Cambodia: U.S. Non-lethal Assistance and Status of the Cambodian Seat at the United Nations

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1990-09-19.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                    United i§t&es General Accounting Offlce / 5Lza 3/-


For Release         CAMBODIA
on Delivery         U.S. Non-lethal Assistance  and
Expected at
2~00 p.m.   EST     Status of the Cambodian Seat
Wednesday           at the United Nations
September 19,

                    Statement   of
                    Harold J. Johnson, Director
                    Foreign     Economic Assistance    Issues
                    National     Security and International      Affairs
                    Before the Committee       on Foreign   Relations
                    Subcommittee     on East   Asian and
                      Pacific   Affairs                                 'i
                    United States Senate

Mr.     Cha'f'rman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We are pleased           to be here today to report              on     our     work related         to
the ongoing U.S. efforts                to encourage a settlement                 of the 11-year
war in Cambodia.               Specifically,        you asked that        we report         on (1) the
accountability           for    and impact of U.S. non-lethal                   assistance      being
provided       to the military          forces      of the Noncommunist Cambodian
Resistance         (NCR) and (2) the           status     of the United Nations              seat
currently       held     by    the Coalition       Government of Democratic                 Kampuchea.

The past couple of weeks have seen some rather                                important     events
occur with         regard      to Cambodia.        As you know, on August 28, the five
permanent members of the U.N. Security                        Council         reached final
agreement on a framework for                   a peace resettlement,              and on September
10,     the four     competing Cambodian parties,                meeting         in Jakarta,
announced their           acceptance         of the Perm-Five       plan.         In a joint
statem-ent released             at the close       of the Jakarta         meeting,        the four
parties       agreed to form a Supreme National                  Council         (SNC), that        would
"embody Cambodia's sovereignty"                    during     the transition          period.         The
joint       statement     named the 12 members of the SNC; 6 representing                                 the
People's       Republic        of Kampuchea in Phnom Penh, 2 representing
Prince       Sihanouk's        party,   2 representing         the Khmer People's             National
Liberation       Front        (KPNLF), and 2 representing               the Khmer Rouge.              We
all     hope that       the steps taken will             lead to a comprehensive
political       settlement         in that     country      in a way that         assures     the
achievement         of U.S. objectives            in Cambodia.
I mention these recent events                      because,        while     much of my testimony
today relates  to the situation                     that       existed      prior      to August 1990,
I believe            the prior     situation       can be instructive                on how continued
U.S. involvement               in Cambodia can be most productive.

Very briefly,            we found that          while        poor accountability             and control
over the U.S. non-lethal                    assistance         program was a problem              in the
early        years     of the program;          controls        now exist       that     can provide
reasonable            assurance     that     the aid reaches              the NCR. We found no
evidence        that     U.S. non-lethal           assistance        has directly            benefited
the Khmer Rouge.                 However, providing             assurance       that     the aid is
properly        used after         being turned             over to the NCR is much more
difficult,           and in some cases impossible,                   given      the restriction           on
U.S. officials            entering         Cambodia where much of the assistance                         is
actually        used.       Moreover,        we were told          that     communications         have
occurred        between military             officers         of the NCR and Khmer Rouge that
may have indirectly                augmented the Khmer Rouge's military                         capacity.

From fiscal            years     1986 through       1990, the United                States    provided
about $20 million                in non-lethal          assistance         under the Solarz
Program,        named after         its     sponsor,        Congressman Stephen Solarz.                   The
non-lethal           assistance      provided       under this            program consisted
primarily    of medical equipment and supplies purchased in Thailand,
and training,    although other activities  were also supported.

During fiscal years 1987 through 1989 about 200 tons of Department
of Defense (DOD) surplus commodities were also provided.  Funds
allocated           to the Agency for            International                 Development            (AID)      to
support          this     program,      known as the McCollum Program,                               named after
its     sponsor,          Congressman Bill            McCollum,              have been used primarily                     to
pay for          transportation          costs     in Thailand                and to construct
warehouse facilities.                    Over one-half               of the commodities                 provided
through          this     program were medical                supplies          and equipment,             but        other
equipment,              such as generators            and pumps and quartermaster                          supplies
have also been furnished.

