Department of Energy: Need to Address Longstanding Management Weaknesses

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1999-07-13.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                    United States General Accounting Office

GAO                 Testimony
                    Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment,
                    Committee on Science and the Subcommittee on Energy
                    and Power, Committee on Commerce, House of

For Release
on Delivery
Expected at
                    DEPARTMENT OF
10:00 a.m. EDT
Tuesday             ENERGY
July 13, 1999

                    Need to Address
                    Longstanding Management
                    Statement of Victor S. Rezendes, Director,
                    Energy, Resources, and Science Issues,
                    Resources, Community, and Economic
                    Development Division

Messrs. Chairmen and Members of the Subcommittees:

We are here today to testify on proposals for reorganizing the Department
of Energy (DOE). As you know, there is renewed concern about DOE’s
management of its missions after recent revelations that foreign countries
have obtained nuclear weapons designs and other classified information.
Our testimony today discusses (1) long-standing weaknesses in DOE’s
management that we have identified over the past several years, (2) the
effect that current proposals to deal with national security weaknesses
would have on addressing these weaknesses, and (3) a framework for
evaluating DOE’s missions and possible reorganization. Our testimony is
based on our management reviews of DOE and our past and ongoing work
on a wide variety of DOE programs and activities.1

In summary, the current security problems facing DOE underscore
long-standing weaknesses in the Department’s management structure and
processes. While the current security lapses raise serious concerns, any
number of past DOE management problems could have easily triggered
today’s debate. For example, DOE’s long-standing failures in managing
major environmental cleanup projects also illustrate the need to
fundamentally change how DOE operates. At the core of DOE’s weaknesses
is its inability to manage its disparate missions within a highly complex
organizational structure. In particular, unclear lines of authority
throughout DOE have long resulted in weak oversight of contractors and
poor accountability for program management, leading us to identify
contracting as a “high risk” activity. For decades, DOE has failed to
respond to reports by us, external experts, and its own consultants that
highlight these weaknesses. Additionally, DOE has resisted independent
regulatory oversight over nuclear and worker safety, perpetuating a
perception that it lacks accountability. DOE has also been reluctant to open
up key laboratory contracts to new bidders, reducing confidence that it
has hired the most capable and responsive contractor.

While the recent proposals for reorganizing DOE’s national security mission
will clarify some lines of authority, a more complete solution is needed.
Current proposals assume that existing missions are still valid in their
present forms and that DOE is still the best place to manage them. Along
with many of the experts we surveyed, we think a more fundamental
rethinking of missions is in order. A framework exists for evaluating DOE’s
missions by asking basic questions about both the validity of missions and

 A list of related products appears at the end of this statement.

Page 1                                                              GAO/T-RCED-99-255
                    their organizational placement. Indeed, now is an ideal time for
                    reconstructing DOE into a more manageable agency.

                    Created predominantly to deal with the energy crisis of the 1970s, DOE’s
Background          mission and budget priorities have changed dramatically over time. By the
                    early 1980s, its nuclear weapons production had grown substantially; and
                    following revelations about environmental mismanagement in the
                    mid-to-late-1980s, DOE’s cleanup budget began to expand—and now
                    overshadows other activities. With the Cold War’s end, DOE found new or
                    expanded missions in industrial competitiveness and science. Responding
                    to changing missions and priorities with organizational structures,
                    processes, and practices that had been established largely to build nuclear
                    weapons has been a daunting task for DOE. For example, DOE’s approach to
                    contract management, first created during the World War II Manhattan
                    Project, allowed private contractors to manage and operate billion-dollar
                    facilities with minimal direct federal oversight, yet reimbursed them for all
                    their costs regardless of their actual achievements. After a number of
                    reports by us and other oversight groups, DOE is now attempting to impose
                    modern standards for accountability and performance.

                    We recently testified that security problems at DOE’s laboratories reflect a
DOE Has             lack of accountability.2 The well-documented history of security lapses in
Long-Standing       the nuclear weapons complex shows that DOE fails to hold its contractors
Management          accountable for meeting essential responsibilities. Achieving
                    accountability in DOE is made difficult by its complex and ever-changing
Weaknesses          organizational structure. Past advisory groups and internal DOE studies
                    have often reported on the Department’s dysfunctional structure, with
                    unclear chains of command among headquarters, field offices, and
                    contractors. For example:

                •   The FBI, which examined DOE’s counterintelligence activities in 1997,
                    noted a gap between authority and responsibility, particularly when
                    national interests compete with the specialized interests of the academic
                    or corporate managements that operate the laboratories. The FBI found
                    that the autonomy that DOE grants has made national guidance, oversight,
                    and accountability of counterintelligence programs arduous and inefficient.

