oversight

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD's Acquisition Efforts

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1997-04-09.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                          United States General Accounting Office

GAO                       Testimony
                          Before the Subcommittees on Military Research and
                          Development and Military Procurement, Committee on
                          National Security, House of Representatives


For Release on Delivery
Expected at
2:00 p.m., EST
                          UNMANNED AERIAL
Wednesday,
April 9, 1997             VEHICLES

                          DOD’s Acquisition Efforts
                          Statement of Louis J. Rodrigues, Director, Defense
                          Acquisitions Issues, National Security and International
                          Affairs Division




GAO/T-NSIAD-97-138
                    Mr. Chairmen and Members of the Subcommittees:

                    I am pleased to be here today to briefly discuss the Unmanned Aerial
                    Vehicle (UAV) acquisition efforts that the Department of Defense (DOD) has
                    undertaken over the past 15 years. My comments are based on our reviews
                    of a number of UAV programs, including Aquila, Pioneer, the Medium
                    Range UAV, Hunter, Outrider, and Global Hawk.1 After a short summary, I
                    would like to present you with a chronological discussion of the
                    descriptions and outcomes of some of these programs, and then provide
                    you with some key observations about DOD’s UAV acquisition efforts.


                    According to DOD, its objective in acquiring UAVs is to provide unmanned
Summary             systems that will complement its mix of manned and national
                    reconnaissance assets. However, its UAV acquisition efforts to date have
                    been disappointing. Since Aquila began in 1979, of eight UAV programs,
                    three have been terminated (Aquila, Hunter, Medium Range), three remain
                    in development (Outrider, Global Hawk, DarkStar), and one is now
                    transitioning to low rate production (Predator). Only one of the eight,
                    Pioneer, has been fielded as an operational system. We estimate DOD has
                    spent more than $2 billion for development and/or procurement on these
                    eight UAV programs over the past 18 years.


                    DOD’s first major post-Vietnam UAV acquisition efforts, Aquila, Pioneer, and
Outcomes of DOD’s   the Medium Range UAV, were managed by the services. The Congress has
UAV Acquisition     strongly supported DOD’s acquisition of UAVs and has sought to encourage
Efforts             cooperation among the military services. In 1987, the Congress
                    consolidated funding for UAVs in a single Defense Agencies account instead
                    of separate service accounts. This action led to the formation of DOD’s UAV
                    Joint Projects Office in 1988 to manage and control UAV programs as joint
                    efforts and prevent unnecessary duplication by the services.

                    The Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office within the Office of the
                    Secretary of Defense oversees the Joint Projects Office. Joint programs
                    undertaken that we have reviewed include Hunter, Outrider, Global Hawk,
                    Predator and DarkStar.


Aquila              The Army’s first major UAV acquisition effort was the Aquila program. This
                    program started in 1979 and was originally estimated to cost $123 million

                    1
                     A chronological list of our prior UAV reports appears at the end of this testimony.



                    Page 1                                                                          GAO/T-NSIAD-97-138
          for a 43-month development effort, followed by planned expenditures of
          $440 million for procurement of 780 air vehicles and associated equipment.
          By the time the Army abandoned the program in 1987 due to cost,
          schedule, and technical difficulties, Aquila had cost over $1 billion, and
          future procurement costs were expected to have been an additional
          $1.1 billion for 376 aircraft.

          The original mission for Aquila was to have been relatively
          straightforward: it was to be a small, propeller-driven aircraft (portable by
          four soldiers) that could provide ground commanders with real-time
          battlefield information about enemy forces located beyond the line of sight
          of ground observers. As development was nearing completion, it became
          evident that the requirement for the small aircraft size conflicted with the
          many avionics and payload-related items the Army wanted to put inside
          the UAV. Aquila was expected to fly by autopilot, carry sensors to locate
          and identify enemy point targets in day or night, use a laser to designate
          the targets for the Copperhead artillery projectile, provide conventional
          artillery adjustment, and survive against Soviet air defenses. Achieving the
          latter expectation required development of a jam-resistant, secure
          communications link, but using the secure link degraded the video quality,
          which interfered with the ability to do targeting. During operational testing
          in 1987, Aquila was only able to successfully meet mission requirements on
          7 of 105 flights.


