oversight

Aviation Security: FAA's Actions to Study Responsibilities and Funding for Airport Security and to Certify Screening Companies

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1999-02-25.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                 United States General Accounting Office

GAO              Report to Congressional Committees
                 and Subcommittees



February 1999
                 AVIATION SECURITY
                 FAA’s Actions to Study
                 Responsibilities and
                 Funding for Airport
                 Security and to Certify
                 Screening Companies




GAO/RCED-99-53
      United States
GAO   General Accounting Office
      Washington, D.C. 20548

      Resources, Community, and
      Economic Development Division

      B-280885

      February 25, 1999

      Congressional Committees and Subcommittees

      After the explosion of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988, the Congress focused its
      attention on increasing aviation security, which culminated in the passage
      of the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990. Congressional interest
      was renewed in 1996 by the still unexplained crash of TWA Flight 800,
      which resulted in additional efforts by the federal government to increase
      aviation security. These efforts included the establishment of the White
      House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security in August 1996. The
      Commission’s report, issued in February 1997, 1 made a number of
      recommendations to improve aviation security. In addition, two laws were
      enacted—the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 and the
      Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 19972 —which, among other
      things, authorized and provided funding for the security recommendations
      contained in the Commission’s report.

      The Reauthorization Act required the Federal Aviation Administration
      (FAA) to take specific actions to improve aviation security. Section 301
      mandated that FAA conduct a study and report to the Congress by
      January 9, 1997, on whether and, if so, how to (1) transfer certain federally
      required security responsibilities of air carriers to either airports or the
      federal government or (2) provide for shared responsibilities between air
      carriers and airport operators or the federal government. The Congress
      required that the report identify potential sources of federal and
      nonfederal revenue that may be used to fund security activities and
      propose legislation, if necessary, for accomplishing the transfer of
      responsibilities. Section 302 of the act mandated that the FAA
      Administrator certify companies providing security screening at airports
      and improve the training and testing of security screeners3 through the
      development of performance standards. This report provides information
      on (1) the status of FAA’s efforts to implement the requirements of section

      1
        Final Report to President Clinton, White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security (Feb. 12,
      1997).
      2
       The Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-264) was enacted on October 9, 1996, to
      reauthorize programs of the Federal Aviation Administration and for other purposes. The Omnibus
      Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997 (P.L. 104-208) was enacted on September 30, 1996, and
      provided $144.2 million for the purchase of commercially available advanced explosives detection
      equipment for checked and carry-on baggage.
      3
       Screeners are air carriers’ or screening companies’ security staff who examine all passengers and
      other persons and all property intended to be carried in the cabin of airplanes or into controlled areas
      to prevent any explosive, incendiary, or other deadly object or dangerous weapon from being carried
      aboard airplanes or into controlled areas.



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                   301 of the act and (2) the status of FAA’s efforts to implement section 302
                   and issues that could impede FAA’s implementation of section 302.


                   FAA issued the report required by section 301 of the Reauthorization Act in
Results in Brief   January 1999, about 2 years after the date mandated in the act.4 The report
                   concludes that there should be no change to the current system of shared
                   aviation security responsibilities among FAA, the air carriers, and the
                   airport operators or to the current funding sources for aviation security.
                   FAA’s conclusions are based on the lack of any consensus in the civil
                   aviation community for changes.

                   To comply with the requirements of section 302, FAA is developing a
                   proposed regulation, which would require the certification of screening
                   companies. The proposed regulation would require screening companies
                   and air carriers to comply with uniform performance standards for
                   screeners and implement FAA-approved training and testing programs for
                   screeners. A critical step in the certification of screening companies is
                   having a reliable and consistent way to measure the screening companies’
                   performance. In January 1999, FAA, after several delays, validated that its
                   automated screener testing system is an accurate measurement of
                   screeners’ performance. Over the next several months, FAA will gather
                   additional data for use in developing performance standards for screeners.
                   The agency plans to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in late 1999
                   for comment and issue a final regulation in late 2000. The aviation industry
                   generally agrees that national standards for security-screening operations
                   are needed. Several issues could impede the issuance of the final
                   regulation. For example, the completion of FAA’s validation process had
                   been delayed several times and any further delays with completing FAA’s
                   current efforts could affect the issuance of the final regulation.