Our work in Thailand                   and along the Thai-Cambodian                           border     indicated
that      in the early            years of the non-lethal                      assistance            program,
accountability              was    inadequate.           From fiscal                year     1986,     when the
Solarz      program began, until                 July        1988,      the program was implemented
solely-by          a designated          agency of the Thai Government with                               virtually
no     management          oversight      by   a U.S. government                     agency.          The AID
Inspector          General        reported     that      during         this        period     serious        abuses

and diversions              of assistance          intended            for     the NCR occurred.                  The
details      of these         abuses     remain         classified             by    the State         Department.

As a result             of the AID Inspector                 General         reports,        AID and the Thai
Government now share responsibility                              for     managing the program.
Tracking and monitoring                  systems         have been installed                     by    AID to make
sure  the U.S. non-lethal                    assistance          reaches            the NCR. These systems

are new, but our review indicates    that they can provide reasonable
assurance that the assistance   reaches its intended recipients.
However, according               to AID officials,                AID's        responsibility        for
assuring       accountability           ends when the assistance                       is turned         over to
the NCR.           Because much of the assistance                          is used inside         Cambodia
where U.S. officials               are not permitted,                    actual     end-use still             cannot
be monitored           or verified.           Consequently,               while     we found no evidence
that      U.S. assistance           is directly            benefiting           the Khmer Rouge,
accountability            systems do not exist                   that     would provide          such

Although       the legislation             states      that       U.S. non-lethal              assistance
provided       to the NCR should              not have the effect                   of directly          or
indirectly         promoting       or augmenting              the capacity           of the Khmer Rouge,
officers       from both the Thai Government and the party                                  of Prince
Sihanouk       told     us that      battle     targets           were, at times,              communicated
to the Knmer Rouge.                Also,      at times           the NCR and Khmer Rouge
coordinated           attacks.       U.S. Embassy officials                       in Bangkok who monitor
this      situation       told    us that      this        may    have occurred           in the past,           but
they do not believe               such cooperation                between the NCR and the Khmer
Rouge has occurred               recently.

As you       may   know, this         issue was raised                  last    week at a House Foreign
Affairs       Committee hearing              chaired        by    Congressman Solarz.                In
   'D    to a question about                    cooperation               between the NCR and the
Khmer Rouge, Under Secretary                    of State           Kimmitt         indicated      that        there

has been-=-adegree of contact                             and communication           between tnese            forces

which work             in        close     proximity.        However, he indicated               that     the
degree of contact                        has not increased,           and is below the "threshold"
laid      out        in the law.              We cannot      judge whether the communications
between the NCR and Khmer Rouge forces                                   has increased,          or decreased,
however,         our examination                     of the legislation           does not indicate             that
there      is a "threshold"                    on indirect          assistance.        Section     906(a)        of
the International                        Security      and Development           Cooperation      Act of        1985

clearly         states            that     U.S. assistance           shall      not have the effect             of
promoting,             sustaining,             or augmenting,          directly       or indirectly,            the
capacity         of the Khmer Rouge to conduct                          military       or paramilitary
operations             in Cambodia.                 To the extent        that     U.S. non-lethal
assistance            has contributed                  to the NCR's performance               on the
battlefield,                it     would appear that               such communications           and contact
between NCR and Khmer Rouge forces                                 may have had the effect                of
indirectly            augmenting              the efforts         of the Khmer Rouge.

As you know, the non-lethal                             aid programs were, and still                    are,
largely         politically                motivated       and represent          symbolic     U.S. support
for     the Association                    of Southeast          Asian Nations'         (ASEAN) agenda for
Cambodia.             However, attempting                   to measure the impact that                   the U.S.
non-lethal            assistance              has had on the political                and military
balance         in    Cambodia is problematic                      at best.        First,     U.S. non-lethal
ass’istance           represents              only     a portion      of the total          assistance
received         by     the NCR, and the effect                     of the U.S. programs would have

to be measured within the context of total assistance being
provided to the NCR by all sources, information   to which we do not
have access.            Also,      as AID's         Office        of Khmer Affairs                 told     us, these
assistance       programs were not designed                          to have specific                 activities
or projects        planned         and implemented,                with     goals,         objectives,            and
benchmarks being clearly                    identified.              Consequently,                traditional
measures of program effectiveness                              do not exist.               However, having
said    that,    the events              of the past           several      weeks all             point     to the
conclusion       that     the political              and diplomatic                objectives             these
programs were intended                    to support           are moving forward.

