oversight

Lessons Learned During GAO's Reviews That Can Be Applied to the Restructuring and Training of U.S. Forces

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1990-04-04.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                     United    States General     Accounting       Office

                     Testimony




For Release           Lessons Learned During GAO's Reviews
on Delivery           That Can Be Applied to the
Expected at
2:oo p.m.             Restructurinq         and Training       of U.S Forces
Wednesday
April  4, 1990




                      Statement of
                      Richard Davis, Director,    Army Issues
                      National  Security  and International
                        Affairs  Division


                      Before the
                      Subcommittee on Readiness
                      House Committee on Armed Services




                              (-y-q)   \y        h\’   ‘/ !,
 GAO/T-NSIAD-90-13
                                                                               GA0Fom160(12/87)
MK. Chairman                    and Members                       of     the        Subcommittee:


I appreciate                    the          opportunity                      to    be here          today       to     discuss             lessons
learned             from        our          work       in        the         force       structure             and training                 areas.

Most     of         them        pertain                to     the        Army,          but     they       have       some applicability

to     the      other             services              as well.


The Department                         of        Defense               (DOD) in           general          and the         Army in
particular                 will         be faced                  with         restructuring                 decisions            over        the
next         few years                 of        a magnitude                   not      seen       since        the     decisions             made in

restructuring                      forces              after            the        Vietnam         war.         A major         challenge                will

be to maintain                         balance               in        the     quality,            resourcing,             training,               and
readiness                 of      a reduced                 force.                 Facing       this       challenge            will         mean

taking             steps          to    ensure               that            reduced          resources           are     used         in    the     most
efficient                 and effective                        manner              possible.



My testimony                      today           is    based                on a number             of    reports         we have             issued
this         past         year         and some ongoing                              work,      which        point        to    significant
issues             that        warrant              the        priority                attention           of     the     Department                of

Defense             and the                 services              as they              make and           implement            their
restructuring                      decisions.                          These          issues       also      point        to    the         need      for
more         efficient                 and effective                          management             of    increasingly                 scarce

resources.                     On the             basis           of         our     recently          completed           work,            we see          the
need         for



--     improvements                         in    assigning                   missions          to     active           and reserve
       components,
--        better            management              of      the     full-time                 support        program             for
          reservists,                and
--    more            effective              management                 of      reservists'              training.



Our ongoing                    work      involving                 requirements                  for     Army land               acquisition

and alternatives                         to        acquiring                 land      for      training           needs         also      points

to        the        necessity              for     improved             decision-making                         on the         part     of        the
Army            in    making          the         most      effective                and balanced                 use of         its     limited
resources.



I would               also      like         to     discuss             DOD’s          forward-thinking                       approach             in

using            simulations                 in      its        recently             completed             REFORGER exercise.

This            approach            seems          to      have     great            potential             for     providing             enhanced
training                that        would          often          not    be feasible                   without           the     use of            such
simulations.                         I would             like      to        discuss          each      of       these         issues         in    a
 little              more      detail,             starting             first          with      mission            assignments.


GUIDANCE FOR DETERMINING WHAT MISSIONS
TO ASSIGN TO THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE COMPONENTS


 In       recent            years,          reserve             components                have      become          an increasingly
 larger              part      of     the         services'             total          force.           From fiscal                years           1980

 through              1988,          Selected              Reserve            units          grew      by 289,000               persons,            with
most            of    this       increase                occurring              in     the      Army.            Now     the     Army's            active

 forces              and Selected                  Reserves             are         about       the     same size.                 Missions
 assigned               to     active             and reserve                 components               are       not,     however,             equally
 distributed                 --combat              capabilities                     are      concentrated                in     the     active

                                                                                2
force         and National                 Guard,          and support                 capabilities                      are      concentrated

in     the      Army        Reserve.              This        situation           was created                      at     a time              when

Defense           guidance              governing              force       structure             decision-making                              focused

primarily              on planning                for      large-scale                 warfare          centered                  in     Europe
and presumed                  that        reserve          mobilization                 would          occur.               Two

difficulties                 with         this      presumption                 are     that          (1)     decisions                   to
activate              reservists             might         be delayed              and         (2)     the         United          States              has
been         historically                 reluctant             to      call     up its          reserve                 units.



