United States General Accounting Office
GAO Testimony
Before the Committee on International Relations,
House of Representatives
For Release on Delivery
Expected at
10:00 a.m., EDT
U.N. PEACEKEEPING
Wednesday,
April 9, 1997
Issues Related to
Effectiveness, Cost, and
Reform
Statement of Harold J. Johnson, Associate Director,
International Relations and Trade Issues,
National Security and International Affairs Division
GAO/T-NSIAD-97-139
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the results of the body of work we
have completed on issues concerning the effectiveness and cost of U.N.
peacekeeping.1 Specifically, my statement will address four key issues:
(1) the U.N.’s limitations in conducting peace operations that require the
use of force, (2) long-standing peacekeeping missions that are from 6 to
nearly 50 years old, (3) the extent to which the United States has provided
voluntary support to U.N.-sanctioned peace operations, and (4) the U.N.’s
efforts to reform the management of peacekeeping operations.
Mr. Chairman, before elaborating on these issues let me summarize my
remarks.
Summary
Limits on Success of U.N. Over the years, the United Nations has had some degree of success in
Peace Operations carrying out peacekeeping missions where the use of force was not
Requiring the Use of Force required. Examples of this might include the U.N. Transition Assistance
Group in Namibia and the U.N. Observer Group in Central America.
However, as the Cold War came to a close and the United Nations was
called on to lead large complex missions that required the use of force to
restore peace and security, the United Nations was demonstrably less
successful. There are clearly many reasons for this, including the failure to
commit sufficient resources, the lack of sufficient will on the part of the
international community, an inadequate operational structure for carrying
out such missions, and the differences in the geopolitical situations that
affect the execution of each mission.
Nonetheless, our analysis of seven operations that called for the use of
force—either directly by citing Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter or implied
by the wording of their mandates2—led us to the conclusion that the
reasons for a lack of success were deeper than the conventional wisdom.
We concluded that the organizational limits of the United Nations put at
risk the success of such missions. Specifically, unlike a sovereign nation,
the United Nations (1) cannot conscript troops and resources when
1
A list of GAO products on peace operations is attached to this statement.
2
These include the U.N. peace operations in the Congo, Lebanon, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, and
Eastern Slavonia.
Page 1 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-139
necessary but must rely on sovereign members to voluntarily provide them
and (2) has no assurance that national troop contingents will carry out
orders issued by a U.N. force commander. The United Nations also seeks
the consent of the warring parties to carry out its mandate, even when
force is authorized. These organizational limits were particularly apparent
in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda.
Because of these limitations, we concluded that the United Nations may
not be an appropriate vehicle to lead missions where force is required to
restore peace, unless a nation or coalition with sufficient military
capability and commitment leads the operation. The U.N.’s limits in
leading operations requiring the use of force have become increasingly
accepted by experts on peacekeeping and by U.N. officials. This lesson is
also reflected in U.S. policy and recent actions by the United States and
the U.N. Security Council in ensuring acceptable leadership and support
for the operations in Haiti and Eastern Slavonia.
Status of Long-Standing In recognition of the limited success of operations such as those that
Peacekeeping Missions required the use of force and the inability to bring closure to several
long-standing missions, U.S. and U.N. policy has become more focused.
There is now general agreement that the main objective of peacekeeping is
to reduce tensions and provide a limited period of time for diplomatic
efforts to find a solution to the underlying conflicts. Thus, peacekeeping
missions are not to be open-ended commitments, and U.S. policy tries to
ensure their effectiveness by seeing that they deploy in support of
peacemaking efforts; have clear, realistic objectives; and have end points
and exit strategies. These guidelines were articulated in a May 1994 public
summary of Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), the
administration’s policy on peace operations. To further ensure
peacekeeping’s value, PDD-25 also directed U.S. officials to consider
vetoing the renewal of long-standing missions that are not achieving their
mandates.
Despite the success of U.N. peacekeeping over the last 50 years, some
situations have proven to be intractable, and the peacekeeping missions
have evolved into open-ended commitments. At your request, we analyzed
the eight U.N. operations that are from 6 to nearly 50 years old—including
the peace operations in India and Pakistan, Cyprus, Angola, Iraq and
Kuwait, the Western Sahara, and three in the Middle East. We focused
specifically on whether these older missions are fulfilling their mandates
and, if not, why the executive branch continues to support them. We found
Page 2 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-139
that three missions—the ones in Lebanon and the Western Sahara and the
one between India and Pakistan—essentially were not achieving their
mandates, and, according to U.N. reports, had contributed marginally to
more secure and stable environments. Three others—including the U.N.
Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East and the missions in
Angola and Cyprus—were only partially achieving their mandates but had
made some positive contributions to stability. The missions in the Golan
Heights and between Iraq and Kuwait were successfully carrying out their
mandates and contributing to stability in their areas of operation. More
importantly however, six of the missions were not linked to settlement
agreements, as called for by U.S. policy, and diplomatic efforts to resolve
the conflicts had stalled or were stalemated. None had clear end points or
exit strategies.
Although these eight missions have become, in essence, open-ended
commitments, U.S. officials support continuing all of them because in their
view the missions help stabilize and prevent the recurrence of conflicts in
areas vital to U.S. interests. We have recommended that the United States
take the lead in working with other members of the Security Council to
identify specific exit criteria and strategies for these missions. This should
be done in a manner consistent with PDD-25, balancing the need to bring
closure to some of these operations with other U.S. interests such as
stabilizing conflicts that pose a threat to U.S. foreign policy objectives.
U.S. Voluntary or Indirect In addition to paying assessed contributions for U.N. peacekeeping
Support operations—currently at a rate of 25 percent of the cost of the
operation—the United States often provides additional support to
U.N.-sanctioned missions for which it is not reimbursed. In March 1996,
we reported that for fiscal years 1992 through 1995, the United States paid
$1.3 billion in assessed contributions for the missions in Haiti, the former
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Somalia. But in addition, the United States
undertook actions in support of these U.N. operations that cost
$5.3 billion. This includes about $3.4 billion in incremental costs incurred
by the Department of Defense (DOD) and $1.9 billion incurred for
humanitarian and other assistance by other U.S. agencies.
For example, in Haiti, the United States spent an additional $953 million to
remove the military dictatorship from Haiti, provide training and
equipment to countries to help prepare them for participating in the
subsequent U.N. operation, and establish civic order so the U.N. mission
could function. Similarly, since the humanitarian crisis was overwhelming
Page 3 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-139
peacekeeping efforts in Rwanda, U.S. agencies spent an additional
$463 million to provide emergency food, water, and sanitation for the
war-affected population, as well as send 2,000 troops to the region in
support of humanitarian actions. And in the former Yugoslavia, DOD
incurred about $784 million in incremental costs for humanitarian
airdrops, airlift of relief supplies into Sarajevo, and for enforcing the no-fly
zone.
U.N. Peacekeeping Reform Finally, let me comment on management reforms the United Nations has
Efforts undertaken to improve the operational effectiveness and efficiency of its
peacekeeping missions. In 1992 and 1993, we reported that the United
Nations was ill-equipped to plan, logistically support, or deploy personnel
to large, complex missions such as in Cambodia and Somalia. The
Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York had a very small
staff, planning was not integrated, the organizational structure obstructed
efficient operations, and field communications with headquarters was
difficult and sometimes impossible. Since then, the United Nations, with
U.S. and other member support, has made progress in strengthening
operations. It has reorganized and expanded the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations; established a 24-hour situation center; revised
its procurement, contracting, and logistics procedures; and established a
logistical support base in Brindisi, Italy. While we have not specifically
evaluated the effectiveness of these reforms, we have observed
improvements in planning and implementing peacekeeping efforts as we
looked at the missions in Haiti and Eastern Slavonia.
While steps to improve management have been made, as one would
expect, peacekeeping operations are not without problems. Reports by the
U.N.’s Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS)—created in 1994 at the
urging of the United States as an important reform measure—have
continued to identify problems with U.N. peacekeeping operations. For
example, it recently reported that due to poor planning, almost 900
generators costing $6 million were purchased for operations in the former
Yugoslavia but were unneeded and not used; bids for supplying fresh food
rations to another mission were manipulated to favor one bidder; lack of
internal controls caused fraudulent claims to be paid on vehicle spare
parts and repairs; and staff members falsely claimed they were in Haiti and
received related benefits to which they were not entitled. I should mention
that, at the request of Senators Helms and Grams, we are now reviewing
how well OIOS is functioning, including whether it is operationally
Page 4 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-139
independent, has adequate staffing, and is otherwise equipped to carry out
its mandate.