                     Department of Energy: Key Factors Underlying Security Problems at DOE Facilities
                    (GAO/T-RCED-99-159, April 20, 1999).

                    Page 2                                                                      GAO/T-RCED-99-255
•   A 1997 report by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) cited serious
    flaws in DOE’s organizational structure. IDA noted long-standing concerns in
    DOE about how best to define the relationships between field offices and
    the headquarters program offices that sponsor work. IDA concluded that
    “the overall picture that emerges is one of considerable confusion over
    vertical relationships and the roles of line and staff officials.” As a
    consequence of DOE’s complex structure, the Institute reported, unclear
    chains of command led to the weak integration of programs and functions
    across the Department and confusion over the difference between line and
    staff roles.3

•   A 1997 DOE internal report stated that “lack of clarity, inconsistency, and
    variability in the relationship between headquarters management and field
    organizations has been a longstanding criticism of DOE operations . . . . This
    is particularly true in situations when several headquarters programs fund
    activities at laboratories.”4

•   DOE’s Laboratory Operations Board also reported in 1997 that there were
    inefficiencies due to DOE’s complicated management structure. The Board
    recommended that DOE undertake a major effort to rationalize and simplify
    its headquarters and field management structure to clarify roles and

•   As far back as 1982, an advisory group recognized the need for
    organizational change in DOE. In its 1982 report, DOE’s Energy Research
    Advisory Board noted the “layering and fractionation of managerial and
    research and development responsibilities in DOE on an excessive number
    of horizontal and vertical levels.”6

    Our own work has shown that DOE’s success with managing big projects is
    not outstanding. From 1980 through 1996, we found that DOE conducted 80
    projects that it designated as “major system acquisitions”—its largest and

      The Organization and Management of the Nuclear Weapons Program, Institute for Defense Analyses
    (March 1997).
     DOE Action Plan for Improved Management of Brookhaven National Laboratory, DOE (July 1997).
     Department of Energy: Uncertain Progress in Implementing National Laboratory Reforms,
    (GAO/RCED-98-197, Sept. 10, 1998).
    The Department of Energy Multiprogram Laboratories: A Report of the Energy Research Advisory
    Board to the United States Department of Energy (Sept. 1982).

    Page 3                                                                      GAO/T-RCED-99-255
most critical projects—ranging in cost from $100 million to billions of
dollars.7 As of June 1996, 31 of the projects had been terminated before
completion after total expenditures of over $10 billion. Only 15 of the
projects were completed, and most of them were finished behind schedule
and with cost overruns. Furthermore, 3 of the 15 completed projects had
yet to be used for their intended purposes. The remaining 34 projects
continue, many with substantial overruns and “schedule slippage.” For
example, we found that DOE has spent a decade and almost one-half billion
dollars building the in-tank precipitation facility at its Savannah River
location. While initially expected to cost $32 million and take 3 years, DOE
now estimates it will take until 2007 to complete and cost $2-3 billion. DOE
estimates that that it may cost up to $75 billion if the proposed alternative
is not effective. The project was originally expected to cost $103 million
and is still not completed.8 A National Research Council committee that
examined DOE’s project management skills recently concluded, “The
fundamental deficiency is DOE’s organization and culture.”9

DOE’s fundamental organizational problem is that laboratory contractors
and their field offices receive funding, program direction and oversight
from several different headquarters offices, which sometimes have
overlapping responsibilities. Creating a “clean” line of accountability
within DOE’s complex structure has not yet been achieved.