In     the      past,         little         definitive                 guidance          existed                 to     help

decisionmakers                     decide         what         missions          should          be assigned                      to      the

reserves              or    to     what         extent         certain          capabilities                      should          reside
there.            We have              pointed          out     in      prior         reports          and testimony,                           and DOD

has      concurred,                that         greater         specificity               in     guidance                  is     needed              for

de,ciding             what       missions           should           be assigned                to     reserve                 components.1
DOD has been                  working            to develop               such        guidance              for         several           years,
including              guidance            on how to              adequately              evaluate                 the         differences

in     cost       between              assigning              a mission           to     the     active                 and to          the
reserve           forces.               Specific              guidance          becomes              even         more          important               in

the      face         of    potentially                  large-scale              force         restructuring                          that      will
affect          both         the       active       and the             reserve          components.                       Rather              than         go
into         detail         concerning              what         this         guidance          should             provide,               let      me


lReserve      Force:      DOD Guidance     Needed on Assigning     Roles to
Reserves      Under the Total      Force Policy      (GAO/NSIAD-90-26,    Dec.                                                                   7,
1989);    Role of the Reserves          in the Total    Force Policy    before                                                                    the
Subcommittee       on Readiness,      House Committee      on Armed Sirvices,
 (T-GAO/NSIAD       89-7,   Feb. 23, 1989);      and Reserve Components:
Opportunities        to Improve    National    Guard and Reserve Policies                                                                        and
Programs      (GAO/NSIAD 89-27,       Nov.   17, 1988).
                                                                          3
highlight             what           we believe             are      some important                             parameters             to     such

decision-making.



The lessening                   of     a European                threat               and talk             of        greater          advanced
warning         time          will          likely         stimulate                  discussions                    about      placing             a

greater         reliance                on the            reserves.                   There          indeed           may be room                  for

this      greater             reliance               overall;          however,                    we believe                that      any         such

discussions               should             focus         on ensuring                      that         (1)     active         forces             are

structured              with          combat          and support                     capabilities                    adequate              to meeting
the      more        likely           low-         to mid-intensity                          contingencies                     and     (2)         the

Army's         strategy               in     fielding             and deploying                         forces          in     less        likely             but

higher         intensity                contingencies                  is            soundly            based         on credible                  threat
data,         warning           time,             and allowances                      for      delays            in     activating                 reserve
components.



Within         the      past          year,          some Army              leaders,                 including               the      Chief         of
Staff,         have       expressed                  concern         about              whether                the    Army has             come to
place         too     much of               its      capabilities                     in     the        reserve           components.                     We

understand              that          the         Army     is     giving              increased                 attention             to     its
contingency               forces,                 including           the            level         of     combat-service                     support

in      the    active           force.               Important             but          not        easily            answered          questions
in      structuring                  this         force       will     no doubt                    concern            what      size         such         a
force         should          be and for                  how long              it      should            be self-sustaining

without             relying           on the           reserves.                     These         questions              are       as much
political              as they              are      strategic.                      For      that        reason,            we believe                  that
they        deserve           an open              discussion               between                the         executive            branch          and

                                                                            4
the     Congress              that      acknowledges                       the        historic                 reluctance                 to     activate

reserves              other      than        on a purely                    volunteer                   basis             and    the       likely

delay      in         activating             them.                 The executive                       branch             and the          Congress

need      to     establish               the        general              parameters                    for      force           structure
decision-making                      by each             of        the     military                services;                  this        should               help
to    guide           decisions             on overall                    force         structure                    and size.


Information                 contained               in    one of             our        recently                 issued          reports                  on
general              support         maintenance                    suggests               the         importance                of       the         Army's
assessing               the     need        for      a self-sustaining                                 contingency                   corps.2                   With

a focus              on a potential                  European                theater               of         war,        the    Army has                  relied
on German civilians                            to    provide               most         of       its          equipment              maintenance

capabilities                   during        peacetime.                      Likewise,                   it     has        expected                  to    rely
on the          Germans              and the         Army Reserve                       and Army National                              Guard              to
provide              such      maintenance                    in    time         of     war.             Our report                   raised

questions               about         the      availability                      of     the        German civilians                             during

wartime.                Further,            with         over            80 percent                of         the     Army's           own heavy

equipment               maintenance                 capabilities                      in     the         reserve              components,                      there

are     also          questions             about             the        Army's         abilities                    to    provide              needed

maintenance                   support          capabilities                      without               reserve             call-ups.                      We
believe              that      these        issues             warrant            examination                        by the          Army as it
plans          for      contingencies                    outside             the        European                    theater          or        for
contingencies                   in     which         reduced               forward             deployments                      increase                  the

need      to plan              for      a rapid               redeployment                    to       Europe.