Over the past 50 years, the United Nations has led peacekeeping missions
Limits on Success of with some degree of success; however, as we reported in March 1997, it
U.N. Peace has not effectively led operations calling for the use of force.3 This
Operations includes both missions authorized to use force under Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter and those missions whose mandates call for forceful action
but do not explicitly authorize it. In part, it is the limits of the U.N.
organization that put at risk the success of such operations. These limits
stem from the United Nations being an organization based on a
fundamental respect for the sovereignty of its members. Unlike sovereign
nations, the United Nations (1) cannot conscript troops and raise other
resources that may be necessary to effectively conduct operations
requiring the use of force; and (2) has no assurance that national
contingents under its command will carry out orders issued by a U.N.
commander. The United Nations also seeks the consent of warring parties
to carry out its mandate, even when force is authorized under Chapter VII
of the Charter. These limitations have been overcome when a nation with
sufficient military prestige and credibility and the commitment of
resources has assumed leadership of the operation.
Several examples help illustrate these points. Of the 42 peace operations
led by the United Nations since 1945, the operations in Bosnia (1992-95),
Somalia (1992-95), and Eastern Slavonia (1996 and ongoing) were
explicitly authorized to use force under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.4
Four other operations—Lebanon (1978 and ongoing), the Congo (1960-64),
Rwanda (1993-96), and the second phase of the Haiti mission
(1995-96)—were not so authorized but had mandates calling for forceful
action. Of these operations, the ones in which the United Nations had full
leadership were hampered by the limitations previously mentioned. For
example, despite Security Council calls for action, the United Nations
could not obtain adequate troops, equipment, and reinforcements to
effectively carry out the operations in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Somalia. For
Bosnia, 34,000 additional troops were requested to deter attacks on “safe
areas,” but only 7,600 were made available.
3
United Nations: Limitations in Leading Missions Requiring Force to Restore Peace (GAO/NSIAD-97-34,
Mar. 27, 1997).
4
The U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission was authorized under Chapter VII to redress small-scale
violations of the demilitarized zone, but is not used as an example here because of the limited scope of
the authority to use force.
Page 5 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-139
Limits on U.N. command and control hindered U.N. commanders from
effectively deploying U.N. peacekeepers to mission-critical locations in
Somalia, Bosnia, and the Congo. National contingents frequently sought
instructions from their capitals before redeploying troops, and in some
cases they refused to redeploy. Finally, the U.N.’s will to use force in
Somalia, Bosnia, and the Congo was uncertain at key points and caused
U.N. forces to lose credibility among the warring factions. The U.N.
operations continued to rely on the consent of the warring parties to
conduct operations. In Bosnia, U.N. officials were reluctant to use
airpower to deter attacks against safe areas, in part because of threats of
retaliation, but also because they feared such action would make it appear
that they were taking sides in an internal fight. Moreover, the U.N.
operation in Bosnia acceded to roadblocks, sought clearance from the
warring factions before moving its vehicles, and allowed the warring
factions to influence the deployment of troop contingents. These actions
partly reflect the U.N.’s fundamental organizational principle of ensuring
that the sovereignty of its members is respected at all times.
In contrast, the operation in Eastern Slavonia and the second phase of the
Haiti mission have been operationally effective, partly because of
leadership by sovereign nations with credibility and respect. The United
States provided leadership for the second phase of the operation in Haiti
and ensured that adequate troops and resources were available to carry
out assigned tasks, used its command and control structure for the
operation, and applied its doctrine for operations other than war to help
guide actions. Military leadership for the operation in Eastern Slavonia is
provided by a Belgian major general, who uses Belgian officers to provide
headquarters command and control. This operation also has the
commitment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to provide
close air support and other help.