                   FAA, the air carriers, and the airport operators share the responsibilities for
Background         aviation security. FAA is responsible for assessing threats, such as
                   terrorism, to the aviation system and determining the procedures and
                   equipment that will most effectively deter these threats. FAA’s regulations
                   prescribe the security responsibilities of air carriers and airport operators.
                   The air carriers and airport operators are responsible for complying with
                   the regulations and procedures. The air carriers are responsible for
                   screening all passengers and baggage, hiring and training their employees
                   or contracting for screening services, and procuring equipment to screen

                   4
                    Study and Report to Congress on Aviation Security Responsibilities and Funding, FAA (Jan. 5, 1999).



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passengers and baggage. The screening of passengers and baggage is a
critical element in FAA’s strategy against terrorism. FAA’s regulations
provide basic standards for the screeners, equipment, and procedures to
be used in screening operations. The airport operators are responsible for
providing secure airport facilities and providing local law enforcement
support relating to air carrier and airport security measures.

The funding of the security operations is divided among FAA, the air
carriers, and the airport operators. FAA is responsible for paying the
salaries and costs associated with its oversight of air carrier and airport
security programs, including security inspections of screening operations
at airports, and for aviation security research and development activities.
FAA’s aviation security budget for fiscal year 1999 includes $100 million for
purchasing and deploying advanced explosives detection equipment to
selected airports, $52 million for research and development, and
$123 million for operations. Air carriers are responsible for paying for the
security personnel and checkpoint screeners, screening equipment, such
as X-ray machines and metal detectors, and the operation and
maintenance costs of that equipment. Airport operators are responsible for
paying for law enforcement officers, access control systems, and
perimeter fences and lighting. Currently, airport operators can fund
certain security functions, such as perimeter fencing, with funds from
FAA’s Airport Improvement Program.5


Both the White House Commission and the Congress recognized the need
to improve screeners’ performance. The Commission’s initial report in
September 1996 made 20 specific recommendations for improving
security, one of which was the development of uniform standards for the
selection, training, certification, and recertification of screening
companies and their employees.6 Following this report, the Federal
Aviation Reauthorization Act mandated that FAA (1) study and report on
the current security responsibilities at airports and the potential sources of
funding for these activities, (2) certify screening companies, and
(3) improve the training and testing of security screeners through the
development of performance standards for security-screening services.
While FAA currently has training and testing requirements for screeners, it
does not have a requirement that screening companies be certified.



5
 FAA’s Airport Improvement Program provides federal funding for planning and development at the
3,300 airports that make up the national airport system.
6
These recommendations were also contained in the Final Report to President Clinton, White House
Commission on Aviation Safety and Security (Feb. 12, 1997).



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                             FAA  issued the report required under section 301 of the Reauthorization
Section 301 Report           Act of 1996 on January 5, 1999, about 2 years after the date mandated in
Issued in January 1999       the act. FAA’s report concludes that there should be no change to the
                             current system of shared aviation security responsibilities among FAA, the
                             air carriers, and the airport operators or to the current funding sources for
                             aviation security.


Report Issued 2 Years Late   FAA  did not meet the January 9, 1997, deadline established by section 301
                             of the Reauthorization Act for submitting its report to the Congress. In a
                             letter dated January 21, 1997, FAA informed the Senate Committee on
                             Commerce, Science and Transportation that because the act directed FAA
                             to consider the findings of the White House Commission on Aviation
                             Safety and Security and because of the time required to complete
                             analytical work, FAA was unable to meet the January 9, 1997, deadline and
                             expected to release its report in April 1997. The report was delivered to
                             the Congress in January 1999.