2See Army Maintenance:                                Use of German Civilians    and U.S. Reservists
in Europe for   General                             Support Maintenance    (GAO/NSIAD-90-22,
Dec. 28, 1989).

                                                                             5
Avoiding            Hollow          Force      Structure



The Army created                     several             new divisions                      in     the        1980s          by reducing                    the

size     of     existing             units,          increa.sing                 its        reliance                on reserve
components,              and trying                 to     achieve             greater             efficiencies                    in      some

capabilities                 with     less          personnel               strength.                    Two of            our     ongoing

reviews         have         given        preliminary                 indications                      of     personnel                 shortfalls
that     may need             to     be corrected                   as restructuring                               takes      place.



First,         as the         Army of           Excellence3                     restructuring                       program             began          in

1984,         the     Army adopted                  a major           initiative                   termed             the        "Logistics
Unit      Productivity                 Study         program"                  (LUPS),            which            was designed                  to

increase             productivity               by introducing                         labor-saving                       equipment              such

as forklifts,                 cranes,           and semitrailers                            into         Army units.                      This
$792 million                 initiative                  was intended                  to        reduce            manpower
requirements                 by 30,000              between           fiscal            years               1986      and 1993.                  We have
recently             found,         however,              that       the        Army generally                        did        not      follow

through             on its      plans          to        validate              the     force           structure                 savings           or
productivity                 gains        before            it     began           converting                  units         to        their       new
designs.              As a result,                  the          Army has            no assurance                     that        the          newly
configured              units        can       accomplish                  their        missions                   with      their             reduced
manpower.               Results           of    the         single             validation                   that      was done                 showed
productivity                 gains        to    be half              of        what     was initially                        anticipated.




3The Army of Excellence                               was the redesign                            of        the     Army's             force
structure that created                              lighter   forces.

                                                                           6
Although          only          10 percent                  of     the        Army units                      included             in     this           program

have     converted               to         their       new designs,                          the        30,000          manpower               spaces

expected          to      be saved                  under         the      LUPS program                        have       already               been

reallocated               to     other              Army units.                     If        the        remaining             LUPS units                   are

unable       to     convert                 on schedule,                   some units                     will         become            understaffed

or     unstaffed             Army units                 without               the         proper              equipment--that                        is,
"paper       units"             with         missions              but        little                or    no manpower                    or equipment
with     which          to      accomplish                  them.



Another         example                involves             the      Apache               helicopter                   and our             ongoing
work      regarding                  its     availability                     for         operations.                     We have                found           that

Apache       helicopter                     battalions                  are       under-resourced                         by about                  28

percent,          primarily                   in maintenance                        support.                     While        this         shortfall

is     one of       the         main          factors             limiting                flight              operations                 during

peacetime,              the          situation              could          be more                  severe          in meeting                  wartime
operational               requirements.                           This        shortfall                   occurred             when manpower
requirements                   for         Apache       units            were            based           on the          requirements                      for
Cobra      units,            which            preceded              the       Apache,                rather            than        on the            greater

needs      of      the       new Apache                 units.                The Army                   is      aware        of        this        shortage
and plans              some corrective                           action;            however,                  an Army official                           told           us
it     may be 2 years                       before          they         know            to    what           extent          this         problem               will
be corrected.                        We do not              know to               what         extent             the     Apache               situation

is     indicative               of         what      other          combat               organizations                    may be faced                      with
in     fielding           new and more                      complex               equipment.                      However,               to      the       extent
that      these          situations                  exist,             the       Army          faces            the     dilemma               of    having



                                                                              7
to     meet     these         increased               demands          in        the      face      of     force        structure

reductions.