Partly in response to peacekeeping operations that were less than fully
successful, the executive branch developed PDD-25, its policy on peace
operations. According to PDD-25, peacekeeping is a tool intended to
provide a finite window of opportunity for combatants to resolve their
differences through diplomatic means. The policy also lays out factors to
be considered both in approving new missions and voting to continue
ongoing ones. These factors include whether U.N. involvement advances
U.S. interests; whether there is a threat to international peace and security;
and whether the missions have clear objectives, international support,
realistic exit criteria, and end points. The application of this policy was
cogently expressed in 1996 by the U.S. Permanent Representative to the
Page 6 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-139
United Nations. She said that the international community simply cannot
afford to maintain operations where the disputants’ commitment to
overcoming obstacles is in question, where there is no discernable
progress toward resolution, and where no end is in sight. The policy also
directs executive branch officials to rigorously scrutinize all missions and
consider voting against the renewal of long-standing ones not
accomplishing their objectives.
Currently there are eight long-standing peacekeeping missions that range
Status of from 6 to nearly 50 years. These are discussed in some detail in our report
Long-Standing being released today.5 These long-standing missions account for over 40
Peacekeeping percent of the current U.N. assessments for peacekeeping and, as of
March 1997, cumulatively cost over $6.1 billion. Of these eight operations,
Missions two—the ones in the Golan Heights and on the Iraq-Kuwait border—have
generally carried out their mandates and helped maintain stability in their
areas of operation. Three other operations—the ones in Angola, Cyprus,
and the Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East—have partially
fulfilled their mandates and made some positive contributions to stability.
The remaining three operations—Lebanon, Western Sahara, and on the
India-Pakistan border—have generally not carried out their mandates and,
according to U.N. reports, have contributed only marginally to establishing
more secure and stable environments. For example, while the operation in
Lebanon does provide humanitarian relief and some security for the local
population, the U.N. Secretary General has reported for the past several
years that the operation’s mandate issued in 1978 remains unfulfilled. One
of the operation’s mandate objectives was to help restore Lebanese
sovereignty and prevent its area of operation from being used for hostile
activity of any kind. However, the United Nations has taken the position
that it has no right to stop Lebanese forces, including Hizbollah, from
resisting Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon.
Seven of the eight long-standing operations were originally deployed to
support diplomatic efforts to achieve lasting settlements of the conflicts.
However, as of February 1997, talks associated with the conflicts in
Cyprus, Western Sahara, Syria, Lebanon, the Middle East, and Kashmir had
stalled or stalemated. I should note that in Angola, progress on the Lusaka
agreement has stalled; whereas in the case of India and Pakistan, there has
been some preliminary movement on arranging discussions. U.N. and U.S.
5
U.N. Peacekeeping: Status of Long-standing Operations and U.S. Interests in Supporting Them
(GAO/NSIAD-97-59, Apr. 9, 1997).
Page 7 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-139
officials and area experts attribute the inability to reach settlements after
so many years to a variety of factors including the deeply rooted nature of
the conflicts and the lack of commitment of the warring parties to resolve
differences peacefully. They also point out that the long-standing
operations may be a part of the problem by promoting a status quo that
seems more preferable than making compromises to achieve settlements.
The eight long-standing operations have become costly and open-ended
commitments. Although seven of these operations were undertaken to
create stable, secure environments to assist diplomatic efforts aimed at
settling these underlying conflicts, diplomatic efforts to resolve the
underlying conflicts had, in most cases, stalled. Nevertheless, U.S. officials
currently see no reasonable alternative to continuing these operations
because they help stabilize conflicts that could threaten U.S. security
interests. In their view, ending these operations would risk renewed
conflict and damage future peacemaking efforts. However, continued
support of these operations does not appear to give adequate
consideration to other factors articulated by U.S. policy that seeks to
ensure that peacekeeping operations are limited in duration, linked to
concrete political solutions, and have exit criteria and identified end
points for U.N. involvement.
In light of U.S. interests in supporting well-defined peacekeeping
operations linked to concrete political solutions, our report recommended
that the United States take the lead in working with other U.N. Security
Council members to identify specific exit criteria and strategies for these
operations. We suggested that this should be done in a manner consistent
with PDD-25, balancing the need to bring closure to these operations with
other U.S. interests such as stabilizing conflicts that pose a threat to U.S.
foreign policy objectives. We noted that these strategies need not propose
immediate ends to these operations but, rather, may focus on how and
when the desired end states can be achieved, what intermediate and final
objectives are sought, and what specific role these operations play in
achieving the sought-after end states.