The events in 1997 at the Brookhaven National Laboratory in New York
illustrate the consequences of organizational confusion and accountability
lapses. The Secretary of Energy at that time—Frederico Peña—fired the
contractor operating the laboratory when he learned that the contractor
had breached the community’s trust by failing to ensure it could operate
safely. DOE’s own oversight report on Brookhaven concluded that the
Department did not have a clear chain of command over environment,
safety, and health matters and, as a result, laboratory performance
suffered in the absence of DOE accountability. In another example, DOE
gave the University of California an “excellent” score for managing
safeguards and security at the Los Alamos National Laboratory for 1998,
even though the number of security breaches had risen dramatically.
Another DOE evaluation, for 1998, criticized the University for its handling
of safeguards and security matters. DOE’s complex organization stems from
the multiple levels of reporting that exist among contractors, field offices,

 Department of Energy: Opportunity to Improve Management of Major System Acquisitions,
(GAO/RCED-97-17, Nov. 26 1996).
 Nuclear Waste: Process to Remove Radioactive Waste From Savannah River Tanks Fails to Work
(GAO/RCED-99-69, Apr. 30, 1999).
 Improving Project Management In The Department of Energy, National Research Council, 1999.
Page 4                                                                     GAO/T-RCED-99-255
                        and headquarters program offices. To improve accountability, DOE has
                        tried several different reporting schemes over the past several years. For
                        example, until recently DOE’s field units—operations offices—reported
                        directly to a central office, under a structure that had been in place for
                        several years. Thus, while the Los Alamos National Laboratory is primarily
                        funded by Defense Programs, it reported to a field manager who, in turn,
                        reported to a central field management office that then reported to an
                        Under Secretary. To correct this meandering line of authority, operations
                        offices now report directly to program offices. But this approach to
                        reporting was tried under former Secretary Watkins and was eventually
                        abandoned when field and laboratory staff became frustrated by having to
                        report to both program and staff offices on the same issues. The former
                        Secretary wanted more direct lines of reporting to allow focused attention
                        on environment, safety and health matters.

                        Furthermore, DOE’s reluctance to allow external oversight for nuclear
                        safety and worker health and safety at its facilities perpetuates the
                        Department’s chronic lack of accountability. Virtually all other federal
                        agencies are externally regulated for nuclear and worker safety. Similarly,
                        despite a 5-year-old competition policy, DOE has never opened up for
                        bidding its multi-billion dollar laboratory contracts with the University of
                        California. As a result, DOE cannot know whether other contractors could
                        perform better at lower cost than the University of California. By contrast,
                        DOE has competed many other laboratory contracts.

                        We believe that DOE’s organizational weaknesses are a major reason for the
Current Proposals for   Department’s failure to develop long-term solutions to its recurring
Change Are              problems. To solve the national security problems revealed in recent
Incomplete and Will     allegations, several reorganization options have been proposed. One
                        approach would create a separate agency within DOE, to be managed by a
Not Address DOE’s       new Under Secretary for National Security. Another would create a
Major Problems          semiautonomous agency whose director would report directly to the
                        Secretary. Another would transfer DOE’s nuclear weapons activities to the
                        Department of Defense.

                        While each of these proposals clarifies some lines of authority in the
                        national security area, they are a piecemeal approach to DOE’s structural
                        problems and ignore the broader organizational issues. Historically, DOE
                        has made piecemeal changes in response to contemporary problems
                        without undertaking a more fundamental assessment of its missions. For
                        example, former Secretary Watkins redirected lines of reporting to correct

                        Page 5                                                     GAO/T-RCED-99-255
    environment, safety, and health deficiencies, and former Secretary O’Leary
    made changes to reflect DOE’s expanding role in science and technology
    competitiveness issues. None of these efforts had long-term success.
    Reorganization efforts that ignore the broader picture could create new,
    unintended consequences.

    To gain insight into DOE’s structural issues, experts we consulted in a 1994
    survey supported the view that, at a minimum, a serious reevaluation of
    DOE’s basic missions is needed. We surveyed nearly 40 former DOE
    executives and experts on energy policy about how the Department’s
    missions relate to current and future national priorities. Our respondents
    included a former President, four former Secretaries of Energy, former
    Deputy and Assistant Secretaries of Energy, and individuals with
    distinguished involvement in issues of national energy policy.