We believe             that       in     restructuring                     its         forces,         the     Army must              fully
assess        its     expected            productivity                     gains          and unit            manning
requirements                to    ensure          that         units         have         sufficient             numbers         of
personnel            to     accomplish                their         assigned             missions.


IMPROVED MANAGEMENT OF THE FULL-TIME
SUPPORT PROGRAM IS NEEDED


Shifting            capabilities                from          the     active            to    the        reserve        components
typically            does        not     represent              a one-for-one                     exchange             of    active           for
reserve         positions.                 To ensure                that         the      reserves            successfully               take

over       formerly           active           duty      roles         the        Army depends                 heavily          on its

full-time            support            program,              which        provides              personnel             to    reserve

components             to     assist           with      the        administering,                       recruiting,
maintaining,                and training                 essential                to      achieving            unit         readiness.

Much needs             to     be done           to      improve             the        efficiency             and effectiveness
of     this     program,               which      consists             of        over        82,000          personnel          and costs
$3 billion             annually.


Our recent             report           on the          full-time                support          program4             showed         that

this       program          had grown             during            the      1980s           without          adequate          direction
and management                   oversight;              the        Army's             overall         personnel             requirements



4See Army Reserve Components:     Opportunities                                                      to Improve               Management
of the Full-Time  Support Program   (GAO/NSIAD                                                      90-43,  Feb.              8, 1990) .
                                                                       8
for      this         program            lacked            sound        justification;                           and the           Army      lacked

guidance              that     defined               the      roles            for         full-time              support           personnel
categories               and procedures                       to       ensure              that          these      positions              were

filled          with         the     most           cost-effective                         mix      of     personnel.



As force              restructuring                       takes        place,              an important                   element          in    making

decisions              affecting                reserve             components                    will       be determining                     the
extent           to    which          the       Army has adequately                                 justified               its     requirement

for      full-time                 support           personnel.                      We found              that       the         Army's

requirement                  for      120,000              full-time                 support              personnel               lacked        sound
justification                      and     recommended                  that           the         Secretary              of      the   Army use

work-load              analyses                to        determine             its         full-time               support           requirement

and take              a number             of       steps         to    improve                  the      management               of   this
program.                These         steps              included             (1)     developing                   measurable              program

objectives,                  (2)      implementing                     adequate                  program           monitoring
mechanisms,                  and         (3)    developing                    clear         (guidance              that        specifically
differentiates                      among the                roles            for      Active             Guard/Reserve,                   military
technician,                  active            component,               and civilian                       employees               and stipulates
when full-time                      personnel                should            be used.                   We also           recommended                that
the      Secretary                 develop               procedures                 that         will       help      the         Army National
Guard       and Army Reserve                              establish                 the      most         cost-effective                   mix        of
personnel.                   DOD generally                    agreed                with         our      audit       findings             and
recommendations                       and said               that        it         planned              corrective               actions.             As
noted           in    our     report,               if     the      Army            requests              additional               personnel
authorizations                      above           current            levels,               the         Congress          may wish             to



                                                                               9
consider          deferring                 the      request            until          it        is     assured           that      adequate

action        has been                  taken       to     improve             the     program.


MORE EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF RESERVISTS'
TRAINING IS NEEDED

During          the        past         year,       we have         issued             three            reports           indicating                the
need      for         improved             management              of         reservists'                 training             programs.                  Two

of    those           reports             focused          on the             Selected                Reserve,5           and the            other
focused          on the                Individual               Ready         Reserve            (IRR).S             The term            "Selected
Reservists"                  generally              refers         to         individuals                 who are           assigned               to
organized              reserve             components              and engage                    in     monthly           and yearly                paid

training,              while            Individual               Ready         Reservists                 generally              are     not
assigned              to     organized              units         before             mobilization                 and do not                 have

mandatory,                  regularly             scheduled              training.



Selected              Reserve



Our      report             disclosed             the       need        for      management                 initiatives                 to     enhance
the      training                 of    Army      Reserve          and National                        Guard      units.               More
specifically,                      we found              that     training              had been              hampered            by         (1)    the
failure           of        some Army schools                      to         provide            sufficient               instruction                   on
equipment                  that        soldiers           were     expected                 to        operate        in     their        units,


5See Army Training:       Management Initiatives                                                          Needed          to     Enhance
Reservists'    Training   (GAO/NSIAD
                                ~ggserve -                                                                                        an
Training:     FIREX 88 Achieved    Its Objectives                                                         but'Missed              Other
Training    Opportunities   (GAO/NSIAD 89-198BR,                                                          Sept.    15,           1989).

