oversight

Aviation Security: Posting Notices at Domestic Airports

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1997-03-25.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

      United States
GAO   General Accounting Office
      Washington, D.C. 20548

      Resources, Community,   and
      Economic Development    Division


      B-275984


      March 25, 1997


      The Honorable Ron Wyden
      United States Senate

      Subject:   Aviation Securitv:      Posting Notices at Domestic Airnorts

      Dear Senator Wyden:

      Under federal law, the Federal Aviation Administration     (FAA) is responsible for
      prescribing regulations to protect the users of the nation’s commercial air
      transportation system against terrorism and other criminal acts. The agency’s
      efforts are concentrated on airports located in the United States (“domestic
      &ports”),    U.S. air carriers wherever they operate in the world, and foreign-
      owned air carriers serving the United States. FAA is also legislatively mandated
      to assess the effectiveness of security measures maintained at certain foreign
      airports. When the Secretary of Transportation determines that a foreign
      airport does not maintain and carry out effective security measures, the
      Secretary is required, if corrective action is not taken by the airport, to have the
      identity of the airport posted at all domestic airports from which regularly
      scheduled air carriers operate, regardless of whether they serve international
      destinations. No similar legal mandate requires the posting of notices at
      domestic airports about the effectiveness of the security measures maintained
      at other domestic airports.

      As agreed with your office, this report addresses the following specific
      questions: (1) What are the bases for security assessments at foreign and
      domestic airports, and how do they differ? (2) What are the views and opinions
      of the aviation community-that    is, of industry, government, and consumer
      groups-on a policy that would require FAA to post public notices in domestic
      airports about the security risks at other domestic airports?




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In summary, we found the following:

-       In assessing the effectiveness of security at foreign airports, FAA applies
        security criteria that have been agreed upon by members of the International
        Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).l When the Secretary of Transportation
        finds that a foreign airport is not maintaining and carrying out effective
        security measures, the Secretary’s authority is generally limited to having
        notices posted in domestic airports identifying the foreign airport and
        placing restrictions on U.S. carriers flying into and out of that airport.
        Conversely, FAA’s criteria for overseeing security at domestic airports are
        based on the Federal Aviation Regulations, which generally include more
        detailed and enforceable standards than ICAO’s. Noncompliance by an
        airport makes it subject to enforcement actions, such as civil penalties or a
        revocation of its certificate to operate.

-       Representatives of government, the aviation industry, and consumer groups
        whom we surveyed were unanimous in opposing the establishment of a
        policy to post notices in domestic airports about security risks at other
        domestic airports. They frequently cited concerns about providing a
        blueprint for terrorists and being unable to measure and compare
        differences in the security risks at airports that varied in their threat and
        vulnerability situations.

    BACKGROUND

    GAO has previously reported on the challenges of protecting the U.S. civil
    aviation system from terrorists’ attacks, the potential extent of terrorists’
    motivation and capabilities, and the attractiveness of aviation as a target.2 Until


    ‘ICAO is a United Nations organization that develops standards and
    recommended practices for aviation safety and security. As of February 1997,
    183 nations were considered ICAO “contracting states.”

    ‘Aviation Securitv: Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic and
    International Challenges (GAO/RCED-94-38, Jan. 27, 1994); &iation Securiw:
    Develoument of New Securitv Technoloav Has Not Met Exnectations
    (GAORCED-94-142, May 19, 1994); Terrorism and Drug Trafficking:      Threats
    and Roles of Exnlosives and Narcotics Detection Technolog-v
     (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR, Mar. 27, 1996); Aviation Securitv: Immediate
    Action Needed to Imnrove Securitv (GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237, Aug. 1, 1996);
     Terrorism and Drug Trafficking:  Technologies for Detecting Explosives and

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the early 1990s the threat of terrorism was considered far greater overseas than
in the United States. However, the threat of terrorism within the United States
has increased. Events such as the bombings of the World Trade Center and the
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City have revealed that the
terrorist threat in the United States is more serious and extensive than
previously believed.

