oversight

Impact of the Governmentwide Computer Security Planning and Review Process

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1990-07-10.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                   United States General Accountine Office
GAO                Testimony



For Release        Impact of the Governmentwide Computer
on Delivery
Expected at        Security Planning and Review Process
1:30 p.m. EDT
Tuesday
July 10, 1990




                   Statement of
                   Jack L. Brock, Jr., Director, Government
                     Information and Financial Management Issues
                   Information Management and Technology Division

                   Before the
                   Subcommittee on Transportation, Aviation
                    and Materials
                   Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
                   House of Representatives




GAOD-IMTEC-90-11
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:


I am pleased to be here to discuss the governmentwide computer security planning and

review process implemented under the Computer Security Act of 1987. The act, which is

intended to improve the security and privacy of sensitive information in federal computer

systems, required agencies to (1) identify systems containing sensitive information, (2)

develop and submit to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and

National Security Agency (NSA) for advice and comment a plan for each system

identified, and (3) establish computer security training programs.’ To be in compliance,

approximately 60 civilian agencies submitted almost 1,600 computer security plans to a

NIST/NSA review team in early 1989.



My testimony today is based on our review at 10 civilian agencies, where we assessedthe

planning process, the NIST and NSA review of the plans, and the extent to which the

agencies implemented planned controls described in 22 plans. The issues I am discussing

are described in greater detail in our report, Comtxter Securitv: Governmentwide

Plannine Process Had Limited ImDact (GAO/IMTEC-90-48,           May 1990).




*The act defines sensitive information as any unclassified information that in the event of
loss, misuse, or unauthorized access or modification, could adversely affect the national
interest, conduct of a federal program, or the privacy individuals are entitled to under the
Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a).

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Overall, we believe that the planning and review process had little impact on agency

computer security programs. Agency officials typically described the plans developed

under the process as merely “reporting requirements” rather than as tools for managing

their security programs. The NIST and NSA review comments on agency plans were

general and of limited use to agencies in dealing with specific computer security

problems. Finally, many agencies we reviewed made little progress in implementing

planned controls --a year after the initial plans were completed, only 38 percent of the

planned controls had been implemented.



PROCESS HAD LIMITED          IMPACT

ON AGENCY SECURITY PROGRAMS



We found that a key problem with the planning and review process was that it was

designed to fulfill dual and somewhat conflicting purposes - -to help agencies plan as

well as to meet the needs of a governmentwide reporting process involving the review of

thousands of plans. The plans were designed to be brief, both to limit the risks of

unauthorized disclosure of system vulnerabilities and to facilitate the NIST/NSA review.

Consequently, the plans lacked important information, such as budget estimates for

planned actions, needed for planning and monitoring security programs.



A number of other reasons contributed to the process’s limited impact:



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--   First, officials from about a third of the agencies we reviewed said that they

     already had more comprehensive planning processes to help them identify and

     evaluate security needs. As a result, the governmentwide process was largely

     superfluous for these agencies.



--   Second, agency officials had little time to consider their security needs in

     preparing the plans. This further limited the plans’ usefulness and, I believe,

     reinforced the view that they were little more than reporting requirements. In

     most departments, instructions for responding to Office of Management and

     Budget (OMB) Bulletin 88-16, which provided guidance on preparing the plans,

     were issued from 4 to 13 weeks before the plans were due back to the

     departments. Much had to be accomplished in this time: instructions had to be

     sent to component agencies and from there to the managers responsible for

     preparing the plans; meetings had to be held to discuss the plans; managers had

     to prepare the plans; and the plans had to be reviewed by agency management

     before being returned to the department for submission to NIST and NSA. As a

     result, some managers had only a few days to prepare the plans.



--   Third, many agency officials misinterpreted or were confused about the guidance

     in the OMB bulletin. Areas of confusion included how systems were to be



                                            3
      combined in plans, the definitions of some key terms, the amount of narrative

      detail, and the need to address telecommunications issues, such as network

      security. For example, although the guidance specified that only similar systems

      could be combined, some plans combined many different types of systems- -such

      as microcomputers and mainframes --having diverse security needs and functions.

      Agency officials stated that they combined systems based on their understanding

      of the OMB guidance and NIST/NSA oral instructions.



--    Finally, since the plans contained minimal detailed information, the review

      feedback was general and of limited use to agency officials. The NIST/NSA

      review team comments focused on stating whether the plans conformed to the

      OMB planning guidance and on citing governmentwide guidance relating to

      planned security controls. However, because the plans were designed to be brief

      and lacked detailed information, a more comprehensive review may have been

      infeasible.



AGENCIES HAVE NOT IMPLEMENTED

MOST PLANNED CONTROLS



The 22 plans we reviewed, initially prepared in early 1989, reported that 145 out of

almost 400 security controls were not fully in place. As of January 1990, a year later,



                                             4
agency officials said that only 38 percent of the 145 planned controls had been

implemented.2 Controls with low implementation rates included risk assessments,

security specifications, and certification. According to agency officials, budget constraints

and inadequate top management support were key reasons why the planned controls had

not been implemented. Some officials stated that although the planning process has

made management more aware of computer security, this awareness generally has not yet

resulted in increased resources for computer security programs.



REVISED DRAFT OMB GUIDANCE REFOCUSES EFFORTS



Based on the results of the planning and review process, OMB--in       conjunction with

NIST and NSA- -issued revised draft security planning guidance in January 1990?

Under the draft guidance, NIST, NW, and OMB would focus efforts on assisting and

advising federal agencies on their computer security programs. Many agency officials

said that they could benefit from technical assistance,especially in areas such as network

security. Under the guidance, NIST, NSA, and OMB would visit agencies to discuss their

security programs, plans, and other related issues and provide technical assistance as

needed.



2About 4 percent of the 145 planned controls had target implementation dates beyond
January 1990.

3 OMB officials said that they expect to issue final revised security planning guidance in
July 1590.
                                              5
We believe that OMB’s draft guidance creates the potential for improving computer

security by going beyond planning and attempting to address agency-specific computer

security problems. However, NIST, OMB, and NSA assistance efforts must be matched

by agency management commitment and actions to make needed improvements.

Ultimately, it is the agencies’responsibility to ensure that the information they use and

maintain is adequately safeguarded and that appropriate security measures are in place

and tested. Agency management of computer security is an issue we plan to address in

our ongoing review of this important area.



                                          ----




That concludes my statement. My colleagues and I would be glad to respond to your

questions.




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