SSee Individual                         Ready       Reserve:              Army Needs to Make More                                      Effective
Use of Limited                         Training       Funds             (GAO/NSIAD 90-55, Feb. 7,                                      1990).

                                                                          10
(2)       the       lack        in       some units                   of     equipment                     necessary              to        teach      critical

skills,             (3)        some units'                    lack          of     sufficient                      focus        on training

soldiers             in        tasks            that        support               the        units'           missions,                 (4)     the      failure

of      some units                 to         incorporate                   survival                 skills           in     training
exercises,                 and          (5)         the      ineffective                     use      of       scarce            training             time.
Some commanders                              told        us that            individual                     skill         deficiencies                  within
their           units,          especially                    in      battlefield                      survival,                 were        significant

and that             they          were             concerned               about            their           soldiers'              and their                units'
survivability                      in         combat.



Our report                 on the               FIREX         88 exercise                      indicated                 that,          although             the
exercise             was successful,                             exercise                planners                  had not          maximized
training             opportunities.                              FIREX            88 was a major                         corps-level,                  live-
fire        field          artillery                      training               exercise              for         I Corps          active            and
reserve             units;              it      integrated                  artillery,                     air,        and combat               service-
support             operations.                           Although           designed                  to      exercise             only         I Corps
artillery                 units,              FIREX          88 grew              beyond             its          originally                intended

scope.              About          half             of     the       troops             at     the         exercise              were         from     units

not       expected              to           operate          with          I Corps             artillery                  in     wartime.               Despite
its       success,              the           exercise's                   size         and complexity,                          along         with         the
Army's            concerns                   about         safety           and environmental                              damage,             caused          Army

officials                 to    limit               opposing               forces            play.                Training             in     offensive            and
defensive                 tactics               was also              lacking                because               the     exercise                involved

only        limited             opposing                   forces           and battlefield                            simulation.                    Finally,
communications                       and combat                      service-support                              operations                were      not
adequately                 planned                  and executed.


                                                                                   11
The Army           is     aware             of      many of          these       training             problems                  and has

initiated           some corrective                           actions.               As significant                      as these

findings           are         for         today's          Army,      we believe                  that      they         could           be

equally        significant                        for     a restructured                   force          to-the           extent           that      the
Army continues                       to     rely         on its       reserve            components                for          early-
deploying           missions.



Individual               Ready             Reserve


The    IRR is            composed                 primarily           of     soldiers              who have              previously
served        in        the        Army and have                    some period               of    service              obligation

remaining.                    In     the         event      of     mobilization,                   IRR soldiers                    are      expected
to    be called                up,         many within               the     first         30 days,           to         fill        gaps        in
deploying               and stateside                     units       and to          replace             early          combat
casualties.



Our recent               report              on IRR training                     showed        that        the       Army's              first

priority           for         available                 training           funds        is    professional                      development
education               for        members              needing       it     for      promotion,                 rather            than
refresher               training                 for     members           required           in     the     first              30 days          of
mobilization.                        We also             found       that        funds        and training                      had not          been
distributed                   based          on early             mobilization                requirements.                        Further,           the
determination                      of      which         skills       required             refresher               training                and how

frequently               had not                 been made.                We recommended                  that          the       Secretary            of
the    Army         (1) make more                        effective           use      of      mobilization                      training           funds
by establishing                           overall         guidance           and controls                  directed                toward


                                                                            12
ensuring           that           available              funds      are      focused           on mobilization

requirements,                     with      special             emphasis        on IRR members                      needed             in     the
first      30 days                of     mobilization,               and       (2)     determine              the         content             and

frequency              of     required             refresher              training.             Here         again,          DOD

generally              agreed            with      our      findings           and recommendations.                               It
recently           formed               a joint          task     group        to     focus        on this              situation.                      In

the      context             of    our      discussions               here      today , we believe                         that         to        the

extent          that         force         restructuring               decisions               place         greater            re liance                on

the      IRR,      the        Congress             may     want       to     assure         itself           that         steps         are
being       taken            to        improve      the         management            of    this       program.



