          DOD efforts and to provide the Deputy
          Secretary of Defense specific recommendations
          on new development, cost avoidance, and phasing
          out of navigation systems.

APPENDIX III                                   APPENDIX III

     The DCP which was to show the merit and cost of a sat-
ellite system was also signed on January 10, 1973. However,
there was disagreement within OSD, and the paper was not
officially approved. On April 17, 1973, the Depu;ty Secre-
tary of Defense designated the Air Force as responsible for
a Defense Satellite Navigation Development Program. He in-
structed the Air Force to undertake the necessary coordina-
tion; assign a program manager; and establish a joint Army,
Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force program office which would
prepare detailed plans for the system. The Army and Navy
were instructed to insure that their elements of the pro-
gram were directed at establishing a comprehensive and inte-
grated DOD sstem. The program office was to prepare a DCP
for Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council I by July
1973. The program office was established at SAMSO in June
1973. The DCP, which was signed on January 10, 1973, in-
cluded joint-service :equirements and some aspects of TIMA-
TION. Thus, the main task was to consolidate the Air Force
and Navy programs.

     SAMSO studied the best concept to present to DSARC I
and determined potential users. After the classes of user
equipment had been determined, contracts for defining the
user equipment and the control systems were awarded in June
1973 to (1) General Dynamics and Magnavox Research Labora-
tories and (2) TRW Systems, Inc., and Philco Ford. In accor-
dance with these contracts, the contract for developing user
equipment and control systems would be awarded to one of
these teams.

     The program office also investigated the state of the
art for navigation. Program personnel visited 13 satellite
contractors before giving an information briefing on pos-
sible development of a global positioning system. Informa-
tion was also obtained on other aspects of satellite naviga-
tion. Studies were made on the capabilities of existing sys-
tems; potential cost avoidances resulting from NAVSTAR; and
cost, performance, and schedule analyses. The latter were
'bsed on various constellations of satellites with different
orbits, boosters, satellites, or support facilities.

     The DCP continued to be revised as the system changed.
DSARC I was rescheduled to October and was finally held on
December 13, 1973. In November 1973, the system was named
NAVSTAR Global Positioning System to more accurately des-
cribe the proposed system and to relieve it of past connota-

APPENDIX III                                     APPENDIX III

     The DCP based its concept of NAVSTAR on the bst as-
pects of TIMATION and 621B. The orbit configuration was
patterned after TIMATION's orbit configuration. Unlike 621B,
it provided worldwide coverage without foreign ground sta-
tions. The satellite signal. however, w s based on 621B re-
search. This signal would provide more resistance to enemy
countermeasures. The precise clock was to be developed by
the Navy. Considerable research on stability and precision
of spaceborne clocks was done under TIMATION, and the Navy
had overall responsibility for work on time and clock devel-
opment for DOD. The Council recommended this approach:
     -- Evolutionary system development.
     --4 years to validate the concept--phase I.
     -- Some operational testing.

     -- Subsynchronous operational satellites.
     -- Cost of $150 million to complete phase I.

     -- Carry over of experimental hardware to system

     This recommendation was approved by the Deputy Secre-
tary of Defense on December 22, 1973. He indicated that
since user equipment costs would be a major factor in pro-
gram approval beyond phase I, the program should use compe-
titive development contracts for user equipment.
     After the first council, SAMSO issued several requests
for proposals. The first, issued in January 1974, was for
space vehicles. It contained functional specifications,
giving contractors flexibility to propose different designs.
It cited constraints such as weight--dictated by the launch
vehicle--and reliability requirements. The requests also
stated that emphasis would be on technical competition ra-
ther than on price competition. Four proposals were received
in April 1974, and source selection began. The contract was
awarded to Rockwell International in June 1974.

     Requests for proposals for user equipment end the con-
trol system were issued to General Dynamics/Magnavox Re-
search Laboratory and TRW/Philco-Ford in April 1974. These
requests contained functional specifications and few cons-
straints. Constraints concerned the size and weight of the

                                                 APPENDIX III

                                           as signal structure
unit; interfaces with the satellite, such
                                            computer language
and data flow; and the use of a high order
to meet changing technology.
     Similar to the space vehicle contract, the       result
                            control  system were  the
for the user equipment and                        competition.
of source selection based  largely  on technical
                                                 received the
General Dynamics/Magnavox Research Laboratory
contracts for the two segments.
                                                      with the
     To pursue a somewhat higher risk technologyof lower
opportunity for additional payoffs   in  the  form
                                                 separate re-
life-cycle-cost user equipment, SAMSO issued
                                     development    of the man-
quests for proposals for alternate                    Proposals
pack and the high dynamic set  in  February   1975.
                                      were   evaluated  by one
for the high eynamic user equipment            unit  were eval-
selection committee; those for  the  manpack
                                of  these   separate  evaluations,
uated by another. As a result
Texas Instruments, Inc. was awarded    both contracts. Alter-
                                                for the low-cost
nate requests for proposals were not issued
user equipment or the control system.

                                                        APPENDIX   IV
                      PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS

                    RESPONSIBLE FOR MATTERS
                   DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT

                                             Tenure of Office
                                             From          To
                  DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
    Donald H. Rumsfeld                    Nov.   1975     Present
    William P. Clements, Jr. (acting)     Nov.   1975
    James R. Schlesinger                                  Nov. 1975
                                          July   1973     Nov. 1975
    William P. Clements, Jr. (acting)     May    1973
    Elliot L. Richardson                                  July 1973
                                          Jan.   1973     May   1973
    Melvin R. Laird                       Jan.   1969     Jan. 1973
    Robert-Ellsworth                      Dec.   1975
    William P. Clements, Jr.                              Present
                                          Jan.   1973     Present
    Kenneth Rush                          Feb.   1972
    Vacant                                                Jan. 1973
                                          Dec.   1971     Feb.  1972
    David Packard                         Jan.   1969     Dec. 1971
    Malcolm R. Currie                     June   1973
    John S. Foster, Jr.                                  Present
                                          Oct.   1965    June 1973
    Thomas C. Reed                        Jan.   1976
    John L. McLucas                                      Present
                                          July   1973    Nov. 1975
    RobeLt C. Seamans, Jr.                Feb.   1969    May   1973