You asked that           we provide           information           on the status                 of the
Cambodia seat of the U.N.                         This    seat,      as you know, has been held,
with    the support        of the United                 States,      by the Khmer Rouge from 1979
until     1982, and by the Coalition                          Government composed of the two
noncommunist        factions             and the Khmer Rouge since                        then.       Our inquiry
into    the role        of the Khmer Rouge at the United                             Nations,             and its
related     organizations,                since     the formation            of the Coalition
Government in 1982, indicates                        that       the Khmer Rouge has dominated
in two respects.                First,      we were informed                that     it     has greater
financial       support         than the two NCR parties,                     and secondly                 a Khmer
Rouge representative                heads the delegations                    at the U.N. in New York
and Geneva; the U.N. Educational,                              Scientific          and Cultural
Organizations  (UNESCO) in Paris; and the Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific  (ESCAP). On the other hand, we

were told by representatives       of all three Coalition members that
decisions      on the issues at the United Nations important to
Cambodia, are          made       on a consensus basis.                 We were also told                that
votes     on economic issues                generally        follow     the "Group of 77" and
votes     on political            issues     follow        those of the Nonaligned                Movement.

On July       18,    1990,       Secretary      of State          Baker announced that             the
United     States      would no longer               support       the seating      of the Coalition
Government at the U.N. as long as the Khmer Rouge remained a part
of that      coalition.            On July      20, Assistant           Secretary     of State            Bolton
elaborated          on this       policy     shift      by stating       that    the United         States
would vote against                a renewal      of the credentials              of the Coalition
Government if          it     continued       to include           the Khmer Rouge.

State     Department          officials       stated       that     they were hopeful             that     the
seat would be filled                by a Supreme National                Council     representing
"all     shades of opinion"                in Cambodia as stipulated                by the Perm-Five
plan     for a comprehensive                settlement.           However, officials              at the
U.S. Mission          to the U.N. and at the State                      Department     with        whom we
spoke,     either      did not know or would not say how, or how actively
they would work to unseat the Coalition                               Government in the event                     a
Supreme National              Council      was not formed in time to present
credentials          to be seated at the next session                      of the General
Assembly later            this     month.


                                                                                              :                 /.-
Our analysis           indicates          that,      in the event a Supreme National
Council-Were           not formed,           the Administration's                        decision        to vote
against       a renewal          of the credentials                    of the Coalition                 Government,
and to actively                work against          the seating                of the Phnom Penh
government        of Prime Minister                  Hun Sen, would be an important
departure       from the historically                      held U.S. policy                  on the seating             of
delegations.            Historically,              the United              States        has taken the
position       that      (1)     a country         should            not   be    deprived         of
representation               at the United           Nations           simply          because     other
governments           find      that     country's         government             objectionable                on
political       or moral grounds--in                      other        words,          a country's         seat should
not be left           vacant-- and (2) the credentials                                 process     is a purely
technical       process          to ensure         that        all     the paperwork              is in order         and
not an appropriate                mechanism for                unseating          a delegation,                especially
when no other           superior          claim      exists           to the country's                 seat.

Instead,       the U.S. position                  has been that                 the only         appropriate         and
legal       mechanism for              suspending         or expelling                 a U.N. member country
from the rights                and privileges             of membership when another                            claimant
is not involved,                is through         a recommendation                     of the Security
Council.        State        Department           officials            with      whom we spoke in
Washington       and New York did not indicate                                  that     attempting            to expel1
the Coalition           Government through                     a Security              Council     recommendation
was under consideration.                     The provisions                     under which the United


States would have to take action through the Security Council                                         are
specified-at Article 5 and 6 of the U.N. Charter.    Article 5
provides       that:

          -- Preventive        or enforcement          action      has to be taken by the
             Security       Council     against       the member state          concerned.
          -- The Security           Council    has to recommend to the General
             Assembly that           the member state           concerned be suspended from
             the exercise           of the rights       and privileges          of membership.
          -- The General           Assembly has to act affirmatively                    on the
             Security       Council     recommendation           by a two-thirds             vote    in
             accordance        with Article         18, which lists        "suspension              of the
             rights      and privileges        of membership"          as an "important

Article      6 states       that     members persistently           violating          the
principles       of the Charter          may be expelled           from the U.N. by the
Generai      Assembly upon recommendation                     of the Security          Council.