BALANCED DEFENSE RESOURCING NEEDED


Our recently                  completed             and ongoing                work        involving               the     requirements
for      Army      land           acquisition               and alternatives                    to     such         acquisition
found       that            the        Army was moving                 toward         acquiring              additional
training           land           for      some installations                        without         fully          assessing                 needs,

examining              alternatives,                     or having           a sound           basis         for         establishing
acquisition                  priorities.7



We are          now in            the      process          of     examining            the     extent             to     which             the     Army
can document                  and/or            quantify           how land           shortages              have         adversely
affected           training                and readiness.                    We are         several           months            away from
completing                  the        fieldwork          on this           follow-on           training                 land



'See Army Training:      Need to                                   Improve           Assessments              of Land
Requirements  and Priorities                                      (GAO/NSIAD           90-44BR,              Dec. 1, 1090).
                                                                       13
assignment.                         However,              we have                     already               found      in     at      least           some

instances                    that         reductions                       in      the       availability                    of     training             funds         for
this      fiscal                year        are          inhibiting                       a full             use of          land      the        Army now

owns,         not            to mention                  its         use of               any         additional              land         that         might         be

acquired.                     At Fort              Polk,             Louisiana,                       for         example,          the        Army,       to     save

fuel,         is         trucking                its       tracked                    vehicles               out      to     ranges            rather         than
maneuvering                     them         there.                   It         is      using          wheeled            vehicles              to     replace
tanks         for            some exercises                           for          the        same purpose.                       While          Fort      Polk        has

been      high               on the          Army's                 priority                  list          for     acquiring              additional                 land
for      maneuver                   training,                  it          appears               that        resource             constraints                 limit
the      use            of    existing                 land.



In      the    early                1980s,             Fort          Carson,                 Colorado,                acquired             over         200,000
acres         of         land            about         150 miles                      away at               Pinon      Canyon             to     provide

sufficient                    space          for         maneuver                     training.                    NOW,      Fort      Carson            is
experiencing                        a cutback                  in          available                  training              funds         and recently
told        us that                 it     may have                   to         curtail              some of          the         training             rotations

it      makes            to     Pinon            Canyon.                    At        Fort           Knox,         Kentucky,              the     home of             the
Army's             Armor            School,              we found                     that,           while         the      school            has modern              Ml
tanks,             it        uses         older,           more                 fuel-efficient                      M60 tanks              and other
surrogate                    vehicles              for         training                    its        armor         officers.                   Several         Army
officials                    have         indicated                   that            less           training             funds       mean less
emphasis                 on larger                 scale,                  fuel-           and land-intensive                             training
exercises.




                                                                                          14
While         it         is     difficult                 to      measure         the        impact      of        incremental              changes

in     training                 funds           on unit            proficiency                and readiness,                 there          does
seem to be some discrepancy                                              between          trying      to       acquire         additional
training                 land        and not              fully          using        land     already             owned.        We believe               .

that         this             type       of     discrepancy                warrants            attention,              especially                as
forces             are         restructured.


SIMULATIONS                     CAN ENHANCE TRAINING



Finally,                 I would               like       to      conclude            on a more positive                      note      by
highlighting                         DOD's          forward-thinking                      approach            in    using      simulations

in     its         recently                  completed             REFORGER follow-on                         exercise         known            as
"Centurion                     Shield."                  Simulations              can        supplement,              though         not
replace,                 ground               training            and,      in    some cases,                 provide         training

opportunities                         that          cannot         otherwise              be replicated                 except         in       actual
combat.



Computer-simulated                                  war-games             have        been      increasingly                 used      by       the
military                 in      recent             years         to     exercise            command and control                       techniques
and procedures                           for        staffs         at     various            echelons.              This      year's
REFORGER marked                               the     first        time        such       simulations               were      used         to    such
an extent                     and       in     such       a large-scale                   exercise.                The exercise
involved                 four         corps--two                  real      and two           simulated--and                  several
levels              of        battle.               One level             of     battle         was fought              in    a field
exercise                 between               opposing            forces         from        the     5th      and 7th         Corps,            using
a limited                     number           of     wheeled            and track            vehicles             (no tanks).                  Another

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level       of     battle            was conducted                         largely            through              a computer-simulated

exercise,               using        opposing                forces              in     a command-post                     type        of      exercise

in      which      the      lowest             echelon               deployed                to      the      field        were        battalion

headquarters                staffs                 interacting                   with        field           simulation               centers.              A
third       level         of        battle,              which            was conducted                      entirely            through

computer           simulation,                      involved               corps-on-corps                       battles           fought            on the

northern            flank           and       to      the        rear        of        the    actual            field          exercise.