    Overwhelmingly, those respondents emphasized that DOE should focus on
    its core missions. Many believed that DOE must re-focus its attention to
    such energy-related missions as energy policy, energy information, and
    research and development on energy supply. A majority favored removing
    many of the remaining missions from DOE to other agencies or entities. For
    example, many respondents suggested moving

•   basic research to the National Science Foundation, the Commerce or
    Interior departments, other federal agencies, or a new public-private
•   some multiprogram national laboratories to other federal agencies (or
    sharing their missions with other agencies);
•   the management and disposal of civilian nuclear waste to a new
    public-private organization, a new government agency, or the
    Environmental Protection Agency (EPA);
•   nuclear weapons production and waste cleanup to the Department of
    Defense (DOD) or a new government agency and waste cleanup to the
    Environmental Protection Agency;
•   environment, safety, and health activities to the Environmental Protection
    Agency or other federal entities;
•   arms control and verification to DOD, the State Department, or a new
    government nuclear agency;
•   activities furthering industrial competitiveness to the Commerce
    Department or a public-private organization; and
•   science education to the National Science Foundation or another federal

    Page 6                                                     GAO/T-RCED-99-255
                           DOE  is taking some steps to improve its management of both national
                           security activities and its other missions. For example, DOE recently
                           realigned several of its national security functions into new offices to
                           eliminate overlap and to sharpen focus. To improve its laboratory
                           management, a Laboratory Operations Board was created to provide
                           policy direction on laboratory mission and management issues. DOE also
                           identified four “business lines” for making strategic decisions, developed
                           “roadmaps” for managing its major science and technology activities, and
                           began a long-range program to make its contracting practices more
                           business-like and results-oriented. Although these changes are important,
                           they all assume that existing missions are still valid in their present forms
                           and that DOE is still the best place to manage them. Along with many of the
                           experts we surveyed, we concluded that a more fundamental rethinking of
                           missions is in order.

                           Two fundamental questions are a good starting point for developing a
A Framework Exists         framework to evaluate the future of DOE and its missions:
for Evaluating DOE’s
Missions               •   Which missions should be eliminated because they are no longer valid
                           governmental functions?
                       •   For those missions that are governmental, what is the best organizational
                           placement of the responsibilities?

                           Once agreement is reached on the appropriate governmental missions, a
                           practical set of criteria could be used to evaluate the best organizational
                           structure for each mission. These criteria—originally used by an advisory
                           panel for evaluating alternative approaches to managing DOE’s civilian
                           nuclear waste program10 allow for rating each alternative structure on the
                           basis of its ability to promote cost-effective practices, attract talented
                           technical specialists, be flexible in responding to changing conditions, and
                           be accountable to stakeholders. Using these criteria could help identify
                           more effective ways to implement missions, particularly those that could
                           be privatized or reconfigured under alternative governmental forms.
                           Appendix I summarizes these criteria.

                           Our work and others’ has revealed the complex balancing of
                           considerations in reevaluating missions. In general, deciding the best place
                           to manage a specific mission involves assessing the advantages and

                            Managing Nuclear Waste—A Better Idea, Advisory Panel on Alternative Means of Financing and
                           Managing Radioactive Waste Facilities (Dec. 1984).

                           Page 7                                                                    GAO/T-RCED-99-255
disadvantages of each alternative institution for its potential to achieve
that mission, produce integrated policy decisions, and improve efficiency.
Potential efficiency gains (or losses) that might result from moving parts
of DOE to other agencies need to be balanced against the policy reasons
that first led to placing that mission in the Department.

For example, transferring the nuclear weapons complex to DOD, as is
proposed by some, would require carefully considering many policy and
management issues. Because of the declining strategic role of nuclear
weapons, some experts argue that DOD might be better able to balance
resource allocations among nuclear and other types of weapons if the
weapons complex were completely under its control. Others argue,
however, that the need to maintain civilian control over nuclear weapons
outweighs any other advantages and that few gains in efficiency would be
achieved by employing DOD rather than DOE supervisors. Some experts we
consulted advocated creating a new federal agency for weapons

Similarly, moving the responsibility for cleaning up DOE’s defense facilities
to another agency or to a new institution, as proposed by some, requires
close scrutiny. For example, a new agency concentrating its focus on
cleanup exclusively would not have to allocate its resources among
competing programs and could maximize research and development
investments by achieving economies of scale in applying cleanup
technology more broadly. On the other hand, separating cleanup
responsibility from the agency that created the waste may limit incentives
to reduce waste and to promote other environmentally sensitive
approaches. In addition, considerable startup time and costs would
accompany a new agency, at a time when the Congress is interested in
limiting the size of government and controlling its costs.