Ensuring aviation security is a shared responsibility. The intelligence
community gathers information to prevent actions by terrorists and provides
intelligence information to F&L3 After receiving that information, FAA makes
judgments about the threat, assesses the airport’s vulnerability, and establishes
procedures to address the security risk. The airlines and airports are
responsible for implementing different parts of the procedures. For example,
the airlines are responsible for screening passengers, baggage, and cargo,
whereas the airports are responsible for maintaining the security of the airport
 ground environment.4

To determine the security risks at foreign and domestic airports, FAA uses a
model that weighs information on threats received from the intelligence
community with information about an airport’s vulnerability to terrorism and
other criminal acts. Both of these types of information are needed to estimate
the security risks at airports and to develop specific countermeasures.

Within FAA, the Office of Civil Aviation Security oversees the agency’s security
program. FAA oversees and establishes requirements for security at more than
470 domestic airports and 150 U.S. airlines, which annually board over 500


Narcotics (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-252, Sept. 4, 1996); and Aviation       Securitv:
Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed (GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-251,          Sept. 11,
1996).

3The intelligence community includes, among others, the Central Intelligence
Agency, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.

4The Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 requires FAA to study and
report on whether, and if so how, to transfer certain responsibilities of air
carriers for security activities conducted at commercial airports to airport
operators or to the federal government, or to provide for sharing responsibilities
between air carriers and airport operators or the federal government. FAA
expects to complete this report and submit it to the Congress in Apr. 1997.

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million passengers with their checked baggage and carry-on luggage and
transport mail and cargo. FAA also assesses security at many foreign airports
and airlines directly serving the United States. For the Office of Civil Aviation
Security in fiscal year 1998, FAA requested $98.7 million. These funds were
requested to support an estimated 1,109 workyears to complete 1,700
inspections of domestic airports, 8,000 inspections of domestic air carriers, 940
inspections of foreign air carriers, and 160 assessments of security at foreign
airpOrts.

FAA’S ASSESSMENTS OF FOREIGN
AND DOMESTIC AIRPORT SECURITY

FAA reviews the security of certain foreign airports under its Foreign Airport
Assessment Program.5 Specific guidance is set forth in law on the
responsibilities and powers of the Secretary of Transportation when a security
deficiency is discovered. The law also specifies that FAA is to assess those
foreign airports (1) that are served directly by U.S. air carriers, (2) from which
a foreign air carrier directly serves the United States, (3) that pose a high risk
of introducing danger to international air travel, and (4) that may be deemed
appropriate by the Secretary of Transportation.    According to an FAA official,
the frequency with which FAA assesses the airports varies:

-       Airports that U.S. carriers serve directly are to be visited every 6 months for
        the purpose of conducting U.S. air carrier safety inspections.

-       Airports that FAA believes represent a low risk and have had no difficulty
        complying with international standards in the past are to be assessed once
        every 3 years.

-       Airports that FAA believes represent a high risk and have had difficulty
        complying with international standards in the past are to be assessed every
        year. In addition, FAA’s Civil Aviation Security Liaison Officers, who are
        stationed at 18 locations overseas, are responsible for providing some
        measure of continuing security coverage at airports of concern.

 In making its assessments, FAA takes into account the available information on
 threats received from the intelligence community.    Personnel in FAA’s overseas
 field offices are to compare the foreign airports’ security systems against


    51n 1995, 233 foreign airports qualified for assessment under F&Y’s Foreign
    Airport Assessment Program.

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standards issued by ICAO.’ ICAO’s standards apply only to international, not
internal, operations and cover such activities as screening passengers and their
baggage for explosives and weapons, matching passengers and bags, and
controlling access to restricted areas.

At domestic airports, FAA oversees security through two major types of efforts-
regulatory inspections and vulnerability assessments. FAA inspectors visit
domestic airports and air carriers to ensure that they comply with the
applicable security requirements included in the Federal Aviation Regulations.
These regulations establish security requirements that airport operators must
follow and detail the security requirements that airplane operators must meet.
In addition, the regulations apply to cargo security, foreign operators of U.S.-
registered aircraft, and foreign air carriers operating to and from airports in the
United States. The Federal Aviation Regulations require these foreign air
carriers to submit their security programs to FAA for review and acceptance.
By law, these security programs must require the foreign carriers, in their
operations to and from the United States, to adhere to the identical security
measures that FAA requires U.S. air carriers serving the same airports to use.

In the aftermath of the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 and in response to
requirements imposed in the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, FAA,
in coordination with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), conducted
vulnerability assessments on security at 28 domestic airports that had high
traffic levels and complex security operations. The assessments were required
by the 1990 act to cover, among other things, (1) the security of checked
baggage, mail, and cargo; (2) space requirements for security personnel and
equipment; (3) the separation of screened and unscreened passengers; and (4)
coordination among FAA, law enforcement, and industry security personnel.