This      longstanding        and consistently          held policy      has been stated
repeatedly       by the U.S. government                to resist      the expulsion            of
governments'           delegations      through       the credentials       process;           both
governments        friendly         to the United       States,     such as Israel,             and
governments        the United         States   does not recognize           diplomatically,
such as Democratic             Kampuchea--that          is,     the Khmer Rouge.              Some U.S.
officials      with      whom we spoke expressed                concern that      if     the United

. States      y.o_ted against         renewal         of the Coalition                  Government's
  credentials        rather        than going          through           the Security          Council     process,
  this     would    represent         a reversal             of long-standing               U.S. policy.           This
  policy     has been supported,                   incidentally,                by   an opinion       of the U.N.
 Legal Counsel.              These officials                 indicated           that    such an action            by

 the United         States        could,         in the future,             weaken the U.S.
 government's          position           that     a country            should       not be deprived          of
 representation          at the United                Nations           simply       because    other
 governments         dislike        that         country's           politics        or find    it    morally
 objectionable.              If    a Supreme National                    Council        is formed in time to
 present       credentials          for     the next session                    of the U.N. General
 Assembly,         the United        States         will        be    spared this          dilemma.

 Mr. Chairman,          this       concludes          my prepared               remarks.       Appendix       I to
 this      statement     provides           further          information             on our review       of the
 U.S. non-lethal             assistance            programs.             We would be pleased             to
 respond to any questions                    you may have.

APPENDIX I                                                                           APPENDIX I

                            U.S. ASSISTANCE TO NONCOMMUNIST
                         RESISTANCEGROUPSIN CAMBODIA--1986-90

In December 1978, Vietnam invaded                      Cambodia, deposed the Khmer
Rouge government,              and installed       the government of the People's
Republic        of Kampuchea (PRK).              The Khmer Rouge began military
resistance          against     the PRK and the Vietnamese              army     in Cambodia, and
in 1982 the two non-communist                    Cambodian resistance            (NCR) forces--
the Khmer People's              National    Liberation         Front   (KPNLF) and Prince
Sihanouk's          FUNCINPEC/ANSl--joined             them in this        effort.

All     three      entities     have armed forces         which operate          in Cambodia from
locations          along the Thai-Cambodia             border.      The United       States
supports        the two non-communist             resistance      forces      with   non-lethal
assistance.            The United     States'      support,      according       to the
Department          of State,     is political         and symbolic        in nature,     and
intended        to support       the agenda of the Association                 of Southeast
Asian Nations            (ASEAN) in bringing           an end to the conflict.                The
State     Department          hoped that    the assistance          would help sustain              the
non-communist           resistance     groups      as viable      independent        forces,        and
by so doing,           enhance their       political      stature      as alternatives          to the
Khmer Rouge and the PRK.

lFUNCINPEC is the acronym for the French name of the resistance
faction supporting Prince Sihanouk.     FUNCINPEC is the political                                    arm
and the ANS is the military  component.

    APPENDIX I                                                                                                   APPENDIX I

    U.S. assistance                to noncommunist resistance                              groups is composed of
    two programs --the                Solarz          Program authorized                    by the Congress in                1985

    and the McCollum Program,                          which began in               1987.

    The Solarz         Proqram
    The Solarz         Program was authorized                           by the International                      Security        and
    Development Cooperation                         Act of       1985       for    the purpose of assisting
    NCR forces.              Legislation              expressly           prohibits          program funds from
    being used "with                 the effect           of promoting,               sustaining,                or
    augmenting,            directly          or indirectly,                 the capacity                of the Khmer Rouge
    or any of its             members to conduct military                             or paramilitary
    operations."              The Department                   of State          determined             that     assistance
    under the Solarz                 Program would               be     non-lethal           and humanitarian                in
    nature-and         would         be    provided            to the military               arms of the two NCR
    forces.         State         Department           documents indicate                    that        it     was not
    intended        that      this        assistance            would significantly                      improve the NCR
    forces'       military           capabilities,               but      rather      it     was to complement
    assistance         received            from other            sources.           The State                 Department     hoped
    that      the military            forces          would perform               well enough on the
    battlefield            that      their         political           stature      would          be    enhanced during
    negotiations             to end the war.                    Beyond this,               there        were no measurable
    program goals             stated         for      the program.