DOE’s task force on the future of the national laboratories (the Galvin Task
Force) has suggested creating private or federal-private corporations to
manage most or all of the laboratories.11 Under this arrangement,
nonprofit corporations would operate the laboratories under the direction
of a board of trustees that would channel funding to various laboratories
to meet the needs of both government and nongovernment entities. DOE
would be a customer, rather than the direct manager, of the labs. The
Galvin proposal raises important issues for the Congress to consider, such

  The Secretary of Energy asked Robert Galvin, Chairman of Motorola Corporation, to chair a task
force to analyze the national laboratories. Its report was titled Alternative Futures for the Department
of Energy National Laboratories, Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, Task Force on Alternative
Futures for the Department of Energy National Laboratories (Feb. 1995).

Page 8                                                                           GAO/T-RCED-99-255
as how to (1) monitor and oversee the expenditure of public funds by
privately managed and operated entities; (2) continue the laboratories’
significant responsibilities for addressing environment, safety, and health
problems at their facilities, some of which are governed by legal
agreements between DOE, EPA, and the states; and (3) safeguard federal
access to facilities so that national priorities, including national security
missions, are met. Other alternatives for managing the national labs exist:
Each has advantages and disadvantages, and each needs to be evaluated in
light of the laboratories’ capabilities for designing nuclear weapons and
pursuing other missions of national and strategic importance.
Furthermore, the government may still need facilities dedicated to national
and defense missions, a possibility that would heavily influence any future
organizational decisions.

Finally, another set of criteria, developed by the National Academy of
Public Administration in another context, could be useful for determining
whether DOE should remain a cabinet-level department.12 These criteria,
which are summarized in appendix II, pose such questions as the
following: “Is there a sufficiently broad national purpose for the
Department? Are cabinet-level planning, executive attention, and strategic
focus necessary to achieve the Department’s mission goals? Is
cabinet-level status needed to address significant issues that otherwise
would not be given proper attention?”

Although DOE has a strategic plan, it assumes the validity of the existing
missions and their placement in the Department. But DOE alone cannot
make these determinations. They require a cooperative effort among all
stakeholders, with the Congress and the administration responsible for
deciding which missions are needed and how best to implement them. The
requirements of the Government Performance and Results Act reinforce
this concept by providing a legislative vehicle for the Congress and
agencies to use to improve the way government works. The act requires,
among other things, strategic plans based on consultation with the
Congress and other stakeholders. These discussions are an important
opportunity for the Congress and the executive branch to jointly reassess
and clarify the agencies’ missions and desired outcomes.13

Our work has shown that to be effective, decisions about the structure and
functions of the federal government should be made in a thorough

  Evaluation of Proposals to Establish a Department of Veterans Affairs (Mar. 1988).
 Managing for Results: Key Steps and Challenges in Implementing GPRA in Science Agencies
(GAO/T-GGD/RCED-96-214, July 10, 1996).

Page 9                                                                          GAO/T-RCED-99-255
                   manner, with careful attention to the effects of changes in one agency on
                   the workings of other agencies.14 Specifically, reorganization demands a
                   coordinated approach, within and across agency lines, supported by a
                   solid consensus for change; it should seek to achieve specific, identifiable
                   goals; attention must be paid to how the federal government exercises its
                   role; and sustained oversight by the Congress is needed to ensure effective

                   Messrs. Chairmen, this concludes our statement. We would be happy to
                   respond to any questions you or Members of the Subcommittees may have.

                   For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Victor Rezendes
Contacts and       at (202) 512-3841. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony
Acknowledgements   included Gary R. Boss, William Lanouette, and Melissa Francis.

                     Government Reorganization: Issues and Principles (GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-95-166, May 17, 1995).

                   Page 10                                                                    GAO/T-RCED-99-255
Page 11   GAO/T-RCED-99-255
Appendix I

Criteria for Evaluating DOE’s Missions

               The following criteria, adapted from a former DOE advisory panel that
               examined the Department’s civilian nuclear waste program, offers a useful
               framework for evaluating alternative ways to manage missions. These
               criteria were created to judge the potential value of several different
               organizational arrangements that included an independent federal
               commission, a mixed government-private corporation, and a private

               Mission orientation and focus: Will the institution be able to focus on its
               mission(s) or will it be encumbered by other priorities? Which
               organizational structure will provide the greatest focus on its mission(s)?

               Credibility: Will the organizational structure be credible, thus gaining
               public support for its action?

               Stability and continuity: Will the institution be able to plan for its own
               future without undue concern for its survival?

               Programmatic authority: Will the institution be free to exercise needed
               authority to accomplish its mission(s) without excessive oversight and
               control from external sources?