In a report issued in 1994, GAO concluded that although the joint FAA-FBI
assessments of the airports examined a wide range of problems affecting
aviation security and confirmed the need for many of FAA’s initiatives, the


‘ICAO has developed and adopted 18 technical annexes involving such varied
fields as security, airworthiness, and aeronautical communications.    ICAO’s
annexes contain standards that member countries must meet and that are
intended to produce a degree of technical uniformity that enables international
civil aviation to function in a safe, orderly, and efficient manner. Annex 17
pertains to security and incorporates references to additional guidance intended
to assist member countries in implementing their national civil aviation security
programs.

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assessments did not match the capabilities, methods, or intent of known
terrorist groups in the United States with vulnerabilities at individual airports.’
FAA’s matching of known terrorists’ capabilities, methods, and intent with
airports’ vulnerabilities is important to help determine the appropriate level of
security at domestic airports and to develop contingency plans.

Following the explosion of TWA flight 800 in July 1996, the President
established the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security to
study matters involving aviation safety and security. The Commission’s initial
report, issued in September 1996, recommended that FAA establish consortia at
the nation’s 450 commercial airports, conduct vulnerability assessments, and
develop action plans to enhance aviation safety and security. Beginning in
September 1996, consortia undertook vulnerability assessments at 41 selected
major domestic airports. The consortia at each airport included airport
operators, air carriers, airport tenants, contract companies, and federal and
local law enforcement agencies.

Separately, FAA’s Reauthorization Act of 1996 mandated that FAA and FBI
conduct joint threat and vulnerability assessments of domestic airports every 3
years at high-risk airports. This legislative requirement was similar to one made
by the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, which also required FAA and
FBI to assess airport security, but did not specify intervals for conducting the
assessments. FM and FBI are in the process of developing and testing criteria
and a methodology to carry out these assessments. The agencies conducted
one vulnerability assessment at an airport in February 1997. As of March 1997,
FAA had not determined what other airports should be designated as “high risk”
and thus subject to the joint FAA-FBI assessments.

The Author& to Inspect Airuorts
Differs Between Domestic and Foreign Air-ports

Although    important differences complicate comparisons of ICAO’s International
Standards    and Recommended Practices for security and the U.S. regulations for
domestic    airport security, the U.S. standards for civil aviation security are
generally   more detailed and enforceable.

 On the one hand, ICAO’s standards differ from U.S. domestic standards in that
 they apply only to international flights. Consequently, they include certain


 7Aviation Securitv: Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic and
 International Challenges (GAORCED-94-38, Jan. 27, 1994).
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standards-such as those requiring passenger-bag matching-that have thus far
not been required for U.S. domestic flights. However, according to an official in
FAA’s Foreign Operations Division within the Office of Civil Aviation Security
Operations, ICAO’s standards represent the “minimally acceptable international
standards” for maintaining security at an airport. To allow member countries
some flexibility in meeting the standards, ICAO’s standards provide a general
minimum framework for security.

Overall, U.S. domestic airport security regulations are generally more detailed
than ICAO’s standards. For example, ICAO’s standards generally require
participating countries to establish “procedures and identification systems to
prevent unauthorized access by persons” to secured airport areas. U.S.
standards require not only that airport operators have security procedures in
place but also that all persons in the secured area continuously wear an
identification badge on their outermost garment and that all persons have
successfully completed training in accordance with an FAA-approved
curriculum.

In addition to specific requirements for airport operators, the United States
imposes more specific security standards for air carriers. At U.S. airports,
where air carriers are responsible for screening passengers, baggage, and cargo,
U.S. standards require that the operators of X-ray system baggage screeners
receive initial and periodic follow-up training in radiation safety, the efficient
use of X-ray systems, and the identification of weapons and other dangerous
articles. In addition, U.S. standards require all crew members on international
and domestic flights to have completed security training within the last 12
months. To ensure an effective aviation security program, ICAO’s standards
require only that the participating country ensure the development and
implementation of training programs for airlines.