                             FAA  officials said the report was delayed because of the complex issues
                             involved and the need to consider the findings of numerous groups that
                             have studied these issues. FAA’s report is based, in part, on an 8-year-old
                             internal FAA study that analyzed alternatives for shifting security
                             responsibilities with respect to passengers, baggage, and cargo from the
                             air carriers to airport operators.7 The study is appended to the report. FAA
                             also reviewed other reports, including reports from the President’s
                             Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism,8 the White House
                             Commission on Aviation Safety and Security,9 the National Civil Aviation
                             Review Commission,10 and Coopers & Lybrand.11




                             7
                              FAA Study on Security Responsibilities (1991).
                             8
                              Report of the President’s Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism (May 15, 1990).
                             9
                              See footnote 1.
                             10
                                Avoiding Aviation Gridlock & Reducing the Accident Rate, A Consensus for Change (Dec. 1997). The
                             Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 established the National Civil Aviation Review
                             Commission and required a report to the Secretary of Transportation setting forth a comprehensive
                             analysis of the Administration’s budgetary requirements through 2002.
                             11
                               Federal Aviation Administration: Independent Financial Assessment, Coopers & Lybrand (Feb. 28,
                             1997). The Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 required FAA to contract with an independent
                             entity to conduct a complete independent assessment of the financial requirements of the agency
                             through 2002.



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                      In addition, FAA conducted a literature search and reviewed testimony
                      provided for the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security
                      and various congressional hearings on aviation security.


No Consensus for      FAA’s report considered the views of the various commissions and other
Changing Security     parties that studied or commented on transferring air carriers’ security
Responsibilities or   responsibilities to the airport operators or to the federal government, or
                      for sharing responsibilities among the air carriers, the airport operators,
Funding Sources       and the federal government. The report also considered the Commissions’
                      and other parties’ views on potential sources of funding for aviation
                      security, such as the Airport Improvement Program, Passenger Facility
                      Charges,12 and user fees. The report points out that the source of security
                      funding has been a matter of continuing controversy over the last 30 years.

                      FAA concluded that there appears to be a consensus in the civil aviation
                      community to retain the current system of shared responsibilities for
                      aviation security. Therefore, FAA would continue to be responsible for
                      establishing and enforcing regulations, policies, and procedures and for
                      identifying potential threats and appropriate countermeasures. Air carriers
                      would bear the primary responsibility for applying screening and other
                      security measures to passengers, baggage, and cargo. Airport operators
                      would be responsible for maintaining a secure airport environment and for
                      providing local law enforcement support.

                      FAA also concluded that there is no apparent consensus for changing the
                      overall system of funding for aviation security and that there is no
                      definitive answer to the long-standing question of who should pay for
                      aviation security. FAA therefore did not make any legislative proposals for
                      transferring security responsibilities from air carriers or any
                      recommendations for changing funding sources. FAA officials, however,
                      stated that even though the report made no recommendations regarding
                      funding sources for aviation security, this issue will continue to need
                      discussion and study because of its high cost. FAA estimated in May 1997
                      that the total 10-year cost to the federal government, airport authorities,
                      and the airlines for security programs at the nation’s largest and busiest
                      airports alone would be close to $3 billion. Thus, funding methods for
                      aviation security improvements is an issue that the Congress and FAA will
                      be faced with for a number of years.



                      12
                       A Passenger Facility Charge is a fee imposed by airport authorities on passengers to be used to fund
                      capital development.