The United States paid $1.95 billion for U.N.-assessed contributions for
U.S. Support of U.N. U.N. peacekeeping for fiscal years 1994 through 1996, but according to the
Peace Operations State Department’s budget request, the United States still owes about
$658 million for peacekeeping arrears. Approximately $533 million of the
U.S. arrearage is owed for assessments to the mission in the former
Yugoslavia.
Page 8 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-139
In addition to paying for the assessments for U.N. peacekeeping missions,
the United States often provides voluntary support for the operations. As
noted in table 1, during fiscal years 1992 through 1995, the U.S. costs for
supporting U.N.-sanctioned peace operations in Haiti, the former
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Somalia was about $6.6 billion. This includes
about $1.34 billion in assessments, and an additional $5.26 billion for other
support. For example, in addition to making payments of $786 million in
assessments for the operation in the former Yugoslavia for these years.,
DOD incurred incremental costs of $784 million when it helped enforce
the no-fly zone over Bosnia with other NATO members, provided close air
support for U.N. peacekeepers, launched air strikes against parties that
attacked safe areas, flew humanitarian airdrops with meals-ready-to-eat
and other necessities for besieged enclaves, and operated a hospital in
Croatia for U.N. peacekeepers.
Table 1: U.S. Costs in Support of
Selected U.N. Peace Operations, Fiscal Dollars in millions
Years 1992-95 Fiscal years
Country 1992 1993 1994 1995 1992-95
Haiti Total $79.7 $130.4 $530.8 $875.8 $1,616.7
(U.S. assessment) (0) (0) (0.5) (51.9) (52.4)
Former Yugoslavia
Total 126.7 408.7 959.0 692.5 2,186.9
(U.S. assessment) (76.4) (70.1) (459.7) (179.8) (786.0)
Rwanda Total 22.1 24.8 261.4 265.4 573.7
(U.S. assessment) (0) (0) (34.0) (75.5) (109.5)
Somalia Total 92.9 1,124.8 913.3 92.1 2,223.1
(U.S. assessment) (0) (40.9) (330.9) (16.9) (388.7)
Total $321.4 $1,688.7 $2,664.5 $1,925.8 $6,600.4
(U.S. assessment) (76.4) (111) (825.1) (324.1) (1,336.6)
Note: As of August 1995, the United Nations had reimbursed the United States $79.4 million for its
participation in these operations.
Other U.S. agencies also provide voluntary support for peacekeeping
operations. Like DOD’s support, most of this assistance is not contributed
directly to the peace operations but helps create environments in which
operations can take place. For example, in fiscal years 1992 through 1995,
the U.S. Agency for International Development spent over $480 million for
activities in Haiti such as training the Haitian police force in conducting
criminal investigations, funding the human rights monitoring mission, and
providing food and health services for the population. In fiscal years 1994
and 1995, the Departments of Justice, Commerce, the Treasury,
Page 9 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-139
Transportation, and Health and Human Services provided over $55 million
for programs to help train Haitian judges, strengthen the criminal justice
system, and help with migration emergencies and refugee processing. In
Somalia, the U.S. Agency for International Development spent $239 million
from fiscal years 1992 through 1995 for activities including food
distribution, water and sanitation, mine clearing, and efforts to establish a
police and judicial system.
Over the years, the United Nations has come under increasing criticism for
U.N. Peacekeeping its inefficient management of peacekeeping missions. However, by the
Management Reform early 1990s when the United Nations was called upon to undertake several
Efforts large, complex missions such as Cambodia, Somalia, and the former
Yugoslavia almost simultaneously, the U.N.’s management deficiencies
were magnified. In 1992 and 1993 we reported that the United Nations was
poorly equipped to efficiently and effectively manage large complex
missions. For example, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations
lacked sufficient staff to plan and implement missions and, moreover, had
to rely on other organizations within the United Nations to prepare
budgets, procure equipment and supplies, and provide logistical support.
For both the Cambodia and Somalia missions, these weaknesses were
reflected in (1) the lack of detailed operational plans prior to deployment,
(2) fragmented military and civilian plans, (3) limited and erroneous
information, and (4) poor communications between headquarters and the
field.
In response to such problems, the United Nations, with the help of
member states, has taken steps to improve its capacity to plan, deploy, and
support missions. Key reform efforts have been to restructure the U.N.