But most importantly, FAA has vastly different enforcement authority for
addressing security deficiencies at foreign and domestic airports. At foreign
airports, neither FAA nor ICAO has direct authority or enforcement powers.
However, if the Secretary of Transportation determines that a foreign airport
does not maintain and carry out effective security measures, the Secretary is
mandated to publish the identity of the airport in the Federal Register, notify
the news media, issue written notice of the Secretary’s determination with the
ticket to each passenger traveling between the United States and the airport,
and have the identity of the airport posted and displayed at all airports in the
United States at which regularly scheduled air carriers operate. These steps
take place 90 days after the government of a foreign country is notified of the


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Secretary’s determination, but only if that government has not taken actions to
bring the security measures at that airport up to the standard used by the
Secretary in making the assessment. The Secretary of Transportation is to
notify the Secretary of State so that a travel advisory may be issued. In
addition, the Secretary of Transportation may revoke or impose conditions on
the operations of any U.S. or foreign carrier serving that airport8

Murtala Muhammad Airport in Lagos, Nigeria, is the only airport that is
currently identified and posted as not maintaining effective security measures,
having been so identified in August 1993. In addition, the U.S. Department of
State issued a travel warning in November 1996 about the dangers of travel to
Nigeria that cites the lack of effective security measures and other problems.
According to the warning, violent crime is an acute problem, and the U.S.
embassy is concerned that maintenance and operational procedures for Nigerian
airlines may be inadequate to ensure passengers’ safety.

Neither FAA nor ICAO can directly order changes to a foreign airport’s security.
This is because most foreign airports are under the sovereignty of another
government and are owned and operated by the central government. Therefore,
such orders would represent an infringement on those governments’
sovereignty. According to an FAA official, the public notification process in
FAA’s Foreign Airport Assessment Program does provide some leverage for
having the security measures at a foreign airport brought up to the requisite
standards.

At domestic airports, FAA can address security deficiencies by imposing civil
penalties and revoking an airport’s operating certificate. According to an FAA.
official, under its revocation authority, FAA may revoke the operating certificate
of an airport that does not comply with the Federal Aviation Regulations’
security requirements, but the agency has never found it necessary to take this
action.

The U.S. government has been trying to make ICAO’s standards more rigorous.
According to FAA officials, the United States has a representative from FAA on
ICAO’s Security Panel, and the United States has been instrumental in many
changes made to strengthen ICAO’s security standards and recommended


 ‘The act also authorizes the President to impose additional restrictions. The
 President may prohibit a U.S. or foreign air carrier from providing
 transportation between the United States and any other intervening foreign
 2lirpOl-t.

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practices. An FAA official stated that in the future, the Security Panel will
concentrate more on ensuring that ICAO’s security standards are followed by
the member countries than on making changes to the standards9

VIEWS AND OPINIONS ON POSTING NOTICES
AT DOMESTIC AIRPORTS ABOUT THE SECURITY RISKS
AT OTHER DOMESTIC AIRPORTS

Officials from FAA, FBI, and organizations we contacted from the aviation
community-representing    the aviation industry and consumers-were
unanimously opposed to a possible policy that would require FAA to post
warnings in domestic airports about the security risks at other domestic
airports based on threat and vulnerability assessmentsl’ These officials
consistently cited a number of reasons to oppose such a policy, including the
following:

-   Such postings would provide information     to terrorist   groups and criminals
    about security wealmesses at airports.

-   Postings would not benefit the public because choosing a secure airport on
    the basis of the limited information in the notice would be too burdensome,
    and a large segment of the public is served by only one airport.

-   Such postings could raise the traveling public’s level of fear.

-   FAA should use its resources to correct rather than publicize security
    problems at domestic airports.




‘On Feb. 12, 1997, the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security
also recommended that the United States submit a resolution to ICAO, calling
on it to begin a program to verify and improve its member nations’ compliance
with international security standards.

l”Organizations contacted include the Air Line Pilots Association, Airports
Council International, Air Transport Association of America, American
Association of Airport Executives, Association of Flight Attendants, Aviation
Consumer Action Project, Aviation Foundation, and International Airline
Passengers Association. See encl. II for details on each organization.

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-     Comparing the security risks at different airports would be difficult because
      the threats and vulnerabilities could be very different and difficult to
      measure.

-        Posting a notice about security problems at an airport would not be fair if
         those problems were caused by a single air carrier at that airport.