APPENDIX I                                                                                     APPENDIX I

The State             Department          delegated       program implementation
responsibility                 to AID which in turn                reached agreement with                the
Royal Thai Government to deliver                               the assistance         to the NCR.             For
the first             2 years,      the Thai Government was responsible                         for     all
aspects         of delivering              Solarz     funded assistance             to the NCR,
including             procuring      materials         and supplies           and providing           training,
transportation,                 and administrative                services.        The Thai Government
received             a cash transfer          from AID to pay for                 these activities,             and
AID's         role      was to monitor          the Thai government's                 implementation            of
the program.                This    continued         until       the AID Inspector           General
reported             serious     diversions         and    abuses      of program funds and
commodi        t ies,      and AID took         control        of the program in J'uly                1988.         The
details         of these diversions                 remain classified.

From fiscal             years      1986     through       1990,     AID has obligated           about $20
million         in assistance              under the Solarz            Program.        Forty-five         percent
was     for     material         support,       including          medicines       and medical         supplies
as well         as non-medical              items such as trucks               and other       equipment.
Approximately               25 percent        has been for            training,      mainly     in the
medical,          vocational,             and community development                 areas.      The
remainder             has paid      for     administrative           and other       support     costs.             The
program has financed                      the operation           of field     hospitals,       clinics,            and

      ---mm,                                                                                           APPENDIX I

mobile        training          teams         in Thailand        and Cambodia and the training                          of
NCR forces            personnel           as field         medics,       surgical       assistants,           and
laboratory            assistants.

With increased                 NCR military            successes         inside      Cambodia, more of the
U.S. equipment                 and supplies            have been used in-country                       for   military
purposes            and for      civic        action       aimed at gaining             popular         support.
Funds and equipment                     for     transportation             infrastructure              to help
distribute            medical       and civic           action         teams and services               inside
Cambodia have been recently                            added to the program.                    Items such as
clothing,            fishing       nets,       and school         supplies          are being distributed
for     to civilians             living         in the NCR-controlled                  areas to win support
for     the resistance.                   Transportation               support,      in the form of road
improvements,               vehicles,          and transport             services,          is intended          to help
move     medical         supplies           and civic        action       items      into      areas in Cambodia
where the NCR troops                      and civilians           are located.                During     our review
in Thailand,             AID was in the process                        of awarding          a $310,000        contract
to a Thai firm                 to build        a 25-kilometer             road from Thailand                 into
Cambodia for NCR use.

AID has recently                 begun refocusing                its     training       to include           NCR
political           party       civilians         as well        as military          members.           They are
giveh       basic      instruction              in civil      government            affairs      to prepare         them
to take an active                 role        in managing territory                  that      comes under NCR
APPENDIX I                                                                                 APPENDIX I

control.        While the program originally                    focused on assisting                  the
military       forces      only,     AID is now training            residents           of the
Cambodian displaced                persons      camps in Thailand           in areas such as
public       administration,           psychological         operations,           and other        public
relations           techniques.

Military-Oriented            Youth Camp
In November 1989, AID began funding                         a Military          Oriented       Youth
Program for           the Sihanoukian           National     Army in Cambodia.                 Funds were
requested       to provide          room and board for           more than 250 young boys
between the ages of 12 and 16, who, according                               to AID officials,
had attached           themselves       to the ANS but were too young to be
accepted       as military          recruits.        Many were orphans who were too old
for    the    orphan facilities              at the displaced        persons          camps in
Thailand       and some were children                of ANS soldiers.               The program is
intended       to care for          these young boys in a secure environment                                and
relieve       the ANS of the financial                  and psychological            burden of caring
for    them, and also             to allow      the ANS to use its              funds    for    military

According       to the ANS request,               basic     educational          courses       would be
taught,      as well       as special         courses      in military          discipline,         first
aid,     military       parade,      and "basic         acts of combatants".                  AID
appgoved the program with                    the understanding           that     AID funds would
APPENDIX I                                                                              APPENDIX I

not be used for              training       related      to basic        acts of combatants;               I
however,          since     the program is carried               out in Cambodia, where U.S.
officials          are not permitted,            AID cannot assure itself                that    U.S.
funds are not being used for                     this       purpose.       Thus far,     $64,000      in
AID funds have been spent and an additional                                $100,000 has been

The McCollum Program
In 1987, under legislation                    known as the McCollum Amendment, DOD
surplus          equipment     and supplies            began to be provided            to the NCR.
According          to the State          Department,         the McCollum Program assistance
complements the Solarz                   Program and is intended               to advance the
resistance          goal of generating             political       support      among the Cambodian
people.           This program is administered                   by the AID Office         of Khmer
Affairs          in Bangkok, Thailand.