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which is responsible for the
planning and day-to-day conduct of missions; upgrade logistics support for
missions; and improve procurement practices. We have not specifically
evaluated the effectiveness of these reforms but believe they are steps in
the right direction. One indication of the reforms’ impact is the Eastern
Slavonia operation, where the Security Council ensured that a NATO
member provided the military leadership and the mission’s command and
control and where the deployment of 5,000 peacekeepers took place on
schedule and without direct assistance from the United States.
Despite these positive signs, OIOS has reported some continuing
weaknesses in managing operations. Three efforts—(1) the restructuring
and strengthening of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations; (2) the
Page 10 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-139
creation of a logistics center at Brindisi, Italy; and (3) steps to improve
procurement practices—help illustrate reform steps taken and the
continuing weaknesses.
Restructuring the The Department of Peacekeeping Operations was restructured over the
Department of past few years to include the field administration and logistics division.
Peacekeeping Operations Previously, the field logistics division was in a different department,
causing delays in mission planning and support and disagreements on
priorities. Several units were also added to the department to support
peacekeeping actions to hold elections, mount international civilian police
actions, and effectively use information in peacekeeping missions. To
ensure adequate staffing for these functions, the department’s personnel
was increased from 60 in 1992 to an authorized staff of 398, with an
additional 110 military officers on loan from member states to deal with
logistics, planning, and procurement. A situation center was also
completed and tasked to maintain 24-hour communication with all
ongoing missions and provide periodic situation reports from the
missions.
In reviewing some of the recent field missions, OIOS noted that the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations still needs to improve the
efficiency and effectiveness of its operations. For example, OIOS reported
that the department needs to provide appropriate guidance and direction
for operations at headquarters and in the field, and it recommended that
the department standardize procedures in the areas of budgeting, finance,
field administration, procurement, and property management. It also noted
the need to institutionalize the lessons learned from past missions in the
form of policies, guidelines, handbooks, and manuals. OIOS said that it
would be an extraordinary waste of hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth
of experience in tasks of continuing significance, such as the
demobilization of warring factions, if this experience was not translated
into practical guides for future missions.
Establishment of a To improve logistics, the United Nations established a center at Brindisi,
Logistics Center Italy, to receive, repair, and store surplus equipment from closing missions
and to maintain mission start-up kits. The logistics center was intended to
safeguard and put to effective use the millions of dollars’ worth of
vehicles, generators, computers, and other assets from completed
missions and to organize them into off-the-shelf kits to support new
missions. According to the 1996 Annual Report to Congress on
Page 11 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-139
Peacekeeping, the center is cost free, except for utilities and upkeep, and
has demonstrated its value.
However, an OIOS report raised questions about the cost-effectiveness of
the center becasue it was uncertain if its annual operating cost was greater
than the value of the equipment it was recovering. For example, the center
recorded the value of its inventory at about $20 million. However, this was
the purchase price rather than the actual value of the inventory. According
to OIOS, much of the equipment and supplies in the inventory was in poor
condition and should have been written off. It estimated that 50 percent of
the generators were not working and most of the trucks and light vehicles
could be used only for spare parts. Some of this equipment—generators
and food rations, for instance—was shipped to missions where it was
unusable and had to be destroyed or shipped back at additional cost. OIOS
reported that “in view of the annual costs of the Logistics Base of more
than $7 million, the actual value of the assets stored is a key element in
assessing the cost-effectiveness of the Base.”
Peacekeeping Procurement weaknesses have been a major concern, and the United
Procurement Concerns Nations has taken several steps to improve its procurement practices.
Continue According to a recent executive branch report, the United Nations
reorganized its Purchase and Transportation Service from regional desks
to commodity desks to take advantage of economies of scale and
established professional training programs for procurement officers. To
expedite procurement of commonly needed items at the lowest cost, the
United Nations negotiated 35 contingency contracts for items such as
vehicles, spare parts, generators, and rations. Also, the practice of
reimbursing troop-contributing countries based on the countries’ own
surveys was replaced with a more efficient standardized cost schedule.