Pioneer   After having been impressed by stories of Israeli successes with UAVs in
          the early 1980s, the Navy initiated an expedited procurement of UAV
          systems. These systems were to serve as spotters for naval gunfire support
          from its battleships, as well as provide a UAV capability for the Marine
          Corps. The resulting Pioneer, produced by a joint venture of an American
          and Israeli firms, skipped the traditional U.S. development phase of the
          acquisition process, and nine systems, each with eight air vehicles, were
          procured beginning in 1986 at an estimated cost of $87.7 million. Similar to
          Aquila, Pioneer was a small, propeller-driven aircraft.

          The Pioneer began to encounter unanticipated problems almost
          immediately. Recovery aboard ship and electromagnetic interference from
          other ship systems were serious problems that led to a significant number
          of crashes. The Pioneer system also suffered from numerous other
          shortcomings. Ultimately, the Navy undertook a $50 million research and
          development effort to bring the nine Pioneer systems up to a level it
          described as a “minimum essential capability.” Although Pioneer has never



          Page 2                                                     GAO/T-NSIAD-97-138
                   met objective requirements, the Navy and Marine Corps used the Pioneer
                   in Operation Desert Storm, and operations in Somalia and, most recently,
                   Bosnia. DOD plans to phase out Pioneer when the Outrider, which is now in
                   development becomes available.


Medium Range UAV   The Medium Range UAV began as a joint effort of the Navy and Air Force.
                   The Medium Range UAV was to augment the services’ manned penetrating
                   reconnaissance aircraft, such as the Air Force’s RF-4C. Like these manned
                   aircraft, the Medium Range UAV was to be powered by a jet engine and
                   penetrate enemy airspace at high subsonic speed, and not slowly loiter for
                   long periods over hostile territory like Aquila or Pioneer. The operational
                   concept called for the Medium Range UAV to precede strike aircraft deep
                   into hostile airspace (350 nautical miles) and relay back near-real-time
                   video that could be used by aircrews and mission planners to identify the
                   highest priority targets and help plan the safest and most effective ways to
                   strike them. The UAV would then return after the air strikes were
                   completed to conduct battle damage assessment.

                   The Medium Range UAV began as a multiservice, cooperative venture. The
                   Navy was to design and build the air vehicle. Air vehicle development
                   costs were estimated to be $387 million in 1993. The Air Force would
                   design and build the sensor payload with cameras, videotape recorder, and
                   communications data link to send back the imagery from the UAV. Payload
                   development was originally estimated to cost $164 million. Unfortunately,
                   the Air Force ran into major difficulties with the payload. Development
                   costs grew to an estimated $346 million, the payload program fell behind
                   schedule, and developmental tests on a surrogate manned aircraft were
                   not successful.

                   The Navy encountered design problems as well, and one test aircraft
                   crashed. Perhaps most significantly for the Medium Range UAV program,
                   the prototype payload ended up being too big to fit in the space the Navy
                   had allotted inside the aircraft. In June 1993, the Air Force terminated the
                   payload contract due to technical difficulties. The Medium Range UAV was
                   terminated in October 1993 by DOD for affordability reasons.


Hunter             The Joint Project Office’s first UAV acquisition effort was the Short Range
                   UAV, subsequently named the Hunter. The program was started in 1988. It
                   was originally estimated to cost about $1.2 billion for development and
                   procurement of 50 systems with 400 Hunter air vehicles and other



                   Page 3                                                     GAO/T-NSIAD-97-138
           associated equipment. However, by the end of the program in 1995, the
           cost was expected to be $2.1 billion for development and procurement of
           52 systems.

           The mission of the Hunter was to be day and night reconnaissance,
           intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition for Corps Commanders. It
           was to be deployed to Army divisions and corps, as well as naval task
           forces, and operate at a range of 200 kilometers. Because of line-of-sight
           limits, the system’s range and ability to see over terrain were dependent on
           the use of a second Hunter air vehicle operating at a closer range to relay
           imagery from the first air vehicle to the task force or ground commander.

           During Limited User Testing in 1992, Hunter’s demonstrated problems
           included the inability to reliably transmit video imagery during relay
           operations, meet Army time standards for artillery adjustments, and meet
           standards for reliability. The Hunter system, with all its associated parts
           and support vehicles, was also far too large to fit in the number of airlift
           aircraft specified for moving one system. Nevertheless, DOD awarded a
           $171 million low-rate initial production (LRIP) contract for seven Hunter
           systems in early 1993. Subsequent logistics demonstrations in 1993
           revealed that the system could not be supported in the field.