The officials also consistently maintained that because more information is
available on terrorist groups and known threats overseas than in the United
States, there is more reason to post notices in domestic airports about security
at foreign airports. A more complete listing of the reasons cited by officials of
FAA, FBI, and the aviation industry and consumer organizations we contacted is
included in enclosure I.

FAA recently began posting safety information about certain air carriers on the
Internet.‘1 We also asked the same officials about making publicly available the
results of the periodic vulnerability assessments conducted at domestic airports.
They were uniformly opposed to making this security information publicly
available through the Internet or other means. They believed that this
information could lead to a degradation of security at an-ports, that
vulnerabilities could be exposed to terrorists or criminals, and that the threat of
exposure could compromise the willingness of parties to divulge weaknesses.

    The officials’ views are consistent with the guidance from FAA to the consortia
    doing vulnerability assessments in response to the recommendation from the
    initial report of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security,
    which stated that all documents resulting from the assessments were to be
    considered “restricted aviation security information-” Moreover, according to
    this guidance, “public disclosure is considered neither appropriate, legal, nor
    conducive to a frank and open dialogue.” An FAA official stated that these


    “In response to congressional interest in disclosing aviation safety information
    to the public, FAA announced on Jan. 29, 1997, that it would make information
    on airline safety available to the public. On Feb. 1, FAA began phasing in its
    new policy of issuing press releases on safely and security enforcement actions
    involving fines of $50,000 or more, as well as information on significant
    regulatory actions, such as revocations of certificates.    At the end of the
    month, the agency made historical statistics on aviation accidents and safety-
    related incidents available on the Internet, and, over the following months, it
    plans to provide additional information on carriers, such as the date of
     certification and types of aircraft flown, as well as data on near collisions.
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assessments could contain proprietary information and making the results
publicly available could compromise the intentions of the people doing the
assessments. In addition, the initial report from the White House Commission
on Aviation Safety and Security pointed out that vulnerability assessments
should become classiEed information if they conclude that a high degree of
vulnerability exists.



The information in this report was developed through discussions with officials
at FAA and FBI, along with representatives of various aviation industry and
consumer groups. We also reviewed previously issued GAO products and
pertinent federal legislation and regulations, along with ICAO’s Standards and
Recommended Practices for aviation security. We performed our review from
January through March 1997 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.

We provided the Department of Transportation and FAA with copies of a draft
of this report. We met with DOT and FAA officials, including the Director of
the Office of Civil Aviation Security Operations. FAA provided some factual
and editorial comments but agreed with the draft report’s overall message.

Major contributors to this report were David Hooper, Barry Kime, Steve Martin,
and Marnie Shaul. Please contact me at (202) 512- 3650 if you or your staff
have further questions.

Sincerely yours,




Gerald L. Dillingham, yh.D.,
 Associate Director, Transportation   Issues




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ENCLOSURE I                                                                  ENCLOSURE I

     VIEWS AND OPINIONS PROVIDED BY THE ORGANIZATIONS CONTACTED
 ABOUT POSTING NOTICES IN DOMESTIC AIRPORTS ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS
              OF SECURITY MEASURES AT DOMESTIC AIRPORTS

The comments provided     by the organizations we contacted are compiled below by general
descriptive categories.

NOTICES COULD INFORM TERRORISTS OR CRIMINALS OF SECURITY WEAKNESSES

Posting notices about a specific airport’s security problems would provide a blueprint of
weaknesses and would be an invitation to criminals or terrorists to target that airport.

Vulnerability assessments, on the whole, are not a good idea. They open up an airport’s
weaknesses. The media obtain them and criticize the airport for having poor security. If
terrorists get them, they learn the security weaknesses at an airport.

NOTICES WOULD NOT HELP THE PUBLIC

Posting notices would impose too much of a burden on the public:      The public would not
have enough information to choose among airports.

In some areas, people have only one airport available. They therefore do not have the
option of choosing another airport if security weaknesses are posted about the airport
serving them.

Posting notices would raise the public’s fear level and could drive the public to use other
modes of transportation, hurting short-haul air carriers in particular.

THERE IS NO STANDARD MEASURE FOR QUANTIFYING OR COMPARING THE
THREATS, VULNERABILITIES. OR RISKS AT DIFFERENT AIRPORTS

There is no standard definition of airport security risk. The threats, vulnerabilities, and
countermeasures are different at each airport. Therefore, the security risk at one airport
cannot be compared with the security risk at another airport. There may be little threat
at an airport with security weaknesses, and a significant threat at another airport with no
security weaknesses. Moreover, without common definitions of security, there are no
agreed-upon, quantifiable measures of threats, vulnerabilities, or risks.