Despite these steps, reports from OIOS indicated continuing weaknesses
involving procurement-related issues. One key weakness was a lack of
internal controls in authorization and approval of contracts that might
have prevented the purchase of mobile cranes that did not meet the users’
needs in Bosnia; the purchase of millions of dollars’ worth of uniforms and
protective gear, 50 percent of which were unused at the close of the
mission; and a contract for photocopier parts that exceeded the initial
value of the contract by 300 percent, partly because of overbilling. OIOS
also found several instances in which conflicts of interest were created,
such as where the chairman of the contracts committee was also the
independent approving official for those contracts and where departments
Page 12 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-139
requisitioning goods were also responsible for contracting and purchasing
them. Similar problems occurred at other missions.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, this concludes my prepared
remarks. I will be happy to answer any questions you or other Members of
the Committee may have.
Page 13 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-139
Related GAO Products
U.N. Peacekeeping: Status of Long-standing Operations and U.S. Interests
in Supporting Them (GAO/NSIAD-97-59, Apr. 9, 1997).
United Nations: Limitations in Leading Missions Requiring Force to
Restore Peace (GAO/NSIAD-97-34, Mar. 27, 1997).
Bosnia: Costs Are Uncertain but Likely to Exceed Estimates
(GAO/NSIAD-96-120BR, Mar. 14, 1996).
Peace Operations: U.S. Costs in Support of Haiti, Former Yugoslavia,
Somalia, and Rwanda (GAO/NSIAD-96-38, Mar. 6, 1996).
Peace Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on
Unit Capability (GAO/NSIAD-96-14, Oct. 18, 1995).
Peacekeeping: Assessment of U.S. Participation in the Multinational Force
and Observers (GAO/NSIAD-95-113, Aug. 15, 1995).
Peace Operations: Update on the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia
(GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR, May 8, 1995).
Peace Operations: Estimated Fiscal Year 1995 Costs to the United States
(GAO-NSIAD-95-138BR, May 3, 1995).
Peace Operations: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect Response to
Regional Conflicts (GAO-NSIAD-95-51, Mar. 8, 1995).
Peace Operations: Information on U.S. and U.N. Activities
(GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR, Feb. 13, 1995).
United Nations: How Assessed Contributions for Peacekeeping Operations
Are Calculated (GAO/NSIAD-94-206, Aug. 1, 1994).
Humanitarian Intervention: Effectiveness of U.N. Operations in Bosnia
(GAO/NSIAD-94-156BR, Apr. 13, 1994).
Peace Operations: Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Somalia
(GAO/NSIAD-94-175, June 9, 1994).
U.N. Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned in Recent Missions (GAO/NSIAD-94-9,
Dec. 29, 1993).
Page 14 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-139
Related GAO Products
Haiti: Costs of U.S. Programs and Activities Since the 1991 Military Coup
(GAO/NSIAD-93-252FS, Aug. 5, 1993).
U.N. Peacekeeping: Observations on Mandates and Operational Capability
(GAO/T-NSIAD-93-15, June 9, 1993).
Serbia-Montenegro: Implementation of U.N. Economic Sanctions
(GAO/NSIAD-93-174, Apr. 22, 1993).
United Nations: U.S. Participation in Peacekeeping Operations
(GAO/NSIAD-92-247, Sept. 9, 1992).
(711264) Page 15 GAO/T-NSIAD-97-139
Ordering Information
The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free.
Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the
following address, accompanied by a check or money order
made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when
necessary. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also.
Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address
are discounted 25 percent.
Orders by mail:
U.S. General Accounting Office
P.O. Box 6015
Gaithersburg, MD 20884-6015
or visit:
Room 1100
700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW)
U.S. General Accounting Office
Washington, DC
Orders may also be placed by calling (202) 512-6000
or by using fax number (301) 258-4066, or TDD (301) 413-0006.
Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and
testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any
list from the past 30 days, please call (202) 512-6000 using a
touchtone phone. A recorded menu will provide information on
how to obtain these lists.
For information on how to access GAO reports on the INTERNET,
send an e-mail message with "info" in the body to:
info@www.gao.gov
or visit GAO’s World Wide Web Home Page at:
http://www.gao.gov
PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
United States Bulk Rate
General Accounting Office Postage & Fees Paid
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001 GAO
Permit No. G100
Official Business
Penalty for Private Use $300
Address Correction Requested
U.N. Peacekeeping: Issues Related to Effectiveness, Cost, and Reform
Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1997-04-09.
Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)