           The Hunter contractor began delivering the seven LRIP systems in May
           1994. Government acceptance testing of these systems revealed new
           deficiencies with the system’s software, data link and engines. Several
           crashes occurring in short order led to the system being grounded for
           months. DOD terminated the program in January 1996 by allowing the
           contract to expire.


Outrider   In the wake of the Hunter termination, DOD awarded a $57-million contract
           in 1996 for six Outrider Tactical UAV systems. DOD will evaluate the military
           utility of the Outrider through multiservice demonstrations. The
           demonstrations will determine if Outrider can fulfill the role for which it
           was originally designed—reconnaissance and surveillance within
           50 kilometers—as well as cover the 200-kilometer range that was the
           Hunter objective. Outrider systems are intended to be fielded with Army
           brigades and battalions, Navy task forces, and Marine Corps regiments and
           battalions. Between now and 2003, if the demonstrations are successful,
           DOD will spend $268.5 million on Outrider UAV and associated system
           development and $583.2 million for procurement of 60 Outrider systems
           with 240 aircraft.



           Page 4                                                     GAO/T-NSIAD-97-138
Predator      Predator UAV development was completed during a 30-month advanced
              concept technology demonstration (ACTD) that ended in June 1996.2 The
              demonstration process allowed DOD to procure Predator UAVs for testing
              while avoiding much of the paperwork and oversight of the traditional
              acquisition process. Predator is now beginning LRIP as a traditional
              acquisition program. Development and procurement costs are estimated at
              $579 million for 13 Predator systems with 80 air vehicles.

              Predator’s mission will be to support the Theater Commander and Joint
              Force Commander with long-range (500 nautical miles), long
              time-over-target (more than 20 hours), near-real-time imagery to satisfy
              reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition requirements. Going
              beyond the capabilities of the smaller UAVs being developed for ground and
              task force commanders (such as Outrider), the much larger Predator will
              be equipped with adverse weather payloads and satellite relay data links.
              Each Predator system will consist of four air vehicles, related ground
              support equipment, and a large complement of personnel. During the
              demonstration phase, Predator UAVs were deployed to Albania to support
              Bosnia operations in 1995 and two were lost, one to hostile fire and one
              reportedly to engine failure. After improvements, Predator was deployed
              to Hungary in 1996 to support NATO operations in Bosnia. Experience with
              Predator deployments showed that the system can be adversely affected
              by unfavorable weather conditions. The Air Force assumed operational
              control of the remaining Predator demonstration assets in October 1996.


Global Hawk   The Global Hawk UAV is in development as an advanced concept
              technology demonstration project. Unlike the small propeller-driven
              aircraft designed for “seeing over the next hill”, Global Hawk is a
              high-altitude endurance UAV. It is intended to reach altitudes of up to
              65,000 feet, have a radius of 3,000 nautical miles, remain over the target
              area for 24 hours, and have total endurance of greater than 40 hours.
              Global Hawk is expected to fly surveillance missions in which long range,
              extended endurance and long periods of time over the target area are
              paramount.

              The Global Hawk airframe is a conventional aircraft design, offering no
              special protection from enemy radar systems. As a result, DOD plans to
              procure Global Hawk UAVs along with another high-altitude endurance UAV,
              the DarkStar, that will be a “stealth” design. Global Hawks will be used in

              2
               As part of its acquisition reform efforts, DOD has authorized a number of ACTDs to try to streamline
              the acquisition process.



              Page 5                                                                         GAO/T-NSIAD-97-138
                     low-to-medium risk environments, while DarkStars will be used in
                     high-risk areas. The planned first flight of Global Hawk has been delayed
                     from February to late fall 1997.


DarkStar             As with Global Hawk, the DarkStar high-altitude endurance UAV is being
                     developed as part of an advanced concept technology demonstration
                     program. Unlike Global Hawk, DarkStar is to be optimized to penetrate
                     and operate in the presence of high-threat air defense systems in which
                     ensured coverage and survivability are more important than total
                     endurance. DarkStar is designed to have low-observable characteristics to
                     minimize the vehicle’s radar detectability and enhance survivability.

                     DarkStar is projected to fly at a high altitude (greater than 45,000 feet),
                     have a radius greater than 500 nautical miles and be able to remain over
                     the target area for 8 hours. The DarkStar program will utilize the same
                     manned common ground segment for launch and recovery, control, and
                     communications as Global Hawk. The planned first flight of DarkStar
                     occurred in March 1996; however, a second flight in April 1996 crashed.
                     The next flight is scheduled for September 1997.