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Officials of three principal aviation industry associations that we
contacted—Air Transport Association (ATA),13 Airports Council
International-North America (ACI-NA),14 and American Association of
Airport Executives (AAAE)15 —generally agreed with the current division of
airport security responsibilities. These officials stated that the continuity
of screening would be broken if the air carriers were not the ultimate
responsible party. For example, under current procedures, if a passenger
is identified as a potential threat at the airport check-in or ticket counter,
the air carrier will label the passenger’s bag appropriately and that air
carrier will take additional security measures for examining the
passenger’s bag, such as sending the bag through explosives detection
equipment. Under any scenario where the carrier is not responsible for all
screening operations, the air carrier would have to transfer the
information about the potential security threat to another entity, such as
the airport operator, and then that entity would further scrutinize the
passenger’s bag. This would disrupt the continuity of the
baggage-screening process and allow for a potential break in the chain of
information.

The associations expressed differing views with regard to funding aviation
security. Two of the associations—ACI-NA and AAAE—believe that the
federal government should provide the initial funding for any increase in
the baseline security standards and then, through the use of increased
Airport Improvement Program funding and an expanded local funding
mechanism, namely the Passenger Facility Charge, the airport users would
have a greater ability to raise funds for the increased security. However,
the third association, ATA, does not support an increased Passenger
Facility Charge for security improvements at airports. ATA believes that the
funding for explosives-detection-screening equipment should be provided
under direct federal appropriations and not from Airport Improvement
Program funds and Passenger Facility Charges.




13
  ATA is the trade organization for the principal U.S. air carriers.
14
  ACI-NA represents airport operators who operate about 1,250 airports across 155 countries and
territories.
15
  AAAE is a professional organization representing airport management personnel at public use
airports nationwide.



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                          FAA  is developing a regulation to comply with the mandated section 302
Lengthy Process           requirements to certify screening companies and improve the training and
Involved for              testing of security screeners. FAA expects the final regulation to be issued
Implementing the          in late 2000. While the aviation industry generally agrees that national
                          standards for security-screening operations are needed, some issues could
Section 302               impede the final regulation’s issuance.
Requirement for
Certifying Screening
Companies
FAA’s Efforts to Comply   FAA plans to issue a new regulation that would establish the requirements
With Section 302          for certifying screening companies.16 One of the requirements for
                          certification would compel screening companies and air carriers to
                          comply with the performance standards that would be established by FAA
                          and to implement FAA-approved training and testing programs for
                          screeners. As the first step toward issuing a regulation, FAA, on March 11,
                          1997, issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking requesting
                          comments and suggestions on issues related to the certification of
                          screening companies and the improvement of screening operations. FAA
                          identified 10 issues of particular interest. They included the establishment,
                          by regulation, of a uniform security-screening program for use by all air
                          carriers and screening companies, methods for measuring screeners’
                          performance, and a curriculum for training screeners. FAA also sought
                          comments on the estimated costs of meeting any qualification or
                          operational requirements that might be imposed. (See app. I for a list of all
                          the issues on which FAA requested comments.)

                          FAA  recognizes that a critical step in the certification of screening
                          companies is having a reliable and consistent way to measure their
                          performance. By collectively analyzing and measuring screener’s
                          performance, FAA can hold screening companies accountable for safe,
                          effective screening operations. FAA has focused its efforts on developing,
                          field testing, and validating an automated screener testing-system called
                          Threat Image Projection (TIP) which would provide the basis for
                          establishing and monitoring performance standards for screening
                          companies.




                          16
                            The proposed regulation would define a screening company as an air carrier or other entity that
                          inspects persons or property for the presence of any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, deadly or
                          dangerous weapon, or destructive substances before entry into a controlled area or carriage aboard an
                          aircraft.



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TIP is an automated system that was developed to improve and maintain
the effectiveness of image interpretation by screening personnel employed
at screening locations in airports. When installed on existing X-ray
machines at airport checkpoints, TIP tests screeners’ detection capabilities
by projecting threat images, including guns and explosives, into bags as
they are being screened or projecting images of bags containing threat
objects onto the X-ray screen as live baggage is being screened.17
Screeners are then responsible for positively identifying the threat image
and calling for the bag to be searched. Once prompted, TIP indicates to the
screener whether the threat is real and then records the screener’s
performance in a database that FAA can access to analyze performance
trends. TIP exposes screeners to threat images on a routine basis to enable
them to become more adept at recognizing threat objects.