About       $1    million     in McCollum Program funds have been obligated
since       1987 to pay for             "in-country"         transportation,       storage       of
surplus          DOD items     in Thailand,            and AID administrative           costs.        These
funds have also been used to construct                            warehouse facilities            at the
border       area camps.

To obtain
      w            surplus     commodities,            AID and NCR officials           select
particular          items or types           of items        available      from a DOD excess
APPENDIX I                                                                                APPENDIX I

property          list.          DOD decides           which items will        be shipped    to the          NCR

based on AID's               stated        needs and requests            and the inventory          of
available           items.         According           to AID, of 11 shipments          delivered
through          fiscal      year        1989, 57 percent           of the items were medical
supplies,          34 percent             were equipment           items such as generators              and
pumps I and the remaining                         9 percent       were quartermaster      stores,
including          clothing,             mosquito       nets,     and canteens.       Data on the tnree
fiscal          year      1990    shipments         are not yet available.             Because DOD does
not maintain               value data on surplus                  equipment,   we were unable to
determine          the value             of the items shipped            to date.

Prior      to 1988, the Royal Thai Government managed both the Solarz
and McCollum Programs.                        The Thai Government's            responsibilities
included          procurement,             training,        and transportation         of goods to the
NCR.       It     also provided             medical       budget support       payments to the NCR
forces.           During         that     time,     AID'S       involvement    in managing the
programs was minimal,                      and detailed           budgets or receipts       to account
for      expenditures             were not required               by AID.

In 1988, AID assumed control                           of both programs.            At the present
time,      AID directly                 procures     most commodities          and pays the NCR
directly for hospital support.  The Thai Government's                                     involvement
in the Solarz Program has been reduced to $1.5 million                                      for     fiscal

            APPENDIX I                                                                                         APPENDIX I

            year 1990 to pay for                  some training             and logistical             support         for     the
            NCR. AID currently                  has direct          oversight          of about 85 percent                   of the
            Solarz       Program funding.

            Our review of the accountability                             and inventory             control      systems
            installed           by AID indicate            that     there      is now reasonable                assurance
            that     funds or commodities                  are reaching             the NCR. However, after
            funds or commodities                  are turned         over to the NCR, AID's                     ability         to
            monitor       end-use     becomes        more difficult,                  and depends on whether                    the
            goods or services             are used in Thailand                      or Cambodia.              Because AID
            officials           are not permitted             inside       Cambodia, AID cannot monitor
            end-use of commodities                  or services             that      cross the border:                however,
            while       the goods and services                    are in Thailand                AID has established
            procedures           to insure        that-U.S.         funds and supplies                are accounted                 for
            and used for           the purposes            intended.          For example, AID staff
            routinely           check NCR warehouses and require                           line     item budgets,
            monthly       financial       reports          and expenditure               receipts       for     cash
            transfers           used to support         NCR medical                facilities.          A     system      of
            requisition           and stock        control        procedures           have been initiated                   that
            have been reviewed               by    the AID Inspector                 General and are currently
            being improved to allow                  for      better       tracking         of the commodities.
            AID officials           monitor        the number of students,                        the training
            provided,           and the   use      of medical          support         funds.        AID also reviews
            rec:ipts        submitted      by      the health          care administrators,                    and visit

    APPENDIX--I                                                                                 APPENDIX I

    hospital         facilities       to monitor      the number of patients                    and extent             of
    activities.               However, in 1989, the ANS hospital                      was moved into
    Cambodia and this               has prevented        AID from making on-site                    visits        to
    this     facility.

    We     conducted our work in Washington,                     D.C.,     Thailand,           and Singapore
    where we reviewed               records     and interviewed           officials           from the
    Department           of State,     AID, the United          Nations,          political         and
    military         wings of the resistance              forces , governments of Thailand
    and other         Southeast       Asian nations,          and private          interest         groups and
    voluntary         organizations.            We observed          conditions        at the Cambodian
    displaced         persons       camps in Thailand.               To test      accountability             of
    items purchased               or supplied      under the two U.S. programs,                      we (1) did
    spot checks on inventory                  records,        (2) reviewed procedures                  for
    maintaining           accountability,          (3) observed          the receipt          and
    distribution           of program funded items to the NCR, and (4) reconciled
    program financial               statements     to bank account             statements,           petty        cash
    counts,         and receipts.        We performed          this     work at one AID warehouse
    and four         NCR warehouses in Thailand.                  Our review           was performed              from
    April      to    August       1990 in accordance          with     generally        accepted
    government           auditing     standards.