                     Mr. Chairmen, with this overview of past and ongoing UAV efforts as a
                     backdrop, let me make several observations that decision-makers may
                     want to keep in mind when addressing proposals for further UAV
                     acquisition.


                     1. The more you ask a UAV to do, the harder it becomes to build. UAV
Observations About   system acquisitions need to be protected from what is known as
UAV Acquisition      “requirements creep.” Just because another capability could conceivably
                     be added to a UAV does not mean it should be added as a requirement. Any
                     proposed new requirement should be judged by its overall effect on the
                     acquisition program in terms of cost, schedule, and performance. DOD’s
                     experience with the Aquila UAV acquisition effort in particular showed that
                     a system that was intended to provide ground commanders with a simple
                     reconnaissance capability, that is, “to see over the next hill,” was at least
                     partly undermined by additional requirements, such as capability for
                     precision targeting.

                     2. UAV “availability” should not be construed as “capability.” Several UAV
                     acquisition efforts have reflected preconceived notions that, because the
                     technologies being inserted into a UAV system are considered mature, any



                     Page 6                                                      GAO/T-NSIAD-97-138
resulting systems composed of those technologies will be mature. This
notion is most visible when a UAV is proffered to DOD and the Congress as
being a “nondevelopmental item,” or being available “off-the-shelf.” A
number of our studies have shown that these UAVs cannot be assumed to
meet DOD or service requirements. The reality is that, after having been
subjected to the rigors of realistic operating environments and/or wartime
operating tempos, UAVs procured as nondevelopmental items often have to
be returned to the research and development cycle. Making them useful to
the military users can involve great unanticipated expenses.

3. When you buy a UAV, remember you are buying more than an unmanned
aircraft. The air vehicle is only the most visible portion of that system.
Besides air vehicles, a UAV system includes numerous other items, such as
computer processors and software, sensor payloads, data links, data
dissemination equipment, ground control stations, launch and recovery
equipment, and a logistics support network. Our reviews have shown that,
before production begins, DOD needs to ensure that adequate testing has
shown that the necessary parts have been proven to work successfully
together, and that the entire system will be affordable to operate and
maintain throughout its lifecycle.


Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions you may have. Appendix I provides additional
information on DOD’s major UAV acquisition efforts.




Page 7                                                   GAO/T-NSIAD-97-138
Appendix I




             Program started in 1979; ended in 1988.
Aquila
             Cost estimates (dollars in millions)
                                                    Original (1978)               Last (1987)
             Development                                      $123                      $868
             Procurement                                       440                      1,157
             Total                                            $563                     $2,025
             Number of aircraft                                780                       376

             Mission: To support brigade commanders fire support mission with laser
             target designation and artillery adjustment; to be survivable against Soviet
             air defenses; and be forward located.

             Design requirements: television/laser designator payload; lightweight,
             manportable air vehicle; low detectability; secure, jam-resistant data link;
             An Aquila system consisted of 13 air vehicles and related ground support
             equipment.

             During operational testing in 1986-87, Aquila successfully met its mission
             requirements on only 7 of 105 flights. Specific problems occurred in
             launch, targeting, survivability, reliability. Test criteria were not rigorous
             and contractors were found to have unduly influenced the scoring of test
             data.

             Observations on reasons for problems: A lightweight man-portable air
             vehicle suitable for location with front-line troops was inadequate for
             satisfying the extensive performance requirements.

             Congress withdrew support for the program and directed DOD to combine
             Aquila funding into an overall UAV line item.




             Page 8                                                       GAO/T-NSIAD-97-138
         Appendix I




         Program started in 1989; ended in 1996.
Hunter
         Cost estimates (dollars in millions)
                                          Development estimate   Last estimate
         Development                      $ 138.2                $ 189.2
         Procurement                      1093.4                 1893.7
         Military construction                                   15.8
         Total                            $1231.6                $2098.7
         Number of systems                50 with 400 aircraft   52 with 416 aircraft

         Mission: To provide corps and division level ground and maritime forces
         with near-real-time imagery intelligence within a 200 km direct radius of
         action, extensible to 300+ km using relay operations. Relay operations
         involve controlling one air vehicle, operating at long range, through a relay
         payload on another air vehicle operating at a closer range.

         Design requirements: Television, infra-red, and relay payloads; A single
         Hunter system consists of 8 air vehicles with sensors and related ground
         support equipment.