While       some         field         training                  still           took        place,           the        focus        was on
training           battle            commanders                    and providing                       corps-level                staffs            with
the      opportunity                  to      conduct              several              battles              simultaneously.                        Army

leaders           in     Europe             describe               the       approach                as "training                 smarter"             and
"making           the      best        use          of     all           funding."


We were           able         to     observe               the      REFORGER exercise                              firsthand               this      year.
While       some         "glitches"                   in     the          simulation                 portion             did     occur,            we also
talked           with      many participants                                in        the    exercise               who saw great

training            benefit            accruing                  from        the        use of              such      simulations,                  even
among some who previously                                        had viewed                  them           reservedly.                We are
still       in      the        process              of      assessing                  the        results           of    the     exercise             in
terms       of         lessons             learned           and benefits                         gained           through        this         type        of
exercise.



On one hand,                   we believe                   that          simulations                  may result                in    cost         savings
over       large-scale                     field         exercises                    because          they         require           fewer
personnel               and lower                  equipment                operation                and maintenance                        costs      and


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result        in        reduced         maneuver              damage.               However,               the    extent              of      long-

term       cost         savings          is      unclear.                Using          the     Army's           training               analogy               of

"crawl,"             "walk,"           and "run"               in    describing                 training            proficiency,

some senior                  leaders           we spoke             with        suggested                 that    the       Army            is
somewhere               between         the         stages          of     crawling             and walking                 in        using

computer-simulated                            training.              Simulation                 systems           vary           in     cost            and

sophistication,                    but         the      technology                 is    advancing               rapidly.                   Uncertain

future        development                 and fielding                     costs         make        it      unclear          at           this         point
what       savings            might       accrue             in     the      future.



A recent             Defense           Science              Board         report          found           that    there            is
insufficient                  coordination                   among the              many DOD organizations                                       that        are

building             simulations,                   particularly                   from        a joint           war-fighting
perspective.8                     It     stated             that     a lack             of     coordination                 "results                    in
redundant               databases              with         less     quality,                 less        data    validation,                         and
less       ability            to maintain                   accurate            data          over        time     than       could               be
achieved."



As part            of    two      ongoing             assignments,                  we are           examining              the
development                  and use           of     simulations.                      Our work             involving                Army land
acquisition                  alternatives,                   as well            as the           REFORGER exercise,                               has
made us aware                   of many computer-assisted                                      war-gaming               programs                  being
developed               or    modified               by the         services.                  While         we are         still                in     the
process            of    completing                  this      work,         we too            are        concerned              about            the



8See COIIIpUter    Applications                                to Training                 and Wargaming,                        Report               of     the
Defense    Science   Board Task                                Force,   May               1988.
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need      for      greater                coordination                within         and among the                services           in
developing                  and acquiring                   future       simulation                systems.



The Army               is    now trying                to    develop           a strategy             for      the    future         use of
simulations,                  including                identifying               requirements               and determining
the      right          mix        of     field        and simulated                 training.              DOD officials,
noting           the        absence            of    a single          point         of     contact         within       DOD to
provide           oversight                   over     the     development                and use of            simulations,                 are
working           toward            correcting               this      s ituat       ion        and developing              policy
guidance.                   This         Subcommittee                may want         to        request        that    DOD more

fully       explain                its        approach         to     this       task,          particularly           in      ensuring
that      requirements                        are    clearly          identified                and that        needed         inter-         and
intra-service                      coordination                takes         place         to    achieve        maximum         benefits

from      this          promising                 technology.



Mr.      Chairman,                 this        concludes             my prepared                statement.            I would           be
glad       to     respond                to    any questions                 you     or     other       members        of      the

Subcommittee                  might            have.




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