The Federal Aviation Regulations do not identify specific security measures that must be
taken. The airports can interpret and implement the regulations as they deem best.
Therefore, FAA would have difficulty measuring and comparing security at airports.


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ENCLOSURE I                                                                     ENCLOSURE I

SECURITY WEAKNESSES SHOULD BE CORRECTED RATHER THAN POSTED

Posting notices could hurt FAA’s credibility. FAA would be publishing      security
weaknesses while letting a deficient airport continue to operate.

Correcting security weaknesses rather than publicizing them would make better use of
federal funds. If FAA finds weaknesses in security at an airport, it should mandate
improvements and follow up to see that the weaknesses are corrected.

Posting notices should not be used as a mechanism to encourage airports to correct
security weaknesses. FAA needs to ensure that these wealmesses are corrected.

If there is no money for tixing security wealmesses, they should not be disclosed in
notices posted at airports.

Security problems identified   by the posting of a notice might not be correctable.

FAA treats security on a systemwide rather than on an individual-airport  basis. That is,
FAA’s countermeasures are directed at the system, not at individual airports.

INFORMATION      ON THREATS IS INSUFFICIENT         TO WARRANT THE POSTING OF
NOTICES

There are few threats to domestic airports. Threat information is usually general
information about a threat to the U.S. aviation system or about terrorists who may be
traveling to the United States. Information on a threat to a specific airport is seldom
received.

There are specific reasons to post notices in domestic airports about security at foreign
airports, such as military actions, known terrorist operations in the area, or terrorist
threats against a specific airport. More information on terrorist groups and threats is
available overseas than in the United States. The United States does not have enough
information on threats or terrorist groups operating in the United States to post notices in
airpOrts.


OTHER

It is not fair to post a notice about security problems at an airport when those problems
may have been caused by an air carrier operating at that airport and not by the airport.




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ENCLOSURE II                                                                       ENCLOSURE II

                                   ORGANIZATIONS      CONTACTED

FEDERAL AGENCIES

Federal Aviation Administration

Federal Bureau of Investigation

AVIATION     ORGANIZATIONS

Air Line Pilots Association

      Represents 46,000 airline pilots at 45 airlines. It provides all of a traditional union’s
      services for its members, including lobbying to the Congress and government agencies
      on behalf of airline pilots. It devotes approximately 20 percent of its income from
      dues to support aviation safety.

Airports   Council International    - North America

      Represents local, regional, state, and national governing bodies that own and operate
      commercial airports in the United States, Canada, and Bermuda. Its member airports
      enplane more than 90 percent of the domestic, and virtually all of the international,
      airline passengers and cargo in North America.

Air Transport    Association   of America

      Supports and assists its 21 U.S. airline members and 3 foreign flag carrier associate
      members by representing the industry on major aviation issues before the Congress,
      federal agencies, state legislatures, and other governmental bodies It promotes safety
      by coordinating industry and government safety programs, and it serves as a focal
      point for industry efforts to standardize practices and enhance the efficiency of the air
      transport system.

American Association      of Airport Executives

      Is the largest professional organization for airport executives in the world,
      representing thousands of airport management personnel in public-use airports
      nationwide.     One of its stated goals is to assist airport executives in fuhilhng their
      responsibilities to the airports and communities they serve.




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ENCLOSURE II                                                                         ENCLOSURE II

Association     of Flight Attendants

     Is the largest flight attendant union in the world. It represents 40,000 flight attendants
     at 26 air carriers and is an advocate for flight attendants in many areas affecting
     aviation safety and working conditions.

Aviation   Consumer Action Project

     Represents    an international group of thousands of air travelers, airline pilots, flight
     attendants,   air traffic controllers, air safety experts, air disaster victims, and
     government     officials. It seeks to increase air safety and security while protecting
     consumers’    rights.

Aviation Foundation

     A nonprofit organization associated with George Mason University          that carries out
     research on various aspects of commercial aviation.

International    Airline Passengers Association

     Represents frequent flyers in matters of safety, comfort, convenience, economy, and
     consumer protection.   It represents over 400,000 frequent travelers worldwide, 100,000
     of whom reside in the United States.




(341521)


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