         During Limited User Testing in 1992, Hunter successfully completed only
         4 of 11 relay flights. Test results revealed (1) the system’s ability to
         transmit video imagery during relay operations was unacceptable for a
         fielded system, (2) the system may never meet Army time standards for
         artillery adjustments, and (3) the system was unreliable.

         DOD awarded a $171 million low-rate production contract for 7 Hunter
         systems in early 1993. Logistics Demonstrations in 1993 revealed that the
         system was not yet sustainable and did not have a support structure in
         place. Government acceptance testing of the low-rate production systems
         revealed new deficiencies with the systems software, datalink and engines.
         Observations on reasons for problems: DOD did not allow enough time to
         perform (1) system integration necessary to integrate non-developmental
         components of the system or (2) analyses necessary to develop a logistic
         support system. DOD terminated the program in January 1996 by allowing
         the contract to expire.




         Page 9                                                            GAO/T-NSIAD-97-138
           Appendix I




           The Outrider Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration began in
Outrider   May 1996. DOD plans for the Outrider ACTD to last 2 years and then
           transition to traditional acquisition if successful.


           Cost estimates (dollars in millions)


           Development                             $268.5
           Procurement                             583.2
           Total                                   $851.7
           Number of systems/air vehicles          60 systems/240 air vehicles

           Mission: To support tactical commanders with near-real time imagery
           intelligence at ranges beyond 200 km and on-station endurance greater
           than 4 hours.

           Design requirements: Television and infra-red payloads, Outrider air
           vehicle not to cost more than $350,000 for the 33rd air vehicle and sensor
           and $300,000 for 100th air vehicle and sensor; A single Outrider system
           consists of four air vehicles with sensors and related ground equipment.

           DOD plans to examine the military utility of the Outrider system in a series
           of operational demonstrations. If the operational demonstrations are
           successful, DOD plans to exercise a low-rate initial production contract
           option for up to 6 systems in third quarter fiscal year 1998.




           Page 10                                                      GAO/T-NSIAD-97-138
           Appendix I




           Predator completed a 30 month Advanced Concept Technology
Predator   Demonstration (ACTD) June 30,1996. Predator begins low-rate initial
           production and becomes a traditional acquisition program in fiscal 1997.


           Cost estimates (dollars in millions)


           Development                                           $ 209.9+
           Procurement                                           368.8
           Total                                                 $578.7+
           Number of systems/air vehicles                        13 systems/80 vehiclesa
           a
            Includes 3 vehicles lost—1 to hostile fire; 1 reportedly to engine failure; 1 production vehicle in
           flight testing.



           Mission: To support the in-theater Commander-in-Chief, National
           Command Authority, and Joint Force Commander with long-range
           (500 nautical miles), long time over target (more than 20 hours),
           near-real-time imagery intelligence necessary to satisfy reconnaissance,
           surveillance and target acquisition requirements

           Design requirements: Television, infra-red, and adverse weather payloads;
           line-of-sight and satellite relay data links; Each Predator System consists
           of four air vehicles and related ground support equipment including one
           Trojan Spirit II Dissemination System.

           As part of the ACTD, Predator was deployed to Albania to support U.S. and
           NATO Bosnia operations from July through November 1995. After
           improvements, including adding an adverse weather sensor, Predator was
           deployed to Hungary from March 1, 1996, to February 1997, to again
           support NATO operations in Bosnia.

           The Air Force assumed operational control of Predator assets on
           September 2, 1996.




           Page 11                                                                          GAO/T-NSIAD-97-138
              Appendix I




Global Hawk   Cost estimate (dollars in millions)


              Development (air vehicles)              $370.7
              Development (Common Ground              272.6
              Segment-shared with DarkStar)
              Total RDT&E                             $643.3
              Number of systems/air vehicles          3 Ground Segments/8 UAVs

              Mission: Global Hawk is intended to complement manned and national
              reconnaissance assets by providing continuous unmanned all-weather,
              wide-area high resolution imagery coverage in support of military
              operations. It is to operate in low to moderate risk threat environment
              after the suppression of enemy air defense and to optimized to support
              those surveillance missions in which long-range, extended endurance and
              long dwell over the target area are paramount.