In order to adequately field test and validate the proposed automated
screener-testing system—TIP—and to continue to collect and analyze data
to develop performance standards for screeners, FAA withdrew the
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on May 13, 1998, and changed
the estimated issuance date of its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking from
March 1999 to the end of 1999. FAA expects to issue its final regulation
within 1 year of the closing of the comment period for the Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, which would be by the end of 2000. In April 1998,
we reported that FAA, at that time, planned to issue the final regulation in
March 2000, which was about a year behind its previous estimated
issuance date.18

In February 1999, FAA officials told us that during January 1999, they had
analyzed the TIP data gathered to date and validated TIP as an effective and
reliable means to measure screeners’ performance. The completion of this
effort, previously projected for September 1998, had been delayed several
times. According to FAA, TIP’s validation process had been slowed because
of one manufacturer’s slowness in bringing the equipment to an operating
level. In addition, the validation of TIP had been further delayed by its


17
  FAA will propose that TIP be installed initially on X-ray and explosives-detection systems at all
Category X and Category I airports. The installations at Category II through Category IV airports would
be phased in during subsequent years. Screeners’ performance at these smaller airports, which,
according to FAA officials, account for only about 5 percent of the passengers boarding planes, would
be measured in the interim by existing and/or enhanced checkpoint-testing procedures, including the
use of special testing and the random testing of screeners by air carriers and FAA. Category X airports
represent the nation’s largest and busiest airports as measured by the volume of passenger traffic and
are potentially attractive targets for criminal and terrorist activity. Category I airports are somewhat
smaller airports that have an annual volume of at least 2 million passengers.
18
 Aviation Security: Implementation of Recommendations Is Under Way, but Completion Will Take
Several Years (GAO/RCED-98-102, Apr. 24, 1998).



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                           software, which did not provide enough unique identification numbers for
                           all screeners using TIP. FAA has since corrected that problem. During the
                           next several months, FAA will continue to gather larger samples of TIP data
                           that it can use to develop performance standards for screeners.


Industry’s Views on        Our review of comments to the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
Section 302                from air carriers, screening companies, airport operators, and associations
                           representing segments of the aviation industry showed that most agreed
                           that a national standard security-screener program for screening
                           companies should be established. Many of the comments also stated that
                           certification for individual screeners should also be required. Several
                           commenters believed that certification would enhance screeners’
                           performance and professionalism. For example, both AAAE and ACI-NA
                           stated that FAA needs to develop a standard training curriculum to certify
                           individual screeners. They stated that FAA-certified screeners would then
                           be invested with a valuable and transferable skill and would be
                           compensated accordingly. FAA, however, does not plan to require the
                           certification of individual screeners because it does not have statutory
                           authority to do so but, instead, will certify companies. In addition, officials
                           from ATA, ACI-NA, and AAAE informed us that, in their opinion, all screening
                           companies who wish to be certified to perform aviation security screening
                           should be regulated by FAA, that FAA should develop a minimum national
                           standard security-screening program, and that FAA should continue to
                           perfect a consistent way to measure screening companies’ performance.
                           These actions are consistent with FAA’s proposed approach for certifying
                           screening companies.


Issues That Could Impede   The Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 allows FAA 16 months
Issuance of Final Rule     from the close of the comment period of a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
                           to publish the final regulation. FAA plans to expedite the process by
                           publishing the final rule within 1 year of the closing of the comment
                           period, which would be at the end of 2000. FAA believes that it is important
                           to implement the final regulation at the earliest date possible to realize the
                           performance improvements expected to be brought about by the proposed
                           certification requirements, training requirements, and performance
                           measurements and standards. However, several issues could impede FAA’s
                           efforts to complete this undertaking.