               Accessibility: Will stakeholders (both federal and state overseers as well
               as the public) have easy access to senior management?

               Responsiveness: Will the institution be structured to be responsive to all
               its stakeholders?

               Internal flexibility: Will the institution be able to change its internal
               systems, organization, and style to adapt to changing conditions?

               Political accountability: How accountable will the institution be to
               political sources, principally the Congress and the President?

               Immunity from political interference: Will the institution be sufficiently
               free from excessive and destructive political forces?

               Ability to stimulate cost-effectiveness: How well will the institution be able
               to encourage cost-effective solutions?

               Page 12                                                        GAO/T-RCED-99-255
Appendix I
Criteria for Evaluating DOE’s Missions

Technical excellence: Will the institution attract and retain highly
competent people with the requisite skills needed to accomplish its

Ease of transition: What will be the costs (both financial and
psychological) of changing to a different institution?

Page 13                                                    GAO/T-RCED-99-255
Appendix II

Criteria for Evaluating Cabinet-Level Status

               The following criteria were developed by the National Academy of Public
               Administration as an aid to deciding whether a government organization
               should be elevated to be a cabinet department. However, they raise issues
               that are relevant in judging cabinet-level status in general.

               1. Does the agency or set of programs serve a broad national goal or
               purpose not exclusively identified with a single class, occupation,
               discipline, region, or sector of society?

               2. Are there significant issues in the subject area that (1) would be better
               assessed or met by elevating the agency to a department, and (2) are not
               now adequately recognized or addressed by the existing organization, the
               President, or the Congress?

               3. Is there evidence of impending changes in the type and number of
               pressures on the institution that would be better addressed if it were made
               a department? Are such changes expected to continue into the future?

               4. Would a department increase the visibility of, and thereby substantially
               strengthen the active political and public support for, actions and
               programs to enhance the existing agency’s goals?

               5. Is there evidence that becoming a department would provide better
               analysis, expression, and advocacy of the needs and programs that
               constitute the agency’s responsibilities?

               6. Is there evidence that elevation to a cabinet department would improve
               the accomplishment of the existing agency’s goals?

               7. Is a department required to better coordinate or consolidate programs
               and functions that are now scattered throughout other agencies in the
               executive branch of government?

               8. Is there evidence that a department—with increased centralized
               political authority—would result in a more effective balance within the
               agency between integrated central strategic planning and resource
               allocation and the direct participation in management decisions by the line
               officers who are responsible for directing and managing the agency’s

               Page 14                                                     GAO/T-RCED-99-255
Appendix II
Criteria for Evaluating Cabinet-Level Status

9. Is there evidence of significant structural, management, or operational
weaknesses in the existing organization that could be better corrected by
elevation to a department?

10. Is there evidence that there are external barriers and impediments to
timely decision-making and executive action that could be detrimental to
improving the efficiency of the existing agency’s programs? Would
elevation to a department remove or mitigate these impediments?

11. Would elevation to a department help recruit and retain better qualified
leadership within the existing agency?

12. Would elevation to a department promote more uniform achievement
of broad, cross-cutting national policy goals?

13. Would elevation to a department strengthen the Cabinet and the
Executive Office of the President as policy and management aids for the

14. Would elevation to a department have a beneficial or detrimental effect
upon the oversight and accountability of the agency to the President and
the Congress.

Page 15                                                    GAO/T-RCED-99-255
Related GAO Products

              Department of Energy: Key Factors Underlying Security Problems at DOE
              Facilities (GAO/T-RCED-99-159, Apr. 20, 1999)

              Department of Energy: Uncertain Progress in Implementing National
              Laboratory Reforms (GAO/RCED-98-197, Sept. 10, 1998).

              Department of Energy: Contract Reform Is Progressing but Full
              Implementation Will Take Years (GAO/RCED-97-18, Dec. 10, 1996).

              Department of Energy: Opportunity to Improve Management of Major
              System Acquisitions (GAO/RCED-97-17, Nov. 26, 1996).

              Department of Energy: A Framework For Restructuring DOE and Its
              Missions (GAO/RCED-95-197, Aug. 21, 1995).

              Department of Energy: National Laboratories Need Clearer Missions and
              Better Management (GAO/RCED-95-10, Jan. 27, 1995).

              Department of Energy: Challenges to Implementing Contract Reform
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(141362)      Page 16                                                  GAO/T-RCED-99-255
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