              System description/characteristics: The Global Hawk is an Advanced
              Concept Technology Demonstration program. It is projected to be a fully
              integrated system consisting of the air vehicle, electro-optical/infrared and
              synthetic aperture radar sensors, communications, and the capability to
              disseminate collected imagery in near-real-time to tactical warfighters at
              various levels of command. It is to be interoperable with existing
              reconnaissance architectures for data collection processing, exploitation,
              and dissemination. Global Hawk is expected to operate at a moderate
              speed of 345 knots, a high altitude of up to 65,000 feet, have a radius of
              3,000 nautical miles and then be able to remain on station for 24 hours,
              and endurance of greater than 40 hours. The system also includes a
              manned Common Ground Segment to be located at a forward operating
              base that will provide launch and recovery, mission control, ground
              communications, and is also to be common to and interoperable with the
              stealthy DarkStar high altitude endurance UAV.

              The planned first flight of Global Hawk has been delayed from February to
              late fall 1997.




              Page 12                                                    GAO/T-NSIAD-97-138
           Appendix I




DarkStar   Cost estimates (dollars in millions)


           Development (air vehicles)                      $326.9
           Development (Common Ground Segment)             (Shown with Global Hawk)
           Total RDT&E                                     326.9
           Number of systems/air vehicles                  6 UAVsa
           a
           DarkStar will utilize Common Ground Segments with Global Hawk.



           Mission: DarkStar is intended to complement manned and national
           reconnaissance assets by providing unmanned long dwell, all-weather,
           wide-area high resolution imagery coverage in support of military
           operations in heavily defended areas. Unlike Global Hawk, it is to be
           optimized to penetrate and operate in the presence of high threat air
           defense systems where assured coverage and survivability are more
           important than total endurance.

           System description/characteristics: The DarkStar is an Advanced Concept
           Technology Demonstration program. It is projected to be a fully integrated
           system consisting of the air vehicle, electro-optical and synthetic aperture
           radar sensors, as well as the associated command, control, and sensor
           data links to disseminate collected imagery in near-real-time to tactical
           warfighters at various levels of command. It is to be interoperable with
           existing reconnaissance architectures for data collection processing,
           exploitation, and dissemination. DarkStar is designed to have
           low-observable characteristics to minimize the vehicles radar detectability
           and enhance survivability. It is expected to operate at a speed of greater
           than 250 knots, a high altitude greater than 45,000 feet, have a radius
           greater than 500 nautical miles and then be able to remain on station for
           8 hours, and mission endurance greater than 8 hours. The DarkStar
           program also includes the manned Common Ground Segment that will be
           located at a forward operating base to provide launch and recovery,
           mission control, ground communications, and is also to be common to and
           interoperable with the conventional Global Hawk high altitude endurance
           UAV.


           The planned first flight of DarkStar occurred in March 1996; however, a
           second flight in April 1996 crashed due to incorrect aerodynamic modeling
           of the vehicles flight control laws. The flight control laws have been
           redesigned and the next flight is scheduled for October 1997.




           Page 13                                                             GAO/T-NSIAD-97-138
Page 14   GAO/T-NSIAD-97-138
Page 15   GAO/T-NSIAD-97-138
Related GAO Products


              Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Hunter System Is Not Appropriate for Navy
              Fleet Use (GAO/NSIAD-96-2, Dec. 1, 1995).

              Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Maneuver System Schedule Includes
              Unnecessary Risk (GAO/NSIAD-95-161, Sept. 15, 1995).

              Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: No More Hunter Systems Should Be Bought
              Until Problems are Fixed (GAO/NSIAD-95-52, Mar. 1, 1995).

              Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Performance of Short-Range System in
              Question (GAO/NSIAD-94-65, Dec. 15, 1993).

              Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: More Testing Needed Before Production of
              Short-Range System (GAO/NSIAD-92-311, Sept. 4, 1992).

              Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Medium-Range System Components Do Not Fit
              (GAO/NSIAD-91-2, Mar. 25, 1991).

              Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Realistic Testing Needed Before Production of
              Short-Range System (GAO/NSIAD-90-234, Sept. 28, 1990).

              Unmanned Vehicles: Assessment of DOD’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Master
              Plan (GAO/NSIAD-89-41BR, Dec. 9, 1988).

              Aquila Remotely Piloted Vehicle: Its Potential Battlefield Contribution Still
              in Doubt (GAO/NSIAD-88-19, Oct. 26, 1987).

              Aquila Remotely Piloted Vehicle: Recent Developments and Alternatives
              (GAO/NSIAD-86-41BR).

              The Army’s RPV Shows Good Potential, but Faces a Lengthy Development
              Program (GAO/C-MASAD-82-8, Feb. 26, 1982).




(707256)      Page 16                                                    GAO/T-NSIAD-97-138
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