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In addition to the TIP validation and data-gathering efforts previously
discussed, the human factors19 staff in FAA’s Office of Aviation Research is
conducting a sophisticated and long-term evaluation using TIP to assess
how such variables as screeners’ experience, method of training,
checkpoint operating environment, and shift lengths affect screeners’
performance. TIP is still in the research and development stage; therefore,
the Office of Aviation Research developed a test and evaluation plan for
TIP.20 The effort is expected to be completed by mid-1999. This assessment
could identify issues regarding screeners’ performance that would have to
be addressed and could potentially delay the issuance of the regulation.
We have previously pointed out the importance of internal coordination
between human factors research programs and all units within FAA in
order to (1) understand the relationship between human performance
capabilities and limitations and the means to measure them and
(2) maximize the opportunity to leverage resources for research on human
factors.21

In addition, FAA has identified other issues that must be addressed before
the final regulation can be issued, including (1) ensuring that the costs of
the rule will result in substantial screening improvements and
(2) establishing a balance of responsibilities between carriers and
screening companies that is clear and effective. FAA is preparing a cost and
benefits analysis for inclusion in its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on
which interested parties will have the opportunity to comment. According
to FAA, the costs for this regulation could be relatively high, and it is
imperative that the regulation result in substantial measurable
improvements to an individual screener’s performance, to screening
companies’ operations, and in decreasing the aviation security system’s
vulnerabilities.

The issue of balanced responsibility involves how much responsibility
screening companies should assume and how air carriers should oversee
the operations of screening companies. FAA recognizes that the successful
implementation of its proposed regulation will require it to clearly outline


19
 The study of human factors examines how humans interact with machines and other people and
determines whether procedures and regulations take into account abilities and limitations. Identifying
chances for human error can reduce the need for later replacing or modifying equipment and
procedures.
20
 Test and Evaluation Plan for Airport Demonstration for Threat Image Projection for Checkpoint
Operations (Aug. 1996).
21
 Human Factors: Status of Efforts to Integrate Research on Human Factors Into FAA’s Activities
(GAO/RCED-96-151, June 27, 1996).



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                  this division of responsibility and create enforcement guidance that will
                  avoid any confusion regarding accountability.


                  To determine the status of FAA’s efforts to implement sections 301 and 302
Scope and         of the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, we reviewed the
Methodology       legislation and other related documents, such as the Final Report of the
                  White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. We obtained
                  FAA’s implementation plans and status reports and interviewed officials in
                  FAA’s Office of Civil Aviation Security and the Office of Aviation Research.
                  Upon its issuance in January 1999, we obtained FAA’s report to the
                  Congress required by section 301 of the Reauthorization Act. We obtained
                  industry’s views by reviewing comments provided in response to the
                  Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and by meeting with
                  representatives of three aviation associations: ATA, ACI-NA, and the AAAE. We
                  conducted our review from August 1998 through January 1999 in
                  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.


                  We provided the Department of Transportation and FAA with a draft of this
Agency Comments   report for review and comment. We met with agency officials, including
                  representatives of FAA’s Office of Civil Aviation Security Policy and
                  Planning. FAA generally agreed with the facts in the report and provided
                  updated information on its validation of the Threat Image Projection
                  system and some suggested clarifying language, which we incorporated as
                  appropriate.


                  As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents
                  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 7 days from the
                  date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies to interested
                  congressional committees, the Secretary of Transportation, and the
                  Administrator of FAA. We will make copies available to others upon
                  request.




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Major contributors to this report include A. Donald Cowan, Robert J. Di
Vito, and Barry R. Kime. Please call me on (202) 512-3650 if you have any
questions about the report.




Gerald L. Dillingham
Associate Director,
  Transportation Issues




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List of Congressional Committees and Subcommittees

The Honorable John McCain
Chairman
The Honorable Ernest F. Hollings
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Commerce, Science,
  and Transportation
United States Senate

The Honorable Slade Gorton
Chairman
The Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Aviation,
Committee on Commerce, Science,
  and Transportation
United States Senate




Page 13                                   GAO/RCED-99-53 Aviation Security
Contents



Letter                                                                                           1


Appendix I                                                                                      16
Issues on Which FAA
Sought Public
Comment in Its
Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking
Related GAO Products                                                                            20




                       Abbreviations

                       AAAE      American Association of Airport Executives
                       ACI-NA    Airports Council International-North America
                       ATA       Air Transport Association
                       FAA       Federal Aviation Administration
                       TIP       Threat Image Projection


                       Page 14                                     GAO/RCED-99-53 Aviation Security
Page 15   GAO/RCED-99-53 Aviation Security
Appendix I

Issues on Which FAA Sought Public
Comment in Its Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking
              1. Oversight by Air Carriers: Guidelines that an air carrier should follow
              when selecting or overseeing a screening company.

              2. Joint-Use Screening Locations: Methods of structuring air carriers’
              selection of a screening company for joint-use screening locations and
              oversight of that screening company’s activities.

              3. Screening Security Program: The regulatory establishment of a uniform
              screening-security program for use by all carriers and screening
              companies, the prevention of the unauthorized use of these standards, and
              the establishment of performance standards for screeners.

              4. Screener Training: Requirement to incorporate into each security
              program the specific curriculum to be used for training screeners.

              5. Qualifications and Operations of Screening Companies: Minimum
              standards for a screening company to be certified in the areas of local and
              national qualifications, aviation-screening experience, and screening and
              training equipment.

              6. Individual Screeners: Encouraging a stronger sense of professionalism.

              7. Screening by Air Carriers: Whether screening by air carriers should be
              subject to the same standards as certified screening companies.

              8. New Screening Companies: Ensuring the qualifications of a company
              that has no aviation screening experience before it begins aviation
              screening.

              9. Checkpoint Operational Configuration Deficiencies: The configuration
              of checkpoints for optimal screening conditions.

              10. Foreign Air Carriers: The regulation’s application and impact on
              foreign air carriers.




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Page 19   GAO/RCED-99-53 Aviation Security
Related GAO Products


              Aviation Security: FAA’s Deployments of Equipment to Detect Traces of
              Explosives (GAO/RCED-99-32R, Nov. 13, 1998).

              Aviation Security: Progress Being Made, but Long-Term Attention Is
              Needed (GAO/T-RCED-98-190, May 14, 1998).

              Aviation Security: Implementation of Recommendations Is Under Way, but
              Completion Will Take Several Years (GAO/RCED-98-102, Apr. 24, 1998).

              Aviation Safety: Weaknesses in Inspection and Enforcement Limit FAA in
              Identifying and Responding to Risks (GAO/RCED-98-6, Feb. 27, 1998).

              Aviation Security: FAA’s Procurement of Explosives Detection Devices
              (GAO/RCED-97-111R, May 1, 1997).

              Aviation Security: Commercially Available Advanced Explosives Detection
              Devices (GAO/RCED-97-ll9R, Apr. 24, 1997).

              Aviation Safety and Security: Challenges to Implementing the
              Recommendations of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and
              Security (GAO/T-RCED-97-90, Mar. 5, 1997).

              Aviation Security: Technology’s Role in Addressing Vulnerabilities
              (GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-262, Sept. 19, 1996).

              Aviation Security: Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed
              (GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-251, Sept. 11, 1996).

              Aviation Security: Immediate Action Needed to Improve Security
              (GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237, Aug. 1, 1996).

              Human Factors: Status of Efforts to Integrate Research on Human Factors
              Into FAA’s Activities (GAO/RCED-96-151, June 27, 1996).




(348109)      Page 20                                       GAO/RCED-99-53 Aviation Security
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